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 Abstract  
 
How do we distinguish what is morally right from wrong? When we act morally, what 
motivates us to do so? And how do we grow so that there is no discrepancy between our 
moral knowledge and our moral action? My dissertation investigates the role emotions 
play in these three important ethical realms (viz. moral judgment, moral motivation, and 
moral cultivation) in the context of two ancient Chinese Confucian texts: Lúnyǔ (the 
Analects of Confucius) and Mèngzǐ (Mencius). Departing from much of the previous 
scholarship on ancient Chinese emotion which has exclusively focused on the single 
Chinese term ‘qíng’ 情 (“emotion”), I closely analyze a number of Chinese terms 
including “love,” “sorrow,” “fear,” “desire,” and “aversion” in the textual and historical 
contexts of Lúnyǔ, and reconstruct Kongzi’s conception of emotion from there. I argue 
that 1) although ‘qíng’ later comes to refer to particular emotions explicitly, it is best 
interpreted as “character” in Lúnyǔ, and that 2) moral emotions embodying correct 
ethical judgment and strong motivational power constitute an integral part of the 
virtuous character (Chapters 2 and 3). 
The sentimentalist view of emotions has been a dominant position in the 
contemporary philosophical discourse on emotions. According to this view, one’s 
evaluative judgment is closely intertwined with the way one feels about things. For 
example, one can find a scoop of ice-cream likable because he likes ice-cream, and one 
can think that she should help out the victims of Katrina because she feels compassion 
for them. Applying this idea to the interpretation of Mengzi’s moral emotions (sìduān 
四端), previous scholars have argued that 1) moral emotions provide a complete basis 
for correct moral judgment, and that 2) the virtuous person in Mengzi is the one who is 
happily carried away by the motivating power of his moral emotions. However, by 
closely analyzing a body of textual evidence, I argue that 1) moral emotions provide an 
important but only partial basis for “all-things-considered” ethical judgment, and that 2) 
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the notion of moral autonomy is never compromised even by moral emotions in Mengzi. 
In relation to these points, I propose an alternative interpretation of Mengzian moral 
agency, in which the faculty of normative rationality superintends the function of moral 
emotions (Chapters 4 and 5). 
Previous scholars have debated much over the correct interpretation of 
“emotional extension (tuī 推)”—Mengzi’s famous theory of how to cultivate moral 
emotions. The basic idea is that one is endowed with a set of moral emotions that clearly 
indicate what the right things to do are in paradigmatic situations, and she can grow fully 
virtuous by “extending” her moral emotions to non-paradigmatic cases. (For example, 
think about people going to the rescue of an endangered baby out of compassion without 
a second thought, and “extending” their compassion to help out a homeless person.) The 
crucial issue is what “extending” really means in Mengzi’s theory, and three interpretive 
positions have been proposed: “logical extension,” “emotive extension,” and 
“developmental extension” interpretations. I argue that the shared mistake of these three 
positions is to neglect the crucial role of culture and society in shaping one’s emotional 
reactions in a way peculiar to the cultural tradition of a given society, and I show how 
much Mengzian extension of moral emotions is based on the cultural assumptions of 
Mengzi’s ideal Confucian society. This lets us rethink the traditional boundary between 
Mengzi and Xunzi as advocating respectively the internal and external grounds for 






1.1 General Goals of the Study 
 
In the past several decades, emotion has become a focus of intensive scholarly discussion 
in a wide range of disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, anthropology, classical 
studies, and Sinology. Since Robert Solomon’s publication of The Passions in 1977,1 a 
number of philosophers have tried to undermine the rigid dichotomy between reason and 
emotion that had been seldom doubted since Plato, and tried to view emotion differently 
from the traditional view that emotion is mainly irrational, uncontrollable, and therefore 
dangerous to the ethical life of human beings. A similar change in views on emotion in 
other disciplines is also found in a plethora of recently published secondary literature on 
emotions including the works by Antonio Damasio2 and Catherine Lutz,3 and the fields 
of Chinese philosophy and Sinology in general were not an exception to this new 
phenomenon. Specifically, some Sinologists have focused on the ancient Chinese term 
‘qíng’ 情 as comparable to the Western conception of emotion and conducted a “cross-
cultural comparison” of emotion,4 and some scholars in Chinese philosophy have also 
argued that there is no conceptual distinction between reason and emotion in ancient 
Chinese thought.5
                                                 
1 Robert Solomon, The Passions (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press, Doubleday, 1976). 
2  Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2000). 
3 Catherine Lutz, Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and Their Challenge to 
Western Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). 
4 For example, see Halvor Eifring, “Introduction: Emotions and the Conceptual History of Qing,” chap. in 
Love and Emotions in Traditional Chinese Literature, ed. Halvor Eifring (Brill: Leiden, 2004). 
5 For example, see David Wong, “Is There a Distinction Between Reason and Emotion in Mencius?” 
Philosophy East and West 41, no. 1 (1991). 
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Given the rapidly growing interest in emotion in many humanistic fields and the 
possible contribution Chinese philosophy could make to the contemporary discourses on 
emotion in the humanities, previous scholarship on ancient Chinese views of emotions 
has not been satisfactory enough. Generally speaking, some Sinological works on 
emotion are not philosophically sophisticated enough to be found sufficiently intelligible 
by the student of philosophy, and some philosophical works on ancient Chinese emotion 
seem to pursue misguided questions such as what is the essential difference between 
Chinese and Western views of emotion, often implying one of the equally unproductive 
dogmas of the inferiority or the superiority of Chinese thought to Western philosophical 
traditions. Moreover, the latter kind of failure often comes with the lack of sufficient 
philological rigor in dealing with ancient Chinese texts. My dissertation tries to overcome 
these three kinds of difficulties in studying ancient Chinese emotions. 
How do we distinguish what is morally right from wrong? When we act morally, 
what motivates us to do so? And how do we grow so that there is no discrepancy between 
our moral knowledge and our moral action? These are the three leading questions of my 
dissertation, and the primary goal of my work is to investigate the role emotions play in 
these three important ethical realms (viz. moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral 
cultivation) in the context of two ancient Chinese texts: Lúnyǔ 論語 (the Analects of 
Confucius) and Mèngzǐ 孟子 (Mencius). The Lúnyǔ or the Analects is an anthology of 
Kǒngzǐ’s 孔子 (551–479 B.C.E)6 teachings in the forms of aphorisms and dialogues, 
collected and edited after his death mainly by Kongzi’s first and second generations of 
disciples. Although containing some portions of possible later interpolation, the Analects 
still remains the primary source for studying the ethical view of emotions in Kongzi, the 
first substantial thinker in the history of Chinese philosophy. Another text to be 
intensively discussed in this study is the Mengzi, and it is said that the text was compiled 
by Mengzi himself (390–305 B.C.E.) and those led by Wàn Zhāng 萬章, one of Mengzi’s 
advanced disciples. The Mengzi is full of great insights on the relevance of emotions to 
our ethical life. This study aims to tease out Mengzi’s implicit theories on the place of 
                                                 
6 Qián Mù 錢穆, Xiānqín zhūzǐ xìnián 先秦諸子繫年 (Běijīng 北京: Zhōnghuá shūjú 中華書局, 1956). 
The birth and death dates of other ancient Chinese thinkers and historical figures provided in the following 
are mostly according to this work. 
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emotions in moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral cultivation, and tries to 




1.2 Emotions in Ancient China? 
 
But how can I propose to study emotions in ancient China in the first place? Did the 
ancient Chinese have emotions? At the first glance, this question seems easy to answer: 
Yes, of course they did! For there are countless passages in our target texts where the 
ancient Chinese seem to burst with joy, moan in sorrow, and blaze with anger. How could 
they lack emotions as long as they were humans? However, the question might not have 
been that simple. It could have been asking whether the ancient Chinese had any 
conception of emotion that approximates that of ours. And if they did not have any 
similar conception of emotion to our own, one might think, we have to say the ancient 
Chinese did not have any emotions at all, because the English term ‘emotion’ only makes 
sense in a particular intellectual and historical context of the West.7
However, I would like to point out that we ourselves have no consensus about 
what emotions really are; what we actually have is only a series of very general and 
vague definitions of emotion. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary contains 
several definitions of the term, among which two are relevant here: 1) “Any agitation or 
disturbance of mind, feeling, passion; any vehement or excited mental state”; 2) “A 
mental ‘feeling’ or ‘affection’ (e.g. of pleasure or pain, desire or aversion, surprise, hope 
or fear, etc.), as distinguished from cognitive or volitional states of consciousness.”8
                                                 
7 Chad Hansen seems to hold this position. He understands emotion as part of the dichotomy between 
reason and emotion, which is “popularly linked” with other dichotomies such as belief/desire, 
intellect/passion, and mind/body and is passed on to us as a Greek philosophical legacy. He argues that we 
cannot find any of these dichotomies in the ancient Chinese philosophical context, and consequently we 
cannot attribute the conception of emotion as we find in the “Western folk psychology” to the ancient 
Chinese. See Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation (New 
York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 18–28, and “Qing (Emotions) 情 in Pre-Buddhist 
Chinese Thought,” chap. in Emotions in Asian Thought: A Dialogue in Comparative Philosophy, ed. Joel 
Marks and Roger T. Ames (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1995), pp. 183–186. 
8 Oxford English Dictionary (Second Edition, online), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. URL= 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/o/oed/oed-idx?q1=emotion&type=Lookup. 
 3
Here we can see how difficult it is to define emotion even for one of the most 
authoritative English dictionaries, at least from a philosopher’s perspective. As for the 
first definition of emotion, what is “agitation or disturbance of mind, feeling, passion” 
exactly? More specifically, we take “mind,” “feeling,” and “passion” to be different 
entities or phenomena, but shall we still call all of the three kinds of disturbances equally 
emotions? What is the ground for that? And as for the second definition, is emotion only 
a mental phenomenon? Does it not also involve a physiological change in our body, 
especially when we “feel” something? In addition, is emotion sharply distinguishable 
from cognition and volition? Does desire or aversion not contain any volitional aspect? 
And does fear not necessarily involve a cognition that something fearful is near, whether 
or not this cognition is wrong? 
None of us would readily claim to have satisfactory answers to all of these 
questions when we use the term emotion. It is no wonder though, because “What is 
emotion?” has been one of the perennial philosophical questions, and it is still undergoing 
heated debates with many disciplines involved.9 Nevertheless, we normally do not 
encounter any serious objections to using that term to refer to such phenomena as joy, 
anger, sorrow, fear, affection (in the sense of warm liking or fondness), aversion, and 
desire. And some ancient Chinese authors singled out this very set of emotions from their 
larger repertoire of emotional phenomena and collectively called them “seven emotions” 
(qī qíng 七情).10 Based on this fact that we hardly share any settled view of emotions (or 
at least have several competing views of emotions) while experiencing virtually no 
difficulty in referring to a set of psychological phenomena as “emotions,” we could safely 
assume that the ancient Chinese also had a certain view or views of emotions that may or 
may not overlap with our views of emotions. And what we need to do now is to find out 
about the ancient Chinese views of emotions by analyzing the passages containing 
                                                 
9 For a useful collection of articles on emotion from diverse fields, see Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, ed., 
Explaining Emotions (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1980). Paul Griffiths 
also provides very useful guidance to the current theories of emotion across fields including philosophy, 
psychology, anthropology, and neuroscience. See his What Emotions Really Are (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997). 
10 Lǐjì 禮記, “Lǐyùn” 禮運. Sūn Xīdàn 孫希旦, Lǐjì jíjiě 禮記集解 (Běijīng 北京: Zhōnghuá shūjú 中
華書局, 1995), p. 607. 
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diverse insights on emotions in our target texts.11
 
 
1.3 Methodological Issues  
 
1.3.1 Qíng 情 and the Ancient Chinese Conception of Emotions 
 
Then, how shall we study the ancient Chinese emotions? There could be many ways to do 
so, but one way would be to postulate that the authors of our target texts had some 
general conception or conceptions of emotions as I have proposed in the previous section, 
and then to search for an umbrella term in those texts that their authors might have used 
to refer to this general conception(s) of emotions. The almost unanimous candidate for 
this term among Sinologists and scholars of Chinese philosophy has been “qíng” 情; it is 
translated as “emotions” or “passions” whenever the context allows, and “qíng” is 
sometimes compared to the English term ‘emotion’ in comparative research on 
emotions.12 However, the scholarship to date on emotions in ancient China focusing on 
the concept of qíng 情 is highly unsatisfactory for two reasons. 
 First, I find some ideas previously suggested concerning the ancient Chinese 
                                                 
11 However, I should not be misunderstood to be saying that the ancient Chinese counterparts to these 
emotions—viz. xǐ 喜, nù 怒, aī 哀, jù 懼, aì 愛, wù 惡, and yù 欲—are exactly the same emotions as 
our joy, anger, sorrow, fear, and so forth. As the advocates of the social constructionism of emotions 
convincingly argue, an emotion from a culture sharing certain cognitive and physiological elements with its 
approximate counterpart in a different culture can turn out to be a very different emotion from its 
counterpart if it lacks some of the important social factors that usually interact with its emotional 
counterpart (Griffiths 1997, p. 137). For example, even if fear and wèikǒng 畏恐 (a classical Chinese 
compound whose meaning is close to fear) are equally accompanied by a cognition of a certain worrisome 
situation involving oneself and any common physiological symptoms, they still may turn out to be very 
different emotions from each other in the following case: that is, if fear is generally regarded as a disturbing 
and unpleasant emotion that hinders one from functioning properly, wèikǒng 畏恐 is generally welcomed 
as a psychological factor contributing to the overall welfare of the person who feels it due to its allowing 
that person more carefully to deliberate on how to escape the problematic situation he is in. Hánfēi 韓非 
(280–233 B.C.E.) provides a very explicit explanation of the benefit of being in the state of wèikǒng 畏恐. 
For this point, see Hánfēizǐ 韓非子, “Jiělǎo” 解老. Chén Qíyóu 陳奇猷, Hánfēizǐ xīn jiàozhù 韓非子新
校注 (Shànghǎi 上海: Shànghǎi gǔjí chūbǎnshè 上海古籍出版社, 2000), p. 386. In any event, my point 
that the ancient Chinese had some psychological phenomena that can be roughly referred to as emotions 
and probably also had some views of them is not threatened by this social constructionist argument on 
emotions. 
12 A typical example of this type of research is Eifring, “Introduction: Emotions and the Conceptual History 
of Qing.” 
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conception of emotions deeply perplexing. The dominant trend in the research concerning 
ancient Chinese emotions in general has been to identify a wide spectrum of meanings in 
the term “qíng” and then to make some suggestions about the postulated ancient Chinese 
conception of emotion. Those suggestions often amount to saying that the ancient 
Chinese conception of emotion has evolved from the term “qíng” while keeping the 
special connotations implied in the non-emotional usages of the term. And this innocent-
looking view of the evolution of qíng sometimes develops into very strange ideas. 
 For example, Christoph Harbsmeier proposed that we can make a rough division 
of the semantic range of qíng into the following seven categories: 1) the basic facts of a 
matter, 2) underlying and basic dynamic factors, 3) basic popular sentiments/responses, 
4) general basic instincts/propensities, 5) essential sensibilities and sentiments viewed as 
commendable, 6) basic motivation/attitude, 7) personal deep convictions, responses, and 
feelings.13 Relying on Harbsmeier’s sensible distinctions, Halvor Eifring proposes a case 
of “multi-tiered semantic specialization” for qíng, in which the concept of emotions 
evolves from the older sense of the term as basic instincts, and then further specializes 
itself to mean positive feelings of intimacy and then love.14
 It is all right so far. However, Eifring goes further and argues that while “qíng” 
had come to designate emotions in its later stage of semantic sharpening, the term “qíng” 
had never lost its original meaning of basic human instincts. In other words, to the writers 
of the classical period, emotions were basic instincts and basic instincts were nothing but 
emotions.15 However, this generalization of uses of “qíng” only makes us raise more 
questions. Is every emotion really a basic human instinct? If so, can there be any 
distinction between a human emotion and an animal emotion (if any)? In addition, we 
already know that certain emotions such as fear and envy involve some propositional 
                                                 
13 Christoph Harbsmeier, “The Semantics of Qing in Pre-Buddhist Chinese,” in Halvor Eifring ed., Love 
and Emotions in Traditional Chinese Literature, p. 71. 
14 Eifring, “Introduction: Emotions and the Conceptual History of Qing,” p. 11. Angus C. Graham also 
suggests a similar idea. According to him, the basic meaning of “qíng” is “what is essential” or “genuine” 
of things, but in the Xúnzǐ and the Lǐjì 禮記 “the word [i.e. “qíng”] refers only to the genuine in man 
which it is polite to disguise, and therefore to his feelings.” However, he also argues that it is only in the 
Sòng 宋 period (960–1279) that the meaning of “qíng” as ‘passions’ develops. See Angus C. Graham, 
“The Background of the Mencian [Mengzian] Theory of Human Nature,” chap. in Essays on the Moral 
Philosophy of Mengzi, ed. Xiusheng Liu and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2002), 
p. 49 and p. 53. 
15 Eifring, “Introduction: Emotions and the Conceptual History of Qing,” p. 13. 
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thought that, e.g., the right engine of the flight I am on is broken or my colleague inferior 
to me in ability got a promotion before me. Given that this is also very probable a case 
for some of the emotions in ancient China, how could we accept that emotions are 
nothing but basic instincts without any further explanation? 
 The second and more important reason why the previous scholarship on the 
ancient Chinese emotions seems disappointing to me is the following: As I see it, even 
though we have several passages from the Lǐjì and the Xúnzǐ16 that make us think that the 
classical Chinese term “qíng” represents all the emotions mentioned in our target texts, 
there is always some room for doubt about the seriousness and comprehensiveness of this 
representation, and consequently it is still an open question whether the discussion of 
“qíng” as the proposed umbrella term for emotions in those texts would completely and 
justly explain every important aspect of these ancient Chinese thinkers’ ideas on emotions. 
In this situation, speculations mainly grounded on the concordance-based analysis of the 
term “qíng” are unlikely to reveal enough aspects of these thinkers’ views of emotions. 
 The limitation of the exclusive study of “qíng” for understanding ancient 
Chinese emotions is very conspicuous in one of our target texts, Lúnyǔ or the Analects. 
As we will see in Chapter 2 below, there are only two instances of “qíng” throughout the 
Analects, and they seem to mean respectively “facts about a certain situation” and 
“sincerity.” Although in Chapter 2 I argue for a strong affinity between these two uses of 
“qíng” in the Analects and the later use of the same term in other texts for referring to 
prima facie emotions such as “joy,” “anger,” “sorrow,” and so forth, what enables me to 
do so is deep contextual study of a number of passages from diverse texts containing 
many emotion terms besides “qíng.” It is almost impossible to identify the important 
theoretical relationship between the concept of qíng and a number of ancient Chinese 
emotions only by studying the two instances of “qíng” occurring in the Analects. 
 
1.3.2 An Alternative Approach—Analysis of Concrete Emotion Terms 
 
                                                 
16 Specifically, “何謂人情? 喜, 怒, 哀, 懼, 愛, 惡, 欲, 七者不學而能.” Lǐjì 禮記, “Lǐyùn” 禮運. Sūn 
Xīdàn 孫希旦, Lǐjì jíjiě 禮記集解, p. 606; “性之好, 惡, 喜, 怒, 哀, 樂, 謂之情.” Xúnzǐ 荀子 
“Zhèngmíng” 正名. Lǐ Díshēng 李滌生, Xúnzǐ jíshì 荀子集釋 (Taipei; Xuéshēng shūjú 學生書局, 
1979), p. 506. 
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Then, what is a better way of studying the ancient Chinese emotions? What I would like 
to suggest here is not a fancy method, but a necessary one: As I have just alluded to in the 
previous section, I think that in order to study ancient Chinese emotions properly, we 
need to collect and analyze as many passages from our target texts as possible that either 
contain concrete emotion terms, or do not contain any emotion terms but still shed some 
significant light on our authors’ ways of thinking about emotions. Specifically, this 
method can be implemented more concretely in the following three steps: 
 First, read the original texts closely and collect all of the emotion-related 
passages within context. In this way, we can be sensitive to the subtle contexts in which 
those emotion terms are used and discussed. Second, group those passages according to 
the particular, indigenous emotion terms those passages contain or implicitly refer to. For 
example, once we put all of the passages containing “jù” 懼 at one place, we could 
determine what are the typical situations where this term is used and whether or not we 
could safely translate it as “fear.” Finally, based on these grass-roots groups create 
second-order groups, each of which corresponds to a large category of emotions and in 
turn contains a set of different indigenous emotion terms that are used for describing 
similar but possibly distinct emotional states. For example, as we will see in Chapter 3, 
the related emotional states in ancient China that can be roughly labeled as “fear” are 
referred to in the Analects by diverse terms such as “jù” 懼, “kǒng” 恐, and “wèi” 畏, 
and searching for rationales that led the authors of the Analects to make these sub-
distinctions in “fear” will allow us a better idea of the ancient Chinese conception of fear 
as presented in the Analects. Moreover, if we repeat the same process for the other 
emotions in the Analects, we could also make some conjectures about Kongzi’s and his 
contemporaries’ view of emotions. 
One of the merits of this “bottom-up” approach is that it is fully compatible with 
the so-called attributional theory of emotions, which makes cross-cultural comparison of 
emotions or the study of emotions in a remote culture—remote both in time and 
geography in our case—often a difficult and doubtful business. The attributional theorists 
of emotions argue that the distinct emotions a person can have are chiefly a matter of his 
own conceptions, and these conceptions vary sharply from culture to culture. So, 
according to this theory, the differentiations we can make interculturally concerning a 
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person’s emotions are only 1) whether the person feels a slight or great degree of 
physiological arousal and 2) whether his feeling toward its object is con or pro; but finer 
distinctions such as anger, fear, or contempt are culturally idiosyncratic. On this view, a 
person is angry only if he is strongly aroused in a negative way and thinks of himself as 
angry, but we cannot say that a scowling man in an exotic land is angry until we learn 
enough about the conventional significance of grimaces in his society.17 However, the 
concrete steps that I specified above for studying ancient Chinese emotion terms will 
keep us sensitive enough to the theoretic concerns expressed by the attributional theory of 
emotions, because our contextual analysis of the relevant passages will involve a massive 
effort to understand our target emotions in the rich context of ancient Chinese history, 
culture, and thought. 
 
  
1.4 Philosophical Agenda 
 
1.4.1 Competing Theories of Emotions and the Interpretation of Mengzi 
 
For the past several decades, a wide variety of competing theories of emotions have been 
proposed. One of the most dominant kinds among them is sometimes called 
“judgmentalism” or “judgmental theories of emotion,” and it argues that an emotion is 
basically a combination of some cognitive component with an affect such as pain or 
pleasure and some kind of desire. For example, fear can be analyzed on this view as a 
belief that something fearful is present or forthcoming, combined with an unpleasant 
feeling and a desire to flee.18 This view is usually considered to provide a “cognitive” 
account of emotions, and what characterizes this view is the idea that “some aspect of 
thought, usually a belief,” is “central to the concept of emotion and, at least in some 
                                                 
17  Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp.141–142. 
18 This explanation of judgmentalism on emotion is from Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, “The 
significance of recalcitrant emotion (or, anti-quasijudgmentalism),” in Philosophy and the Emotions, Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52, ed. Anthony Hatzimoysis (Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the 
University of Cambridge, 2003), p. 128. 
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cognitive theories, essential to distinguishing different emotions from one another.”19 For 
example, Robert Solomon, a prime advocate of this view, proposes that “to have an 
emotion is to hold a normative judgment about one’s situation”, and in this light my anger 
for John’s stealing my car is basically “my judgment that John has wronged me.”20
However, critics of the judgmentalist theories of emotion argue that this view 
does not explain the existence of the so-called recalcitrant emotions very well. That is, it 
is a well-known psychological phenomenon that we sometimes feel certain emotions like 
fear, anger, or jealousy while thinking that those emotions are not justified or warranted. 
What is probably going on in such a case is that the evaluation of the situation in question 
embodied in our emotion is in conflict with our best judgment about the situation; for 
example, some people cannot suppress their fear of traveling by the flight while sincerely 
believing that the airplane is one of the safest means of travel, and I might keep feeling 
jealous about my colleague’s promotion while sincerely thinking that his promotion is 
well deserved. This poses a serious problem for judgmentalist theorists of emotion, 
because it is very hard for them to explain why unjustified emotions do not yield to one’s 
best judgments about the situations in question, if those emotions were a form of 
judgments or beliefs. As an alternative, some scholars have proposed that the cognitive or 
propositional content of an emotion does not have to be a belief or judgment. In Robert 
Roberts’ terms, emotions are “concern-based construals” 21  that are some sort of 
propositional attitudes short of beliefs or judgments. For example, “in order to be afraid, 
an agent need only construe or perceive the situation as dangerous; she need not believe it 
to be dangerous.”22
However, this alternative approach to emotions in turn faces its own critics, some 
of them belonging to the so-called sentimentalist tradition. Sentimentalist theorists of 
value treat evaluative judgments as somehow dependent on human emotional capacities, 
and one of their goals is to explain evaluative concepts such as moral wrong, 
shamefulness, amusingness, and so forth by way of more basic emotional reactions rather 
                                                 
19 William Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 33. 
20 Robert Solomon, “Emotions and Choice,” chap. in Explaining Emotions, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1980), p. 258. 
21 Robert Roberts, “What an Emotion Is: a Sketch,” The Philosophical Review 97, no. 2 (April, 1988). 
22 This is D’Arms and Jacobson’s description of Roberts’ view of emotions in their “The significance of 
recalcitrant emotion,” p. 130. Emphasis is original. 
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than the other way around. So, Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, two strong 
proponents of contemporary sentimentalism, propose that “to think that X has some 
evaluative property Φ is to think it appropriate to feel F in response to X.”23 For example, 
judgments of wrongness should be analyzed in terms of such emotions as guilt and 
disapproval, and the concept of danger should be explicated in the light of fear.24 Now, 
the previous two kinds of theories of emotion—viz. judgmentalism and its alternative 
which D’Arms and Jacobson call “quasi-judgmentalism”—pose a serious challenge for 
the sentimentalist view of evaluative judgment, because both judgmentalism and quasi-
judgmentalism postulate that evaluative concepts are explicable in terms of the 
propositional contents of emotions, whether they be fully committed judgments, 
construals, or some sort of “emotionally held thoughts”.25
In response to this theoretical threat, D’Arms and Jacobson clarify that they are 
primarily concerned with what they consider to be “paradigmatic emotion kinds,” such as 
amusement, anger, contempt, disgust, embarrassment, envy, fear, guilt, jealousy, joy, pity, 
pride, shame, and sorrow. According to them, most of these emotions are “pan-cultural 
emotions” or “natural emotion kinds,” which are “products of relatively discrete special-
purpose mechanisms that are sensitive to some important aspect of human life.” In other 
words, “[e]motions evolved for their adaptive value in dealing with what psychologists 
have called ‘fundamental life tasks,’ ‘universal human predicaments,’ or ‘recurrent 
adaptive situations’—especially but not exclusively social situations.”26  This view of 
emotions highly resembles Paul Ekman’s “affect program” theory: In Paul Griffiths’ 
description, “the affect program theory deals with a range of emotions corresponding 
very roughly to the occurrent instances of the English terms ‘surprise,’ ‘fear,’ ‘anger,’ 
‘disgust,’ ‘contempt,’ ‘sadness,’ and ‘joy.’ The affect programs are short-term, 
stereotypical responses involving facial expression, autonomic nervous system arousal, 
and other elements….These patterns [of response] are triggered by a cognitive system 
which is ‘modular’ in the sense that it does not freely exchange information with other 
                                                 
23 Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, “Sentiment and Value,” Ethics 110 (July, 2000), p. 729. 
24 D’Arms and Jacobson, “The significance of recalcitrant emotion,” pp. 127–128. A similar position is 
defended in Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, pp. 147–150. 
25 Michael Stocker, “Emotional Thoughts,” American Philosophical Quarterly 24, no. 1, p. 59, quoted in 
Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are, p. 37. 
26 D’Arms and Jacobson, “The significance of recalcitrant emotion,” p. 138. 
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cognitive processes. This system learns when to produce emotions by associating stimuli 
with broad, functional categories such as danger or loss. To do this it uses the organism’s 
past experience and some specialized learning algorithms…”27 In short, emotions on this 
view are primarily distinct sets of responses whose “evaluations” of the relevant 
situations are more of direct perception than some sort of higher cognitive processes 
mediated by human language, and evaluative concepts such as slights, contamination, or 
incongruity are explicable by directly appealing to their corresponding emotions of anger, 
contempt, and amusement.28
Affect program theory and other theories of similar kind 29  seem to be well 
established especially for explaining basic, natural emotions such as fear, anger, disgust, 
contempt, sadness, and joy. We can identify some form of these emotions across cultures 
and even in the animal kingdom, and it is no wonder that the aforementioned list of seven 
emotions in the Lǐjì—viz. xǐ 喜 (“joy”), nù 怒 (“anger”), aī 哀 (“sorrow”), jù 懼 
(“fear”), aì 愛 (“love”), wù 惡 (“aversion”), and yù 欲 (“desire”)—overlaps to a large 
extent with Ekman’s list of seven affect programs. However, these six or seven basic 
emotions are not the only emotions we feel as human beings, nor is it the case that we 
feel these basic emotions only as adaptive syndromes—i.e. only in relation to “universal 
human predicaments” or “recurrent adaptive situations,” in the form of short-term 
responses not mediated by human language partly consisting of abstract concepts. As 
Griffiths has put it, “the functional situations that elicit the six or seven affect programs 
do not cover the whole range of functional situations which seem to elicit 
emotions….[M]any of the states currently included under the label ‘emotion’ are 
sustained responses, not brief responses like the affect programs,…[and s]ome emotions 
seem to be highly integrated with complex, often conscious cognitive processes in a way 
that is quite alien to the affect program model. These emotions play a role in motivating 
considered plans of action rather than in triggering rapid, reflexlike responses.”30
Then, it is quite doubtful that D’Arms and Jacobson enlist such emotions as 
                                                 
27 Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are, p. 8. 
28 D’Arms and Jacobson, “The significance of recalcitrant emotion,” p. 139. 
29 Neil McNaughton provides a thoughtful alternative to Ekman’s affect program theory. For a good 
introduction to the affect program theory and its alternatives, see Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are, pp. 
77–99. 
30 Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are, p. 102. 
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amusement, embarrassment, guilt, pity, pride, and shame with other more basic or natural 
emotions as if they all belonged to the same category. As I see it, the typical situations 
stimulating such emotions as amusement, embarrassment, pity, or pride might vary 
considerably from culture to culture, and the occurrence of these emotions highly 
depends on what kinds of things the members of each culture believe to be funny, 
embarrassing, pitiable, and deserving pride respectively. Moreover, as we will see in 
Chapter 3, there can be disagreement, even in the same society, about what the proper 
objects of more basic emotions like fear are, and perhaps it is because the members of the 
society belong to different sub-cultures or hold different evaluative standards. In my view, 
these cultural or other kinds of difference in evaluative standards are hardly accountable 
without recourse to some sort of higher cognitive thinking of human beings mediated by 
their capacity to use language, and it seems to me that the second kind of view of 
emotions, labeled somewhat negatively as “quasi-judgmentalism” by D’Arms and 
Jacobson, could provide a very promising theory for explaining the types of emotions that 
some scholars call “higher cognitive emotions.”31
What, then, is the relevance of all these contemporary theories of emotions to my 
study of the ancient Chinese view of emotions in Kongzi and Mengzi? I believe that 
many ancient Chinese emotions discussed in the Analects and the Mencius are best 
described as belonging to the category of “higher cognitive emotions,” and that the best 
view of emotions with which to interpret these thinkers’ ideas on emotions is the second 
of the three kinds of contemporary theories of emotions summarized above. Many 
versions of this theory have been proposed so far, but I find Robert Roberts’ seminal 
theory of emotions as concern-based construals published in 1988 especially insightful 
and useful for my study of Mengzi’s view of emotions.32  In a nutshell, emotions in 
Roberts are particular ways in which things present themselves to the person who feels 
those emotions, and one’s construal of things in a certain situation—i.e. the particular 
way in which one interprets the situation one is in—is largely determined by what one’s 
primary long-term or short-term concern is in the situation in question. For example, if a 
                                                 
31 Ibid., p. 100. 
32 Bennett Helm also provides a similar view of emotions in his Emotional Reason (Cambridge: The Press 
Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 2001), and Roberts develops his “sketch” to a full-fledged 
theory of emotions in his Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology (Cambridge: The Press 
Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 2003). 
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person felt some sort of painful distress at the sight of a baby about to fall into a well and 
ran to the rescue of it, that person’s feeling of distress is primarily her construal of the 
situation as one where an innocent being is endangered, and such a construal is possible 
only when she is concerned about the welfare of the baby in particular or the welfare of 
other beings in general. This example is discussed by Mengzi himself when he explains 
his first ethical “sprout” (duān 端) cèyǐn zhī xīn 惻隱之心 (“familial affection” or 
“sympathy”), and in Chapter 4 below I argue that this view of emotion as a concern-
based construal provides us with the best interpretation of Mengzi’s view emotions. 
 
1.4.2 Reason and Emotion in Mengzi’s Ethical Thought 
 
As I have briefly mentioned above, the burst of research on emotions during the past 
several decades has much to do with the new appreciation of the positive roles emotions 
are supposed to play in our everyday life. This new attitude toward emotions is most 
explicit in Robert Solomon, one of the earliest proponents of the judgmentalist view of 
emotions: 
 
Against the near-platitude “emotions are irrational,” we want to argue that emotions are 
rational. This is not only to say that they fit into one’s overall behavior in a significant 
way, that they follow a regular pattern (one’s “personality”), that they can be explained 
in terms of a coherent set of causes. No doubt this is all true. But emotions…are 
judgments, and so emotions can be rational in the same sense in which judgments can be 
rational….Judgments are actions. Like all actions, they are aimed at changing the 
world….[And] if emotions are judgments, and judgments are actions, though covert, 
emotions too are actions, aimed at changing the world….In other words, emotions are 
purposive, serve the ends of the subject, and consequently can be explained by reasons or 
“in order to” explanations.33
 
That is, Solomon argues that emotions are not passive occurrences but active judgments 
that one purposively makes with an intention to change the world, and such emotions are 
fully explicable in terms of reasons or what goals of the subject they are supposed to 
serve. However, judgmentalists are not the only proponents of the “rationality of 
emotions” thesis. Although based on different kinds of data and with diverse 
                                                 
33 Solomon, “Emotions and Choice,” pp. 262–263. Emphasis is original. 
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philosophical agendas in mind, many scholars tend to agree that emotions are analogous 
to perception, and that emotions can be considered to be rational in the sense that they 
often provide us with an indispensable basis for more conventional way of reasoning 
such as calculation or means-ends reasoning, by letting us perceptively focus on a set of 
features of the situation in question that are relevant to us in terms of our goals and 
concerns at the moment while safely neglecting the other irrelevant features.34 Moreover, 
scholars in evolutionary psychology of emotion point out that certain emotions that seem 
to conflict with calculative rationality can be considered to be rational from a larger 
perspective. For example, one’s resentment at an unfair bargain and consequently 
drawing out of it altogether may be locally irrational in the light of the gain one could 
still make by participating in the bargain, but such irrationality can be globally rational if 
it can prevent one’s bargaining partner from making further exploitations in the future 
bargaining situations.35
Along with these positive views of emotions recently proposed in the 
contemporary Western discourse on emotions, we find a series of scholars in Chinese 
philosophy making similar claims, especially on Mengzi’s view of emotions. The most 
pronounced among such scholars is David Wong, who proposed that there is no 
distinction between reason and emotion in Mengzi’s ethical thought. According to Wong, 
emotions in Mengzi have essential cognitive function built in, due to their having an 
intentional object. For example, when one sees a child about to fall into a well, the 
observer of the disquieting scene would normally feel compassion for the child. And her 
compassion, in Wong’s view, besides the phenomenal quality of alarm and distress and its 
accompanying physiological changes, also contains the perception of the child in 
suffering or in danger. In other words, one’s compassion for the child focuses on the 
endangered child as its intentional object, and makes the child’s suffering, whether actual 
or forthcoming, appear to be the salient feature of the situation. However, Wong argues, 
the cognitive function of compassion has more to contribute to one’s moral deliberation, 
because one’s compassion for the endangered child recognizes the child’s suffering as a 
reason to act to prevent or stop the suffering. In other words, “[t]he intentional object of 
                                                 
34 For example, see Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987), 
Chapter 7, and Damasio, Descartes’ Error, Chapter 3. 
35 Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are, p. 70. 
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compassion identifies the suffering of a sentient being not only as the salient feature of 
the situation, but as a reason for acting in helping ways.”36
Wong’s view of Mengzian emotion as non-distinguishable from reason apparently 
reflects the new direction of contemporary discourse on emotions summarized above, but 
this view is by no means a new one. Traditionally, it has been an undisputable assumption 
among Sinologists and scholars in Chinese philosophy that the faculty of the human mind 
in ancient China, referred to by the character “xīn” 心, contains both the cognitive 
function and the affective or emotional function due to the etymological origin of the 
character “xīn” 心 as referring to the heart, arguably the most important body part of a 
human being but also the locus of a variety of mental activities for the ancient Chinese. 
Taking this assumption one step further, most scholars translate “xīn” as either “heart-
mind”37 or “heart-and-mind,”38 implying that the cognitive mental activity of thinking 
and the affective activity of feeling occur in an interrelated manner in the same faculty of 
xīn 心. This assumption of no rigid distinction between mind and body, thinking and 
feeling, and reason and emotion in ancient China is so deeply ingrained in the minds of 
many Sinologists and scholars in Chinese philosophy that even David Nivison, one of the 
finest scholars in Chinese philosophy, holds that Mengzi postulated only one source of 
morality, viz. his four moral sprouts in the form of emotion, and that such emotions 
embody correct moral judgments and reside in one’s xīn 心.39
However, this view of ancient Chinese psychology in general and more 
specifically of the relationship between “reason” and emotion in Mengzi is as dubious 
and potentially misleading as it is fascinating. It is dubious, because this view of 
“embodied mind” or “emotional reason” seems to coincide a little too nicely with the 
heightened attention on the positive aspect of the body and emotion in the West for the 
past several decades. And it is potentially misleading, because such an emphasis on the 
blurred boundaries between mind and body or reason and emotion in ancient China tends 
                                                 
36 Wong, “Is There a Distinction Between Reason and Emotion in Mencius?” p. 32. 
37 For example, Kwong-loi Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1997), p. 48. 
38 For example, Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Confucian Self Cultivation and Mengzi’s Notion of Extension,” chap. in 
Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi, ed. Xiusheng Liu and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett, 2002), p. 222. 
39 David S. Nivison, “Two Roots or One?” chap. in The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese 
Philosophy, ed. Bryan Van Norden (Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1996), p. 147. 
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to make us overlook a large part of the ancient Chinese philosophical discourse that was 
devoted to answering such questions as 1) how one could arrive at a correct moral 
judgment when multiple moral emotions or ethical concerns conflict with each other, 2) 
what kinds of psychological resources are available for one to overcome one’s 
pathological desires and carry out one’s ethical judgment successfully, and 3) what kind 
of self-cultivation practice one should engage in to become a desirable moral agent who 
not only thinks and acts properly but also feels in the right way. These questions 
respectively correspond to the three important ethical realms of moral judgment, moral 
motivation, and moral cultivation that I mentioned earlier, and I believe that these topics 
cannot be adequately explored without postulating a serious degree of “disembodied 
mind” or meaningful distance between reason and emotion in ancient Chinese thought. 
The following chapters are my efforts to draw a balanced picture of Kongzi’s and 




Qíng 情, Hàowù 好惡, and Kongzi’s Conception of Emotion 
 
 
The main purpose of Chapters 2 and 3 is to provide a background research of some of the 
ethically important emotions in ancient China. The following three Chapters (Chs.4–6) 
are devoted to the study of the development of ethical theories of emotions mainly in 
Mengzi, and this and the next chapter (Chs.2 and 3) are intended to explore the 
theoretical background of this development by a study of the Analects. This chapter, 
specifically, investigates Kongzi’s conception of emotion by elaborating insightful 
implications embodied primarily in his remarks on the concepts of qíng 情 and hàowù 好
惡.  
The Analects is the most trusted anthology of Kongzi’s teachings, and Kongzi is 
not only the founder of the Confucian tradition but also the first substantial thinker in the 
history of Chinese philosophy, whose ideas are further developed by his theoretical 
descendents and severely criticized by many of his later opponents. In addition, as will be 
clear in the following, the Analects is an extremely rich text in terms of the number of 
particular emotion terms it contains as well as of the great influence it had on the later 
development of diverse views of emotions in different schools. In this light, it will be 
most reasonable to start our investigation of emotions in ancient China from the Analects. 
   
 
2.1 Qíng 情 
 
When one proposes to study emotions in a certain text, the first question she encounters 
could be whether there is any general conception of emotion in the text, which binds all 
of the particular emotion terms occurring in the text together and give them a meaningful 
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structure. One might start searching for such a generic conception of emotion in the 
Analects by seeing whether there is any single term in the text that roughly corresponds 
to certain generic English words such as ‘emotion,’ ‘passion,’ or ‘sentiment,’ but 
unfortunately we do not have any such term in the Analects. We do have a number of 
passages in later texts (from 4th to 2nd centuries B.C.E.) in which ‘qíng’ 情 explicitly 
refers to prima facie emotions such as hào 好 (“liking”), wù 惡 (“disliking”), xǐ 喜 
(“joy”), nù 怒 (“anger”), āi 哀 (“sorrow”), and lè 樂 (“pleasure,” i.e. the feeling of 
happiness, satisfaction, or enjoyment).1 However, one can doubt that this is also the case 
in the Analects, thinking that qíng in the Analects (and the other roughly 
contemporaneous texts also) designates primarily “facts about a situation”2 rather than 
referring to particular emotions.  
This is a reasonable view, and I agree with it to a large extent. However, although 
we cannot equate ‘qíng’ in the Analects directly with particular emotions, I think that we 
can find a substantial link between the later usage of qíng as referring to emotions and the 
two instances of qíng in the Analects. As I see it, this link is not merely a coincidence but 
a sign of an important theoretical aspect of the conception of qíng, which is commonly 
found in later theories of emotions. In this section I try to clarify this link just mentioned, 
and my discussion of qíng below takes the following three steps. First, I briefly introduce 
the two instances of qíng in the Analects. Second, I summarize two of the dominant 
interpretations of qíng in the early Chinese texts, which I think tend to overemphasize the 
factual aspect of qíng at the expense of its emotional or affective aspect. Third, I try to 
balance this traditional interpretation of qíng through my analysis of several important 
instances of qíng from the Guóyǔ 國語, and propose an alternative, more comprehensive 
interpretation of qíng that reconciles the so-called factual and affective aspects of qíng 
more successfully than other interpretations. 
 
2.1.1 Qíng 情 in the Analects 
                                                 
1 For example, “性之好惡喜怒哀樂, 謂之情.” Xúnzǐ 荀子, “Zhèngmíng” 正名. Lǐ Díshēng, Xúnzǐ jíshì, p. 
506. 
2 This phrase is from Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, p. 184. Also see pp. 183–187 of this book 
for a detailed explanation of the meaning of qíng 情 in various early Chinese texts. His analysis of qíng will 
be discussed shortly. 
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First, the two instances of qíng in the Analects: (1) When a disciple of Zēngzǐ 曾子 
(Zēngzǐ himself was one of Kongzi’s disciples.) became a judge (shìshī 士師) in the Lǔ 
dukedom, Zēngzǐ thus advises him: “Those above have lost their way, and the 
commoners [consequently] have been drifting digressively for a long time. If you could 
extract any truth from them [in interrogation], then be sorrowful and pitiful instead of 
being joyful [about your ability]!”3 In this passage, qíng probably means the facts about a 
case under interrogation, and it seems to have nothing to do with one’s emotions or 
feelings that could be regarded as internal in contrast to the external facts about a 
criminal case.  
(2) On the other hand, in another passage Kongzi says that “If those in the above 
like rituals, then none of the commoners will dare to be disrespectful; if those in the 
above like righteousness, then none of the commoners will dare to be disobedient; if 
those in the above like trustworthiness, then none of the commoners will dare to be 
insincere.”4 In this passage, the phrase “yòngqíng” 用情 describes the way commoners 
deal with their superiors—they are sincere and never deceive their superiors. However, it 
is not clear here whether qíng refers to the facts about a certain situation as in the 
previous passage or it could be broad enough to include the way one really feels and sees 
things—i.e. one’s feelings and opinions in a certain situation. If the latter were the case, 
“yòngqíng” 用情, literally “using [one’s] qíng,” could mean that the commoners are 
honest in informing their superiors not only of what they did wrong in interrogations but 
also of their opinions and affective reactions in politically important situations, so that the 
superiors could not only make correct judicial judgments but also come up with 
reasonable policies based on a realistic basis. 
 
2.1.2 Two Interpretations of Qíng 情 in Early Chinese Texts and Beyond 
 
According to Kwong-loi Shun’s analysis of qíng in the early Chinese texts, qíng seems to 
                                                 
3 “上失其道, 民散久矣. 如得其情, 則哀矜而勿喜!” Lunyu 19:19. The underlined words correspond to 
‘qíng’ in the original text. Same for the translation of the next passage. 
4 “上好禮, 則民莫敢不敬, 上好義, 則民莫敢不服, 上好信, 則民莫敢不用情.” Lunyu 13:4. 
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be used in roughly two related but distinct ways.5 First, it is often used to refer to the 
facts about a situation or certain facts about an object of observation. For example, in 
making a judicial judgment, one should be guided by the qíng or the facts about the 
situation6; and in governing a country, it is important for the superiors to understand the 
qíng of their subordinates, or to know who are the good people and who are bad.7 Second, 
when qíng is used for a certain object in the context of ‘X zhī qíng (X 之情, the qíng of 
X),’ then it often refers to certain characteristic features of X’s as a class, revealing what 
things of this kind really are or do. For example, it is said in the Lǚshì chūnqiū 呂氏春秋 
that the qíng of the sense organs is to desire their proper objects,8 and the qíng of human 
beings is to desire longevity, safety, honor, and comfort, and to hate short life, danger, 
shame, and hardship.9
Shun provides a detailed and very useful analysis of qíng, and at the same time he 
carefully avoids making a suspicious theoretical commitment to Aristotelian metaphysics 
that Angus Graham is often accused of having made.10 In any event, in his seminal study 
of qíng, Graham seems to understand qíng in a similar way to Shun’s. That is, he also 
seems to think that qíng means ‘facts’ or ‘what is genuine’ when used of situations, but it 
means ‘essence’ when used of things. For after pointing out that qíng in many early 
Chinese texts means ‘the facts’ as a noun, ‘genuine’ as an adjective, and ‘genuinely’ as 
an adverb,11 Graham argues: 
 
In philosophy qing is generally used not of situations (‘the facts’) but of things. The qíng 
of X is ‘what is genuinely X in it’, ‘what X essentially is’, often contrasted with its xing 形 
                                                 
5 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, pp. 183-187. 
6 “公曰: ‘余聽獄雖不能察, 必以情斷之.’” Guóyǔ 國語, “Lǔyǔ shàng” 魯語上. Dǒng Lìzhāng 董立章, 
Guóyǔ yìzhù biànxī 國語譯注辨析 (Guǎngzhōu 廣州: Jìnán dàxué chūbǎnshè 暨南大學出版社, 1993), p. 
153. 
7 “上之爲政, 得下之情, 則是明於民之善非也. 若苟明於民之善非也, 則得善人而賞之, 得暴人而罰之
也. 善人賞而暴人罰, 則國必治.” Mòzǐ 墨子, “Shàngtóng xià” 尙同下. Sūn Yíràng 孫詒讓, Mòzǐ xiángǔ 
墨子閒詁 (Běijīng 北京: Zhōnghuá shūjú 中華書局, 2001), p. 90. 
8 “耳之情欲聲…目之情欲色…鼻之情欲芬香…口之情欲滋味.” Lǚshì chūnqiū 呂氏春秋, “Shìyīn” 適音. 
Chén Qíyóu 陳奇猷, Lǚshì chūnqiū jiàoshì 呂氏春秋校釋 (Shànghǎi 上海: Xuélín chūbǎnshè 學林出版社, 
1984), p. 272. 
9 “人之情, 欲壽而惡夭, 欲安而惡危, 欲榮而惡辱, 欲逸而惡勞.” Ibid. 
10 For example, see Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, p. 185, and Hansen, “Qing (Emotions) 情 
in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought,” p. 195. 
11 Graham, “The Background of the Mencian [Mengzian] Theory of Human Nature,” p. 49. 
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‘shape’ or mao 貌 ‘guise, demeanor’…Qing is common in definitions and quasi-
definitions; the most convenient equivalent, but with dangerous Aristotelian associations, 
is “essence.”12
 
And from a close analysis of a passage from the Zhuāngzǐ, he “deduce[s] a definition of 
qíng”: 
 
The qíng of X is what X cannot lack if it is to be called “X”.13
 
 However, there is another important usage of qíng that seems to have been given 
relatively less attention by Shun and Graham. As I see it, qíng is not only used to refer to 
characteristic features of things belonging to the same kind; for when it is used of human 
beings, qíng can also refer to certain psychological items in an individual’s mind, the 
contents of which might characterize the individual in one way or another and possibly 
distinguish him from others. These “psychological items” can include one’s goals and 
aspirations, one’s opinions about a politically important situation, emotional or affective 
reactions toward a certain object, deep-seated evaluative judgments of things, and so 
forth. And all of these psychological items can contribute to one’s character and reveal 
what kind of person she is. Let me take several examples from the Guóyǔ 國語. 
(1) Before waging war against the neighboring country Wú 吳,14 Gōu Jiàn 句
踐—the king of Yuè 越—summons his five ministers and asks what would bring about 
victory. And Gōu Jiàn, asking for their opinions, urges them to speak their qíng instead of 
just flattering him, because he will make an important decision based on their opinions. 
The five ministers take turns and say what they think is most important to prevail in the 
war, and qíng here could be best translated as ‘genuine opinions.’ And that the qíng or 
genuine opinions of these five ministers are all different from each other shows that qíng 
in this case can vary from person to person and does not refer to either facts about a 
situation or characteristic features of a species, or even “essence” of the species.15  
                                                 
12 Ibid., p. 50. 
13 Ibid., p. 52. 
14 This war between Wú 吳 and Yuè 越 was in 473 B.C.E., and it resulted in the destruction of Wú 吳. 
15 “‘吾…敢訪諸大夫, 問戰奚以而可? 句踐願諸大夫言之, 皆以情告, 無阿孤, 孤將以擧大事.’ 大夫舌
庸乃進對曰: ‘審賞則可以戰乎?’ 王曰: ‘聖.’ 大夫苦成進對曰: ‘審罰則可以戰乎?’ 王曰: ‘猛.’ 大夫種進
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(2) In 655 B.C.E., Chóng’ěr 重耳—a prince of the Jìn 晉 dukedom who later 
becomes the famous Jìn wéngōng 晉文公—flees to a neighboring country Dí 狄, having 
been unjustly accused of being part of the alleged trial of regicide. One year later his 
brother Yíwú 夷吾, who was under the same false accusation and also had to flee, 
considers following his elder brother to Dí 狄 and staying together with him there. At this, 
one of Yíwú’s vassals Jì Ruì 冀芮 objects to this idea and suggests going to a different 
country for several reasons, and one of those reasons involves qíng: “Also, [even if two 
parties] went into exile together, it is difficult for them to return hand in hand. For if two 
parties stay together with different hearts, then they [definitely] come to hate each other. 
It is better [for us] to go to Liáng 梁.”16  
Here we have the expression ‘yìqíng (異情)’ which literally means ‘make one’s 
qíng different,’ and I suggest interpreting qíng here as referring broadly to some of the 
following things: 1) Yíwú’s desire or aspiration to become the ruler of his home country, 
which can be difficult to fulfill and possibly conflicts with Chóng’ěr’s if Chóng’ěr also 
had the same desire; and 2) Yíwú’s relative indifference to the well-being of Chóng’ěr or 
even hostility to him, which is likely to be fermented by his awareness that the existence 
of Chóng’ěr can be a big obstacle for advancing his interest, viz. achieving the dukedom. 
In my translation above, I used ‘heart’ as a term embracing these desiderative and 
affective elements of qíng. And this interpretation of mine is partly corroborated by the 
facts that these two brothers both returned to their home country later at different times 
and succeeded to the dukedom one after the other, and that Yíwú, who became the ruler 
of his country before his elder brother, tried to kill Chóng’ěr so that he could not 
challenge his rulership in the future.17
(3) A certain Yíng 嬴 happens to host a person named Yáng Chùfǔ 陽處父 as an 
overnight guest to his house. By the elegant manner and magnificent appearance of Yáng 
Chùfǔ, Yíng takes Yang as the kind of nobleman he has been longing for meeting, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
對曰: ‘審物則可以戰乎?’ 王曰: ‘辯.’ 大夫蠡進對曰: ‘審備則可以戰乎?’ 王曰: ‘巧.’ 大夫皐如進對曰: 
‘審聲則可以戰乎?’ 王曰: ‘可矣.’” Guóyǔ, “Wúyǔ” 吳語. Dǒng Lìzhāng, Guóyǔ yìzhù biànxī, p.  739. 
16 “且夫偕出偕入難, 聚居異情惡, 不若走梁.” Guóyǔ, “Jìnyǔ èr” 晉語二, Ibid., p. 361. 




decides to follow and serve him. However, before long Yíng departs from Yáng Chùfǔ 
and comes back home disappointed, and says the following to his wife:  
 
I wanted him after seeing his appearance, but hated him after listening to his words. In 
general, appearance is the flowering of [one’s] qíng, and words are the most crucial of 
[one’s] appearance. Qíng originates in oneself, and matures inside; and words are 
ornamental patterns of oneself. Ornate words can initiate it [i.e. an action], but an action 
can be complete only when [one’s qíng, words, and appearance] are united; otherwise 
[the action will be] defective…Now, Master Yáng’s qíng is clear to me: He is covering his 
defects with rounded manner; he is stubborn and places high value on ability; and he 
does not care about the fundamentals [of morality] and trespasses against other people—
[this way,] he is [making himself] the target of [everyone’s] rancor. I am afraid that I will 
get in trouble before reaping any benefit from his company; this is why I parted from 
him.18
 
This passage reveals us several important aspects of qíng. First, qíng is considered as 
deep-seated in the innermost place of one’s mind. Although it is expressed through one’s 
words and manners to a certain extent, one’s external manners and speeches do not 
always represent one’s inner qíng correctly; careful observation over a substantial period 
of time is needed to know about a person’s qíng correctly. Second, qíng in this passage 
refers to the peculiar character of a person, which distinguishes him from others. 
Specifically, Yáng Chùfǔ’s qíng or his character revealed afterwards to Yíng includes 
such things as temper, evaluative judgment, and certain tendency or habitual way of 
behaving: Yáng’s stubbornness, his high esteem on people’s abilities (presumably as 
opposed to their virtues), and his frequent infringement on other people’s authorities. 
Third, Yíng’s affective response to Yáng’s defective character in turn reveals Yíng’s qíng 
or his character: Yíng likes or desires [to be with] noblemen, and hates or despises those 
of low character. It is clear here also that Yíng’s qíng comprises the elements of 
evaluative judgments and affective responses of liking and disliking. 
So far, I have argued based on the three Guóyǔ passages above that in addition to 
‘facts’ of a situation and ‘characteristic features’ of a certain category of things, qíng also 
refers to what is sitting deeply in an individual’s mind in the forms of sincere opinions, 
                                                 
18 “吾見其貌而欲之, 聞其言而惡之. 夫貌, 情之華也; 言, 貌之機也. 身爲情, 成於中; 言, 身之文也. 言
文而發之, 合而後行, 離則有釁….今陽子之情譓矣. 以濟蓋也, 且剛而主能, 不本而犯, 怨之所聚也. 吾
懼未獲其利而及其難, 是故去之.” Guóyǔ, “Jìnyǔ wǔ” 晉語五, Ibid., p. 460. 
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goals or aspirations, desires for certain objects, a certain kind of temper, evaluative 
judgments, or certain characteristic behavioral patterns. And I have also emphasized that 
this last sense of qíng is not the features belonging to a certain species in general but to an 
individual human being, thus often distinguishing the possessor of those features from 
others. Now resuming my previous discussion of the two instances of qíng in the 
Analects, this last sense of qíng seems to support the interpretation that I suggested above 
for the second Analects passage in question (i.e. Lunyu 13:4). That is, 1) as long as qíng 
can be reasonably understood as referring to some of the various psychological items 
enumerated above when it is used for individual human beings, and 2) since the phrase 
‘yòngqíng (用情)’ can be a shortened form of ‘yòng qíqíng (用其情),’ i.e. “using their 
qíng” as opposed to “using the neutral facts” so to speak, I think it is reasonable to 
interpret the phrase ‘yòngqíng (用情)’ as not only telling the truth in interrogation but 
also being broadly sincere about the way one feels and sees various things. 
 
2.1.3 A More Comprehensive Interpretation of Qíng 情  
 
At this point, it should be made clear where I am going with this point. What I would like 
to ultimately derive from this point is that the use of qíng 情 in Lunyu 13:4 makes one of 
the earliest cases in which qíng can refer to emotions among other things, thus letting us 
anticipate the more explicit use of qíng for emotions in later texts. However, in order to 
make this point convincing, I need to address the following two questions first: 1) What 
is the relationship between the two instances of qíng in the Analects; or more broadly, 
what is the relationship between the qíng in the sense of ‘facts’ or ‘characteristic features’ 
on one hand and the qíng as diverse psychological items including emotions? I need to 
answer this question because one would expect that as long as qíng is not a word of 
drastically different meanings, there be some link between these two senses of qíng, and 
my interpretation of the qíng 情 in Lunyu 13:4 as referring to emotions will be more 
convincing if I could explain the semantic link between the two instances of qíng in the 
Analects. 2) As I have raised an example above, qíng refers explicitly to emotions in later 
texts such as the Xúnzǐ and the Lǐjì. Then, again, what is the relationship between the qíng 
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as referring to emotions in these texts and the qíng as referring to diverse psychological 
items having volitional, affective, or even sometimes judgmental aspects as in the 
Guóyǔ? Since I base my ultimate point that the use of qíng 情 in Lunyu 13:4 makes one 
of the earliest cases in which qíng can refer to emotions on the previous three Guóyǔ 
passages, it will make my point more convincing if I could establish a strong connection 
between the conception of qíng in these Guóyǔ passages and the qíng in later texts such 
as the Xúnzǐ and the Lǐjì in which it refers more explicitly to emotions. 
As an answer for the first question, I would like to modify Graham’s hypothesis 
about the meaning change of qíng from ‘facts’ or ‘essence’ in the pre-Han literature to 
‘passions’ in later times. According to him, the meaning of qíng in the pre-Han literature 
is only ‘facts’ or ‘what a thing genuinely is,’ but it comes to mean ‘passions’ in later 
times, especially since the neo-Confucianism of the Sòng 宋 dynasty (960–1279 C.E.), 
because passions were considered by the so-called ritualistic Confucian school as what is 
genuine in human beings and not imposed from the outside. Graham says: 
 
We find a slightly different use of ch’ing [qíng] in the ritualistic school of Confucianism, 
in Hsün-tzu [Xúnzǐ] and the Li chi [Lǐjì], where ch’ing is the genuine and unassumed, in 
contrast with the mao 貌 ‘guise, demeanour’ which is wen 文 ‘patterned, refined’ in 
obedience to the rites. In these texts, but nowhere else in pre-Han literature, the word 
refers only to the genuine in man which it is polite to disguise, and therefore to his 
feelings.19
 
 As I see it, this hypothesis contains two important points, and I would like to keep 
one point while rejecting the other. First, I agree with Graham that the qíng as originally 
meaning ‘what a thing genuinely is’ is very likely to have come to refer to what Graham 
calls “passions.”20 For passions, or what I would prefer to call emotions, are considered 
as indispensable for human life in many early Chinese philosophical texts such as the 
Analects and the Zhuāngzǐ, and in that sense emotions are what make a human being 
genuinely a human being. In this sense, I find a firm continuation of meaning between 
                                                 
19 Graham, “The Background of the Mencian [Mengzian] Theory of Human Nature,” p. 53. 
20 Graham’s “passions” refer to the same things as what I would call “emotions.” An example is the 
following list of emotions in the Xúnzǐ: hào 好 (“liking”), wù 惡 (“disliking”), xī 喜 (“joy”), nù 怒 
(“anger”), āi 哀 (“sorrow”), and lè 樂 (“pleasure,” i.e. the feeling of happiness, satisfaction, or enjoyment). 
Xúnzǐ 荀子 “Zhèngmíng” 正名. Lǐ Díshēng, Xúnzǐ jíshì, p. 506. 
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‘what a thing genuinely is’ and ‘emotions,’ because the former is a formal definition of 
qíng which is substantiated by the latter in the case of human beings. Moreover, this 
continuum could be extended a little further towards both ends: At one end, if qíng is 
what makes a certain thing genuinely that thing, then qíng is what reveals the true reality 
of that thing. Likewise, when qíng is used for a situation, then the qíng of that situation is 
what reveals the reality about that situation, namely the facts about the situation. And at 
the other end of the continuum, even if emotions are what make humans really humans, 
this fact does not preclude that such emotions vary from person to person in terms of their 
degree and objects, and this in turn allows that the qíng of an individual can be the 
characteristic features of that person which might distinguish him from others.  
However, I do not agree with Graham that qíng came to mean “passions” or 
emotions only in the post-Han period. For I have already shown previously that the use of 
qíng as referring to various inner psychological items including emotions is a quite 
established linguistic phenomenon in the Guóyǔ, which is definitely a pre-Han text. At 
this, Graham might want to distinguish between qíng’s referring to passions (or emotions 
in my term) and its meaning passions, and say that although qíng in the Xúnzǐ and the Lǐjì 
refers to passions, it is doubtful that the word yet means ‘passion.’ 21  However, this 
distinction between meaning and reference does not seem to make much sense, because if 
we could identify a strong semantic continuum between ‘what a thing genuinely is’ and 
‘emotions’ as I have just argued, then we hardly need any such distinction. 
The second question that I raised above was about the relationship between the 
qíng as referring to emotions (as found in such texts as the Xúnzǐ and the Lǐjì) and the 
qíng as referring to diverse psychological items from volitions and affections to 
evaluative judgments (as in the Guóyǔ). In other words, the question is whether there is a 
strong connection between the qíng as emotions (the Xúnzǐ and the Lǐjì) and the qíng as 
the “various psychological items” (the Guóyǔ), and my answer is very positive. There are 
several reasons for my thinking in this way.  
First, one of the most crucial characteristics of qíng is that it is considered as 
originally maturing inside before receiving any kind of influence from the outside, and 
this feature is equally true for both the instance of qíng in the Xúnzǐ and the Lǐjì and the 
                                                 
21 Graham, “The Background of the Mencian [Mengzian] Theory of Human Nature,” p. 54. 
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qíng in the Guóyǔ. Examine the following two passages respectively from the Xúnzǐ and 
the Lǐjì first: 
 
Our nature’s liking and disliking, joy and anger, sorrow and pleasure, is called ‘the 
genuine in us.’ … ‘[Our] nature’ is the tendency which is from Heaven [i.e. Nature], and 
‘the genuine in us’ is the substance of our nature. 22
 
What is meant by ‘the genuine in man’? Joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hatred, and  
desire—we are capable of these seven [emotions] without learning.23
 
In the first passage, Xunzi is clear that the six emotions of human beings are the 
materialization of natural human tendency in response to external objects, and the 
following Lǐjì passage says that such emotional responses of human beings to external 
objects are completely spontaneous and natural, at least in the earlier stage of human life, 
or before one launches on moral self-cultivation. Now let us look back at the three Guóyǔ 
passages quoted above. As I said, the ‘qíng’ in the first passage of the three refers to 
‘genuine opinions,’ and it is contrasted with flattering words which conceal one’s sincere, 
innermost thoughts. And in the second Guóyǔ passage, one’s aspiration to and desire for 
dukedom and hostility towards a rival who is pursuing the same goal are definitely inside, 
originating from one’s inherent desire for honor and power. And finally in the third 
passage, it is said that “qíng originates in oneself and matures inside.” Combining these 
three and comparing them with the two Xúnzǐ and Lǐjì passages above, we could see that 
both the Xúnzǐ and Lǐjì passages and the Guóyǔ passages implicitly share the 
inside/outside dichotomy and considers qíng as concerning the former, which is the realm 
of absolute freedom and spontaneity and whose response is originally free from the 
external influence such as a need to please authorities or dress up oneself by concealing 
one’s desires according to social norms.  
Second, in both the Xúnzǐ and Lǐjì passages and the Guóyǔ passages, hàowù 好惡 
(liking and disliking, or desire and aversion, or preference), which can be considered as 
                                                 
22 “性之好惡喜怒哀樂, 謂之情…性者, 天之就也, 情者, 性之質也.” Xúnzǐ 荀子, “Zhèngmíng” 正名. Lǐ 
Díshēng, Xúnzǐ jíshì, p. 506 and p. 529. The translation here and that of the following passage are slight 
modifications of Graham’s in his “The Background of the Mencian [Mengzian] Theory of Human Nature,” 
pp.  54–55. 
23 “何謂人情? 喜怒哀懼愛惡欲, 七者弗學而能.” Lǐjì 禮記, “Lǐyùn” 禮運. Sūn Xīdàn, Lǐjì jíjiě, p. 606.  
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emotions, equally occupy the most important place among the instances of qíng, or play 
the most crucial role in the workings of qíng. Let us start from the Guóyǔ passages this 
time. Unfortunately, it is not clear how hàowù are related to the qíng in the first Guóyǔ 
passage as ‘genuine opinions.’ For the ‘genuine opinion’ in that passage is one’s sincere 
thought about what is the best way to win in a war, and one’s judgment about the best 
means to the victory seems to have hardly anything to do with one’s personal preference. 
However, the situation is much different in the second and the third passages. For if 
Yíwú’s qíng in the second Guóyǔ passage can be interpreted as his aspiration to or desire 
for the dukedom and his hatred for his elder brother who could turn out to be the biggest 
obstacle for achieving his goal later, then the very contents of Yíwú’s qíng becomes his 
liking (hào 好) of the dukedom and disliking (wù 惡) of his elder brother. And in the 
third passage from the Guóyǔ above, Yang’s problematic high esteem on people’s 
abilities as opposed to virtues and his frequent infringement on other people’s authorities 
tell us enough about what would be the primary objects of his desires, and Yíng’s desire 
to be with well-cultivated noblemen and his aversion to Yang’s low character constitute 
the very contents of Yíng’s qíng. 
Now as for the Xúnzǐ and Lǐjì passages, those passages themselves do not tell us 
the same point as straightforwardly. For both passages seem simply to enumerate six or 
seven emotions without making any apparent effort to single out hàowù from others. 
However, considering that the beginning of a list is usually more important than the end 
of the list and the end than the middle, we could say that hàowù are the most important 
emotions in Xunzi’s list (footnote 22), and xǐnù 喜怒 the most representative in the list 
from the Lǐjì (footnote 23). And we can also see in the Lǐjì passage that hàowù, in the 
form of ‘wùyù (惡欲),’24 still occupy the second important place in the list. Then, what 
do all these mean? As I see it, combined with the evidence provided in the next several 
paragraphs, they mean that 1) hàowù 好惡 are distinguished in kind from other emotions 
such as xǐ nù āi lè 喜怒哀樂, and that 2) xǐnù 喜怒 represent all of the particular 
emotions except for hàowù 好惡. Now let us examine some evidence for these theses. 
(1) To begin with, take a look at the following two passages from the Huáinánzǐ 
                                                 
24 Hào 好, ài 愛, and yù 欲 are sometimes interchangeable in some of the important ancient Chinese 
philosophical texts. This point will be argued more explicitly in a later section (2.2.2.1). 
29 
 
淮南子 and the Lǐjì 禮記: 
 
It is one’s nature from Heaven that one is born tranquil, and it is harmful to one’s nature 
that [one’s mind] is to move after being stimulated. When an object approaches, one’s 
spirit responds, and this is the movement of one’s intellect. And when one’s intellect 
contacts [external] objects, liking and hatred consequently arise. However, when liking 
and hatred once formed their shapes, if one’s intellect is attracted away to the outside 
and one cannot put oneself back [to its original position], then one’s heavenly principles 
are destroyed.25
 
It is one’s nature from Heaven that one is born tranquil, and it is [according to] one’s 
nature’s desire that [one’s mind] moves when it is stimulated by [external] objects. And 
liking and disliking shape after objects have arrived and one’s intellect has grasped them. 
However, if liking and disliking are not moderated inside and one’s intellect is attracted 
away to the outside, and [in addition] one fails to turn oneself back, then one’s heavenly 
principles are destroyed.26
 
These two passages are very similar not only in content but also in form, and 
typically represent people’s dominant view about human nature, desire, intellect, emotion, 
and external objects from the late Warring States period, say, 3rd century B.C.E., 
throughout the Qín and Hàn times (221 B.C.E.— 220 C.E.).27 According to this view, the 
originally tranquil human nature comes to respond to the stimulation of external objects 
by generating two gross types of emotional responses, viz. liking and disliking (or desire 
and aversion), and one is supposed to moderate one’s desire and aversion in order to keep 
one’s heavenly nature intact. In any event, what is important to us in this psychological 
picture is that 1) liking and disliking or desire and aversion are two primary responses 
that one’s nature issues in reaction to external objects, and 2) from the fact that other 
                                                 
25 “人生而靜, 天之性也. 感而後動, 性之害也. 物至而神應, 知之動也. 知與物接, 而好憎生焉. 好憎成
形, 而知誘於外, 不能反己, 而天理滅矣.” Huáinánzi 淮南子, “Yuándàoxùn” 原道訓. Hé Níng 何寧, 
Huáinánzǐ jíshì 淮南子集釋 (Běijīng 北京: Zhōnghuá shūjú 中華書局, 1998), p. 24. 
26 “人生而靜, 天之性也. 感於物而動, 性之欲也. 物至知知, 然後好惡形焉. 好惡無節於內, 知誘於外, 
不能反躬, 天理滅矣.” Lǐjì, “Yuèjì” 樂記. Sūn Xīdàn, Lǐjì jíjiě, p. 984. 
27 The second of these two passages is also found almost verbatim in Shǐjì 史記, “Yuèshū” 樂書. Zhōng-
huá ed., p. 1186, and another similar passage is found in Lǚshì chūnqiū 呂氏春秋, “Chǐyuè” 侈樂. Chén 
Qíyóu, Lǚshì chūnqiū jiàoshì, p. 266. The observation of the similarity among the two translated passages 
in the text and the just mentioned Lǚshì chūnqiū passage has been originally made in Chang Won-Tae, 
“Chŏn’guksidae insŏngnon ŭi hyŏngsŏng gwa chŏn’gae e gwanhan yŏn’gu” [A study on the formation and 
development of the theories of human nature in the Warring States period] (Ph. D diss., Seoul National 
University, 2005), pp. 91–92. 
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emotional responses such as joy or anger are not mentioned, we could assume that hàowù 
好惡 have priority to other emotional responses in this picture. And this assumption will 
be confirmed right in the next paragraph by examining a passage from the Zǔozhuàn 左
傳. 
 (2) The following passage is an excerpt from the conversation between Zǐdàshū 
子大叔 and Zhàojiǎnzǐ 趙簡子, two nobles respectively from Zhèng 鄭 and Jìn 晉 
dukedoms. In this conversation Zǐdàshū explains the meanings and functions of the 
rituals, and his explanation involves presenting a folk-psychological view of the 
emotional structure of people’s mind, which Zǐdàshū ascribes to Zǐchǎn 子産, a 
renowned previous minister of his home country: 
 
People have desire and aversion, joy and anger, sorrow and pleasure, which originate 
[respectively] from the six types of qì [i.e. yin and yang, wind and rain, darkness and 
brightness]…When sad, [people] cry and weep; when happy, they sing and dance; when 
pleased, they distribute goods; when angry, they fight. Joy comes from [the satisfaction 
of] desire, and anger comes from [the feeling of] aversion. For this reason, [the ruler] 
controls [people’s] life and death by recourse to careful action and faithful order, fortune 
and misfortune, and reward and punishment. Life is a good thing and death is a bad 
thing, and pleasure [comes from encountering] a good thing, and sorrow [comes from 
encountering] a bad thing. And if one does not make any mistake concerning joy and 
sorrow, then he can take part in the nature of Heaven and Earth and enjoy a long life.28
 
What we have to extract for now from this rich and occasionally unclear remark is that 
the two pairs of emotions, i.e. joy and anger on one hand and sorrow and pleasure on the 
other, are considered as respectively originating from one’s liking and disliking, or desire 
and aversion (hàowù 好惡). However, concerning the two immediately previous passages, 
I notified that hàowù are two gross types of emotional responses to the stimulation of 
external objects. Now, given that emotions are a certain kind of responses to their various 
objects, how are we to understand the saying that joy and anger, and sorrow and pleasure 
are all derived from hàowù? In other words, how can emotions originate from another set 
                                                 
28 “民有好惡喜怒哀樂, 生于六氣…哀有哭泣, 樂有歌舞, 喜有施舍, 怒有戰鬪. 喜生於好, 怒生於惡. 是
故審行信令, 禍福賞罰, 以制死生. 生, 好物也, 死, 惡物也. 好物, 樂也, 惡物, 哀也. 哀樂不失, 乃能協于
天地之性, 是以長久.” Zǔozhuàn 左傳, Zhāogōng 昭公 25. Yáng Bójùn 楊伯峻, Chūnqiū Zǔozhuàn Zhù 
春秋左傳注 (Běijīng: Zhōnghuá Shūjú 中華書局, 1990), pp. 1458–1459. 
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of emotions? Is this not some sort of category mistake? 
In my view, we might be able to solve this problem by distinguishing broad and 
narrow conceptions of emotion and postulating that in ancient Chinese philosophy, 
hàowù are emotions of different kind (broad ones) from the other emotions (narrow ones). 
In order to substantiate this interpretive hypothesis, I would like to introduce John 
Rawls’s conception of attitude and venture to interpret hàowù as a set of opposite 
attitudes in Rawls’s sense. According to him, an attitude is a set of ordered families of 
dispositions,29 and love is a good example of such a natural attitude. For love, which is 
often no doubt considered as an emotion, consists of a set of dispositions such as the 
disposition to feel joy at the presence of the person one loves and the disposition to feel 
sorrow when one’s loved one suffers.30 Perhaps we could regard attitudes of this type as 
emotions broadly conceived. Now, this natural attitude of love seems to me very similar 
in kind to hào 好, and I would like to regard hào 好 as one of such natural attitudes of 
human beings. For we have already seen in the Zǔozhuàn passage above that 1) xǐ 喜  
(“joy”) and nù 怒 (“anger”) derive respectively from hào 好 and wù 惡, and that 2) lè 樂 
(“pleasure”) and āi 哀 (“sorrow”) arise respectively by encountering good and bad things. 
Based on these two statements and also considering that joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure 
are all on an equal status, it is quite clear that hàowù or desire and aversion are two 
opposite attitudes consisting of dispositions to be expressed as joy or pleasure and anger 
or sorrow respectively, depending on the object one encounters. 
(3) In many Warring States period philosophical texts, xǐnù 喜怒 seem to be often 
used as a general representative of emotions. However, hàowù 好惡 do not seem to be 
part of the emotions represented by xǐnù. Rather, they often enjoy a special status. First, 
compare the following two passages: 
 
You [i.e. Kongzi] are studying between benevolence and righteousness,…trying to make 
your desire and aversion in accordance with your principles, and trying to make your 
moderated joy and anger harmonious. However, you are almost doomed to fail.31
                                                 
29 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971; Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 420. 
30 Ibid., p. 426. 
31 “子審仁義之間… 理好惡之情, 和喜怒之節, 而幾於不免矣.” Zhuāngzǐ, “Yúfū” 漁夫. Guō Qìngfān 郭
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It is called equanimity that joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure have not yet arisen; and it is 
called harmony that those emotions are all expressed to the moderate degree.32
 
Moderation and harmony of emotions were an important philosophical topic in the 
Warring States period and throughout the Han times. And we see in these passages that 
emotions are sometimes referred to by enumerating joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure, but 
sometimes mentioning only the first two of them is enough. Now look at the following 
two passages: 
 
People have the attitudes of desire and aversion; but [if they] have no [means to 
generate] the responses of joy and anger, then [they fall into] disorder.33
 
Rituals…are [the means with which one can] moderate one’s desire and aversion and 
make one’s joy and anger appropriate.34
 
In these two passages, desire and aversion (hàowù) clearly stand outside the boundary of 
particular emotions represented by joy and anger (xǐnù). We might reasonably try to 
understand these passages through the distinction between attitudes as a broad conception 
of emotion and emotions per se that I sketched above. 
 
My lengthy discussion so far throughout a number of passages provided in groups 
(1), (2), and (3) above boils down to the point that hàowù occupy a crucial place among 
the emotions mentioned in the original Xúnzǐ and Lǐjì passages, such that particular 
emotions, primarily joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure, are different expressions of 
human’s two general attitudes toward external objects, viz. hàowù. This point in turn 
establishes strong affinity between the Xúnzǐ and Lǐjì passages in question and the three 
Guóyǔ passages discussed above, and the importance of hàowù in these three Guóyǔ 
passages and its connection with the later use of qíng in the Xúnzǐ and Lǐjì passages as 
referring to emotions support my claim that Lunyu 13:4 is one of the earlier cases in 
                                                                                                                                                 
慶藩, Zhuāngzǐ jíshì 莊子集釋 (Běijīng: Zhōnghuá Shūjú 中華書局, 1989), p. 1031. 
32 “喜怒哀樂之未發, 謂之中; 發而皆中節, 謂之和.” Zhōngyōng 中庸, in Yasui Kō 安井 衡, Chūyōsetsu 
中庸說 (Tokyo 東京: Fuzanbō 富山房, 1972), p. 2. 
33 “夫民有好惡之情而無喜怒之應,則亂.” Xúnzǐ, “Yuèlùn” 樂論. Lǐ Díshēng, Xúnzǐ jíshì, p. 460. 
34 “凡禮… 好惡以節, 喜怒以當.” Xúnzǐ, “Lǐlùn” 禮論. Ibid., p. 427. 
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which qíng can refer to emotions. Nevertheless, qíng still occurs only twice in the 
Analects, and it is very difficult to illuminate Kongzi’s ethical view of emotion by 
analyzing these two instances of qíng. However, as I have established in this section, 
hàowù or desire and aversion constitute an important part of qíng’s contents, and 
Kongzi’s view of emotion can still be clarified to some extent by analyzing his use of 
hàowù in the Analects. This is the task that I turn to in the next section. 
 
 
 2.2 Hàowù 好惡 
 
Hàowù 好惡 are complex concepts in several ways. First, their meanings are interrelated 
with those of another pair, namely hăo’è 好惡, which share the same characters as hàowù 
but are pronounced slightly differently in modern Chinese. Second, hăo’è 好惡 designate 
primarily good or bad things in rough terms, and hàowù 好惡 are emotional attitudes of 
liking and disliking expressed towards those good and bad things. However, since the 
things that are either hăo or è are good or bad in several different kinds, one’s emotional 
attitudes of hàowù to those things are distinguished accordingly, and sometimes compete 
with each other in one person’s mind. In the following two sections, I analyze various 
uses of hàowù, hăo’è, and some other related terms in the Analects and other ancient 
Chinese texts, and try to extract some themes and questions that later thinkers discuss 
hotly and in a more sophisticated manner. 
 
2.2.1 The Semantic Range of Hàowù 好惡 in Early Chinese Texts 
 
According to the Hànyǔ dà cídiǎn 漢語大詞典 and the Daikanwajiten 大漢和辭典, hǎo 
好 and è 惡 in the pre-Han literature each have several related but distinct meanings.35 
First, hǎo means ‘beautiful’ or the beauty of a woman. According to Duàn Yùcái 段玉裁, 
                                                 
35 Hànyǔ dà cídiǎn biānjí wěiyuánhuì 漢語大詞典編輯委員會, Hànyŭ dà cídiăn 漢語大詞典 (Shànghǎi 上
海: Hànyǔ dà cídiǎn chūbǎshè 漢語大詞典出版社, 1989), vol. 4, p. 281 and vol. 7, pp. 552–553; and 
Morohashi Tetsuji, Daikanwajiten 大漢和辭典, rev. ed. (Tokyo: Taishūkan shoten 大修館書店, 1984), vol. 
3, p. 627 and vol. 4, p. 1093. 
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hǎo 好 originally referred to women (nǚzi 女子), but it came to mean beauty in general.36 
As a related sense, hǎo can mean ‘fine’ in terms of texture of things. Supposing that one 
of the qualifications for a beautiful woman will be her fine and soft skin, the relationship 
between these two senses of hǎo is obvious, and people are naturally attracted to (hào 好) 
things that are hǎo in this sense. On the other hand, è means ‘ugly’ or ‘coarse’ as an 
adjective, and various kinds of filth as a noun. And it is obvious that things that are è 
become the natural objects of people’s repugnance or aversion (wù 惡).  
Second, hǎo can mean ‘good’ in a material sense or ‘fine’ in terms of the quality 
of things, and refers to valuable things or things of good quality. In contrast, things that 
are è are of bad quality and consequently considered as less valuable. As in the previous 
case of hăo’è, things that are hăo’è in this second sense are also the objects of people’s 
opposite attitudes of hàowù. However, if the things that are either hăo or è in the first 
case (such as a person’s beauty or a piece of dung that does not require a highly refined 
aesthetic sense for their perception) elicit people’s immediate response by stirring up 
their appetitive desire or corresponding aversion, people’s response to things that are hăo 
or è in the second case seems to me less immediate. For one’s response of hàowù to these 
things will be often mediated by his evaluative judgment involving such concept as utility 
or the activity of weighing things of value. For example, a warrior would not like a sword 
made of coarse steel because it easily breaks and is consequently less useful, and one 
would desire a roll of silk more than a roll of cotton because she could barter the former 
for more things than she could get with the latter. 
Third, hăo means a good relationship between two (or sometimes more than two) 
parties, whether it be between countries, between rivaling clans or families within a 
country, or even between the members of a single family. This use of hăo is one of the 
most frequently found in the Zǔozhuàn 左傳 and the Guóyǔ 國語, and in those texts it 
often refers to the relationship of amity between two countries. Correspondingly, è 
sometimes refers to the bad relationship per se between any two parties, but more often it 
also refers either to misconduct or bad act of one party to another37 or to the enmity 
                                                 
36 Quoted in Morohashi Tetsuji, Daikanwajiten, vol. 3, p. 627. 
37 For example, in 561 B.C.E. the Zhèng 鄭 dukedom provokes a battle at her border with the Sòng 宋 
dukedom in order to make Sòng invade Zhèng in response and get into trouble. The Zǔozhuàn vaguely 
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between two parties,38 which hinder them from being in a good relationship. Now, what 
is the relationship between this sense of hăo’è and the attitudes of hàowù? When two 
countries (or sometimes several noble families within a country) agree to come into a 
friendly relationship in the Spring and Autumn period, they form a league by making a 
covenant. The covenant of this type describes the duties of the participants in the league, 
and this description of duties includes such things as mutual relief of famine, no 
monopoly of profit, no protection of criminal-refugees, and so forth.39  
What is noteworthy here is that this type of covenant almost always includes such 
phrase as “make one’s desire and aversion the same [as the other’s],” i.e. ‘tóng hàowù (同
好惡)’ or ‘hàowù tóngzhī (好惡同之).’40 As I see it, this phrase seems to generalize the 
other particular duty descriptions nicely, because if one country helps the other country 
recover from famine instead of invading that country by taking advantage of it, or if one 
country shares the profit from her natural resources with the other, or if one country sends 
criminal refugees back to their home country for punishment instead of protecting them, 
then these two countries can be said to share the same interests and respond to things in 
the same way. That is, establishing a good (hăo) relationship with another party involves 
a certain axiological process of setting the same standard as the other party with which to 
judge what is good and bad for oneself, and this in turn requires one to think that what is 
good or bad for the other party also deserves one’s response of liking (hào) or disliking 
(wù) respectively, even when one occasionally finds betraying the other party more 
profitable for oneself and is accordingly tempted to do so.41
Fourth and most important, one’s responses of hào and wù can be directed to what 
is morally good and bad in a broad sense. This implies that as long as one is a person of 
                                                                                                                                                 
describes this provocation of war as “[Zhèng] inflicted harm on Sòng (è yú sòng 惡於宋).” Zǔozhuàn, 
Xiānggōng 襄公 11. Yáng Bójùn, Chūnqiū Zǔozhuàn Zhù, p. 988. 
38 For example, the Zǔozhuàn, Zhāogōng 昭公 7 mentions the enmity between two clans of the Zhèng 鄭 
dukedom, viz. Mǎshīshì 馬師氏 and Zǐpíshì 子皮氏. The word for enmity here is ‘è’ 惡, presumably 
deriving from its verbal use of ‘wù’ (惡, to hate). See Yáng Bójùn, Chūnqiū Zǔozhuàn Zhù, p. 1293. 
39 “秋七月, 同盟于亳…載書曰, ‘凡我同盟, 毋蘊年, 毋壅利, 毋保姦, 毋留慝, 救災患, 恤禍亂, 同好惡, 
奬王室…’” Zǔozhuàn, Xiānggōng 襄公 11. Yáng Bójùn, Chūnqiū Zǔozhuàn Zhù, p. 989. 
40 The use of hàowù in this way is originally observed and explained in Chang Won-Tae, “Chŏn’guksidae 
insŏngnon ŭi hyŏngsŏng gwa chŏn’gae,” pp. 8–14. 




moral character to a certain extent, she can desire moral good and feel averse to moral 
evil at least to that extent. However, unlike the case of è 惡 that often very clearly 
designates either 1) misdeed or harm done to someone else42  or 2) various kinds of 
vices,43 it seems to be very hard to find a case in which hǎo exclusively refers to moral 
good. As I suspect, in cases where hǎo can mean moral goodness, it might mean moral 
goodness only inclusively. In other words, when a usage of hǎo seems capable of being 
regarded as referring to moral goodness or virtues, the context is often unclear whether 
the term hǎo designates moral goodness only or it could also include various kinds of 
non-moral goods. For example, the “Hóngfàn” 洪範  chapter of the Shàngshū 尚書 
contains the following passage: 
 
As for the head officials, they [tend to] be good only after they are given [enough] riches. 
If you cannot make [them] bring about good to your country [by giving them enough 
motivation], then they will consider their failure as their own fault. [But at the same time, 
if] they are not good [to begin with], they will do wrong to you even if you endow them 
with fortune.44
 
In this passage, we have two instances of hǎo, and the second one seems to mean ‘being a 
good person in character.’45 However, the first usage of it seems to refer to good things 
that these good people can bring about, and those “good things” do not necessarily mean 
only moral good. For it could mean, say, wealth and prosperity of the society as a result 
of the clean and conscientious government consisting of these good people. In addition, a 
chapter in the Lǐjì ascribes a story to Kongzi where he is asked whether the purpose of the 
rituals is to regulate evils (è 惡) and make the good (hǎo 好) perfect. In that story, Kongzi 
                                                 
42 For example, Kongzi praises the legendary brothers Bóyí 伯夷 and Shūqí 叔齊 that they “never bore old 
ills in mind and had but the faintest feelings of rancor.” “伯夷叔齊, 不念舊惡, 怨是用希.” Lunyu 5:23. 
Translation is from Arthur Waley, The Analects (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 2000), p. 105. 
43 For example, at a disciple’s question of whether a nobleman also hates something, Kongzi says that the 
nobleman hates those who [like to] talk about other people’s vices: “子貢曰: ‘君子亦有惡乎?’ 子曰: ‘有惡. 
惡稱人之惡者...’” Lunyu 17:24. For similar examples, see Lunyu 4:4, 12:16, 12:21, and 20:2. 
44 “凡厥正人, 旣富方穀. 汝弗能使有好于而家, 時人斯其辜. 于其無好德, 汝雖錫之福, 其作汝用咎.” 
Shàngshū 尚書, “Hóngfàn” 洪範. Sūn Xīngyǎn 孫星衍, Shàngshū jīngǔwén zhùshū 尙書今古文注疏, 2nd 
ed. (Běijīng: Zhōnghuá shūjú 中華書局, 2004), pp. 304–305. My translation of this passage is along the 
lines of Sūn’s view and the views of the traditional commentators that Sūn cites. The underlining is mine. 
45 Based on the same text that Sīmǎ Qiān 司馬遷 used in his Sòng Wēizǐ shìjiā 宋微子世家 and the edition 
of the same text that Zhèng Xuán 鄭玄 commented on, Sūn Xīngyǎn deletes ‘dé (德)’ from the original 
‘hǎodé (好德)’ phrase. See ibid for further discussion of this matter. 
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gives an affirmative answer to this question, and further specifies the list of goods that are 
completed by the rituals. What is noteworthy in this Lǐjì passage is that this list does not 
only include moral goodness in a broad sense or virtues such as harmony in the family 
(“sānzú hé” 三 族 和 ) or the demarcation between the elders and the youngsters 
(“zhǎngyòu biàn” 長幼辨), which entails the youngsters’ respect for the elders and the 
elders’ love for the youngsters. For as Kongzi in this passage sees it, the rituals 
appropriately performed in certain areas of human life can bring about certain goods that 
are specific in those areas, and those goods can include non-moral goods such as 
skillfulness in the hunt (“róngshì xián” 戎事閑) or military success (“wǔgōng chéng” 武
功成).46 In short, although these examples do not represent all of the usages of hǎo in 
early Chinese texts, they make a quite plausible case that hǎo in itself or things that are 
hǎo might not be exclusive objects of one’s desire for morality. 
Nevertheless, there is a near-synonym for hǎo, viz. shàn 善, which has as wide a 
semantic range as hǎo. And while meaning various kinds of ‘good’ just as hǎo does, 
when shàn is used in a moral sense it does not tend to include other non-moral senses in it, 
thus making itself a perfect object of one’s moral desire hào. To take examples from the 
Analects: Kongzi says, “Even in any [random] group of three people walking on the 
street, I could definitely find my teacher in it. I will select their good qualities and 
emulate them, and [discern] their bad qualities and correct them in myself [if I had 
them].”47 Although the ‘good qualities’ in this passage are not confined to moral ones by 
definition, given that Kongzi’s main concern is moral cultivation of himself and others, 
we have to interpret shàn here as referring exclusively to moral qualities. And according 
to Kongzi, one is supposed to reach out at the moral good as if it might elude him, and 
avoid what is morally bad as [one would do] if he [accidentally] stirred boiling water 
with his bare hand.48 In short, my point here is that shàn 善, instead of hǎo, often clearly 
refers to moral goodness and thus makes the primary object of one’s hào, desire for moral 
good or virtues. And we already have seen that è can refer to misdeeds, harm, or vices, 
thus becoming the primary object of one’s moral aversion.  
                                                 
46 Lǐjì, “Zhòngní yànjū” 仲尼燕居. Sūn Xīdàn, Lǐjì jíjiě, p. 1268. 
47 “三人行, 必有我師焉, 擇其善者而從之, 其不善者而改之.” Lunyu 7:22. 
48 “見善如不及, 見不善如探湯.” Lunyu 16:11.  
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2.2.2 Hàowù 好惡  in the Analects 
 
In the previous section, we have seen that hào 好 and wù 惡 are respectively one’s liking 
and disliking or desire and aversion for diverse objects. We have also seen that these 
objects range widely from things that deserve natural, immediate, and relatively universal 
responses from all kinds of people, to the kind of things that only those of proper moral 
cultivation could respond to appropriately. Now turning to the analysis of hàowù in the 
Analects, one of the recurring themes in Kongzi’s treatment of hàowù is that people’s 
liking and disliking or desire and aversion are different from person to person, and that 
people very rarely like morality or virtues more than the objects of their appetitive desires. 
For example, in his biographical remark Kongzi says that it was only at seventy that he 
could follow what his mind’s (xīn 心) desires without overstepping the boundaries of the 
right,49 and he repeatedly makes a disappointed remark that he has never seen one who 
likes the virtuous as much as the beautiful.50
There seem to be embodied roughly three questions in this observation. Namely, 
they are 1) how one could judge what are the correct objects of one’s desire and aversion; 
2) how one could enact one’s judgment about what to desire and what not to, sometimes 
against the stream of his other desires; and 3) how one could get to desire what he does 
not but is supposed to desire. In other words, when there is a disagreement about whether 
something is desirable or not, then there needs to be some sort of desiderative standard 
that everyone should look to. And when one already knows what is really desirable, he 
has to have enough motivation for enacting his judgment, quelling down all possible 
resistance from any other pathological desires of his mind. However, sometimes one can 
find that he does not have enough motivation to implement his judgment, or does not 
desire yet what he is supposed to desire. In those cases, one could want to cultivate his 
emotional attitudes and strengthen up one’s already existing moral desires, or develop 
new desires for the right things. These are the questions that I deal with consecutively in 
the following several subsections. 
 
                                                 
49 “吾...七十而從心所欲, 不踰矩.” Lunyu 2:4. 
50 “已矣乎! 吾未見好德如好色者也.” Lunyu 15:13. Also see Lunyu 9:18. 
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2.2.2.1 Hàowù 好惡 and Evaluative Judgment 
 
As we have seen above, hào 好 and wù 惡 are basically one’s emotional responses of 
liking and disliking toward what are good (hǎo 好 or shàn 善) and bad (è 惡). And given 
that what are good and bad constitute the primary objects of one’s desire and aversion 
respectively, it would be very plausible to think that hào and wù do not only refer to 
one’s feelings of liking and disliking but also sometimes to one’s more deep-seated 
attitudes of desire and aversion. For this reason I have been using liking/disliking and 
desire/aversion somewhat interchangeably for the rendering of hàowù so far, but there is 
also textual evidence for this indiscriminate use of ‘hàowù (好惡)’ in the Analects. Take 
a look at the following two passages: 
 
Wealth and high status are what men desire; [but if] they are not attainable with the right 
way, then I would not remain in them. Poverty and low status are what men dislike; [but 
if] they are not removable with the right way, then I would not leave them.51
 
If wealth can be pursued [in a proper way], then even the work of a marketplace 
gatekeeper with a whip, I will do it. Bu if not, then I will follow what I like.52
 
In the first passage, Kongzi acknowledges that wealth and high rank are what human 
beings, including himself, commonly desire (yù 欲). And for their opposite, i.e. poverty 
and low rank that human beings normally hate, he uses the word ‘wù (惡, “dislike”).’ 
This makes a clear case that wù can refer not only to one’s occurrent emotional response 
of dislike for certain things as we have seen in the Huáinánzǐ and the Lǐjì passages 
above,53 but also to one’s long-term tendency to avoid those things. Now as for the case 
of hào, it is noteworthy that in the second passage Kongzi says he will “follow” (cóng 
從) what he hào. For from the facts that 1) Kongzi already mentioned wealth as what 
human beings commonly desire in the first passage and that 2) he now uses a similar term 
to “follow,” viz. “pursue (qiú 求),” for wealth, we can conclude that Kongzi’s hào here 
                                                 
51 “富與貴, 是人之所欲也, 不以其道得之, 不處也. 貧與賤, 是人之所惡也, 不以其道得之, 不去也...” 
Lunyu 4:5. 
52 “富而可求也, 雖執鞭之士, 吾亦爲之. 如不可求, 從吾所好.” Lunyu 7:12. 
53 See footnotes 25 and 26 above. 
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specifically refers to his desire for things that he can legitimately pursue. In short, hào 
and wù, while sometimes referring to one’s emotional response of liking and disliking to 
various things, can sometimes also refer to desire and aversion. 
Now, if people have desire (hào) for good things (hǎo) and aversion (wù) for bad 
things (è), and they experience emotions of liking and disliking (hàowù) for good and bad 
things (hǎo’è) respectively, then how do people sometimes come apart from each other in 
desideration? In other words, besides the simple and clear cases mentioned earlier as 
belonging to the first category of hǎo’è in 1.2.1 above, why do people often conflict 
concerning what to desire and what to avoid? As I have alluded to while explaining the 
second category of hǎo’è in 1.2.1, hàowù seem to be somehow related to one’s evaluative 
judgment, i.e. the judgment of what is valuable or what is more valuable than others. And 
in relatively complex cases such as involving deliberation among several different 
choices or involving some sort of conflict between the demand of morality (whatever it is) 
and other non-moral values, it seems that people’s evaluative judgments are easily 
misguided, and consequently they come to have different emotional attitudes from others’ 
for the same objects. 
The statement that I just made could imply that 1) one’s evaluative judgment 
precedes one’s emotional attitudes of hàowù and that 2) how one judges the relative 
values of things determines how he would emotionally respond to those things. However, 
is it really the case? In 1.2.1 above, we have seen that there are certain things (e.g. a 
person’s beauty or a malodorous object) that draw immediate and quite universal 
emotional responses from many people. For such cases, there is no clear distinction 
between one’s judgment that this is a beautiful person and thus is lovable and one’s 
positive emotional attitude of liking for that object. If this view were plausible, one might 
think that we could postulate the same kind of theoretical relationship between the 
evaluative judgment and one’s emotional response in other less clear cases. That is, one 
might think that one’s liking for honor or dislike of one’s family member’s misfortune 
are not clearly distinguishable from his thinking that his honor or the well-being of his 
family members are highly valuable. 
I shall not try to provide a complete answer for this question now, because this 
issue is very complicated and requires a lengthy and more sophisticated discussion that I 
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will provide in Chapter 4. Instead, for now I will quote a passage from the Analects 
which seems to testify to the close relationship between hàowù and evaluative judgment. 
However, before doing so, I have to make a preliminary point. Earlier in this section, I 
have shown that hàowù 好惡 are sometimes used interchangeably with yùwù 欲惡 and 
mean one’s desire and aversion. Now let me submit another point that hàowù, when used 
for a human being, can refer to one’s love and hatred (àiwù 愛惡) for that person. For 
example, Kongzi says that one is still supposed carefully to study about a person even if 
he is loved (hào) by the multitude or if he is hated (wù) by the multitude;54 and he also 
says that it is only those who are possessed of the highest Confucian virtue rén 仁 that 
can love and hate (hàowù) other people correctly.55 Now, look at the following passage: 
 
[If you] love someone, then [you will] want him to live; [and if you] hate someone, then 
[you will] want him to die. [But if you] want someone to die, having already wanted him 
to live, this is a delusion.56
 
In this passage, Kongzi comments on the negative aspect of capricious affection. 
Specifically, he names it delusion or misguidedness, and by doing so he seems to be alert 
to the tendency of our affection to carry us astray and let us make a wrong judgment of 
the object in question. That is, when one feels inconsistent desires simultaneously for the 
same object, he is probably making contradicting evaluative assessments of that object, 
hastily basing one of his incompatible assessments on the positive aspect of the object 
and the other on the negative aspect. And perhaps his capricious feeling of affection and 
hatred for that object is to blame in this case, because once in the strong grip of affection 
or hatred toward an object, one seldom sees anything but what he likes (for the case of 
affection) or what he hates (for the case of hatred) in that object. In this light, Kongzi 
might be thinking either that 1) one’s evaluative judgment of things is affected by one’s 
emotional attitudes of liking and disliking, or that 2) the latter is a rather imperfect form 
of the former. 
This close relationship between one’s evaluative judgment and the emotional 
                                                 
54 “衆惡之, 必察焉, 衆好之, 必察焉.” Lunyu 15:28. 
55 “唯仁者能好人, 能惡人.” Lunyu 4:3. 
56 “愛之欲其生, 惡之欲其死. 旣欲其生, 又欲其死, 是惑也.” Lunyu 12:10. 
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responses of hàowù is more explicitly and even humorously illustrated by Zhuāngzǐ 
(365–290 B.C.E.), roughly two centuries after Kongzi. Look at the following passage: 
 
To weary one’s spiritual intelligence by trying to unify things without knowing that they 
are already identical is called “three in the morning.” Why is it called “three in the 
morning”? A monkey keeper handing out nuts said, “I will give you three in the morning 
and four in the evening.” At this, all the monkeys were angry. So he said, “All right, then 
I will give you four in the morning and three in the evening.” The monkeys were all 
pleased this time. There was nothing chipped off either in name [i.e. number seven] or in 
reality [i.e. seven nuts], but anger and joy were [alternatingly] exerted; this was also due 
to [the aforementioned mistake].57
 
It is a very clever satire that Zhuāngzǐ chose monkeys as the protagonists of his story. As 
he has clearly thought, primates share many things with human beings to a less number 
and degree: They have certain basic emotions such as joy and anger; they have their own 
unique preference about things; and they also have some amount of intelligence. In this 
story, the monkeys got angry at the keeper’s offer to give three nuts in the morning and 
four in the evening, apparently because they wanted (hào 好 or yù 欲) to get more in the 
nearer future, and thought getting less in the morning was bad (è 惡). And they got happy 
for the same reason when the keeper offered to give four in the morning and three in the 
evening instead, but they were not smart enough to know that there was no real difference 
either in name or in substance. And also recall my previous explanation of the 
relationship between hàowù 好惡 and xǐ 喜 (“joy”), nù 怒 (“anger”), āi 哀 (“sorrow”), lè 
樂 (“pleasure”) in 1.1.3 above (specifically around the Zuǒzhuàn passage quoted in 
footnote 28). Combining my explanation in that section and my explanation of hàowù so 
far, many ancient Chinese thinkers seem to have thought that “joy” or “pleasure” arises 
when one encounters an object that he likes (hào) and thinks good (hǎo), whereas 
“anger” or “sorrow” arises when one faces an object that he dislikes (wù) and thinks bad 
(è). And Zhuāngzǐ on this passage would be one of those thinkers. 
 
                                                 
57 “努神明爲一而不知其同也, 謂之朝三. 何謂朝三? 狙公賦芧曰: ‘朝三而暮四.’ 衆狙皆怒. 曰: ‘然則朝
四而暮三.’ 衆狙皆悅. 名實未虧而喜怒爲用, 亦因是也.” Zhuāngzi, “Qíwùlùn” 齊物論. Guō Qìngfān 郭
慶藩, Zhuāngzi jíshì, p. 70. The translation is a slight modification of Victor Mair’s. However, one might 
notice that I significantly disagree with him in translating the last sentence. See Victor H. Mair, Wandering 
on the Way (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1998), pp. 16–17. 
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2.2.2.2 The Standards of Hàowù 好惡 
 
In the previous section, we have seen that one’s hàowù (i.e. desire and aversion or liking 
and disliking) are closely related to one’s evaluative judgment, and that one’s peculiar 
kind of hàowù can affect one’s evaluative judgment of things. We have also seen that 
Kongzi calls both the problematic value judgment influenced by passionate affection or 
hatred and the consequent inconsistent desires deriving from it “delusion” or 
“misguidedness,” and that Zhuāngzǐ mocks those people whose hàowù result in defective 
evaluative judgment as well as inappropriate expression of emotions (such as joy and 
anger directed alternatingly to the same thing) by comparing them to monkeys. In 
contrast to this problematic situation of many human beings, Kongzi and Zhuāngzǐ both 
propose their own ideal types of human beings, whose hàowù either embody correct 
evaluative judgments of things (in Kongzi) or do not lead to endangering oneself by 
misjudging the relative values of things and to exhausting one’s spiritual life by abusing 
one’s intellect (in Zhuāngzǐ). Zhuāngzǐ’s view is well illustrated in a passage from the 
“Signs of fullness of power” (Déchōngfú 德充符) chapter of the Zhuāngzǐ, but I will not 
discuss it here. In this section, I focus only on Kongzi’s ideal type of person jūnzǐ 君子 
and his hàowù. 
Throughout the Analects, Kongzi often contrasts the character of the nobleman 
(jūnzǐ 君子) with that of the petty man (xiǎorén 小人). The word “jūn” 君 means “ruler” 
or “lord” and “zǐ” 子 means “son,” so “jūnzǐ” may have originally meant “sons of lords.” 
According to Hsu Cho-yun, jūnzǐ gradually came to refer to all the persons related to the 
ruling group by kinship, and during the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 B.C.E.) the 
term was mainly used to mean the following three categories of people: 1) lord, sovereign; 
2) son of a ruler, princely man, gentleman, nobleman, or officer; and 3) host, husband. 
These uses of “jūnzǐ” tell us that until the end of the Spring and Autumn period, “jūnzǐ” 
mainly referred to the hereditary nobility that constituted the ruling class of society in 
general, and it was also used by wives who would have considered their husbands as their 
masters and by guests who might have wanted to use a grateful and polite form of address 
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for their hosts’ hospitality.  58 On the other hand, “xiǎorén” 小人 seems to have originally 
referred to mín 民, who were ruled by the nobility and were mainly engaging in physical 
labors such as agriculture and handicraft. For we find many passages from various 
ancient Chinese texts, which seem to be descriptions of the historical situation of Western 
Zhou or at least idealizations of it as follows: “The nobility (jūnzǐ 君子) are diligent in 
government, and the commoners (xiǎorén 小人) are diligent in physical labors;”59 or 
“The nobility exert their intellect, and the commoners exert their physical strength. This 
is the institution of the ancient Kings.”60  
However, by Kongzi’s time “xiǎorén” 小人 came to refer to those who had 
previously belonged to the mín 民 class but now were newly establishing themselves as 
the lower strata of the ruling class. They could make their way up the social scale partly 
thanks to their own ability and diligence but also more importantly to the various 
socioeconomic changes that occurred over the Spring and Autumn period. Two of the 
most important changes in this period were the private ownership of land widely 
acknowledged for the peasantry 61  and the introduction of the taxation based on the 
amount of land owned instead of the previous labor service system.62 For these new 
institutions made some of the peasants work more efficiently in the fields that were their 
own now and consequently enabled them to produce surplus materials that they could 
dispose of at will. In this way they could accumulate some wealth, which in turn allowed 
some of them enough leisure to engage in various studies that were traditionally allowed 
only for the aristocracy and turn themselves into “intellectuals.” These intellectuals of the 
                                                 
58 Cho-yun Hsu, Ancient China in Transition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 158–161. 
59 “君子務治而小人務力.” Guóyǔ 國語, “Lǔyǔ shàng” 魯語上. Dǒng Lìzhāng, Guóyǔ yìzhù biànxī, p. 153. 
60 “君子勞心, 小人勞力, 先王之制也.” Zuozhuan, Xiānggōng 襄公 9. Yáng Bójùn, Chūnqiū Zǔozhuàn 
Zhù, p. 968. Also see Mengzi 3A:4: “或勞心, 或勞力. 勞心者治人, 勞力者治於人. 治於人者食人, 
治人者食於人, 天下之通義也.” 
61 Cho-yun Hsu provides detailed explanations for the nature of the private land-ownership by peasants in 
the Chūnqiū and the Zhànguó periods and for the several different ways in which the ancient Chinese 
peasantry could come to have their own lands, in his book Ancient China in Transition, pp. 110–116. 
62 Under the labor service system, the peasants had to devote a fixed amount of time to working on the 
manorial lands of the local rulers on whom they were dependent, instead of having private lands to 
cultivate and paying tax or rent for what they produced. But the problem with this system was that the 
peasants were not disposed to work hard on the “public land” unless they were supervised, and this system 
was gradually replaced by the taxation system based either on the amount of land or the amount of total 
product, as the general agricultural productivity in this period increased by such factors as the use of ox and 
iron tools for cultivating land. See Hsu, Ancient China in Transition, pp. 107–110. 
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xiǎorén background often studied together with the traditional shì 士 class under the 
same teacher, 63  and some of them held positions at their local governments. And 
consequently, they constituted an important social “interest group” in the politics of each 
state who had their own independent political opinions that the nobility could not simply 
neglect.64
This newly arisen xiǎorén class is viewed in a very negative light in the Analects. 
Kongzi tells his disciples to become an intellectual (shì 士) who represents not the 
xiǎorén class but the jūnzǐ class,65 and he criticizes one of his disciples as being a petty 
man because he wanted to have agricultural knowledge that would bring him immediate 
profit, instead of wanting to engage in the noble study including the learning of the 
rituals.66 It seems that in Kongzi’s eyes, what was most problematic about this xiǎorén 
class was the fact that these petty people were so concerned about making personal profit 
that they cared neither about observing social norms in their material pursuit, nor 
maintaining social harmony by sharing what they earned with other members of the 
society. According to Kongzi, the petty people are always concerned about land (as an 
important profitable resource),67 and they look at things only from the perspective of 
profit.68 And since they, especially those intellectuals who represent the interest of the 
xiǎorén class, hate poverty and think it shameful to wear coarse clothes and eat poor 
food69, they dare to do anything to escape such situations, and often end up going far 
beyond the boundary of social norms70 and turning themselves into a source of social 
disorder.71
In contrast, jūnzǐ, which had traditionally referred to the hereditary aristocracy, 
started to be widely used in the Analects for a virtuous person regardless of his social 
                                                 
63 Kongzi was the typical case of such a teacher.  
64 We can find a very illustrative example of this case in the Zuozhuan, Xīgōng 僖公 15. 
65 “子謂子夏曰: ‘女爲君子儒! 無爲小人儒!’” Lunyu 6:13. 
66 Lunyu 13:4. 
67 “君子懷德, 小人懷土.” Lunyu 4:11. 
68 “君子喩於義, 小人喩於利.” Lunyu 4:16. So, for example, having found the same size of tin block on 
the road, a legendary thief Zhí 跖 would think of casting a key to the rich’s storehouse, whereas a sage king 
Yáo 堯 would think of feeding the old. Yasui Kō 安井 衡, Rongo shūsetsu 論語集說 (Tokyo 東京: 
Fuzanbō 富山房, 1972), 卷二, p. 11. 
69 “士志於道, 而恥惡衣惡食者, 未足與議也.” Lunyu 4:9. 
70 “君子固窮, 小人窮斯濫矣.” Lunyu 15:2. 
71 “君子有勇而無義爲亂, 小人有勇而無義爲盜.” Lunyu 17:23. 
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origin or status. Throughout the Analects, jūnzǐ or the nobleman is praised as virtuous in 
many ways, and his character is sharply contrasted with that of the petty man (xiǎorén). 
For example, if the petty man is concerned about land, the nobleman cherishes virtue;72 
and if the petty man looks at things only in terms of profit, the nobleman’s mind is set to 
right. 73  Among the many characteristics of the nobleman that are highly praised by 
Kongzi, what is important concerning our current topic of hàowù is this: Whereas the 
desires for wealth, beauty, fame, and so forth mainly govern the thinking and behavior of 
the petty men and many other ordinary people belonging to the mín 民 (commoners) class, 
the nobleman (and other levels of virtuous people mentioned in the Analects such as 
rénzhě 仁者 “benevolent man” or shànrén 善人 “good man”) really likes virtue (dé 德) 
and learning (xué 學), and these two are among the most important factors that govern the 
nobleman’s thinking and action. 
The term that I just rendered as ‘virtue’ is ‘dé ( 德 ).’ According to David 
Nivison’s analysis of a series of inscriptions on oracle bones, turtle shells, and a bronze 
vessel,74 during the late Shāng 商 and the Zhōu 周 dynasties ‘dé (德)’ referred to the 
properties primarily of the ruler but also of any good person, including being generous, 
not self-indulgent, self-sacrificing (in a rare and extreme situation), dutiful in performing 
religious ceremonies, humble and polite (in the sense of ego-denying and being open to 
advice), and so forth.75 In other words, the virtuoso in the Shāng and the Zhōu period 
China is the person of generosity or benevolence, self-restraint or self-sacrifice, piety, 
humility, and politeness among others. And in this light, Nivison argues that it is proper 
to call dé 德 virtue or a collection of virtues.76 Now, carefully looking at these qualities 
of the virtuoso, what stands out about the virtuoso’s behavioral pattern or character trait 
                                                 
72 See footnote 67 above. 
73 See footnote 68 above. 
74According to Nivison, the dates of these materials are from about 1200 B.C.E. to a little after 1031 B.C.E., 
i. e. from the late Shāng 商 to the early years of the Zhōu 周 dynasty. David S. Nivison, ““Virtue” in Bone 
and Bronze,” chap. in The Ways of Confucianism, p. 19 and p. 27. (In this article Nivison discusses ancient 
Chinese uses of “dé” 德, which he wants to refer to by using “virtue” with double quotation marks; hence 
“virtue” left unchanged into ‘virtue’ in the reference.) 
75 For illustrative examples and explanations for each of these virtuous characteristics, see especially pp. 
21–24 (self-sacrifice), p. 26 (generosity and religious piety), pp. 27–29 (humility, politeness, and various 
kinds of self-restraints). 
76 Ibid., p. 29. 
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is that not only does he not advance himself at the expense of others, but he is even 
willing to sacrifice himself if necessary. Let us examine this aspect of dé further through 
the Analects and other ancient Chinese texts. 
According to Nivison again, we from time to time encounter a simple idiomatic 
expression common in classical Chinese, viz. “A yǒu dé yú B” (A有德於 B). Literally it 
is “A has dé with B,” and it means that A has done something for B, and B consequently 
feels a debt of gratitude to A.77 This sense of dé is very common in the Zuǒzhuàn. Bryan 
Van Norden points to a phrase of the same grammatical structure from Zhāogōng 昭公 
year 14, where Zǐqí 子旗, the prime minister of Chǔ 楚, has done a service to the Zhōu 
king and makes an excessive request for repayment.78 This sense of dé is also found in 
the form of verb, and the structure “A dé B (A 德 B)” means A thinks that he owes to B, 
or that A feels gratitude to B.79 And in the Analects, we find a passage where someone 
asks Kongzi about a traditional saying or a principle of action, viz. “Meet resentment 
(yuàn 怨) with kindness (dé 德).” To this question, Kongzi asks back: “[Then] what are 
you going to repay kindness with? Meet resentment with straightness and respond to 
kindness with kindness.”80 This remark of Kongzi’s implies that the attitude of dé in 
ancient China, for all its humble and ego-denying characteristics, is not close to turning 
the other cheek to an angry neighbor. In addition, it should be noted that “resentment 
(yuàn 怨)” is mentioned in opposition to “kindness” or benefit (dé 德), and that the same 
verb “bào” 報 (“repay” or “respond”) is used for both types of attitudes (“resentment” 
and “kindness”) or acts (“harm” and “benefit”). 
According to Chang Won-tae, in ancient Chinese texts such as the Zuǒzhuàn and 
the Guóyǔ we can find not only the structure of “A dé B” (A 德 B) but “A yuàn B” (A 怨 
B), and in both cases A thinks that he owes something to B and feels that he has to do 
something to repay or compensate for (bào, 報) what B has done to him. What B has 
                                                 
77 Ibid., p. 25. 
78 David S. Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism, p. 285, footnote 8. The original phrase is as follows: “楚令
尹子旗有德於王, 不知度…而求無厭.” Yáng Bójùn, Chūnqiū Zǔozhuàn Zhù, p. 1366. 
79 Chang Won-tae, “Chŏn’guksidae insŏngnon ŭi hyŏngsŏng gwa chŏn’gae,” p. 33. One example is from 
the Zuǒzhuàn, Xīgōng 僖公 24: “The king felt grateful to the Dí people, so he was going to marry a Dí 
princess.” “王德狄人, 將以其女爲后.” Yáng Bójùn, Chūnqiū Zǔozhuàn Zhù, p. 425. 
80 “或曰: ‘以德報怨, 何如?’ 子曰: ‘何以報德? 以直報怨, 以德報德.’” Lunyu 14:34. 
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done to A will be benefit in the case of dé, and it will be harm or injury in the case of 
yuàn. In both cases, Chang argues, the benefit or harm initiated by B to A makes both B 
and A enter particular types of relationships, and A’s respective ways of responding to B 
are very much determined by the nature of those relationships. So, in the case of benefit, 
A will try to repay B’s kindness in a certain way, and in the case of harm, A will try to 
return B’s ill-will eye for eye or in some other way. According to Chang, the importance 
of dé in the ancient Chinese political context is that through the exercise of dé, the 
benefactor initiates a friendly relationship with his beneficiaries, hopefully anticipating 
that such relationship is established and continued by the beneficiaries’ initial favorable 
response and the subsequent on-going reciprocal relationship among them. And this dé-
based relationship can be between equals, but more often it is between rich and powerful 
countries and small and relatively weak countries in an international setting, or between 
the ruler or high officials and their subjects within a country.81
However, as Nivison has already pointed out, the contents of such dé are not 
merely confined to material benefit or providing bounties. By examining the usages of dé 
in the Analects, we find that dé more or less refers to such attitudes or actions as 1) 
forsaking one’s interest for the greater benefit of the society in general, 2) modesty or 
unwillingness to offend others relying on one’s power, and 3) performing a service 
without considering the reward first. For example, Kongzi highly praises Tài Bó 泰伯 as 
having possessed a great dé. He was the eldest son of the Old Duke (gǔgōng 古公), who 
came to be recognized by his later generations as the dynastic founder of Zhōu. Tài Bó 
knew about his father’s great esteem for his younger brother’s son Chāng 昌, and decided 
to cede the throne entitled to him by primogeniture to his younger brother Jì Lì 季歷, so 
that the kingship could be eventually transmitted to Jì Lì’s son, who became later the 
great King Wén (Wén wáng 文王).82  Originally the Zhōu dynasty was a small clan 
governing a limited territory, but during the reign of the King Wén it came to be able to 
exert influence over two thirds of China. However, although having overpowered the Yīn 
殷 dynasty, King Wén still respected the ruler of Yīn as his superior, and Kongzi again 
                                                 
81 Chang Won-tae, “Chŏn’guksidae insŏngnon ŭi hyŏngsŏng gwa chŏn’gae,” pp. 31–40. 
82 “泰伯, 其可謂至德也已矣. 三以天下讓, 民無得而稱焉.” Lunyu 8:1. 
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praises him as having had a great dé.83 Finally, Kongzi repeatedly emphasizes that a 
virtuous person always engages in a difficult service for others first and think about the 
reward from it afterwards.84  
All of these examples and the previous discussion of dé as “benefit” or “kindness” 
clearly illustrate jūnzǐ or the Confucian nobleman as the person who initiates and tries to 
maintain a harmonious relationship among the members of the society. He does so by 
generously providing bounties when capable, but more importantly his power to attract 
people toward himself comes from his playing a virtuous role model, which moves 
people in the deepest of their hearts and elicit respectful and voluntary support from them. 
So Kongzi says, “[If you] guide them by edicts and keep them in line with punishments, 
the common people will stay out of trouble but will have no sense of shame. [But if you] 
guide them by virtue and keep them in line with the rites, they will have a sense of shame 
and [willingly] come [to you to be your subjects].”85 However, according to Kongzi, 
petty people are hardly susceptible to the nobleman’s moral influence. They are not 
respectful to noblemen (in the sense of their social superiors) and make fun of sages’ 
words;86 and they become disrespectful when closely associated with, whereas getting 
resentful when kept at a distance.87
My long discussion so far of the ancient Chinese concept dé 德 and the sporadic 
contrast between the nobleman’s and the petty man’s characters in Kongzi clearly 
indicate that (1) dé or the ethical attributes embodied in it is the primary object of the 
nobleman’s hào 好, and that (2) the petty man’s hào greatly digresses from  that of the 
nobleman’s in pursuing profit as the top priority. Here we witness a clash of preference, 
but it is not really a matter of “preference” but a matter of great importance concerning 
the correct evaluative judgment and social harmony deriving from the sharing of such a 
judgment. It is exactly at this point that the question of the standard of hàowù is to arise; 
                                                 
83 “三分天下有其二, 以服事殷. 周之德, 其可謂至德也已矣.” Lunyu 8:20. 
84 “樊遲...曰: ‘敢問崇德...’ 子曰: ‘善哉問! 先事後得, 非崇德與?...’” Lunyu 12:21; “仁者先難而後獲.” 
Lunyu 6:22. 
85 “道之以政, 齊之以刑, 民免而無恥; 道之以德, 齊之以禮, 有恥且格.” Lunyu 2:3. The translation is 
adapted from D. C. Lau, The Analects (New York: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 63. For my translating “gé” 格 
as “come,” see Yáng Bójùn, Lúnyǔ yìzhù, p. 12. 
86 “小人…狎大人, 侮聖人之言.” Lunyu 16:8. 
87 “唯女子與小人爲難養也. 近之則不孫, 遠之則怨.” Lunyu 17:25. 
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that is, how does one know that the nobleman’s desire and aversion or his liking and 
disliking are directed to the correct objects? Disappointingly, though, this question is 
never raised explicitly in the Analects. However, Kongzi’s thesis implied throughout the 
Analects that the nobleman’s hàowù are toward the correct objects can be taken as 
addressing a more basic question that I have raised myself above, viz. how one could 
judge what are the correct objects of one’s desire and aversion. In other words, to this 
question Kongzi is basically saying that in order to know what is the right object of one’s 
desire and aversion, one is supposed to look at what the nobleman likes and dislikes for 
himself and others. 
For example, Kongzi says that only those possessed of the supreme Confucian 
virtue rén 仁  (“benevolence”) can like and hate other people properly, 88  and he 
recommends to study carefully a person’s case even if he is loved (hào) by the multitude 
or if he is hated (wù) by the multitude.89 And additionally, at Zǐgòng’s 子貢 (a disciple of 
Kongzi’s) question of how one has to find a person’s character who is loved by everyone 
in town, Kongzi expresses the view that being liked by everyone does not make his 
character good or estimable; one can be considered as deserving esteem only when he is 
liked by good people and hated by bad people in the village.90 These several remarks of 
Kongzi’s clearly suggest some sort of elitist view of moral judgment: The judgment of 
the masses is not reliable; they might judge something good or right if they like it, and 
judge something bad or wrong if they hate it. In this light, we have to say that the 
nobleman’s judgment is not affected by passionate desire and aversion. On the other hand, 
it is not the case that all of those belonging to the nobility group judge things correctly. 
According to Kongzi, among the nobility there are people who are not “benevolent” (rén 
仁 ) 91 , and only the morally cultivated nobleman can see things from the correct 
perspective. 
Now, what does it mean exactly to “see things from the correct perspective”? 
Since we have seen that the nobleman’s judgment is different from that of the masses and 
                                                 
88 “唯仁者能好人, 能惡人.” Lunyu 4:3 
89 “衆惡之, 必察焉, 衆好之, 必察焉.” Lunyu 15:28. 
90 “子貢問曰: ‘鄕人皆好之, 何如?’ 子曰: ‘未可也…不如鄕人之善者好之, 其不善者惡之.’” Lunyu 
13:24. 
91 “君子而不仁者有矣夫, 未有小人而仁者也.” Lunyu 14:6. 
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some petty-minded nobles, one might think that the nobleman judges in a very sober state 
of mind free of the binding grips of emotions. This could be true to the extent that the 
nobleman is not affected by egoistic desires for profit and comfort which the petty man is 
very much vulnerable to, but the passages quoted in footnote 88 and 90 seem to indicate 
that the nobleman’s hàowù or liking and disliking embody the very standard of correct 
evaluative judgment. The point that moral judgment and emotions or feelings are strongly 
intertwined is made in a number of passages throughout the Analects. Let me take an 
example. Kongzi is supposed to be the first private teacher in Chinese history, whose 
education was actually quite profitable. His disciples served in many countries as 
officials of diverse capacities, and one day he complained that it was hard to find a man 
who could study for three years without wanting to have a paid appointment in the 
government.92 To Kongzi in such a situation, Qīdiāo Kāi’s 漆彫開 modesty would have 
been greatly admirable. Qīdiāo Kāi was one of Kongzi’s disciples, who Kongzi thought 
had learned enough to serve in the government. But he declined Kongzi’s 
recommendation to serve in a government by saying that he was not confident about his 
learning yet, and the authors of the Analects write “the master was pleased.”93
If pleasure (yuè 說) is one way of how you would respond to an admirable 
character or act in the Analects, disgust is expressed at a morally wrong or unacceptable 
behavior. For example, when Kongzi was visiting the Wèi 衛 dukedom, the duke’s 
beautiful but disreputable concubine Nánzǐ 南子 invited him to her place. Kongzi wanted 
to avoid this meeting but could not refuse, and when Kongzi was off from his meeting 
with Nánzǐ, Kongzi’s disciple Zǐlù 子路 expressed displeasure (búyuè 不說) about this 
event. As an intellectual aspiring to become a nobleman and further to be a rénzhě 仁者 
(“humane person”) himself, Zǐlù perhaps have thought that it was wrong for Kongzi to 
meet such a wicked woman. But as the text stands, we have no way clearly to distinguish 
                                                 
92 “三年學, 不至於穀, 不易得也.” Lunyu 8:12. 
93 “子使漆彫開仕. 對曰: ‘吾斯之未能信.’ 子說.” Lunyu 5:6 (Italic is mine). A related passage is Lunyu 
6:12. In that passage Rǎn Qiú 冉求, another disciple of Kongzi’s, complains that although he does not 
dislike Kongzi’s teaching, he lacks enough strength to carry it out completely (“冉求曰: ‘非不說子之道, 
力不足也.’”). His saying is an acknowledgment that Kongzi’s teaching has merits, and Rǎn Qiú makes this 
point by saying that he is pleased by Kongzi’s teaching. 
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between his moral judgment of Kongzi’s (mis)deed and his feeling of displeasure.94  
Moreover, the exchange between Kongzi and Zǐlù culminates in Kongzi’s reaction: At 
his disciple’s displeasure, Kongzi swears that if he had committed any adultery, Heaven 
will feel disgusted at it.95 Here we see not only the apex of Kongzi’s elitist view of moral 
judgment, but also the so-called sentimentalist view of moral judgment. That is, the 
morally cultivated nobleman’s hàowù embody the standard of what to like and dislike, 
but his liking and disliking should be in turn assessed against Heaven’s emotional 
attitudes toward things, which constitute the ultimate standard of hàowù for human 
beings. But admittedly, Kongzi mentions Heaven’s preference only to convince Zǐlù that 
he has done nothing wrong; Kongzi makes no systematic or substantial effort to know 
about Heaven’s opinion and follow it in every situation. 
So far, I have argued that the nobleman’s emotional attitudes of hàowù embody 
the correct standard for liking and disliking things, and I also said that there is not 
explicitly raised in the Analects the question of what is the further standard with which to 
judge whether the nobleman’s desire and aversion or liking and disliking are directed to 
the correct objects. However, we have already seen that Kongzi rejects hasty and 
inconsistent desires for the same object as “misguidedness” or “delusion” (huò 惑), and 
Kongzi makes some further remarks that would shed some light on the special character 
of the nobleman’s hàowù. For one thing, courage (yǒng 勇) is often regarded as one of 
the most important virtues in Kongzi,96 but he seems to recommend not to pursue it 
excessively. For example, one day Kongzi comments on Zǐlù’s character that he 
surpasses Kongzi in liking courage, but his excessive fondness of courage is of no use.97 
Kongzi also makes a general remark, again when commenting on two disciples’ relative 
drawbacks, that exceeding the appropriate degree (in liking and trying to enact virtues, 
e.g.) is as defective as falling short of it.98 Here Kongzi seems to have in mind some 
conception of the mean or appropriateness, and when applied to one’s hàowù, Kongzi 
might say that one must like and dislike things, even virtue and vice, only to the 
                                                 
94 “子見南子, 子路不說.” Lunyu 6:28. 
95 “夫子矢之曰: ‘予所否者, 天厭之! 天厭之!’” Lunyu 6:28. Italic is mine. 
96 Cf. Lunyu 2:24 and 9:29. 
97 “由也好勇過我, 無所取材.” Lunyu 5:7. 




appropriate degree.  
In addition, Kongzi also warns that unbalanced fondness of a particular virtue or a 
positive character trait can turn itself into a vice, which is, paradoxically, uniquely 
characteristic of that virtue or character trait. Kongzi points out six such cases in the 
following passage: 
 
If one likes benevolence without liking learning, its harm is foolishness; if one likes 
smartness without liking learning, its harm is groundlessness; if one likes to keep 
promises without liking learning, its harm is harmfulness [to other people and 
righteousness]; if one likes uprightness without liking learning, its harm is harshness; if 
one likes courage without liking learning, its harm is social disorder; if one likes 
resolution [i.e. firm determination] without liking learning, its harm is extravagance.99
 
That is, Kongzi thinks that if not balanced and rounded out by love of learning, the 
aforementioned six virtues or positive character traits can turn into six related vices (bì 
蔽). To elaborate, 1) if one likes practicing benevolence without being properly informed 
and sophisticated by learning, one can end up being foolish and cause difficulty for 
oneself; 2) if one likes only the brilliance of mind and does not have constant reference 
points to frame his mind by studying correct materials, the harm deriving from it is lack 
of foundation; 3) if one likes to keep promises blindly without proper study that would 
allow one to have flexible attentiveness to other considerations besides the demand of 
keeping one’s promise, such a person is a petty man100 who tends to harm others and 
prevent the Way from being realized; 4) if one likes to straighten oneself according to the 
norms but does not round oneself out by learning good manners, such a person tends to 
be very harsh about pointing out and criticizing other people’ mistakes; 5) if one likes 
courage (i.e. likes to do what other people are afraid of doing) but is not guided by proper 
study, such a person would often find himself in a socially disruptive activity; 6) and 
finally, if one likes one’s resolution and does not hold it back through the learning of 
good manners, such a person’s extravagance will result in frequent conflict with others. 
In my translation of this passage above I rendered the Chinese character “bì” 蔽 
                                                 
99 “好仁不好學, 其蔽也愚; 好知不好學, 其蔽也蕩; 好信不好學, 其蔽也賊; 好直不好學, 其蔽也絞; 好
勇不好學, 其蔽也亂; 好剛不好學, 其蔽也狂.” Lunyu 17:8. 
100 “言必信, 行必果, 硜硜然小人哉!” Lunyu 13:20. 
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as “vice,” according to several commentators’ view that “bì” 蔽 stands for its homophone 
“bì” 弊, which means “evil” or “harm.”101 While thinking that this makes good sense, I 
also think that keeping the original character will reveal an important aspect of Kongzi’s 
view on emotions and evaluative judgment. That is, “bì” 蔽 literally means ‘to block’ or 
‘to cover,’ and when used in the context of value judgment, it refers to the unclear state 
of mind.102 And in this passage bì 蔽 apparently refers to the clouding of one’s mind due 
to one’s single-minded or unbalanced fondness for one of the six different virtues or 
character traits. In other words, if one has strong and unbalanced fondness for 
benevolence, for instance, he tends to see things primarily from the perspective of 
benevolence and act mainly in accordance with the spirit of benevolence. It is granted 
that benevolence is the most important virtue for the nobleman to have, and also that one 
who acts out of benevolence in a proper situation has a good reason for his action. 
However, at the same time if that person is too much preoccupied with benevolence, his 
benevolence plays the evil role of clouding his mind so that he is blind to other important 
considerations for morality. This probably is what Kongzi meant by “bì” 蔽, and the 
nobleman’s mind is free of this kind of vice (bì 弊). 
To summarize, although it is Kongzi’s main thesis that the nobleman’s emotional 
attitudes of hàowù embody the correct standard of liking and disliking things for human 
beings in general, this thesis is arguably supplemented by sporadic insights throughout 
the Analects into the existence of standards of hàowù that are quite independent of the 
nobleman’s hàowù. They are 1) the psychological demand of consistency in one’s desire 
and aversion for the same object, 2) the concern for the appropriate degree within which 
one’s liking and disliking of things are to be kept, and 3) the importance of correcting 
one’s possible obsession with a particular virtue by engaging in the proper study. Perhaps 
Kongzi proposes the nobleman’s hàowù as the proper standard of hàowù for all human 
beings because he thinks that the nobleman’s hàowù are impeccable even in terms of 
these independent standards, and in this light the nobleman’s hàowù seem to be 
                                                 
101 For example, see Waley, The Analects, p. 250 and Yáng Bójùn, Lúnyǔ yìzhù, p. 184. 
102 In his collection of traditional commentaries on this passage, Yasui Kō quotes Wáng Bì’s 王弼 saying 
that “bì” 蔽 is failing to see one’s mistake [because one’s mind is clouded]. See Yasui Kō, Rongo shūsetsu, 
卷六, p. 10. 
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enlightened hàowù, so to speak. 
 
2.2.2.3 Hàowù 好惡 and Moral Motivation 
 
This section deals with the second of the three questions that I raised above at the 
beginning of 2.2.2, namely how one could enact one’s judgment about what to desire and 
what not to, sometimes against the stream of his other desires. As I have mentioned 
above, even for Kongzi it was not until the age of seventy that he could follow what his 
mind (xīn 心) desires without overstepping the boundaries of the right.103 And according 
to Kongzi, the nobleman has to guard himself against three things throughout his lifetime. 
He says: 
 
The nobleman has three things to guard against. When young, one’s blood and qì are not 
settled down, and the caution should be taken against [one’s lust for] the beauty. When in 
the prime of life, the blood and qì have become strong, and the caution should be taken 
against fighting with others. And when old, the blood and qì have already declined, and 
caution should be taken against [one’s] acquisitiveness.104
 
This passage views three kinds of primary human desires—viz. for sex, honor, and 
wealth—as rooted on the basic constituents of human body in three different stages of 
human life. Regardless of its details, the passage tells us that it is very natural for humans 
(men in this passage) to be lured by beauty, to fight with others in order to preserve one’s 
honor, and to try to satisfy one’s desire for gain, and even the nobleman is not totally free 
from such desires. In this light, it is very natural for people to pursue the satisfaction of 
their appetitive desires. However, Kongzi does not approve this kind of natural life. For if 
not regulated properly, that kind of natural behaviors would only incur rancor in others 
and lead to social disorder, and they are the primary object of the nobleman’s 
disapprobation. 
In contrast, Kongzi’s nobleman, although not completely free from his own 
appetitive desires, is supposed to like virtue as much as he would like the beauty, honor, 
                                                 
103 “吾...七十而從心所欲, 不踰矩.” Lunyu 2:4. 
104 “君子有三戒, 少之時, 血氣未定, 戒之在色, 及其壯也, 血氣方剛, 戒之在鬪, 及其老也, 血氣旣衰, 戒
之在得.” Lunyu 16:7. 
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and so forth.105 And we have seen that he cultivates his virtuous character mainly by 
happily engaging in the proper study of various subjects. Kongzi’s teaching seems to 
have covered diverse materials. Kongzi and his disciples engaged in 1) the learning of the 
Rituals (lǐ 禮), 2) the study of the Documents (shū 書), 3) the study of the Poetry (shī 詩), 
and 4) the learning of the Music (yuè 樂), and they are also very likely have studied the 
histories of the previous dynasties as well as that of the Zhōu dynasty. 106  Rituals 
prescribe proper behavior for human beings who are interrelated with each other in 
different roles and ranks within the society, and through the learning of the rituals one 
can get a firm footing [in one’s behavior].107 The Documents concerns what would be 
called the ancient Chinese political thought, including dialogues and instructions on royal 
virtues a ruler should have, desirable policies such a ruler should adopt, and proper 
principles or manner of behaviors for politicians to participate in the government with.108  
On the other hand, studying the Poetry provides one with the command of 
powerful affective imagery. By citing poetry properly, one can incite other people’s 
sentiments, and by observing the poems other people cite one can read their thoughts and 
feelings. This in turn facilitates one’s socialization with others, and helps one criticize 
others elegantly and gently when one needs to. In addition, by studying the poetry one 
can accumulate extensive knowledge on the names of various animals and plants!109 And 
finally, the Music includes playing an instrument, singing the poems along the tunes, and 
dancing. Kongzi says, “One gets aroused by the Poetry, is given a firm footing by the 
Rituals, and becomes perfect by the Music.”110  That is, the music composed by the 
ancient sage kings inspires one to the noblest thoughts and actions, and learning to play 
them and contemplating the spirits embodied make the culmination of the self-cultivation 
process. 
Now, since the unorchestrated pursuit of appetitive desires by everyone in the 
society would certainly bring about social disorder, it was beyond question that the 
                                                 
105 Lunyu 9:18 and 15:13. 
106 Cf. Lunyu 2:23, 3:9, and Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 86. 
107 “子曰: ‘興於詩, 立於禮, 成於樂.’” Lunyu 8:8. 
108 Cf. Lunyu 2:21 and 14:40. 
109 “詩, 可以興, 可以觀, 可以羣, 可以怨…多識於鳥獸草木之名.” Lunyu 17:9. 
110 “子曰: ‘興於詩, 立於禮, 成於樂.’” Lunyu 8:8. 
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unbridled satisfaction of desires and accompanying conflicts and crimes must be 
regulated. What was among the questions instead for the ancient Chinese in this kind of 
social turmoil was how to regulate people, or how to make the members of the society act 
properly. As we have seen above, the members of the ancient Chinese society were 
traditionally divided into two groups, viz. the ruling and the ruled respectively 
represented by the jūnzǐ 君子 and the xiǎorén 小人 classes (not in the moral sense as 
proposed by Kongzi).111 Although we do not have to assume that those belonging to the 
xiǎorén 小人 class are morally inferior by nature, the jūnzǐ 君子 and the xiǎorén are still 
very different types of people coming from different social backgrounds with different 
privileges and duties, and in this light we could postulate legitimately that the answers to 
the question of how to regulate people’s act might depend on which kind of people the 
question addresses. And regarding the second group of people (i.e. the xiǎorén class), the 
question specifically raised in the Analects is whether they should be kept in line through 
force or can be persuaded into order.  
Many rulers and powerful officials during Kongzi’s time thought that the masses 
would be best controlled by forceful means such as edicts (zhèng 政) and criminal law 
(xíng 刑). Jì Kāngzǐ 季康子, for example, who was the head of the noble Jì 季 family and 
the powerful minister of Lǔ 魯, asked for Kongzi’s opinion about killing bad people as an 
effective means for guiding the masses toward the right way.112 However, Kongzi stands 
firmly against such a trend of political practice that manipulates people’s fear. According 
to him, trying to keep the multitude in line by forceful means would make them stay out 
of trouble, but they will do so only reluctantly and will feel no shame at all for violating 
the rules, as long as they do not get caught. However, Kongzi suggests, the effects of 
virtue and rituals on the human soul are more deep and far-reaching than the effects of 
edicts and penal laws, and those guided by virtue and rituals would not only have a sense 
of shame but also become sincere and faithful subjects of the virtuous ruler.113  
This position of Kongzi’s clearly suggests two points. First, not only the 
commoners’ acts but even their character can be shaped in the right way; and second, it 
                                                 
111 See my discussion of each class in 2.2.2.2 above. 
112 “季康子問政於孔子曰: ‘如殺無道, 以就有道, 何如?’” Lunyu 12:19. 
113 See footnote 85 above. 
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does not have to be done by forceful means. Now, if one wonders how it is possible, she 
might want to look at the following passage. It is Kongzi’s answer to Jì Kāngzǐ’s question 
above about killing people to keep order: 
 
In governing your country, why do you have to kill? If you desire to be good, the 
commoners will become good. The nobleman’s virtue is like the wind, and the petty 
man’s virtue is like the grass. The grass will surely bend when the wind blows over it.”114
 
In this passage, Kongzi seems to think that the commoners have the ability to appreciate 
their ruler’s virtue and emulate it. As we have seen above, dé 德 not only refers to the 
bounties bestowed onto the commoners by the ruler or high officials but also to what we 
would usually regard as virtuous behaviors or attitudes such as modesty or benevolence. 
However, here we notice that Kongzi uses the term dé 德 in a slightly different way. 
According to him, if the ruler desires to be good, then his subjects will emulate their 
ruler’s liking (hào 好),115 so that they will desire to be good themselves and eventually 
become good. And Kongzi calls the commoners’ passive power of such emulation also 
‘dé’ 德. 
Here, though, remains an important question to be asked. Namely, what is the 
extent of becoming good for the commoners in the Analects? That is, does ‘becoming 
good’ only refer to the acquisition of certain behavioral characteristics such as the 
compliance to the rule or harmoniousness with other people, or does it go so far as to 
involve some sort of deep moral understanding? To this question, Kongzi says flatly: 
 
The commoners can be made to follow it, but cannot be made to understand it. 116
 
‘It’ here probably refers to the Way (dào 道), or the correct way of life. And this passage 
seems to say that after all, the commoners are like the blades of the grass; they do not 
bend themselves on their own terms, and once bent, would not remain like that for long. 
That is, the commoners will conform to the rule of virtue and rituals only as long as they 
                                                 
114 “子爲政, 焉用殺? 子欲善而民善矣. 君子之德風, 小人之德草. 草上之風, 必偃.” Lunyu 12:19. 
115 For the interchangeability between yù 欲 and hào 好, see 2.2.2.1 above. 
116 “民可使由之, 不可使知之.” Lunyu 8:9. 
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are exposed to the influence of the moral authorities; without those authorities’ moral 
charisma imposed upon from the outside, they are liable to resume their problematic way 
of life and pursue the satisfaction of their desires in unorganized manners. But as long as 
the ruler takes the initiative of playing the virtuous role model himself, convinces the 
commoners that he is genuinely interested in their well-being, and assumes appropriate 
degree of authority when dealing with them, it is often the case that the commoners 
would dare not to digress from the rule of morality. So Kongzi says to Jì Kāngzǐ’s 
question about how to govern the country: “To govern is to rectify. If you set an example 
by rectifying [yourself], who would dare not to rectify [themselves]?117
Admittedly, then, Kongzi does not seem to answer this section’s main question 
clearly for the case of the commoners. For if the desires for sex, honor, and wealth among 
others are biological facts about human beings such that even the nobleman should guard 
himself against those desires throughout his lifetime, then it remains very mysterious for 
Kongzi to say that the commoners who lack the chance of extensive moral training would 
not digress from the moral standards only by being under the influence of the well-
meaning virtuous ruler. Moreover, as we will see in the following, even two of the most 
talented and advanced disciples of Kongzi’s fail to place their desires for morality over 
the desires for non-moral goods, and Kongzi himself often complains of those who do not 
really care about the moral teachings.118 Presumably, for all these reasons, Kongzi has to 
admit that what he could genuinely expect from the commoners are their compliance with 
the rule of morality on the level of behavior and their trust, as opposed to knowledge or 
understanding that doing so is good in itself as well as for their best interest. 119
In contrast, Kongzi’s ethical expectation of the traditional nobility or the jūnzǐ 
class is quite demanding. As we have seen above, ‘jūnzǐ’ originally referred to the 
hereditary aristocrats related to the royal house by blood, without having any ethical 
connotations implied in its definition. However, in the Analects it became to be used 
                                                 
117 “政者, 正也. 子帥以正, 孰敢不正?” Lunyu 12:17. Italic is mine. 
118 For example, see Lunyu 9:24. 
119 This optimistic view that the populace are prone to emulate their superior’s hàowù is also found in the 
Mèngzǐ 孟子. But more interestingly, Mòzǐ 墨子 picks up this idea before Mèngzǐ and reinterprets it in 
terms of his own view of human action and motivation. And Hánfēizǐ 韓非子 further develops Mòzǐ’s 




widely to refer to the Confucian moral ideal, and Kongzi’s use of the term in this way can 
be interpreted as a serious proposal to the hereditary nobility that the ruling class of the 
society (jūnzǐ) deserves to remain the ruling class only when they struggle to transform 
themselves into the noblemen (jūnzǐ) through self-cultivation. 120  Then, what are the 
qualifications for being a nobleman? We already know the answer to this question. The 
nobleman, as opposed to the petty man who is only concerned with material benefit, sets 
his mind primarily to the right. The conception of the right broadly conceived by the 
nobleman includes commonsensical and intuitive moral norms such as the golden rule 
and prohibitions on killing, stealing, and so forth, but the aforementioned four subjects of 
learning—i.e. the Rituals, the Documents, the Poetry, and the Music—provide the rich 
contents for the concept of the right in Kongzi. And most importantly in the light of this 
section, the cultivated nobleman is the one who loves the learning of these subjects and 
the ethical principles embodied in them, as much as or even more than he likes non-moral 
goods such as wealth, honor, beauty, and so forth. 
Now, just as I discussed above how the masses come to emulate the virtuous 
ruler’s ethical preference, the question to be asked concerning the traditional jūnzǐ class is 
likewise what psychological resources they have in order to be motivated to the right way 
of thinking and action as prescribed in the high cultural legacy of the “great” Zhōu 
dynasty. As I see it, there seem to be two routes through which one can be attracted to the 
life of morality and the project of self-cultivation. One is that as long as one has a 
sufficient degree of calculative intelligence, he can see the overall benefit for himself of 
acting in accordance with the social norms or the picture of the moral ideal embodied in 
the Zhōu cultural tradition. In other words, this type of person is attracted to the moral 
way of life due to the instrumental value it has for furthering his self-interest. Given that 
those belonging to the traditional jūnzǐ class were not born the morally cultivated 
noblemen only by having “noble” blood, and also considering that their primary goal was 
certainly to keep their rank and privilege as long as possible, it is understandable that they 
might have been attracted to the Confucian ethical ideal of “benevolent” or “humane” 
man mainly for this prudential reason, if they were attracted to the Confucian ideal at all. 
                                                 
120 The reader might be reminded of Kongzi’s theory of the rectification of names (zhèngmíng 正名) by this 
and read Lunyu 12:11 in this light. 
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Indeed, we do find several passages in the Analects where Kongzi preaches to live 
or govern the country according to virtue and ritual, by appealing to the advantages that 
such a way of living and governance can bring about. For example, in Lunyu 13:4 one of 
Kongzi’s disciples Fán Chí 樊遲 asks Kongzi to teach how to grow crops and vegetables, 
apparently interested in making profit by growing and selling them. However, Kongzi 
criticizes him as being a petty man, and says thus: 
 
If those in the above like rituals, none of the commoners will dare to be disrespectful; if 
those in the above like righteousness, none of the commoners will dare to be disobedient; 
if those in the above like trustworthiness, none of the commoners will dare to be insincere. 
If [those above behave] like this, people from the four directions will arrive carrying their 
children on their backs; why [do the superiors] need [to learn] farming?121
 
And in Lunyu 14:41 Kongzi advises the ruling class in general to develop hào 好 (liking 
or desire) for the rituals by pointing to its immediate benefits. He says, “If those above 
like the rituals, the commoners become easy to manage.”122
However, those who like virtue and ritual primarily for their instrumental value 
can easily depart from the moral way of life, if they find themselves in adverse situations 
a little too long. In Kongzi’s eyes, the traditional jūnzǐ class of his time included many 
people who were to be considered petty men from the moral point of view,123 and he 
thought that such people tended to do digressing behaviors from the social norms if they 
had been put into hardships.124 However, this kind of moral precariousness was not the 
problem only of the “petty” members of the jūnzǐ class. According to Kongzi, zhīzhě 知
者 (“the person of wisdom”), one of the three types of virtuosos he occasionally discusses 
in juxtaposition to the other two—i.e. rénzhě 仁者 (“the person of benevolence”) and 
yǒngzhě 勇者 (“the person of courage”), also tends to suffer the same problem. Kongzi 
says: 
 
                                                 
121 “上好禮, 則民莫敢不敬, 上好義, 則民莫敢不服, 上好信, 則民莫敢不用情. 夫如是, 則四方之民襁負
其子而至矣, 焉用稼?” Lunyu 13:4. 
122 “上好禮, 則民易使也.” Lunyu 14:41. 
123 “君子而不仁者有矣夫.” Lunyu 14:6. 
124 “小人窮斯濫矣.” Lunyu 15:2. 
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Those who are not humane cannot endure hardship for long, and cannot enjoy pleasure 
for long. The person who is humane feels at home in humaneness, while the wise person 
finds humaneness [merely] advantageous.125
 
What I have translated here as ‘humane’ or ‘humaneness’ is rén 仁. Rén 仁 in the 
Analects seems to be used roughly in two senses. First, when used in a narrower sense, it 
refers to such qualities as benevolence, kindness, or goodwill for others.126 And secondly, 
when it is used in a broader sense, it designates the highest Confucian moral ideal that 
encompasses all of the positive ethical qualities such as deference, respect, loyalty, 
generosity, trustworthiness, and so forth.127 In whichever way rén is interpreted in this 
passage, the point of contrast is clear: Unlike the humane person who finds enacting 
humaneness highly pleasant and comfortable in itself, the wise person adopts rén or 
humaneness mainly because she understands how it will benefit her. But her motivation is 
not strong enough to endure hardships caused by practicing humaneness or even to 
remain pleased in performing humaneness in the face of such troubles and difficulties. 
This motivational inferiority of the “wise person” to the “humane person” is well 
illustrated also in the following passage: 
 
If your humaneness cannot keep what you have reached by understanding, you will 
definitely lose it even if you have acquired it. If you do not approach with dignity what 
you have reached through understanding and your humaneness can keep, the commoners 
will not respect [you]. If you do not move according to the rituals what you have reached 
through understanding, your humaneness can keep, and you approach with dignity, it is 
not yet perfect.128
 
In this passage it is not entirely clear what ‘it’ (zhī 之) refers to exactly; ‘it’ seems 
to be equivocal in referring at least to two different things. First, as the objects of the 
verbs ‘approach’ (lì 涖) and ‘move’ (dòng 動), it definitely refers to the commoners. But 
the ‘commoners’ can seem, at least at a quick glance, not to make a very good sense as 
the objects of the other verbs in the original passage such as ‘acquire’ (dé 得), ‘keep’ 
                                                 
125 “不仁者不可以久處約, 不可以長處樂. 仁者安仁, 知者利仁.” Lunyu 4:2. 
126 For example, see Lunyu 6:30 and 12:22. 
127 For example, see Lunyu 13:19 and 17:6. 
128 “知及之, 仁不能守之, 雖得之, 必失之. 知及之, 仁能守之, 不莊以涖之, 則民不敬. 知及之, 仁能守之, 
莊以涖之, 動之不以禮, 未善也.” Lunyu 15:33. 
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(shǒu 守), or ‘lose’ (shī 失), and this might be the reason why Arthur Waley rendered ‘it’ 
as ‘[political] power’129 and Yáng Bójùn ‘the office in the government’ or even ‘the 
entire world.’130 However, it remains still strange that the same ‘it’ should refer to such 
diverse things as political power or office on one hand and the commoners on the other. 
What I would like to suggest for this interpretive difficulty is to keep the rendering of ‘it’ 
as the ‘commoners’ consistently throughout the passage, while extending the semantic 
boundary of the ‘commoners’ a little bit for such verbs as ‘acquire’ (dé 得), ‘keep’ (shǒu 
守), or ‘lose’ (shī 失), so that ‘it’ could actually mean ‘the political support of the 
commoners’ when used with these verbs. In this way, without significantly hurting the 
consistency in the interpretation of the word ‘zhī’ (之), it is fully understandable that 
what is meant by “acquiring people” through one’s intelligence or wisdom, for example, 
is actually to “get people’s hearts” by knowing how to appeal to their hearts. 
Interpreted this way, the beginning part of this passage could be rendered in the 
following way: “If your humaneness cannot keep the people’s support that you have 
reached by understanding, you will definitely lose it even if you have acquired it.” And 
this means the following: If you have enough intelligence, it is possible for you to acquire 
the people’s support. For you might know that appealing to them with benevolent 
attitudes131 will get you their hearts, and you will behave according to the guidance of 
your understanding. However, it is more difficult to continue to keep those people around 
you rather than getting their initial support. For if you are not the right person who likes 
to practice benevolence for its own sake, you will occasionally happen to show your 
ulterior motive in pretending to be benevolent, and they will eventually turn their backs 
to you. 
Unlike the person of wisdom (zhīzhě 知 者 ), the well-cultivated nobleman’s 
commitment to morality is not easily compromised at the sight of difficulties, and the 
prime example of such a person in the Analects, besides Kongzi, is Yán Yuān 顏淵. 
Kongzi sometimes distinguishes himself from others as fond of learning (hàoxué 好
                                                 
129 Waley, The Analects, p. 188. 
130 Yáng Bójùn, Lúnyǔ yìzhù, p. 169. 
131 Here I am interpreting rén 仁 in a narrower sense. 
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學),132 but Yán Yuān is the only person throughout the Analects whom Kongzi praises 
for the same reason. According to Kongzi, living in a shabby street on a bowlful of rice 
and a gourdful of water is an unbearably depressing condition for many people. But Yán 
Yuān was not only indifferent to his extreme poverty but was pleasant all the time,133 
because he had a genuine source of pleasure: learning. Kongzi’s estimation of Yán Yuān 
for his fondness of learning was so great that when Jì Kāngzǐ asked Kongzi who was 
most fond of learning among his disciples, Kongzi said, “There was one named Yán Huí 
顏回 who was eager to learn, but since he has died unfortunately at a young age, there is 
no one now who likes learning.”134
From the fact that such people as Kongzi or Yán Yuān are very much indifferent 
to their material well-being as long as they can entertain themselves by leading the life of 
learning and moral cultivation, we could conclude that in contrast to the case of the “wise 
person” (zhīzhě 知者), the fully cultivated nobleman’s (rénzhě 仁者) motivation toward 
morality seems to come from the attractiveness that the moral way of life itself possesses. 
However, the main question in this subsection on hàowù and moral motivation still 
remains partly unanswered—namely, what psychological resources does the fully 
cultivated nobleman uniquely have in order to be attracted to the moral way of life for its 
own sake? At the beginning of this subsection, we have seen Kongzi saying that every 
human being, including the nobleman, commonly has desire for sex, honor, and wealth 
among others. And from my discussion so far of the motivational structure of the “wise 
person,” it would plausibly derive that the “wise person” in Kongzi is the one who has a 
keen understanding of how pursuing the moral way of life would best serve the 
satisfaction of his basic desires. However, given the difference we have identified above 
in motivational structure between the “wise person” and the fully cultivated nobleman in 
Kongzi, we could suspect that Kongzi’s nobleman has additional desires or likings (hào 
好) for things that constitute the realm of morality in the Analects. 135  
This being the case, what we have to investigate at this point is precisely the 
                                                 
132 “十室之邑, 必有忠信如丘者焉, 不如丘之好學也.” Lunyu 5:28. 
133 “賢哉, 回也! 一簞食, 一瓢飮, 在陋巷, 人不堪其憂, 回也不改其樂. 賢哉, 回也!” Lunyu 6:11. 
134 “季康子問: ‘弟子孰爲好學?’ 孔子對曰: ‘有顔回者好學, 不幸短命死矣, 今也則亡.’” Lunyu 11:7. 
135 The reader should be reminded that I use the concept of morality here very broadly so that it could be 
interchangeable with a quite broad conception of good life or ethical ideal. 
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nature of the nobleman’s hào for morality in terms of motivation. In other words, given 
that Kongzi’s nobleman has additional source of pleasure to the satisfaction of his basic 
desires, and since we have seen in a previous section (2.2.2.1) that there is a close 
relationship between one’s emotional response of hàowù and evaluative judgment, it is 
highly probable that the fully cultivated nobleman’s desire or liking (hào 好) for morality 
embodies some sort of knowledge or cognition that morality is valuable and worth 
pursuing. On the other hand, though, the cognition of morality’s value does not 
automatically motivate the nobleman towards the wholehearted practice of morality 
because, as we have seen above, Kongzi warns that the nobleman should guard himself 
against his own desires for sex, honor, and wealth throughout his lifetime. In this light, 
the cognition of morality’s value embodied in the nobleman’s liking for morality seems 
to be in a strained relationship with his basic desires. Or alternatively, the fact that the 
nobleman has desires for such things as sex, honor, and wealth indicates his 
acknowledgement that those things have value to a certain extent, and this in turn reveals 
that the tension in question might be actually between the nobleman’s hào for morality 
and his hào for the objects of his basic needs, respectively based on his recognition 
(whether explicit or implicit) of both kinds of values. 
In that case, there arises an interesting question in moral psychology: Given this 
picture of the nobleman’s hào for morality and the objects of his basic needs, how is it 
explained in the Analects that the fully cultivated nobleman likes morality or virtue and 
ritual more than he likes the beauty? In answering this kind of question, sometimes 
examining a case of moral failure or imperfection seems to shed more light; I would like 
to analyze two such passages from the Analects. The first passage is an exchange 
between Kongzi and Rǎn Qiú 冉求, one of the most talented disciples of Kongzi’s:  
 
Rǎn Qiú said, “It is not that I do not delight in your teaching, but my strength is 
insufficient.” The Master said, “Those whose strength is insufficient [just] collapse 
midway. But you are now drawing a line.”136
 
In this passage, complaining to his master about the difficulty in pursuing the correct way 
of life, Rǎn Qiú introduces two important points concerning our current inquiry. First, he 
                                                 
136 “冉求曰: ‘非不說子之道, 力不足也.’ 子曰: ‘力不足者, 中道而廢. 今女畵.’” Lunyu 6:12. 
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acknowledges that he feels pleased in practicing the Way Kongzi preaches. This means 
that he finds Kongzi’s moral teaching valuable, and is attracted to it. Second, however, 
Rǎn Qiú also mentions that he does not have enough moral strength. This reveals Rǎn 
Qiú’s implicit view that although the recognition of morality as valuable comes with 
one’s being attracted to it to a certain extent, the morality’s attraction is not necessarily 
strong enough to motivate one all the way to moral perfection. Would Kongzi agree to 
this view? Yes, he would. For in this passage, he seems to acknowledge the existence of 
those who are genuinely short of moral strength and would give out during the course of 
their moral journey, although he disagrees strongly that Rǎn Qiú is one of them.137
In contrast to Kongzi’s scornful encouragement for Rǎn Qiú, Kongzi seems to 
“draw a line” himself for another of his disciples, Zǐgòng 子貢. Look at the following 
passage: 
 
Zǐgòng said, “What I do not want others to do to me, I also want not to do to them.” The 
Master said, “Cì 賜, this is not what you can reach [yet].”138
 
Here we see a Kongzian version of the golden rule, viz. the idea that “my behavior or 
attitude affecting another person should in some sense be the kind of thing that I would 
find acceptable if I were the person affected.”139 In the Confucian tradition this had been 
called “shù” (恕 , “consideration”), and sometimes Kongzi seems to view it as an 
important constituent of rén 仁 (“humaneness”), the highest moral ideal in the Analects. 
For example, when Zhònggōng 仲弓 (an advanced disciple of Kongzi’s famous for his 
virtuous acts) asks about rén 仁 in Lunyu 12:2, Kongzi includes this maxim in the list of 
things for him to act on,140 and when Zǐgòng 子貢 asks for one maxim worth practicing 
                                                 
137 On another occasion Kongzi also says, although very reluctantly, that there could be people who are 
short of moral strength: “有能一日用其力於仁矣乎? 我未見力不足者. 蓋有之矣, 我未之見也.” Lunyu 
4:6. 
138 “子貢曰: ‘我不欲人之加諸我也, 吾亦欲無加諸人.’ 子曰: ‘賜也, 非爾所及也.’” Lunyu 5:12. 
Emphasis is mine. 
139  I borrowed this formulation from David S. Nivison, “Golden Rule Arguments in Chinese Moral 
Philosophy,” in The Ways Of Confucianism, p. 59. 
140 “仲弓問仁. 子曰: ‘出門如見大賓, 使民如承大祭. 己所不欲, 勿施於人. 在邦無怨, 在家無怨.’ 仲弓
曰: ‘雍雖不敏, 請事斯語矣.’” Lunyu 12:2. 
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until the end of his life, Kongzi again recommends this maxim.141 In any event, it is 
curious that Kongzi seems to take Zǐgòng down in the passage above when he says that 
he desires not to do to others what he does not want others to do to him. What is going on? 
What is it exactly that Kongzi says Zǐgòng cannot reach yet? I will suggest an answer to 
this question shortly, but I would like the reader to compare the following two statements 
first, as possible interpretations of what Zǐgòng says in this passage. These statements are 
identical but differently emphasized:  
 
(i) I desire not to do to others what I do not want them to do to myself.  
 
(ii) I desire not to do to others what I do not want them to do to myself. 
 
The first statement can be taken as a description of what kind of person the agent 
is in general in terms of the things that she normally desires. That is, when a person 
makes this statement for herself, she can be saying that she is the type of person who 
desires not to do to others what she does not want others to do to herself.142 On the other 
hand, the second statement can be considered as an indication of what kind of act the 
agent is willing to perform, among a range of choices she could voluntarily make. In 
other words, the speaker of the second statement can be simply saying that she is willing 
to act in accordance with this maxim rather than against it, insofar as it is under her 
control to do so. Now, I propose, the second statement as I just interpreted cannot be 
what Zǐgòng meant or what Kongzi thought Zǐgòng to mean in this passage, because in 
Lunyu 15:24 (quoted in footnote 141 above), Kongzi recommends this maxim to Zǐgòng 
as what he is supposed to practice until death. If Kongzi thought that not doing to others 
what one does not want others to do to oneself is totally what Zǐgòng cannot make 
himself do, why would Kongzi recommend it to him? So, we are left only with the first 
                                                 
141 “子貢問曰: ‘有一言而可以終身行之者乎?’ 子曰: ‘其恕乎! 己所不欲, 勿施於人.’” Lunyu 15:24. 
142 Another interpretive possibility is to take this statement as a description of the agent’s occurrent 
desiderative state. In other words, when a person makes this statement, she can be commenting on her 
emotional state that she is currently desiring not to do to others what she does not want others to do to 
herself. However, this interpretation is trivial and subject to what I just suggested in the text, in the sense 
that she can be desiring to act in accordance with this maxim only because she is the kind of person who 
would act in accordance with this maxim. Of course this excludes the possibility that she suffers a mental 
illness in which she occasionally feels this particular desire against her will. 
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interpretation open—i.e. Kongzi is denying that Zǐgòng has acquired the character of the 
person who would normally desire to adopt the attitudes or behaviors that this maxim 
would dictate, no matter how many times he could actually manage to act in accordance 
with that maxim. 
Now, in order to show how my discussion of this Zǐgòng passage contributes to 
making a larger point concerning our current question that I raised several paragraphs ago 
(i.e. how is it explained in the Analects that the fully cultivated nobleman likes morality 
more than he likes the beauty?), I need to discuss briefly what kind of person Zǐgòng was. 
First of all, Zǐgòng was a highly gifted person in commerce, and he was very much 
interested in making profit throughout his life. According to Sīmǎ Qiān’s 司馬遷 
biographical remark on him, after learning under Kongzi he left his master to serve in the 
government of the Wèi 衛 dukedom, and there he became the richest among Kongzi’s 
disciples by engaging in some sort of international trade—buying goods when cheap and 
selling them when expensive between the Cáo 曹 and Lǔ 魯 dukedoms.143 In addition, 
Kongzi once made a comparing remark between Yán Huí and Zǐgòng. He said, “Huí has 
nearly [completed his moral training], but he is often in want. Cì was not content with his 
lot, and increased his wealth; he often hits the mark when he predicts [the price of 
goods].” According to this remark of Kongzi’s, unlike Yán Huí who did not care about 
his material well-being as long as he could pursue his moral and spiritual perfection, 
Zǐgòng had a perpetual desire for wealth, and perhaps the satisfaction of it was part of his 
conception of happy life. And perhaps this was the reason why Zǐgòng tried to remove 
the sacrificial sheep from the gàoshùo 告朔 ritual in Lunyu 3:17: Traditionally, the rulers 
of the Lǔ dukedom had practiced a custom called “gàoshùo” ritual, in which the duke 
sacrifice a sheep to the spirits of his ancestors and announce them a new moon on the 
first day of every lunar month. However, by the time of Kongzi and Zǐgòng this practice 
became almost dormant but that a sacrificial sheep was still being killed every month. 
Zǐgòng, apparently focused on the material value of the sheep, wanted to stop the 
wasteful killing of it, and to such Zǐgòng Kongzi said: “Cì 賜! You care about the sheep, 
                                                 
143 Shǐjì 史記, “Huòzhí lièzhuàn” 貨殖列傳, p. 3258. 
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but I care about the ritual!”144  
The point of Kongzi’s retort here might be that Zǐgòng did not see the high value 
of the gàoshùo ritual, being obsessed with the inferior material value of the sacrificial 
sheep. However, Zǐgòng was not a petty man to the bone. On the contrary, he greatly 
valued Kongzi’s teaching, comparing himself to a beautiful house that can be peered over 
a shoulder-high wall and Kongzi to a great palace whose beauty and wealth cannot be 
fathomed due to the high wall around it, which is many times a person’s height.145  
Moreover, after all, Zǐgòng had enough intelligence to apprehend the bindingness of the 
golden rule—or the reasonableness of the maxim that one should treat others as one 
wants to be treated by them—and wanted to live up to it. Taking all of these into 
consideration, we can see that Zǐgòng’s problem is exactly the same as (or at least a very 
similar one to) Rǎn Qiú’s, viz. that one’s grasp of morality’s value is not strong enough 
so that 1) one is not motivated toward morality sufficiently (Rǎn Qiú), or that 2) one’s 
attention is often diverted from morality to other things (Zǐgòng). The only difference 
between Rǎn Qiú and Zǐgòng is that one thinks he is short of moral strength when his 
master thinks he actually has enough of it, and the other thinks he can reach what his 
master thinks is actually not within his reach yet. 
In short, the picture of motivational malfunction we could derive from both cases 
is that the strength of one’s recognition of morality’s value is not proportionate to the 
degree in which one is supposed to like (hào 好) morality. And based on this picture, we 
could postulate that the ideal nobleman’s recognition of morality’s value is such that 1) 
he gives the top priority to morality over other things of value, and that 2) the order of 
priority among morality and other valuable things is proportionate to the more and less 
degrees in which he likes morality and other things respectively. However, we still do not 
know how exactly one could straighten things up and acquire the fully cultivated 
nobleman’s character in the Analects. This is the question that I turn to in the next section. 
 
                                                 
144 “賜也! 爾愛其羊, 我愛其禮!” Lunyu 3:17. I provide a much detailed discussion of this passage from 
another angle in the next chapter. 
145 “譬之宮牆, 賜之牆也及肩, 窺見室家之好. 夫子之牆數仞, 不得其門而入, 不見宗廟之美, 百官之
富.” Lunyu 19:23. Note that Zǐgòng uses here a metaphor of wealth and goods in comparing his moral 
worthiness and Kongzi’s. In another passage, we witness him using a metaphor of commerce for probing 
Kongzi about serving in a government. See Lunyu 9:13. 
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2.2.2.4 The Cultivation of Hàowù 好惡 
 
So, the question that concerns us now is specifically how one could shorten the gap 
between the strength of one’s recognition of morality’s value and the degree in which he 
should like morality, and our task is to see whether we can find any answers to this 
question (or at least the beginning of it) in the Analects. However, before delving into this 
question, let me try again to explain more clearly what is the problematic situation that 
this question poses. In a previous section, we have seen that Kongzi postulates a close 
relationship between one’s emotional response of liking and disliking (hàowù) to a 
certain thing and one’s evaluative judgment of that thing. On this view, when two kinds 
of valuable things (morality and wealth, e.g.) are in competition, one is expected to like 
those things as much as she finds them valuable. Now, the problematic situation is that 
one’s recognition of the value of morality is not translated into one’s fondness of morality 
in due degree, and what I mean by the ‘due degree’ here is invested in the two 
problematic cases that we have just examined above. 
That is, on one hand, it could be the case that one has not yet fully savored the 
deep meaning and value of morality, so while being attracted to morality to a certain 
degree, morality’s attraction for him is not sufficient enough to overcome the attraction of 
other valuable things. In other words, one’s liking for morality has not yet reached the 
sufficient degree where she would not be tempted away by the value of those things other 
than morality. In this case, although one might think that one has exhausted the meaning 
and value of virtue and ritual, often it is merely a case of self-deception and one has yet 
to dig further deep into the mine (Rǎn Qiú’s case). On the other hand, it could be the case 
that although one sincerely thinks (or thinks oneself as sincere in thinking) that morality 
is of the utmost value, one is not infrequently distracted from the value of morality and 
pursue other things. This is a little paradoxical, because one’s evaluative judgment 
embodied in one’s action fails to accord with what one consciously thinks as of the 
highest value. In this case, the ‘due degree’ will be the proper degree of motivational 
power into which one’s sincere and conscious value judgment should have been 
transformed (Zǐgòng’s case). In any event, these two cases seem to share an important 
point, viz. that both cases require the invigoration of one’s liking for morality and 
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disliking for what is harmful to morality. 
Then, what we have to look for now in the Analects is Kongzi’s method for 
strengthening one’s liking (hào) for morality and disliking (wù) for what is against 
morality. However, concerning this matter things do not look very promising at least on 
the surface. For throughout the Analects, Kongzi does not seem to suggest any particular 
method for cultivating hàowù, which makes a direct reference either to the concept of 
hào or to the concept of wù. For instance, Kongzi says that “Liking it (i.e. morality or the 
correct way of life) is better than understanding it, and delighting in it is better than liking 
it;”146 and when Zǐgòng asks his opinion about the maxim “Poor without fawning, rich 
without swagger,” Kongzi suggests a better version: “Poor, yet joyful; rich, yet fond of 
rituals.” 147  It is clear in both cases that Kongzi’s nobleman of the highest moral 
cultivation almost naturally pursues morality taking delight in it, but Kongzi does not 
seem to provide any concrete method for altering one’s hàowù according to this moral 
ideal. 
This lack of concrete methodology for cultivating one’s hàowù in the Analects is 
markedly contrasted with Mengzi’s elaborate discussion of emotional cultivation over a 
century later. For example, Mengzi 1B3 and 1B5 contain Mengzi’s dialogues with King 
Xuān 宣 of the Qí 齊 dukedom concerning how the king could transform his desires (hào 
好) for small courage, beauty, and wealth and become fond of morality. Being fond of 
morality, according to Mengzi, the king will like great courage and want to share the 
beauty and wealth previously in his possession with all of the people in his country. It is 
very important, though, to construe correctly what is meant by this lack of concrete 
methodology for cultivating one’s hàowù in the Analects. Certainly, for one thing, it can 
never mean that Kongzi was not interested in the question of how to cultivate one’s 
hàowù. For it is clear from my discussion of the Analects so far that correct judgment and 
properly motivated action are closely intertwined with one’s correct emotional responses 
of hàowù, and Kongzi’s moral education based primarily on the curricula of the Rituals, 
the Documents, the Poetry, and the Music is all about producing the person of good 
character. 
                                                 
146 “知之者不如好之者, 好之者不如樂之者.” Lunyu 6:20. 
147 “子貢曰: ‘貧而無諂, 富而無驕, 何如?’ 子曰: ‘可也; 未若貧而樂, 富而好禮者也.’” Lunyu 1:15. 
72 
 
However, on the other hand, the specific problem under our consideration in this 
section belongs to those who have already engaged themselves in the noble study for a 
substantial period of time, and their problem is that they still either complain about not 
having strong enough motivation for morality (such as Rǎn Qiú), or wrongly think that 
they have enough motivation for morality when they actually have not (such as Zǐgòng). 
And Kongzi does not seem to handle this problem very well—for such people as Rǎn Qiú, 
he simply encourages them to study and practice harder by telling them they have not yet 
used up their moral energy; and for those like Zǐgòng, he would provide the same advice, 
telling them not to be complacent until they will have reached the highest plane of moral 
character. Perhaps then it might be the case, as David Nivison has pointed out more than 
twenty years ago, that Kongzi never solved this problem of “how to get at the 
unmotivated student” (or more appropriately here, insufficiently motivated student) 
successfully;148 perhaps we shall wait for later thinkers such as Mengzi and Xunzi to take 




2.3 Kongzi’s Conception of Emotion 
 
In Section 2.1 above, I suggested that we could have some ideas of Kongzi’s general 
conception of emotion by pondering the implications of various usages of ‘qíng’ 情 in the 
Analects as well as in other ancient Chinese texts. According to my argument, the ancient 
Chinese concept of qíng 情 has the following characteristics:  
(1) In addition to ‘facts’ of a situation and ‘characteristic features’ of a certain 
category of things, qíng also refers to what is sitting deeply in an individual’s mind in the 
forms of sincere opinions, goals or aspirations, desires for certain objects, certain kinds of 
temper, emotional or affective reactions toward a certain object, evaluative judgments, or 
certain characteristic behavioral patterns. (2) Such qíng, being considered as deep-seated 
in the innermost place of one’s mind, are partly expressed through one’s words and 
                                                 




manners. However, one’s external manners and speeches do not always represent one’s 
inner qíng correctly, and consequently careful observation over a substantial period of 
time is needed to know about a person’s qíng correctly. (3) The qíng conceived in this 
way are not the features commonly found in the species of human being in general, but 
the features uniquely belonging to an individual human being. And given the nature of 
the aforementioned elements of qíng (such as goals, desires, emotional reactions, and 
evaluative judgments), qíng is roughly equivalent to the concept of character that 
distinguishes its possessor from others. 
Besides making these points, I have also argued that (4) this sense of qíng as 
referring to various “psychological items” can be ascribed to one of the two usages of 
qíng in the Analects (i.e. Lunyu 13:4), and that (5) this sense of qíng is semantically 
commensurable with another dominant sense of qíng as referring to “facts” about a 
situation or “characteristic features” of a certain category of things. Moreover, I have also 
shown that (6) there exists a strong connection between these earlier senses of qíng and 
its later use as referring to prima facie emotions such as hào 好  (“liking”), wù 惡 
(“disliking”), xǐ 喜 (“joy”), nù 怒 (“anger”), āi 哀 (“sorrow”), lè 樂 (“pleasure”), and I 
argued that (7) these earlier and later senses of qíng are held together by the concept of 
hàowù 好惡, which I proposed to interpret as a broad conception of emotions or some 
sort of attitudes that are expressed as particular emotions depending on what kind of 
object one encounters. 
Now, from these characteristics of qíng we could derive two important points 
about Kongzi’s general conception of emotion. First, we could ascribe to Kongzi the 
view that emotion is an important part of qíng; and given the point (3) above (i.e. the 
rough equivalence between an individual’s qíng and her character), we could regard 
Kongzi as thinking that one’s emotion or one’s particular way of emotional reaction in a 
certain situation is an important constituent of one’s character. Second, based on the 
points (6) and (7) above (i.e. the close relationship between the earlier and later senses of 
qíng, which is made possible through the concept of hàowù), we could find some sort of 
structure in the Analects among the emotions occurring in the text. Specifically, I would 
like to ascribe to Kongzi a peculiar type of hierarchical relationship between hàowù 
(liking and disliking) and other particular emotions such as “joy,” “anger,” “sorrow,” and 
74 
 
so forth.  
I discuss these two points respectively in the following two subsections. 
Concerning the first point that emotion is an important element of one’s character, I first 
argue that the cultivation of good character is a primary ethical and political concern for 
Kongzi, and then show that emotions or feelings constitute the most important and 
revealing element of a person’s character by analyzing a passage from the Analects. And 
then finally, I discuss how a person’s character is intertwined with, expressed by, and can 
be cultivated through his particular emotions or feelings. Concerning the second point 
about the importance of hàowù in combining the earlier and later senses of qíng (i.e. 
character and emotion respectively), I focus on delineating the relationship between 
hàowù and other particular emotions in the Analects. Specifically, I emphasize the non-
hedonistic aspect of Kongzi’s picture of this relationship by contrasting it with the picture 
we have already examined in Section 2.1.3 above, namely the account in the Zǔozhuàn 
左傳 of how particular emotions such as joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure arise from 
one’s attitudes of liking and disliking (hàowù) towards different objects. I also elaborate 
the subtle but significant theoretical difference between the Zǔozhuàn and the Analects 
models concerning how hàowù organize the other particular emotions. 
 
2.3.1 Character Cultivation and Emotions in the Analects 
 
Throughout the Analects, we can easily observe that good character and the cultivation of 
it are among the greatest ethical and political concerns of Kongzi’s. First of all, Kongzi’s 
following remark clearly shows how much importance he places on knowing about 
people’s character correctly: 
 
Look at what he does, see what he acts through, and observe what he feels content with. 
[If so,] how could people conceal [their character]? How could people conceal [their 
character]?149
 
                                                 
149 “視其所以, 觀其所由, 察其所安. 人焉廋哉? 人焉廋哉?” Lunyu 2:10. For translating ‘yǐ’ (以) as ‘wéi’ 
(為, to act), See Yáng Bójùn, Lúnyǔ yìzhù, pp. 16–17, and James Legge, Confucian Analects, The Great 
Learning, And The Doctrine Of The Mean, The Chinese Classics, vol. I (Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 
2000), p. 149. 
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As James Legge has aptly pointed out,150 this passage consists of two corresponding sets 
of gradually heightening or deepening steps—i.e. on one hand (a) one’s ostensible act, 
one’s motive behind that act, and one’s innermost feeling about one’s own act and motive; 
and on the other hand (b) the gradual heightening of the observer’s attention 
corresponding to the gradually lowering degree of each object’s observability. And 
although we do not find in this passage any explicit term matching the English word 
‘character,’ what Kongzi is talking about here is doubtless character, because we come to 
know a person’s character mainly by observing how she behaves in a certain situation, 
what is her motive for behaving in that way, and whether she feels comfortable or not 
about her motive as well as her behavior coming out of that motive.151
Then, why is character such an important topic in Kongzi’s thought? There might 
be two reasons, closely related to each other. First, we have previously distinguished 
between two large social groups in the ancient Chinese society, viz. the xiǎorén 小人 and 
the jūnzǐ 君子 classes. And for the xiǎorén class, we have seen Kongzi arguing that (1) 
while not being able to understand things properly, the commoners can still be made to 
pursue the correct way of life, and that (2) they can be made to do so not by forceful 
means but by some sort of persuasion or moral influence. Once Kongzi acknowledges 
this point, he is logically to face such questions as what is the nature of the commoners’ 
character in general and how their character can be shaped into a moral one. On the other 
hand, for the jūnzǐ 君子 class Kongzi also argues that every member of the ruling class 
must cultivate himself into a nobleman, and Kongzi’s nobleman is the person of noble 
character who does the right thing only from the correct motive.152 In this light, it is out 
of question that character also occupies the central place in Kongzi’s theory of moral 
cultivation for the jūnzǐ 君子 class. 
                                                 
150 Legge, ibid. The similar point can be observed between one’s intentions or goals (zhì 志) and behaviors 
(xíng 行) in Lunyu 1:11, and between one’s acts (xíng 行) and words (yán 言) in Lunyu 5:10. In these two 
passages, the former are less observable than the latter respectively; and by combining these two passages, 
we acquire another interesting sequence, i.e. one’s words → behaviors or acts → intentions or goals (in the 
order of decreasing observability), which in turn reminds us of the third Guóyǔ passage (quoted in footnote 
18 above) on the relationship between one’s internal qíng and external words and appearance of that person. 
151 Presumably for this reason, both Lau and Legge supply the word ‘character’ in their translations. See 
Lau, The Analects, p. 64 and Legge, ibid. 
152 The reader can be reminded of my discussion of the humane person (rénzhě 仁者) in contrast to the wise 
person (zhīzhě 知者) in Section 2.2.2.3 above. 
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However, this seemingly individual moral concern of character cultivation is 
actually an important element of Kongzi’s political thought too, because in the Analects 
we often find the idea that good character is the very foundation of good government. For 
example, in response to someone’s question of why Kongzi does not participate in 
government, Kongzi quotes a passage from the Documents: “Filial piety! [Be] filial [to 
your parents] and loving to your brothers; only then [these virtues] will be reflected in the 
governing of the country.”153 That is, serving as an official in the ruler’s court is not the 
only way to participate in government, because such virtues as filial piety and kindness to 
one’s brothers constitute the very foundation of the good and harmonious government, 
and consequently practicing those virtues in the private realm is one of the important 
ways of participating in government. On the other hand, it is also true that good 
government is crucial for maintaining and improving people’s good character, because 
Kongzi thinks that the most effective means for moral transformation of the commoners 
is to recommend good people for governmental offices and let them play the active role-
model in moral action and moral cultivation.154 And this is the reason why Kongzi takes 
it so important to know other people’s character correctly in the previously quoted 
passage (i.e. Lunyu 2:10). 
Now that the ethical and political importance of character cultivation in Kongzi’s 
thought is clarified, what I would like to do next is to highlight the importance of 
emotions in Kongzi’s implicit theory of character cultivation. Specifically, I would like to 
argue that Kongzi thinks the most important as well as the most revealing element in a 
person’s character is her feelings or emotions. This point can be proven by further 
analyzing Lunyu 2:10, which was just quoted in footnote 149 above. That is, from 
Kongzi’s recommendation in Lunyu 2:10 to pay more and more attention for observing 
another person’s character as one moves one’s gaze from his obvert behavior to his 
covert motive and further to his innermost feeling, we could derive the following thought 
of Kongzi’s: Although one might do a right thing for some reason, he does not 
necessarily do so with a right motive; and even if one does a right thing from a right 
motive, he is always liable to relapse from the correct way of life, as long as he is not 
                                                 
153 “書云, ‘孝乎惟孝, 友于兄弟, 施於有政.’” Lunyu 2:21. 
154 For example, see Lunyu 12:22. I provide a detailed explanation of this passage in the next chapter, 
specifically when I explain Kongzi’s view of ài 愛 (“love”). 
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completely happy with his own action (i.e. the combination of his behavior and motive). 
In this light, Kongzi seems to think that (1) character cultivation culminates in making 
oneself feel in the right way, and that (2) one’s emotions or feelings arising in various 
situations, despite their extremely private character, are the most revealing indicator of 
one’s character when properly observed. 
Supposing that my general point of emotions’ importance in the Analects for 
character cultivation is clear, I would like to cite now a couple of passages from the 
Analects that will illustrate Kongzi’s concrete view of how a person’s character is 
intertwined with, expressed by, and can be cultivated through his particular emotions or 
feelings. Specifically, the following three consecutive passages contain Kongzi’s remarks 
on what kinds of emotions a filial son, or the person possessed of the virtue xiào 孝 
(“filial piety”), should and should not feel: 
 
1) The Master said, “In serving one’s parents, [one should] counsel them gently; [if one] 
sees that one’s advice gets ignored, [one should be] more reverent and never disobedient; 
and [even if they get angry and] give one a hard time, one should not conceive any 
rancor.”155
 
2) The Master said, “While one’s parents are alive, one should not go too far afield in 
one’s travels. If one does, one’s whereabouts should always be known.”156
 
3) The Master said, “One should not be ignorant of one’s parents’ age. On one hand one 
gets joyful by [knowing it], but on the other hand one gets worried by [knowing it].”157 
 
Just as many virtues in general involve lack of certain emotions or at least control of them 
(e.g. courage involving fearlessness or control of fear), so we can see in the first passage 
above that Kongzi’s filial son is characterized by lack of anger or at least control of it 
when dealing with his parents. That is, it is very normal for human beings to get angry 
when slighted or given a hard time unjustly, and we can guess from the prescriptive tone 
of the original passage that this might be also the case for ancient Chinese, even between 
parents and children. However, as Kongzi prescribes, the person of filial piety in the 
                                                 
155 “子曰: ‘事父母幾諫, 見志不從, 又敬不違, 勞而不怨.’” Lunyu 4:18. The underlining is mine. 
156 “子曰: ‘父母在, 不遠遊, 遊必有方.’” Lunyu 4:19. Translation is only slightly modified from Lau’s. See 
Lau, The Analects, p. 74. 
157 “子曰: ‘父母之年, 不可不知也. 一則以喜, 一則以懼.’” Lunyu 4:21. The underlining is mine. 
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Analects overcomes this normal inclination of human beings; he meets his parents’ slight 
with respectful obedience, and does not feel indignant at his parents’ unjustified 
punishment. 
However, this does not mean that Kongzi’s filial son does not feel any emotions 
at all. On the contrary, the second and third passages above clearly show that the person 
of filial piety in the Analects is characterized by rich emotional experience involving 
several particular emotions. First, despite no explicit mention of any particular emotion 
terms, the second passage above is clearly about one’s loving concern for one’s parents, 
especially for their emotional well-being. That is, parents normally get worried when 
their child goes too far on a travel, and Kongzi’s filial son is the one whose loving 
concern for his parents makes himself concerned that his parents will be worried when he 
goes on a far travel. The filial son informs his parents of his whereabouts in order to 
alleviate his parents’ worry, and behind this action is his filial love combined with the 
deep belief that serving one’s parents does not stop with fulfilling their material need but 
requires thoughtful care for their emotional welfare.158
Moreover, Kongzi’s filial son is not merely a person who is attentively concerned 
about his parents’ feelings while staying calm on his part, but a person who is 
emotionally susceptible to circumstances that affect general well-being of his parents. So, 
Kongzi recommends in the third passage above that one should not forget one’s parents’ 
age, because knowing the age of one’s parents is an important source of joy and fear. 
That is, being aware of one’s parents’ age, Kongzi’s filial son is happy that his old 
parents survived another year; but at the same time, he is also afraid and worried that his 
parents got one step further to their death.  
To summarize, (1) Kongzi’s filial son is the one whose loving concern for his 
parents makes him stay attentive to his parents’ feelings. In addition, (2) Kongzi’s filial 
son does not feel, or at least restrains himself from indulging in, certain disassociating 
emotions such as anger or indignation towards his parents, even if they were usually 
justifiable or at least understandable when provoked by other members of the society. On 
the other hand, (3) Kongzi’s filial son cultivates certain positive emotions such as 
                                                 
158 The importance of paying attention to parents’ feelings when serving them is well illustrated in Lunyu 
2:7 and 2:8. 
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reverence for his parents, and voluntarily leaves himself vulnerable to the uneasy sweep 
of emotions, including the agony of fear or worry about his parents’ misfortune. 
 
2.3.2 Hàowù and the Structure of Emotions in the Analects 
 
In Section 2.1.3 above, I have discussed a passage from the Zǔozhuàn that suggests an 
interesting view of the relationship between hàowù and particular emotions. According to 
this view, human beings have two pairs of basic emotions, viz. “joy” (xǐ 喜) and “anger” 
(nù 怒) on one hand and “pleasure” (lè 樂) and “sorrow” (āi 哀) on the other, and they 
respectively originate from another set of broad conception of emotions, namely liking 
and disliking or desire and aversion (hàowù 好惡). In addition, I have also suggested 
assimilating hàowù 好惡 to John Rawls’s conception of attitude, which he defines as “a 
set of ordered families of dispositions.” A good example of Rawls’s conception of attitude 
is love; according to him, love consists of a set of dispositions such as the disposition to 
feel joy at the presence of the person one loves and the disposition to feel sorrow when 
one’s loved one suffers. And I have argued, since the Zǔozhuàn passage in question says 
that 1) xǐ 喜  (“joy”) and nù 怒 (“anger”) derive respectively from hào 好 and wù 惡 and 
that 2) lè 樂 (“pleasure”) and āi 哀 (“sorrow”) arise respectively by encountering good 
and bad things, we could likewise conclude that hàowù or desire and aversion are two 
opposite attitudes consisting of dispositions to be expressed as joy or pleasure and anger 
or sorrow respectively, depending on the object one encounters. 
In addition to providing a picture of the hierarchical structure of emotions 
between hàowù and other particular emotions, this Zǔozhuàn passage also deserves a 
special attention in suggesting a monolithic view of human motivation. According to this 
passage, positive emotions such as joy and pleasure result from the satisfaction of one’s 
desires (hào), whereas negative emotions such as anger and sorrow result from 
experiencing frustration of one’s desires or encountering bad things that one do not like at 
all (wù). Furthermore, the passage points out that life and death are two primary examples 
of good and bad things that people respectively pursue and avoid, and it also recommends 
that the ruler manipulate people’s behavior by taking advantage of this general 
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inclinations of human beings. In other words, given that it is a general human tendency to 
pursue what is conducive to one’s life and prosperity and avoid what will bring about 
suffering and death, the ruler can make his people act in one way rather than the other by 
deploying rewards and punishments accordingly. 
Now concerning Kongzi’s general conception of the structure of emotions, I think 
we can ascribe to Kongzi this Zǔozhuàn picture to some extent, viz. the picture that 
particular emotions arise as the results of one’s emotional response of liking and disliking 
to various objects. To take an example from the two passages quoted at the end of the 
previous section (footnote 155 and 157), people usually get angry when they are slighted, 
remain joyful when their loved ones are well, and stay worried when they anticipate bad 
things for their loved ones. And apparently, they would not have these feelings unless 
they believe that slight on their self-esteem from others and misfortunes for their loved 
ones are also bad things for themselves, whereas the welfare of their loved ones is also a 
good thing for themselves. 
However, this cannot mean that people’s general attitudes of desire and aversion 
or liking and disliking (hàowù) are the sufficient conditions for people to feel particular 
emotions such as anger, sorrow, fear, shame, resentment, and so forth. For even if one 
desires (hào) that only good things happen to one’s loved ones, this does not make one 
necessarily feel sorrow among other emotions when misfortune hits one’s loved ones; 
and even if one does not like (wù) to be slighted, one would not necessarily feel anger 
when slighted, say, as opposed to frustration. 159  However, the Zǔozhuàn passage in 
question explicitly says that “joy” and “pleasure” come from the satisfaction of desire, 
while “anger” and “sorrow” come from the feeling of aversion, without further specifying 
under which conditions one’s equally positive or negative emotional reactions are 
subdivided into “joy” and “pleasure” or “anger” and “sorrow.” Perhaps the author of the 
passage did not think carefully enough about this issue. Then, what about Kongzi? Would 
he suffer the same problem? 
As I see it, an important difference between this Zǔozhuàn passage and Kongzi’s 
remarks on hàowù and other emotions in the Analects is that the latter is theoretically 
much more flexible and seemingly reluctant to propose any strong doctrinal theses about 
                                                 
159 Stephen Darwall pointed this out to me in a private discussion on 10/3/06. 
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emotions. 160  For example, Kongzi does not make any explicit claim that particular 
emotions are generated (shēng 生) from two fundamental human attitudes of liking and 
disliking. His theoretical flexibility of this kind enables us to interpret his view of the 
relationship between hàowù and other particular emotions in a more plausible way. In a 
nutshell, I would like to ascribe to Kongzi a view that one’s opposite attitudes of liking 
and disliking represent one’s emotional reactions to diverse stimuli in the most general 
and basic way, and one’s particular emotions can be further distinguished out of these 
two basic categories by specifying the conditions and evaluative beliefs involved in the 
occurrence of the respective particular emotions.  
In other words, in my view Kongzi thinks that human beings experience emotions 
on two different levels: on the lower level of the generic responses of liking and disliking, 
and on the higher level of particular emotions. For example, if one feels particular 
emotions such as joy, pride, and admiration for distinct objects, one also finds those 
objects likable (hǎo) and simultaneously likes (hào) those objects. On the other hand, if 
one feels distinct emotions such as anger, sorrow, and shame toward the respective 
objects of these emotions, one also finds the objects of these emotions dislikable or bad (è) 
and simultaneously dislikes (wù) those objects. Analyzing Kongzi’s use of “hào” in 
Lunyu 9:18 can prove this point: Among the usual emotions one can feel about having a 
beautiful woman (sè 色) as one’s wife are included joy and pride, and about a virtuous 
person (dé 德) one can feel admiration or respect. And the ancient Chinese terms for 
these particular emotions are part of Kongzi’s usual vocabulary. In Lunyu 9:18, though, 
Kongzi also uses the verb “hào” for both objects (i.e. a beautiful woman and a 
virtuoso),161 and this clearly shows that the general emotional response of liking (hào) 
permeates the particular positive emotions like joy, pride, admiration, respect, and so 
forth in Kongzi’s view of emotions.162
In addition, we have already seen that people’s general attitudes of liking and 
disliking are closely intertwined with their evaluative thinking in the Analects, and in 
                                                 
160 This could be a sign that the Zǔozhuàn passage in question was written in a later period than most of the 
relevant remarks on hàowù in the Analects. 
161 “吾未見好德如好色者也.” Lunyu 9:18. 
162 The same point can be easily made about wù (dislike) and particular negative emotions such as anger, 
sorrow, shame, resentment, disgust, and so forth. 
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principle people’s evaluative thinking can be concerned not only with general 
assessments of whether something is likable or dislikable but also with more concrete 
assessments such as whether certain things or situations deserve the responses of joy, 
pride, admiration, anger, fear, shame, and so forth respectively. In this light, we could 
also project a two-level structure of evaluative thinking to Kongzi which corresponds to 
the two-level structure of emotions just described. That is, just as the generic human 
responses of liking and disliking are further concretized as we examine the particular 
circumstantial conditions and evaluative beliefs involved in the occurrence of particular 
emotions, so the generic evaluative assessments of certain things’ favorable or 
unfavorable attributes get further specified as we examine the distinct factors for each of 
the situations. And particular evaluative attitudes—e.g. “I have been unjustly slighted,” 
“My grandmother, who loved me so much, is no longer with me,” “Tom made such a 
great sacrifice for his football team.”—provide the most crucial elements for the 
occurrence of particular emotions corresponding to those attitudes respectively. 
Besides this difference between the Zǔozhuàn and the Analects on the relationship 
between hàowù and other particular emotions, I also see another significant area of 
discrepancy between Kongzi’s conception of emotion and this Zǔozhuàn picture: I think 
that Kongzi’s conception of hàowù involves a much more complex view of human desire 
than what is delineated in the Zǔozhuàn passage. As I have just said, 1) Kongzi postulates 
a strong relationship between one’s emotional responses of hàowù and one’s evaluative 
attitudes, and 2) the crucial difference between the cultivated nobleman and the petty or 
ordinary man in Kongzi is that they take different things as the objects of their respective 
desires and aversions. For example, Kongzi’s nobleman, who is a filial son to his parents, 
goes against the general human tendency to get angry when slighted or unjustly punished, 
when the slight or punishment is from his parents. For in the eye of this Confucian 
nobleman, the slight or punishment occasionally given by his parents are nothing 
compared to the great parental love his parents have continuously showed for his well-
being. In addition, Kongzi’s filial son does not simply follow the general tendency of 
human beings to feel fear and worry when their parents’ well-being is threatened; he 
actually tends to exceed the ordinary degree in feeling these emotions about his parents. 
In other words, Kongzi’s filial son places the highest value on the welfare of his parents, 
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and consequently he becomes especially susceptible to these feelings when his parents’ 
well-being is threatened. 
 
So far, I have discussed Kongzi’s conception of emotion focusing on two aspects: 
1) the importance of emotion in his view of character cultivation, and 2) how one’s desire 
and aversion (hàowù) intertwined with one’s evaluative attitudes play a pivotal role in 
organizing particular emotional reactions in various situations. And based on my analysis 
of Kongzi’s remarks on the emotional states of the filial son, I have also argued that the 
cultivated nobleman in the Analects is not merely a person of equanimity who is calmly 
concerned about the well-being of oneself as well as of others, but a person of rich 
emotional experiences that reveal his character. In the next chapter, I elaborate this 
picture of Kongzi’s emotional ideal by discussing a number of passages in the Analects 
that contain Kongzi’s and his immediate disciples’ views of concrete emotion terms. 
Specifically, I focus my attention on several ancient Chinese emotion terms that might be 




Love, Sorrow, and Fear in the Analects 
 
 
In this chapter, I discuss three sets of ancient Chinese emotion terms that could be very 
roughly rendered as “love,” “sorrow,” and “fear” respectively. What I discuss under the 
category of “love” is “ài” 愛, and I interpret this concept to consist mainly of 1) one’s 
natural affection for close people and 2) one’s universal caring attitude adopted towards 
those who are not the primary objects of one’s natural affection. This sub-distinction of 
“love” nicely matches that of “sorrow”—“āi” 哀  in ancient Chinese: I interpret the 
emotion of āi 哀 to comprise 1) one’s deep sadness at the loss of close people and 2) 
one’s sympathy at the misfortune of others. As I will argue later in Chapter 6, one’s 
natural affection for close people is expressed as sorrow when misfortune befalls them, 
and the caring attitude one adopts for everyone can be based on her sympathy at the 
suffering of others. Finally, I divide the category of “fear” in the Analects further into 1) 
natural fear for things that directly threaten one’s existence, 2) apprehension or anxiety 
that bad things might happen to oneself or one’s loved ones, and 3) a kind of moral or 
religious awe and reverence. I discuss “jù” 懼, “kǒng” 恐, and “wèi” 畏 for these topics. 
In the Analects, the well-cultivated nobleman is often presented to have three cardinal 
virtues: rén 仁 (“benevolence”), zhī 知 (“wisdom”), and yǒng 勇 (“courage”).1 Among 
these, the nobleman’s ài 愛 and āi 哀 constitute the core of his rén 仁, and the nobleman 
cultivates courage by working on his various kinds of fear. In this sense, understanding 
Kongzi’s view of “love,” “sorrow,” and “fear” is the key to understanding the character of 
Kongzi’s virtuoso. 
 
                                                 
1 For example, see Lunyu 9:29, 14:4, and 14:28. 
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3.1 “Love” (Ài 愛) 
 
Love is no doubt one of the most complex emotions to analyze, and this is not the case 
only in the Analects. In general, love sometimes seems to mean our feeling of affection 
for our family members and other beloved ones, but we are also often exposed to 
religious sermons that recommend us to love our neighbors as much as ourselves, and 
even to love our “enemies.” Apparently these two kinds of love are different from each 
other; one is our natural affection that we are born with as normal human beings, whereas 
the other is a moral or religious virtue that is not naturally given to us but needs to be 
cultivated one way or another. The ancient Chinese term that I discuss in this section 
under the category of “love” is “ài” 愛, and we seem to find a roughly similar distinction 
in the Analects: on one hand ài 愛 as natural affection for close people, and on the other 
hand ài as an indiscriminate attitude of care that any virtuous person is supposed to 
assume universally toward all human beings. 
In addition to these two, we have another sense of ài. This third sense of ài is 
traditionally glossed as xī 惜2 and sometimes translated as “grudging,”3 in the sense of 
being stingy or feeling reluctant to forsake or give up something. A typical example of 
such usage of “ài” can be seen in Mengzi 1A:7: One day, the ruler of the Qí 齊 dukedom 
happened to see an ox being led to slaughter to be killed for a sacrifice, and he ordered 
the ox to be replaced by a sheep. He gave this order because he felt compassion for the 
miserable situation of that ox, but other people mistook him to be merely stingy about the 
ox.4 This passage tells us that ài in this sense has to do with cherishing the material value 
of certain things, but based on my analysis of a similar passage in the Analects which will 
be presented below, I think that ài in this third sense is some sort of valuing in a broad 
sense, and one’s valuing (ài) does not have to be a response only to one kind of value, 
especially the material value of things. 
                                                 
2 For example, see Zhū Xī’s 朱熹 (1130–1200) commentary on Lunyu 3:17, in his Lúnyǔ jízhù 論語集註. 
3 For example, see Waley, The Analects, p. 90. 
4 “齊國雖褊小, 吾何愛一牛? 卽不忍其觳觫, 若無罪而就死地, 故以羊易之也.” Mengzi 1A:7. Yáng 
Bójùn, Mèngzǐ yìzhù 孟子譯注 (Běijīng 北京: Zhōnghuá shūjú 中華書局, 1960), p. 15. 
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However, although distinguishing three senses of ài here, I do not think that there 
are three distinct meanings of the term “ài” in the Analects. Linguists often distinguish 
between meaning and interpretation or semantics and pragmatics, and point out that what 
a word means can be different from what it is used for in a particular situation. In other 
words, a word of the same meaning can be interpreted differently depending on the 
situations in which it is used.5 According to this view, we could postulate that the basic 
meaning of ài is valuing or placing value on diverse kinds of objects, and ài is interpreted 
as natural affection for close people, universal caring for everyone, or stinginess about 
material goods depending on what kind of value or valuing is involved in one’s ài 愛. In 
the following, I explicate these three “senses” of ài in the Analects by closely analyzing 
concrete passages in which the term is used, and conclude this section by making a brief 
suggestion of how the one meaning of ài as “valuing” could weave through these three 
senses of ài. 
 
(1) We have two primary instances of the first kind of ài in the Analects. One is 
the affection or loving care of parents for their children, and the other is the feeling of 
fondness between two people (the Analects does not specify what kind of relationship it 
exactly is in this case.). The former instance, namely parental affection, is discussed in a 
conversation between Kongzi and one of his eloquent disciples Zǎi Wǒ 宰我. One day, 
Zǎi Wǒ complains to Kongzi that the three years of mourning for deceased parents is too 
long, and that only one year would be sufficient. To this complaint, Kongzi asks whether 
Zǎi Wǒ would feel comfortable with living a normal life, eating rice (a luxury food at the 
time) and wearing silk, only one year after the death of his parent. Zǎi Wǒ says he will be 
comfortable with that, and Kongzi tells him he may go ahead and observe only one year’s 
mourning if it would be comfortable to him. However, after Zǎi Wǒ went out of Kongzi’s 
room, he severely criticizes Zǎi Wǒ by saying this:  
 
How inhuman [rén 仁] Yú 予 is! A child does not leave his parents’ bosom until three 
years after his birth. The three years of mourning is a universal institution [that 
everyone] under the heaven [follows]. Did Yú get three years of love from his parents? 6
                                                 
5 I owe this idea to William H. Baxter. 
6 “予之不仁也! 子生三年, 然後免於父母之懷. 夫三年之喪, 天下之通喪也. 予也有三年之愛於其父母
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And the second instance of affection can be found in Kongzi’s answer to Zǐzhāng 子張, 
another disciple of Kongzi’s, who asked about a good example of being in delusion (hùo 
惑), or how to know whether one is in delusion or not: 
 
[If you] love someone, [you will] want him to live; [and if you] hate someone, [you will] 
want him to die. [But if you] want someone to die, having already wanted him to live, 
then this is a delusion.7
 
As I have briefly mentioned above, ài 愛 here is used as a feeling of affection or fondness 
that everyone can have, but people usually do not share their objects of fondness. In other 
words, people may equally feel similar type of affection for their own children and 
beloved ones, but these special people are different from person to person. In that sense I 
would like to call it a private emotion,8 i.e. an emotion that is felt only within the private 
domain, which involves oneself and only a small number of people tied in personal or 
familial relationships. As a private emotion of this kind, the affection for one’s child or 
one’s lover is seldom criticized; there can hardly be anybody who will say you are wrong 
in feeling affection for your son or your dear friend, because every normal person would 
do so. 
However, this characteristic of affection as a private emotion does not make 
affection an irrelevant emotion to the ethical life of human beings in the Analects. As can 
be seen in the passage quoted above (Lunyu 17:21), Kongzi thinks that constant parental 
affection and caring given to the child for a considerable amount of time provide the very 
foundation for three years of mourning for one’s deceased parents, which had remained 
one of the most important social institutions throughout Chinese history. That is, the 
feeling of affection that the parents naturally feel toward their children makes the parents 
take loving care of their children for many years, and this in turn generates filial affection 
                                                                                                                                                 
乎?” Lunyu 17:21. Yú 予 is Zǎi Wǒ’s given name. 
7 “愛之欲其生, 惡之欲其死. 旣欲其生, 又欲其死, 是惑也.” Lunyu 12:10. 
8 This could seem a somewhat awkward label, because every emotion is private in a more familiar sense. 
That is, emotion is primarily a personal psychological phenomenon, to which the external observer has no 
direct access. In other words, you could tell that I feel an affection for my two-year-old daughter by 
observing some of my behavioral signs such as my tender look at her and my running a hand gently on her 
cheek, but you never know how I feel exactly when I do such behaviors, because you have no direct access 
to my feelings. However, this is not the sense of ‘private’ that I am interested in here. 
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and gratitude in the children’s hearts. In Kongzi’s view, having this kind of affective bond 
is one of the essential conditions for normal human existence, and indulging in one’s 
filial affection to the appropriate degree is one aspect of rén 仁—the most important 
virtue in Kongzi and his later followers. And Kongzi thought that spending three years in 
mourning for one’s deceased parents makes the full expression of one’s filial affection 
possible. In short, parental affection and by extension the mutual affective bond between 
the parent and the child, despite its remaining in the private domain, is considered by 
Kongzi to be highly conducive to the ethical life of human beings. 
Now turning to our second passage quoted above (Lunyu 12:10), we immediately 
notice that Kongzi comments on the negative aspect of affection too, and it is very 
important that he specifies this negative aspect of affection as delusion or misguidedness. 
In this passage, Kongzi seems to be alert to the tendency of our affection to carry us 
astray and let us make a wrong judgment of the object in question. That is, when one 
feels inconsistent desires simultaneously for the same object, he is probably making 
contradicting evaluative assessments of that object, basing hastily one of his incompatible 
assessments on the positive aspect of the object and the other on the negative aspect. And 
perhaps his capricious feeling of affection and hatred for that object is to blame in this 
case, because once in the strong grip of affection or hatred toward an object, one seldom 
sees anything but what he likes (for the case of affection) or what he hates (for the case of 
hatred) in that object. And it might have been in a similar context that Kongzi also said 
the following: 
 
If [you] love someone, can [you] not make him work hard? If [you] are loyal to someone, 
can [you] not advise [him well]?9
 
It is not that you cannot love or be loyal to anybody at all without making him toil or 
guiding him well, insofar as you sincerely think that you love him or you care about his 
best interest. However, without being combined with or guided by some sort of wisdom 
or at least good sense that tells you what to do about the person you love or you are loyal 
                                                 
9 “愛之, 能勿勞乎? 忠焉, 能勿誨乎?” Lunyu 14:7. 
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to, your affection and loyalty towards him is either imperfect or even foolish ones that do 
not work for the best interest of him. 
 
(2) The second kind of ài 愛, which I roughly rendered above as a “cultivated 
indiscriminate attitude of care,” is expressed three times in the Analects by a set phrase 
that roughly means “to love fellow men,” namely “ài rén” 愛人. For example, when Fán 
Chí 樊遲 (a disciple of Kongzi’s) asked about rén 仁 (the highest Confucian virtue), 
Kongzi said:  
 
Love your fellow men.10
 
It is not clear yet what it means to love one’s fellow men, especially what is the boundary 
of “fellow men.” I will turn to this question shortly, but even before answering this 
question, it seems clear that the “fellow men” here designates a larger group of people 
than those persons one would feel natural and special affection for (e.g. one’s children, 
friends, and lovers). For otherwise, everyone, as long as they have this natural affective 
bond with whatever people they personally find close and special to themselves, would 
be automatically qualified for 仁, the highest Kongzian virtue that Kongzi often denied 
not only for many otherwise virtuous persons of his time and in the history11 but also 
once for himself.12 We have seen that the affective bond between the parent and the child 
is an important aspect of rén 仁, but it is no more than one strand of attitude that 
contributes to the entire fabric of rén 仁. Consequently, it derives that “ài rén” 愛人 or 
“loving one’s fellow men” might possibly involve conscious or non-spontaneous efforts 
to expand the boundary of one’s natural affection. In other words, what Kongzi tells Fán 
Chí to do here is to somehow expand his natural and “private” love and rise to the more 
“lofty” state of loving his fellow men.  
But first, what does it mean to love one’s fellow men? And second, who are the 
fellow men? I would like to deal with the second question first, because once we have a 
                                                 
10 “樊遲問仁. 子曰: ‘愛人.’” Lunyu 12:22. 
11 For example, Lunyu 5:5, 5:8, and 5:19. 
12 “子曰: ‘若聖與仁, 則吾豈敢?’” Lunyu 7:34. 
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clearer idea of who the “fellow men” are, then we will know more clearly how one is 
supposed to “love” his fellow men in the Analects. In a nutshell, what I do in the 
following several paragraphs is basically to persuade the reader to pay fairer and more 
careful attention than previous scholars have done13 to the possibility that 1) “rén” 人 in 
the Analects often designates persons of the upper social strata who belonged to the 
ruling class in general, and that 2) ài rén 愛人 in the Analects had a particular 
sociopolitical sense of taking special care for this group of people so that many of them 
could play a leading role in restoring the harmonious state of society as had been realized 
in the Western Zhou (Xīzhōu 西周, 1122–771 B.C.E.14). Kongzi thought this was possible 
by giving positions of political power and social eminence to noblemen (jūnzǐ 君子), i.e. 
mainly those among the traditional nobility, who were supposed to cultivate themselves 
morally through the training in the traditional curricula such as the Poetry (shī 詩), the 
Documents (shū 書), the Rituals (lǐ 禮), and the Music (yuè 樂).15
What I translated above as “fellow men” is “rén” 人 in the original, and this 
character seems to have a quite broad semantic range. 1) In its broadest usage “rén” 
refers to “humankind,” a generic term for individual human beings who constitute the 
species of humanity;16 2) it also frequently refers to “others” as opposed to oneself (jǐ 己 
or wú 吾) or “others” around a particular person who evaluates things and behaves in a 
different way from many other ordinary people around him.17 In addition, 3) there is a 
                                                 
13 Namely, Donald J. Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1969), pp. 208–209, and David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking Through Confucius (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1987), pp. 138–146. 
14 Herrlee Creel, The Origins of Statecraft in China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. xiv. 
15 My thesis that rén 人 in ancient China designated persons of the upper social strata is basically a 
modified or moderated version of Zhào Jìbīn’s 趙紀彬 proposal that rén 人 and mín 民 in the Spring and 
Autumn period China (770–476 B.C.E.) referred to the slave-master class and the slave class respectively. 
Zhào Jìbīn’s claim is based on too schematic an application of historical materialism to the history of 
ancient China, and the textual evidence he cites from the Analects and other ancient Chinese texts to 
support his claim is often inconclusive. Nevertheless, I believe that having pared off all of the suspicious 
assumptions and unconvincing evidence from his work, we are still left with this arguably sound, 
minimalist view of the social status of rén 人 in ancient China. In the following, I defend this minimalist 
version of his thesis by citing mainly what I think is the most convincing textual evidence he provides in 
his book, Lúnyǔ xīntàn 論語新探 (Běijīng: Rénmín chūbǎnshè 人民出版社, 1976), pp. 1–59. 
16 For some exclusive examples of this sense, see Lunyu 4:5 and 6:19. 
17 For some examples that do not also refer to humanity in general, see Lunyu 1:1, 1:10, 1:16, 2:10, 3:18, 
5:5, 5:10, 5:12, 6:11, and 6:30. 
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third sense of rén 人, viz. those belonging to the ruling class as opposed to the ruled (mín 
民), and I think that this is the most important sense of ‘rén’ for clarifying the meaning of 
the phrase ‘ài rén’ 愛人 in the Analects.18 Throughout the Analects, we encounter two 
most conspicuous passages that seem to use rén 人 and mín 民 as if they belonged to two 
distinct social classes in a broad sense. For example, in Lunyu 1:5 Kongzi says the 
following: 
 
The master said, “[In order to] govern [well] a country that could mobilize a thousand 
war-chariots [at a time], [one should] attend the [administrative] business carefully, keep 
one’s promises faithfully, be frugal in expenditure, love the people [who belong to the 
ruling class in general], and conscript the commoners for public services at the proper 
times of the year [i.e. outside the busy seasons of planting and harvesting].19
 
This passage discriminates “loving people (愛人)” and “conscripting commoners (使民)” 
as two different kinds of matters, and a Qīng 淸 dynasty commentator Liú Fénglù 劉逢祿 
(1776–1829) said that “rén” here refers to prime minister and other vassals, 20  who 
apparently belong to the ruling class. And concerning this same passage, Huáng Kǎn 
皇侃 (488–545) clearly distinguishes rén and mín by saying that “‘Rén’ 人 [here] refers 
to the people who have an intelligent eye (i.e. intelligence to understand things), and “ài 
rén” 愛人 means to share the court [with these people]. [On the other hand,] “mín” 民 
designates [those who have] troubled or darkened eyesight (thus who are foolish), and 
[when Kongzi said] ‘Conscript them (shǐ zhī 使之),’ [he] only meant that black-headed 
crowd.”21 Also consider Lunyu 3:21: 
 
                                                 
18 Again, the aforementioned distinction between meaning and interpretation or semantics and pragmatics 
also applies to the interpretation of “rén” 人 here. According to this view, we might suppose that the basic 
meaning of “rén” 人 is “human beings,” but “rén” can be also interpreted as “others” or “those belonging 
to the ruling class” based on the context in which the term is used. As I see it, although both senses of “rén” 
as “other people” and “the ruling class” presuppose that they must be groups of human beings, it is not only 
insufficient but also misleading to interpret “rén” as human beings in general regardless of its particular 
context. 
19 “子曰: ‘道千乘之國, 敬事而信, 節用而愛人, 使民以時.’” Lunyu 1:5. The underlining is mine. 
20 “人謂大臣群臣.” Ruǎn Yuán 阮元, Huángqīngjīngjiě 皇淸經解, juǎn 卷 1297, p. 10. Quoted in Zhào 
Jìbīn, Lúnyǔ xīntàn, p. 2. 
21 “人是有識之目, 愛人則兼朝廷也. 民是瞑闇之稱, 使之則唯指黔黎也.” Yasui Kō, Rongo shūsetsu, 卷 
1, p. 6. Also quoted with a slight variation of characters in Zhào Jìbīn, Lúnyǔ xīntàn, p. 2. 
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Duke Āi 哀 asked Zǎi Wǒ 宰我 about the wooden altar to the god of the earth. Zǎi Wǒ 
replied: “The rulers of the Xià 夏 dynasty used the pine, the people of the Yīn 殷 dynasty 
used the cedar, and the people of the Zhōu 周 dynasty used the chestnut, saying that [this 
will] make the commoners tremble.”22
 
In this passage, Zǎi Wǒ takes advantage of the fact that the character “lì” 栗 means both 
‘chestnut’ as a noun and ‘to fear’ or ‘to tremble’ as a verb, and interprets that the Zhōu 
people tried to instill fear in their subjects’ hearts by making their altar with chestnut trees, 
exploiting the semantic ambiguity of the term “lì” 栗. In any event, from Zǎi Wǒ’s 
remark we can derive the point that the ancient Chinese upper class people like Zǎi Wǒ 
himself23 sometimes used “rén” in opposition to “mín” in order to distinguish themselves 
from the commoners, and this particular use of “rén” is further confirmed by the fact that 
he uses “xiàhòushì” 夏后氏, “yīnrén” 殷人, and “zhōurén” 周人 exactly in parallel (i.e. a 
dynasty name followed by a term for a certain kind of people), indicating that what he 
means by “rén” here is “rulers” or at least “the ruling class in general.” 
So far, I have distinguished three different senses of rén 人 in the Analects. Now, I 
am going to argue that among these three references of rén, the third one (i.e. rén as the 
people belonging to the ruling class in general) is what most pertains to our interpretation 
of ài rén 愛人. I will also argue, following Zhào Jìbīn, that the nobleman’s (jūnzǐ 君子) 
activity of ài rén 愛人 in the Analects should be primarily taken as politically and 
socially taking care of those people who belong to the ruling class in general.24 However, 
as we have noted above, rén 人 in the Analects also has the other two references: 1) the 
species of human beings in general and 2) “others” in contrast to oneself or a particular 
person in question. So, while arguing that ài rén 愛人 in the Analects mainly means 
                                                 
22 “哀公問社於宰我. 宰我對曰: ‘夏后氏以松, 殷人以栢, 周人以栗, 曰, 使民戰栗.’” Lunyu 3:21. 
23 Note that his surname is Zǎi 宰, which meant different levels of officials in different periods and contexts 
of Chinese history. According to the “Yǐguān wéishì” 以官爲氏 section of the “Shìzúlüè” 氏族略 in the 
Tōngzhì 通志, the people of the surname Zǎi 宰 belonged to the Jī 姬 clan (the same clan as the Zhōu 
emperors and the dukes of the Lǔ dukedom), and they are descendants of those who had served the Zhōu 
emperors as prime minister through generations and eventually came to take up their office name as their 
surname. See Daikanwajiten 大漢和辭典, p. 3289. 
24 I will later raise and discuss questions such as the following: 1) What is the goal of this caring action? 2) 
Is ài rén 愛人 here no more than a set of behavioral tendencies to take care of rén 人, or is it more than 
that? And 3) does ài rén 愛人 have any interesting relation to the various instances of affection that we 
have discussed above? 
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taking special care of the members of the ruling class in general, I need to consider at the 
same time whether or not these two references of rén 人 would affect my interpretation of 
ài rén 愛人.25
To begin with, I would like to say that my interpretation of ài rén 愛人 in the 
Analects as taking special sociopolitical care of the members of the ruling class in general 
makes a good case. This can be seen by considering three Analects passages in 
conjunction. First, let us be reminded that in Lunyu 1:5 above, Kongzi distinguishes 
“loving people (愛人)” and “conscripting commoners (使民)” as two distinct matters, 
implying that ài rén 愛人 has little to do with the commoners-related business. Then, in 
Lunyu 12:22, after being told to love fellow men as an important way to enact rén 仁, Fán 
Chí 樊遲 also asks Kongzi about zhī 知 (“knowledge” or “wisdom”) and gets told to 
“know about fellow men.” Fán Chí gets perplexed at these answers as the reader might be 
right now, and Kongzi kindly provides him with a further explanation: “Elevate the 
upright [people] and set them on the crooked [people]; this could make the crooked 
upright.”26  
Combining Lunyu 1:5 and 12:22, Kongzi’s message might be this: an important 
way for a nobleman (jūnzǐ 君子) to enact rén 仁 is to love one’s fellow men, i.e. those 
who belong to the ruling class in general as he does (Lunyu 1:5). And the nobleman’s 
love for his fellow men is to be expressed mainly through a certain type of sociopolitical 
action, viz. elevating—or recommending one’s superior to elevate—the upright among 
his fellow men for various administrative positions, so that the chosen upright people 
could lead and transform those “crooked” people. In order to do so, the nobleman needs a 
certain type of knowledge or wisdom, i.e. the knowledge of who are “upright” and who 
are “crooked” among the people of the upper social strata, or the wisdom that enables 
him to have this knowledge (Lunyu 12:22). In short, here we can see that loving one’s 
fellow men is an important aspect of rén 仁, and rén 仁 is manifested primarily through 
sharing political power and high social status with the right persons among those who 
                                                 
25 Again, my interpretation of ài rén 愛人 is a minimalized version of what was originally argued by Zhào 
Jìbīn, in his Lúnyǔ xīntàn, pp. 27–59. 
26 “樊遲問仁. 子曰: ‘愛人.’ 問知. 子曰: ‘知人.’ 樊遲未達. 子曰: ‘擧直錯諸枉, 能使枉者直.’” Lunyu 
12:22. 
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belong to the upper social strata. And these “upright” people chosen for political power 
and social eminence will best benefit the rest of the rén 人 group as well as the entire mín 
民 group. Now, let us compare Lunyu 12:22 with Kongzi’s definition of rén 仁 in Lunyu 
6:30: 
 
Rén 仁 is this: If you want a position [in the government], help others have such 
positions; if you want to have a successful political career, help others build such careers. 
[If you] could take analogy from what is near, it can be called a method of rén 仁.27
 
Following Zhào Jìbīn, I interpret the two crucial characters in the original text of this 
passage, viz. “lì” 立 and “dá” 達, to have strong political connotations. These two terms 
literally mean “to stand” and “to reach a certain destination (whether it be a place or a 
goal)” respectively, and they were often treated somewhat abstractly or regarded to carry 
figurative senses in this passage. For example, Lau translates the first sentence of the 
passage as follows: “[A] benevolent man helps others to take their stand in so far as he 
himself wishes to take his stand, and gets others there in so far as he himself wishes to get 
there.”28 This is not an impossible translation, but it is widely accepted that “lì” 立 (“to 
stand”) in ancient China was used often interchangeably with “wèi” 位, which either 
meant a particular spot in the court where one as a vassal was supposed to stand in the 
presence of the ruler, or more abstractly, a certain rank in the government including the 
ruler’s throne. For example, Duàn Yùcái 段玉裁 quotes two passages from the Zhōulǐ 周
禮 and the Gǔwén Chūnqiū 古文春秋 in which “wèi” 位 was written as “lì” 立, and 
concludes that these two characters were one and the same character in antiquity.29
Moreover, the way “lì” 立 and “wèi” 位 are used in the Analects attests to the 
close relationship between these two characters. For example, Kongzi says to his 
disciples, “Do not worry about not having an official position, but worry about how to 
                                                 
27 “夫仁者, 己欲立而立人, 己欲達而達人. 能近取譬, 可謂仁之方也已.” Lunyu 6:30. 
28 Lau, The Analects, p. 85. Also compare this with Legge, Confucian Analects,  p. 194: “Now the man of 
perfect virtue, wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged 
himself, he seeks also to enlarge others.” 
29 Duàn Yùcái 段玉裁, Shuōwén jiězì zhù 說文解字注, 2nd ed. (Shànghǎi 上海: Shànghǎi gǔjí chūbǎnshè 
上海古籍出版社, 1988), p. 371 [下b].  
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stand [at the court].”30 This is an example where lì (立) and wèi (位) are semantically 
related with each other. Consider also the following remark of Kongzi’s: “Zāng 
Wénzhòng 臧文仲 must be a thief of positions! Knowing Liǔ Xiàhuì’s 柳下惠 
worthiness, [Zāng] did not give him a position (or alternatively, did not stand together 
[with him at the court]).”31 Regretfully, though, there is no convincing textual evidence in 
the Analects for “dá” 達 to mean a successful political career. But we see that a century 
later Mengzi uses “dá” exactly in this sense: “The intellectual (shì 士) does not lose 
righteousness in a predicament and does not deviate from the Way in a prosperous 
[political career]. It is because he does not lose righteousness [even] in predicament that 
he [can] preserve himself (i.e. stay untainted), and the commoners are not disappointed 
with him because he does not deviate from the Way in a prosperous [political career].”32 
And given our evidence for the strong political connotation of lì (立) and wèi (位), we 
could also legitimately interpret dá in this passage to mean a successful career. 
Then, what is the message of this passage? It seems to convey the following: A 
good way to enact rén 仁 is 1) to acknowledge that other people will feel analogously to 
how you would feel in many circumstances and 2) to take fulfilling their need to be as 
important and urgent a task as fulfilling your own need. Now, pondering this message in 
conjunction with the previous passage (Lunyu 12:22) that relates rén 仁 to loving one’s 
fellow men, we can derive the following theses: 1) “loving one’s fellow men” can be 
rephrased as judging and acting with “oneself put into another person’s shoes;” and 2) 
Kongzi’s recurring example of this reciprocal action is to let the “upright” members of 
the upper social strata have appropriate political power and social authority. 
Then, how would the other two senses of rén 人 affect my interpretation of ài rén 
愛人? In his seminal book The Concept of Man in Early China, Donald Munro mentions 
Zhào Jìbīn’s view that rén 人 and mín 民 in ancient China were hierarchically 
                                                 
30 “不患無位, 患所以立.” Lunyu 4:14. 
31 “臧文仲其竊位者與! 知柳下惠之賢而不與立也.” Lunyu 15:14. This and the previous passage are 
originally quoted as textual evidence for the interchangeability between “lì” 立 and “wèi” 位 by Zhào Jìbīn. 
He also quotes many traditional exegetical notes on “lì” 立 and “wèi” 位, which say that in the antiquity 
there was no distinct character “wèi” 位 besides  “lì” 立. See Zhào Jìbīn, Lúnyǔ xīntàn, p. 20. 
32 “士窮不失義, 達不離道. 窮不夫義, 故士得己焉, 達不離道, 故民不失望焉.” Mengzi 13:9. 
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distinguished. But he seems to think that there is little evidence for this view, and defends 
his thesis that rén 人 in ancient China referred to human beings in general, by pointing 
out that “rén” 人 in some of the Shāng 商 (ca. 1570–1045 B.C.) oracle bones and Zhōu 
周 bronze inscriptions referred not only to the people of upper social strata such as “men 
of king’s clan” and “members of the slave-master class” but also to “common agricultural 
workers” or even numerous “serfs.” 33  However, as I have argued thus far, my 
interpretation of ài rén 愛人 in the Analects as taking special sociopolitical care of the 
members of the ruling class in general makes a good case, because it is based on the 
strong interrelationship among the concepts of rén 仁, ài rén 愛人, and rén 人 as 
contradistinguished from mín 民. We do have instances of rén 人 in the Analects that 
refer to humankind in general, but merely pointing out this fact does not by itself 
undermine the strong conceptual interrelations between rén 仁, ài rén 愛人, and rén 人 as 
the people of the upper social strata in the Analects. 
On the other hand, it seems to me that for every single case of rén 人 in the 
Analects that primarily means “others,” we could also interpret it to mean “people of the 
upper social strata” simultaneously. To see this is the case, take any of the Analects 
passages that I suggested in the footnote 17 above as clear cases of rén 人 that is used in 
the sense of “others” (and pick more such Analects passages if you like), and try to 
interpret the character “rén” 人 in that passage as “people of the upper social strata” and 
see whether that interpretation makes sense. You will see that rén 人 in any of those 
passages can have both meanings at the same time. However, now, take a passage from 
the same pool, interpret the character “rén” 人 in the passage as people of the lower 
social strata (i.e. mín 民), and see whether it makes sense. You will see that some 
passages make sense but some do not. I take this to show that among the three references 
of rén 人, rén as human beings in general (i.e. people from all of the social strata) is the 
least frequently used one in the Analects.  
                                                 
33 Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China, pp. 208–209. 
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Let us consider Lunyu 1:1 for example. In this passage, Kongzi says that the 
nobleman (jūnzǐ 君子) is not resentful even if others do not appreciate one’s merits.34 
What is meant by “appreciating one’s merits” is mainly to acknowledge that the person in 
question has met relevant qualifications for an office in the government and give him an 
opportunity to perform his sociopolitical roles as a responsible member of the ruling class. 
This being the general background of the passage, it is clear that those who can 
appreciate one’s merits properly are only the peer group of the nobleman, who hold 
certain ranks in the power structure and are capable of exerting a significant degree of 
influence for the employment of the nobleman. Seen in this light, it is also clear that the 
mín 民 or those of the lower social strata, who are considered in the Analects as having 
little agency on the political affairs such as the employment of the nobleman, cannot be a 
sound candidate for “rén” 人 in this passage. In short, the instances of rén 人 as “others” 
go perfectly well with the interpretation of rén 人 as the persons of the upper social strata, 
and pose no obstacle for my interpretation of ài rén 愛人 in the Analects as taking special 
sociopolitical care of the members of the ruling class in general. 
Thus far, we have traveled a long way to determine the meaning of our second 
kind of ài 愛 in the Analects. I have argued that “loving one’s fellow men (ài rén 愛人)” 
is giving the positions of political power and social eminence to the noblemen, i.e. those 
who belong to the ruling class in general and are morally and professionally qualified for 
such positions, so that they could bring about the maximum benefit to the other members 
of the society by realizing a harmonious society in accordance with the political ideal of 
the Western Zhōu. I have also showed that Munro’s sweeping interpretation of rén 人 as 
referring to human beings in general in ancient China does not fit the Analects very well.  
Now, having determined the second sense of ài 愛 in the Analects, I would like to 
spend a couple of paragraphs reflecting on it. As we have seen so far, ài rén is a loving or 
caring attitude that one consciously assumes towards other people who are not 
necessarily connected with oneself biologically or by some other kinds of natural 
affective bond. Because this second kind of ài is applied to those who stand far beyond 
the circle of one’s family members, relatives, or close friends, we can say that “loving 
                                                 
34 “人不知而不慍, 不亦君子乎?” Lunyu 1:1. 
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one’s fellow men” in the Analects might involve either 1) a conscious effort to go against 
the drive of one’s strong natural affection for those who are close to oneself, or 2) an 
equally non-spontaneous or voluntary effort to “extend one’s natural feeling of affection” 
to what are not originally its natural objects, viz. those people who are not one’s relatives 
or close friends, and so forth. In this sense, Kongzi’s ài rén seems to be quite similar to 
Mòzǐ’s doctrine of “universal care” (jiānài 兼愛). For example, Kongzi says the 
following in Lunyu 1:6: 
 
Younger brothers and sons must be filial [to their parents] at home and respectful [to the 
elders] outside. [They] must be discreet in speaking and faithful to their words, love the 
multitude widely, and treat those who are rén 仁 as if those people were their family 
members or relatives. It [should] be only when they have extra [time and] energy after 
fully engaging in all of these activities that they devote themselves to learning the Culture 
[wén 文].35
 
In this passage, Kongzi recommends the youth in his society to “love the multitude” 
(àizhòng 愛衆) widely, and loving the multitude clearly involves the effort to go beyond 
the boundary of one’s natural affection. This can be shown by pointing out that “zhòng” 
衆, which literally means “many people,” designates in the Analects either 1) “others” 
who live in the same community and interact with oneself in one way or another, or 2) 
the multitude in general living in the world.36 Let me take examples of these two cases 
respectively. In Lunyu 15:28, Kongzi recommends not to follow the sentiments of the 
multitude blindly in judging a case. That is, he says, “Even if the multitude hates a person, 
[you should] carefully examine his case [independently]; and even if the multitude likes a 
person, [you should also] carefully examine his case [independently].”37 This is the case 
for those “others” who live in one’s community and whose opinions one needs to heed 
(even if one eventually rejects them) before judging a case. And for the generic multitude 
in the world, Lunyu 12:22 provides a good case. This is the very passage in which Kongzi 
recommended Fán Chí to “love his fellow men” and “know about his fellow men.” 
                                                 
35 “弟子, 入則孝, 出則悌, 謹而信, 汎愛衆, 而親仁. 行有餘力, 則以學文.” Lunyu 1:6. 
36 Lunyu 15:28 and 19:3 are good examples of the first case, and some examples of the second case are 
Lunyu 6:30, 12:22, and 17:6. However, sometimes it is hard to distinguish clearly between these two cases, 
and Lunyu 9:3 is such a borderline case. 
37 “衆惡之, 必察焉, 衆好之, 必察焉.” Lunyu 15:28. 
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Kongzi himself explained these dicta as “Elevating the upright [people] and setting them 
on the crooked [people],” but Zǐxià 子夏 (a disciple of Kongzi’s) explains this remark 
even further by raising the historical examples of this act. According to him, the ancient 
sage kings Shùn 舜 and Tāng 湯 chose respectively Gāo Yáo 皐陶 and Yī Yǐn 伊尹 from 
the multitude in the world as their vassals, so that the “crooked” or those who are not rén 
仁 could not but stay away from the kings. In other words, these sage kings chose the 
right persons from the crowd so that these chosen people could help them bring about 
peace and order to the world. In short, interpreted either way, zhòng 衆 in the Analects 
means “others” or “the multitude” who are closer to strangers than to one’s relatives or 
close friends, and àizhòng 愛衆 involves going beyond the natural boundary of one’s 
affection that usually takes as its objects one’s family members, relatives, lovers, and so 
forth. 
Moreover, this point is also confirmed by the fact that Kongzi views loving the 
multitude, along with other things that he recommends for youngsters, as conscious 
activities (xíng 行). That is, often it is not naturally the case that one is respectful to the 
elders on the street, punctual in keeping one’s promises, and cares for people widely 
enough. And even as for one’s parents, with whom one is connected with such a strong 
affective bond, one often treats them in a wrong way and disappoints them. This being 
the usual circumstance, how could we expect him to treat the virtuous persons as if they 
were his family members? It is clear that all of these things recommended by Kongzi are 
activities, which the youngsters in Kongzi’s society are supposed to voluntarily engage in, 
for the purpose of the betterment of themselves. Xíng 行 literally means walking on the 
road (dào 道), and moral self-cultivation is often compared in the Analects to walking on 
a long way with heavy burdens. This journey to the perfection of one’s character or the 
attainment of rén 仁 is so hard that even one of the most talented disciples of Kongzi’s 
once complained that he is short of strength to finish this journey,38 and another disciple 
remarked that one aspiring to achieving rén 仁 must be strong and resolute in order to 
make it on this long and arduous trip.39  
                                                 
38 “冉求曰: ‘非不說子之道, 力不足也.’” Lunyu 6:12. 
39 “曾子曰: ‘士不可以不弘毅, 任重而道遠. 仁以爲己任, 不亦重乎? 死而後已, 不亦遠乎?’” Lunyu 8:7. 
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We will have a chance later to think about what psychological resources are 
involved in Confucian moral self-cultivation, but the only point I want to emphasize here 
is that loving the multitude and other activities Kongzi recommends for youngsters of his 
society are not things that they can do naturally. Although these activities require feelings 
such as respect (tì 悌), familial affection (qīn 親), and care (ài 愛), and although Kongzi’s 
youngsters might be already capable of applying these feelings to some of their natural 
but limited objects (i.e. their parents and other elders in the household and some of the 
members of the community), these feelings do not naturally find their fully prescribed 
objects (i.e. the elders of the community, those who are rén 仁, and the multitude of the 
society in general), and there needs to be some sort of conscious efforts to narrow this 
gap. In Chapter 6, I turn to the question of what is the nature of these “conscious efforts” 
that enable one to go beyond the boundary of natural affection and “love the multitude.” 
 
(3) Now, let us turn to our third and the final sense of ài. What we have 
concerning this type of ài in the Analects is a passage about two competing instances of 
ài 愛, one for the sacrificial sheep and the other for the ritual of sacrificing this sheep. In 
ancient China, there had been an old practice that each year, when the autumn turns into 
winter, the Zhōu 周 emperor should distribute the new year’s calendar among his 
subordinate rulers of various dukedoms; and each ruler of the dukedoms, once given this 
calendar, store it in his ancestral temple and then sacrifice a sheep at the temple on the 
first day of each lunar month, before considering and making decisions about the 
administrative affairs of that month. This practice of sacrificing a sheep and announcing a 
new moon to the spirits of one’s ancestors is called “the announcement of the new moon” 
(gàoshùo 告朔), and the dealing with the administrative affairs of the month following 
this announcement ceremony is called tīngshùo 聽朔, literally “being briefed about [the 
matters of the month, each cycle of every month starting from] the new moon.” By 
Kongzi’s time, though, the dukes of Lǔ 魯 were no longer participating in both 
activities,40 but they were still having the sacrificial sheep killed at each day of the new 
                                                 
40 Specifically, starting from 620 B.C.E., the 6th year of duke Wén’s 文 reign (625–608 B.C.E.). 
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moon.41 It is in this historical context that Kongzi says the following remark to Zǐgòng 
子貢, one of his disciples, who wanted to stop the killing of the sheep for this now almost 
empty ritual: 
 
Cì 賜! You care about the sheep, but I care about the ritual!42
 
As I have briefly mentioned above, “ài” 愛 in this passage has been traditionally glossed 
as xī 惜, which means one’s feeling of reluctance to use something for a certain purpose 
or to give it to somebody else because one thinks that that thing is too valuable to use for 
such a purpose or too valuable to give to such a person. Sometimes this case of ài is 
translated as “grudge” (e.g. Waley 2000, p. 90), but ài here is not to be considered to 
contain the affective element of resentment, which usually accompanies grudge.43 That is, 
although Zǐgòng might “grudge” the sheep and Kongzi “grudge” the ritual, they do not 
grudge them to any particular person out of resentment against that person. Rather, it 
should be the case that this third sense of ài 愛 primarily arises from or involves some 
sort of value assessment of its object. We are not fully certain about what was exactly 
Zǐgòng’s motivation for trying to save the sheep in this now dormant ceremony, but 
partly based on Kongzi’s saying that Zǐgòng grudged the sheep, we could cautiously 
accept Zhū Xī’s 朱熹 opinion that Zǐgòng could not see the sheep being wasted for no 
purpose.44 We also know that Zǐgòng was a very successful merchant of his time,45 so it 
seems quite likely that he focused on the material value of the sheep, which he might 
have thought to be wastefully sacrificed for the no longer properly observed gàoshùo 告
朔 ritual. 
However, Kongzi objects to Zǐgòng’s “caring about” or grudge for the sheep, and 
what is deeply interesting and significant in his move is that Kongzi seems to ground his 
                                                 
41 This account is based on Yáng Bójùn’s explanation. See his Lúnyǔ yìzhù, p. 29, and Chūnqiū Zǔozhuàn 
zhù, pp. 543–544. 
42 “賜也! 爾愛其羊, 我愛其禮!” Lunyu 3:17. Cì 賜 is Zigong’s personal name. 
43 David Caron (Associate Professor of French in the department of Romance Languages and Literatures, 
the University of Michigan) pointed this out to me in our conversation on 2/15/06. 
44 Zhū Xī 朱熹, Lúnyǔ jízhù 論語集註, in Yasui Kō, Rongo shūsetsu, 卷 1, p. 44. 
45  See Lunyu 11:19, 9:13, and Sīmǎ Qiān’s 司馬遷 biographical remarks on Zǐgòng in his “Huòzhí 
lièzhuàn” 貨殖列傳 (“Biographies of successful merchants”)  in the Shǐjì 史記. 
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objection on the same kind of valuing that takes a different thing as its object. That is, we 
see here a conflict between two instances of the same kind of valuing, which insist to take 
different things as their appropriate objects. One person feels reluctant to let the valuable 
sheep be wasted in a no longer meaningful sacrifice, and the other person feels reluctant 
to see the valuable sacrificial ritual retreat completely to oblivion for the petty cause of 
saving the sheep. In the previous paragraph, I hypothesized that Zǐgòng’s act was 
probably motivated by the material benefit the saved sheep would bring about. Then, 
what is the rationale on Kongzi’s part? What makes Kongzi argue that his feeling of 
“caring” about the ancient ritual is the right emotion to feel for the case in question? In 
order to see Kongzi’s rationale, we need to understand to some extent the historical 
situation of his time and how he viewed this situation. 
Kongzi lived during the time of tumultuous social transition between the Spring 
and Autumn period (chūnqiū shídài 春秋時代 770–476 B.C.E.) and the Warring States 
period (zhànguó shídài 戰國時代 475–221 B.C.E.).46 The Spring and Autumn period was 
the time when the Western Zhōu feudal system (fēngjiàn zhìdù 封建制度), combined 
with the zōngfǎ 宗法 system, was falling apart swiftly. (The rest of this paragraph and the 
following paragraph are brief explanations of these systems respectively.) After finally 
overthrowing Shāng in the late 12th century B.C.E., the Zhōu house developed a garrison 
system to effectively control the newly acquired vast territory along the lower Yellow 
River, and enfeoffed Zhōu princes and royal kinsmen at the various sites of military 
importance in the region to protect the Zhōu house against its enemies. 47  Ideally, 
according to Mengzi, there were five descending ranks under the Zhōu emperor, viz. 
gōng 公, hóu 侯, bó 伯, zǐ 子, nán 男, and they were given different sizes of fiefs 
between one hundred to fifty square Chinese miles (lǐ 里; one li is about five hundred 
meters.) and became the rulers of their states.48
                                                 
46 The periodization of these two periods slightly varies from scholar to scholar. I follow here Endymion 
Wilkinson. He also provides some explanations for this “modern convention” that he himself adopts. See 
his Chinese History: A Manual (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000), p. 10. 
47 Hsu, Ancient China in Transition, p. 3. And also see, Zǔozhuàn, Zhènggōng 定公 4: “昔武王克商, 成王
定之, 選建明德, 以蕃屛周.” Yáng Bójùn, Chūnqiū Zǔozhuàn zhù, p. 1536.  
48 Mengzi 10:2. 
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Most of these feudal lords belonged to the same clan as the Zhōu emperor, and 
they obeyed and respected the Zhōu emperor not only as their political leader but also as 
the head of their big family. For example, among the seventy one states established by 
King Wǔ 武, fifteen countries were ruled by King Wǔ’s brothers and forty by his 
relatives. 49  This hierarchical familial structure between the Zhōu emperor and his 
subordinate rulers found its exact replicas in each of the states ruled by these rulers. That 
is, each of these rulers appointed his brothers and older sons as the prime ministers (qīng 
卿) of his country, and let his (i.e. the ruler’s) younger sons and the older sons of the 
prime ministers assist those ministers as “great officers (dàfū 大夫).” Each of these 
ministers and “great officers” could establish their own noble houses, because they were 
enfeoffed with different sizes of fiefs by their ruler, and most of their positions were 
hereditary. If the Zhōu emperor was regarded as the head of the big family (dàzōng 大宗) 
from which the families of his subordinate rulers (xiǎozōng 小宗) branched, these prime 
ministers and “great officers” regarded their ruler as the head of the family (dàzōng) from 
which their own families (xiǎozōng) branched off. The younger sons of the “great 
officers” constituted the lowest rank of the ruling class, viz. the shì 士 (“knights” or 
“officers”), and the same hierarchical familial relationship obtained between the prime 
ministers and the “great officers” on one hand and the shì 士 class on the other hand.50 In 
short, “[t]he familial network embraced all of China, with the feudal structure as the 
political counterpart of the family structure.”51  
So far we have seen that the fēngjiàn 封建 system of Western Zhōu was 
established according to the principle of the zōngfǎ 宗法 system. And this principle of the 
zōngfǎ system is nothing but that of qīnqīn 親親, i.e. “Treat close people as close” or 
“Give primary consideration to those who are close to you.” It was according to this 
qīnqīn principle that the Zhōu house distributed its political power, and it is also this 
qīnqīn principle that explains why filial piety (xiào 孝) and respect for elders (tì 悌) are 
                                                 
49  “昔武王克商, 光有天下, 其兄弟之國者十有五人, 姬姓之國者四十人, 皆擧親也.” Zǔozhuàn, 
Zhāogōng 昭公 28. Yáng Bójùn, Chūnqiū Zǔozhuàn zhù, pp. 1494–1495. 
50 A more detailed explanation of the feudal lord system and the zōngfǎ system of Western Zhōu can be 
found in Hsu, Ancient China in Transition, pp. 2–8. 
51 Ibid., p. 7. 
 104 
often compared to one’s allegiance for the king and the subordinates’ obedience to their 
superiors in the Analects. For example, Yǒu Ruò 有若 (one of Kongzi’s disciples) says 
that “It is rarely the case that one is filial [to his parents] and respectful [to the elders] in 
character but likes to challenge the authority of his superior; and there has been no one 
who does not like to challenge his superior’s authority but at the same time likes to stir up 
a rebellion.”52 In addition, in response to someone’s question of why Kongzi does not 
participate in government, Kongzi quotes the Documents that says, “Filial piety! [Be] 
filial [to your parents] and kind to your brothers; only then [these virtues] will be 
reflected in the governing of the country.”53 According to Kongzi, serving as an official 
in the ruler’s court is not the only way to participate in government. Being filial to one’s 
parents and kind to one’s brothers at home is also an important way of participating in 
government, because the close family ties and the accompanying “virtuous” affections 
such as filial piety and respect for elders were considered by the founding fathers of 
Western Zhōu to provide the very foundation of the stable political structure. 
It was in this context that Kongzi thought by his time there was no order any more 
in the world (“tiānxià wúdào” 天下無道).54 After losing its capital to the barbarians of 
the west in 770 B.C.E. (Note that this is the beginning of the Spring and Autumn period), 
the Zhōu house had to move to the east, and the Zhōu emperor no longer had as strong a 
military and political control over his subordinate rulers of the states outside the imperial 
territory as before.55 At the same time, the kinship ties that once strongly bound the Zhōu 
emperor and his vassals-cum-relatives together became devoid of the familial affections 
gradually and naturally generation by generation. This situation of the lack of the 
absolute political authority and the general weakening of the kinship ties in the interstate 
relationship led to the endless competition for power and wealth among the states and the 
ever-increasing wars among them both in frequency and size.56 However, it was not only 
at the level of the interstate relationship that this lack of authority and the weakened 
kinship ties took effect. For we also witness continuous intrastate conflicts between the 
                                                 
52 “其爲人也孝弟, 而好犯上者, 鮮矣. 不好犯上, 而好作亂者, 未之有也.” Lunyu 1:2. 
53 “書云, ‘孝乎惟孝, 友于兄弟, 施於有政.’” Lunyu 2:21. 
54 Lunyu 16:2. 
55 Hsu, Ancient China in Transition, pp. 3–5. 
56 Ibid., Chapter 3. 
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ruler and the noble families as well as among the noble families themselves in several 
countries of this period, the situations of which are relatively well recorded. 57  It is 
generally said that thirty-six rulers were killed by their subordinates and seventy-two 
states were destroyed and annexed to the other stronger countries throughout the Spring 
and Autumn period,58 and Mengzi comments that it was in this disastrous situation of the 
[rampant] regicide and patricide that Kongzi felt fear and wrote the Spring and Autumn 
Annals (chūnqiū 春秋).59
Now let us resume our discussion of Kongzi’s “caring” about the sacrificial ritual. 
What was Kongzi’s rationale for wanting to save the ritual at the expense of the sheep 
being apparently wasted? One thing I might be able to extract from my previous 
description of this ritual is that the monthly practice of announcing a new moon to the 
spirits of one’s ancestors is supposed to inculcate filial piety and respect for elders in the 
performers as well as the beholders of this ritual, so that those who participate in this 
ritual (including both the performers and the audience) can cooperate with each other in 
their daily lives to maintain social harmony as if they were members of a big 
hierarchically organized family bound together by familial affections. Probably it was in 
this context that Yǒu Ruò (one of Kongzi’s disciples mentioned above) said, “Among the 
usages of the rituals, it is most valuable that they bring about harmony.”60  
However, although maintaining the gàoshùo ritual would contribute significantly 
to bringing about a harmonious, and thus to a certain extent well-governed and 
flourishing, society, the source of Kongzi’s valuing of this ritual seems to lie much deeper 
than the prospect of this important political benefit this gàoshùo ritual is supposed to 
bring about. In other words, it does not seem to be the case that Kongzi’s “caring” about 
or high evaluation of the ritual is the result of his calculative inference that 1) preserving 
the gàoshùo ritual would cultivate certain politically useful attitudes such as obedience or 
deference to domestic and social authorities and 2) these attitudes would in turn help 
bring about a harmonious or a well-governed society. Rather, it seems to be the case that 
                                                 
57 Ibid., pp. 78–92. 
58 Méi Sìpíng 梅思平, “Chūnqiū shídài de zhèngzhì yǔ Kǒngzǐ de zhèngzhì sìxiǎng” 春秋時代的政治與孔
子的政治思想 [The politics during the Spring and Autumn period and Kongzi’s political thought], in 
Gǔshǐbiàn 古史辨, ed. Gù Xiégāng 顧頡剛 (Xiānggǎng: Tàipíng shūjú 太平書局, 1962), vol. 2, p. 161. 
59 “世衰道微, 邪說暴行有作, 臣弑其君者有之, 子弑其父者有之. 孔子懼, 作春秋.” Mengzi 3B:9. 
60 “禮之用, 和爲貴.” Lunyu 1:12. 
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certain affective bonds in familial relationships, sometimes expressed as filial piety and 
respect for elders, were deemed intrinsically valuable by Kongzi. For as we have seen 
above, Kongzi says that knowing the age of one’s parents puts one in fear and joy at the 
same time, and this terse remark of his does not allow any room for the thought that 
people have these feelings because of the political benefits they could reap with those 
affective attitudes. On the contrary, the affection-imbued familial relationships seem to be 
of fundamental value for Kongzi, and he colors the picture of his ideal polity much in this 
light. Given this being the way Kongzi views things, his annoyance at Zǐgòng’s removal 
of the sacrificial sheep is intelligible. 
 
Now, I would like to conclude this lengthy discussion of ài 愛 in the Analects by 
making some comments on an important theme that seems to weave through these three 
senses of ài that I have been distinguishing so far. The theme that I see as common to 
these three senses of ài is, valuing.61 Children are intrinsically valuable beings for many 
of their parents, and that is why those parents lovingly care for their children throughout 
their lives, especially during the early formative age of their children. And it is normally 
during this age and through this type of parental care that one learns about the intrinsic 
rewardingness of certain human relationships, comes to value such relationships for the 
sake of themselves, and forms a deep motivation for maintaining and enriching those 
relationships. And one comes to develop the same attitude in one’s relationships with 
friends and lover(s), and such development or extension is very natural (the first sense of 
ài).  However, people “love” or ài a diverse array of objects because they find them 
valuable, but they often disagree about what are the right things to ài. Plausibly many 
human beings who grow up under the loving care of their parents also grow strong 
affective bond with their parents, and consider their parents and their interactions with 
them invaluable; but some do not do so for one reason or another, like Zǎi Wǒ. People are 
attracted by many things, and sometimes they even value different aspects of the same 
thing (We have just seen such a case in my discussion of the third sense of ài). This clash 
of valuable and therefore “lovable” objects, though, is not the only problem concerning ài 
                                                 
61 The idea of valuing as a theme shared by these three senses of ài significantly comes from my discussion 
of this matter with William H. Baxter on 3/21/06. 
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愛 in the Analects. One can also ask: If we naturally value and love those who are close 
to us, how much value should we place on those who are relatively far from us? And, if 
we ever place as much value on strangers as we do on friends, could we love them as 
much as we value them (the second sense of ài)? Mòzǐ’s challenge to the Confucian ideal 
of rén 仁 can be interpreted in terms of these questions, and I fully discuss them in the 
section on ài 愛 and moral cultivation in Chapter 6. 
 
 
3.2 “Sorrow” (Āi 哀) 
 
According to the Collins COBUILD English Language Dictionary, sorrow is defined as 
“a feeling of deep sadness or regret, caused for example by the death of someone you 
love or because of your sympathy for the sufferings of someone else.”62 This definition, 
and especially the examples given in the definition, nicely capture the two senses of āi 哀 
that I will discuss under the category of “sorrow” in this section. In the Analects, āi 哀 
seems to be used in two ways. On one hand, it refers to the feeling of deep sadness at the 
loss of close people; on the other hand, it refers to the feeling of pity or sympathy at the 
suffering of others. In the following, I first discuss Kongzi’s use of āi 哀 as referring to 
deep sadness at the death of those close to oneself, and then move on to discuss the 
second sense of āi 哀—pity or sympathy, combining it with my discussion of jīn 矜, 
another term that also falls under the category of pity. 
 
(1) Most frequently, āi 哀 is used in the Analects as the feeling of great sadness at 
the death of the people who are close and important to oneself, the death of parents being 
the most illustrating case. Out of the total seven occurrences of āi 哀 throughout the text, 
five of them are related with death, and in four of them (Lunyu 3:26, 19:1, 19:14, and 
19:25) āi 哀 or “sorrow” is viewed as the proper emotional state to be in when one 
performs funerary and mourning rituals at the death of those who are close to oneself. I 
                                                 
62 Collins COBUILD English Language Dictionary (London: William Collins Sons & Co Ltd, 1987; reprint, 
1991), p. 1390. 
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have previously argued at several occasions for the importance of familial and other kinds 
of close relationships in a desirable human life for Kongzi, and this point is once again 
underscored here by seeing how much importance Kongzi and his disciples assign to the 
feeling of sorrow at the deathbeds of their family members, friends, disciples, and so 
forth. For example, Zǐzhāng 子張, one of Kongzi’s disciples, enlists the capacity to feel 
[enough degree of] sorrow in mourning as one of the most important character traits of 
the Confucian “intellectuals”: 
 
An intellectual, [willing to carry out his duty] even by sacrificing his life in the face of 
danger, reminding himself of the right at the sight of gain, thinking of reverence while 
performing a sacrificial ceremony, and thinking of sorrow in a mourning ritual, would be 
not a bad one indeed.63
 
The term that I translated above as ‘intellectual’ is shì 士. As I have briefly mentioned 
earlier, shì 士 originally consisted of the lowest stratum of the ruling class in the Western 
Zhōu period, being in charge of ceremonial, military, scribal, divinatory, and fiscal 
activities of the local and imperial governments as the lower functionaries of the 
administrative structures.64 By Kongzi’s time, though, the traditional shì 士 class got 
much expanded by the influx of people from above and below, primarily by the joining of 
the declining nobility whose countries were destroyed by and annexed to their powerful 
neighbors and many commoners who could procure themselves enough leisure for study 
by successfully adapting to the changing social circumstances. As a result, there came to 
be a big group of people with different social origins, who tried to promote their social 
statuses and make their living first by wholeheartedly engaging themselves in the study 
of classics and the art of governance under such teachers as Kongzi and Mòzǐ and then by 
seeking an office at a local ruler’s court. Following Schwartz65 and Yü Ying-shih,66 we 
could call this large element of the shì 士 class “intellectuals” (and specifically “rú” 儒 
for those belonging to the Confucian schools), as distinguished from the other constituent 
                                                 
63 “士見危致命, 見得思義, 祭思敬, 喪思哀, 其可已矣.” Lunyu 19:1. 
64 Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, pp. 57–58. 
65 Ibid., p. 58. 
66 Yü Ying-shih 余英時, “Gǔdài zhīshíjiēcéng de xìngqǐ yǔ fāzhǎn 古代知識階層的興起與發展 [The 
Origin and Development of the Ancient Intellectual Stratum],” chap. in Shì yǔ zhōngguó wénhuà 士與中國
文化 (上海: 上海人民出版社, 1987), especially pp. 1–26. 
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of the shì 士 class, viz. “warriors” (xiá 俠). In the Analects, the picture of the ideal shì 士 
often overlaps with that of jūnzǐ 君子, the ethical ideal of Kongzi.67 And this being the 
case, we might be able to say quite safely that the death of a close person is an important 
ethical situation for both shì 士 and jūnzǐ 君子 as the ideal type of Kongzian agents, and 
that sorrowful mourning is an important type of action for them in such a situation. 
Now, before engaging in a full discussion of the last thesis that sorrowful 
mourning is an important type of action in Kongzi, I would like first to elaborate one 
aspect of it by saying that sorrow at the deathbed of and throughout the mourning period 
for close people is often cast in a very positive light in the Analects. In other words, 
sorrow of this kind seems often described as intrinsically good or almost fully warranted. 
This can be partly seen in the current passage because it equally ranks sorrow, or the 
capacity to feel sorrow in the right circumstance, with other virtues such as fortitude in 
front of danger, righteousness over self-interest, and reverence for the spirits of deceased 
ancestors. However, we can see the high esteem of sorrow in the Analects more clearly in 
the following two passages: 
 
The master said, “Holding a high office without generosity, performing rituals without 
reverence, being in mourning without sorrow—how can I [bear to] see these things?”68
 
Zǐyóu 子游 said, “One may dispense with [the trappings of] mourning, as long as he can 
fully express his sorrow.”69
 
It is clear in the first passage that Kongzi wants to see one performing an act or his duty 
in the right or virtuous state of mind, and sorrow in mourning is one of such states of 
mind. Moreover, it is also implied here that Kongzi would have some sort of negative, 
second-order sentiment such as disgust, disappointment, or aversion (wù 惡) in general, if 
one fails to be in the correct state of mind when performing his duties. What I mean by 
“second-order sentiment” here is the way one would feel at one’s own or someone else’s 
                                                 
67 Compare especially Lunyu 4:9, 8:7, 12:20, 13:20, 13:28, 14:2, 18:11, 19:1 (for the ideal of shì) with 1:2, 
4:10, 4:16, 5:16, 8:6, 15:18, and 16:10 (for the ideal of jūnzǐ). 
68 “子曰: ‘居上不寬, 爲禮不敬, 臨喪不哀, 吾何以觀之哉?’” Lunyu 3:26. 
69 “子游曰: ‘喪致乎哀而止.’” Lunyu 19:14. My translation adopts Legge’s helpful note on this passage, 
rather than his translation of it. See Legge, Confucian Analects, p. 344. 
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character, acts, motives, and so forth which will be considered to be “first-order” in the 
sense that they become the objects of one’s second-order sentiments. So, for example, if 
Kongzi felt averse to a mindless performance of a mourning ritual, then his aversion is a 
second-order sentiment directed at the lack of sorrow in the poor performance of the 
mourning ritual. And if the mindless performer somehow came to be aware of the bad 
quality of his own ritual performance due to his lack of sorrow and consequently felt 
ashamed about it, then his emotion of shame is also a second-order sentiment about his 
own lack of sorrow in the mourning ritual. One of the important characteristics of these 
second-order sentiments is that they carry certain kind of evaluation with them, either 
positive or negative,70 and the minimal point I want to make regarding this passage here 
is that Kongzi’s negative second-order sentiment about the mindless performance of a 
mourning ritual marks sorrow as a highly valuable quality to be found in any mourning 
rituals. 
While Kongzi valued sorrow as the correct emotional state for a mourner to be in, 
and thus he viewed sorrow as the correct motivational foundation for any performance of 
the mourning ritual, we witness in the second passage above that Zǐyóu 子游, one of 
Kongzi’s distinguished disciples, goes one step further and puts the richness of the 
emotional foundation of a ritual—sorrow in this case—over the elegant form of 
expression of the emotion—the elaborated mourning ritual for the current case. This 
position of Zǐyóu’s is not the orthodox Confucian picture of the ideal combination of the 
ritual and the emotional foundation of it, because the best way to combine them is the one 
in which one expresses one’s rich feeling with full elegance of the relevant ritual.71  
However, this ideal state is rarely found in many ordinary people, and when it comes to 
the question of what is the second-best and more realizable option, the answer is 
unequivocally rich emotion with less embellished rituals, rather than scanty emotion with 
overly elaborate rituals. So at Lín Fàng’s 林放 question about the foundation of the 
rituals, Kongzi says that “As for the rituals in general, they should be frugal rather than 
                                                 
70 See also Section 2.2.2.1 of the previous chapter. 
71 So Kongzi said, “When natural substance prevails over ornamentation, you get the boorishness of the 
rustic. When ornamentation prevails over natural substance, you get the pedantry of the scribe. Only when 
ornament and substance are duly blended do you get the true gentleman.” Waley, The Analects, p. 111. “質
勝文則野, 文勝質則史. 文質彬彬, 然後君子.” Lunyu 6:18. Also consider Lunyu 12:8. 
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exuberant; as for the mourning rituals in particular, sorrow is valued over well-
manneredness.”72 And Zǐlù 子路, one of Kongzi’s disciples mentioned above, says in the 
Lǐjì 禮記, “I heard this from the Master: As for the mourning rituals, one had better be 
excessive in sorrow and short of rituals rather than being excessive in rituals and short of 
sorrow; as for the sacrificial rituals, one had better be excessive in reverence and short of 
rituals rather than being excessive in rituals and short of reverence.”73 In my opinion, all 
of these sayings testify sufficiently to Kongzi’s and his disciples’ high evaluation of 
sorrow. 
This importance of sorrow in a desirable human life, though, is not a feature 
emphasized only in philosophical texts like the Analects. For we can find a similar view 
in the Zǔozhuàn 左傳, the chronicle of the Lǔ dukedom covering the period from 721 to 
463 B.C.E. Since Lǔ is Kongzi’s home country, and Kongzi died in 479 B.C.E.,74 studying 
the use of āi 哀 in the Zǔozhuàn would reveal us what were Kongzi’s predecessors’ as 
well as his contemporaries’ thoughts on āi 哀. Significantly, the predominant two-fold 
use of āi 哀 in the Analects as sorrow at the death of close people on one hand and pity 
for other people’s sufferings on the other is nicely mirrored by the usage of āi 哀 in the 
Zǔozhuàn. For except a couple of ambiguous cases, 75  āi 哀 in the Zǔozhuàn is 
dominantly used either as sorrow at the death of one’s parents, relatives, colleagues, and 
so forth76 or as pity at the misfortune or suffering of others.77 What should interest us 
more for now, though, is the fact that the first cases of āi in the Zǔozhuàn (i.e. the sorrow 
at the loss of close people) include some interesting cases of emotional failure. In those 
cases, the protagonists do not feel sorrow at all, or at least do not feel it to the appropriate 
                                                 
72 “禮, 與其奢也寧儉, 喪, 與其易也寧戚.” Lunyu 3:4. 
73 “子路曰: ‘吾聞諸夫子: “喪禮, 與其哀不足而禮有餘也, 不若禮不足而哀有餘也. 祭禮, 與其敬不足而
禮有餘也, 不若禮不足而敬有餘也.”’” Lǐjì, “Tángōng shàng” 檀弓上, p. 202. 
74 This is a widely accepted dating of Kongzi’s death, but according to the Zǔozhuàn, Kongzi died in the 
16th year of Āigōng’s 哀公 reign, which is 480. B.C.E. 
75 For example, Xiānggōng 襄公 29, Yáng Bójùn, Chūnqiū Zǔozhuàn zhù, p. 1164; Zhāogōng 昭公 25, 
ibid., p. 1456; Zhāogōng 昭公 25, ibid., pp. 1458–1459. 
76 For example, Wéngōng 文公 15, ibid., p. 611; Chénggōng 成公 14, ibid., p. 870; Xiānggōng 襄公19, 
ibid., p. 1051; Xiānggōng 襄公 23, ibid., p. 1081; and Xiānggōng 襄公 31, ibid., p. 1185. 
77 For example, Zhuānggōng 莊公 20, ibid., p. 215; Xīgōng 僖公 33, ibid., p. 497; Wéngōng 文公 5, ibid., 
p. 540; Wéngōng 文公 6, ibid., p. 547; Xuāngōng 宣公 12, ibid., p. 722; and Chénggōng 成公 13, ibid., p. 
865. 
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degree while in mourning for their parents or close relatives. As I see it, examining how 
these cases were interpreted and responded to by the people of this period will tell us 
what the attitude of Kongzi’s predecessors and contemporaries was about sorrow at the 
loss of close people, and what the place of close familial (and other important kinds of) 
relationships was in their communal life.  
I encountered four accounts of emotional failure of this kind in the Zǔozhuàn, and 
three of them equally comprise the following three elements:78 1) The father dies, and the 
son is in mourning for his father; 2) the son is not sorrowful (enough) while in mourning; 
and 3) people around him express disapprobation of his digressive emotional state, and 
predict that his emotional eccentricity will bring about great misfortune in the future not 
only to himself but often to other people, and even to his entire country. The aberrant 
sons in these accounts were very likely to harm not only themselves but also their 
countries, because they were heirs to the positions of great authority and power in their 
home countries—two of the positions were each the dukedom of Lǔ 魯 and the dukedom 
of Wèi 衛, and the third one was the position of the head of a powerful noble family in 
Wèi 衛.79 In the following, I will focus on some important details of these stories and 
discuss their implications. 
First, as in my translation of Lunyu 3:26 above, the sons’ indifference to their 
father’s death is faced with other people’s disapprobation. The most explicit case of these 
three stories is Chénggōng 成公 14: One day, the wife of the last duke happens to notice 
that the heir to the dukedom—a concubine’s son, not her own—is not sad at all about his 
deceased father. She gets so disgusted and disappointed at this that she cannot even drink 
a scoop of water, and predicts that not only will he fail his country, but the disaster will 
start by affecting her own life.80 It is clear that her negative sentiment about him cannot 
be interpreted simply as hatred which has to do with the fact that her own son failed to 
                                                 
78 They can be found respectively in Chénggōng 成公 14, ibid., p. 870; Xiānggōng 襄公 19, ibid., p. 1051; 
and Xiānggōng 襄公 31, ibid., pp. 1185–1186. 
79 The fourth story, which I will not discuss in this section, goes as follows: At the death of a cousin, the 
protagonist initially refuses to do the ceremonial weeping for him, because this person (the deceased) has 
done some harm to the protagonist in the past. But at a mild reproach and admonition from a third party, he 
is persuaded to participate willingly in the mourning ritual. See Wéngōng 文公 15, ibid., pp. 609–611. 
80 “夫人姜氏旣哭而息, 見大子之不哀也, 不內酌飮, 歎曰: ‘是夫也, 將不唯衛國之敗, 其必始於未亡人. 
烏呼! 天禍衛國也夫!’” Zǔozhuàn, Chénggōng 成公 14. Yáng Bójùn, Chūnqiū Zǔozhuàn zhù, p. 870. 
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succeed to the dukedom, because her involuntary and severe sickness about his emotional 
misconduct reveals her deep conviction that his emotional insensitivity is in itself 
blamable and utterly ominous. 
Second, although their negative sentiments are not as explicit as the case just 
presented, those who comment on this type of emotional failure in the other two stories 
not only declare it to be wrong but also specify what kind of wrong it is. In Xiānggōng 
襄公 19 Dàozǐ 悼子 does not show any sorrow for his deceased father Shí Gòngzǐ 
石共子, and Kǒng Chéngzǐ 孔成子 (one of the prime ministers of Wèi 衛) says that 
“This is called ‘uprooting (juéběn 蹶本)’ one’s [tree of family]. Definitely he will not be 
maintaining his family line.”81 And in Xiānggōng 襄公 31, Gōngzǐ Chóu 公子綢, who 
becomes Zhāogōng 昭公 of the Lǔ dukedom later, is commented by Mùshū 穆叔 that he 
does not qualify to succeed to the dukedom because, for one thing, he is not only not 
sorrowful at his father’s death but even playful while in mourning; this type of person is 
called “aberrant man (búdùzhīrén 不度之人),” and it is rare that this kind of person does 
not bring about troubles later.82
From my discussion in the last two paragraphs the following picture emerges: For 
the ancient Chinese described in the Zǔozhuàn, failing to feel sorrow in a sorrowful 
situation, especially while in mourning for one’s family members, is something deeply 
wrong and inauspicious. It is so specifically in three senses. First, failing to feel sorrow in 
a sorrowful situation is wrong, because it does not satisfy the general condition that one’s 
emotional response meet the emotional requirement of the situation. That is, the situation 
of one’s parent’s death requires one to feel sorrow, and one who does not feel sorrow in 
such a situation cannot be said to be a normal person. Second, failing to feel sorrow in a 
sorrowful situation is wrong in the sense that this type of emotional failure reveals a 
concrete flaw in one’s character. According to Kǒng Chéngzǐ’s comment on Dàozǐ above 
that he is uprooting his family tree by not lamenting his father’s death, one who does not 
feel sorrow even at his own father’s death does not care about his root (běn 本), and this 
type of person is unlikely to care about one’s lineage and make it flourishing. Third, since 
                                                 
81 “是謂蹶其本, 必不有其宗.” Zǔozhuàn, Xiānggōng 襄公 19, ibid., p. 1051. 
82 “且是人也, 居喪而不哀, 在慽而有嘉容, 是謂不度. 不度之人, 鮮不爲患.” Ibid., p. 1185. The heart 
radical of ‘慽’ is under ‘戚’ in the original. 
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this type of person does not grasp the situation correctly—failing to feel sorrow in a 
sorrowful situation is a good example, he is likely to make crucial mistakes at important 
turning points of his life by misinterpreting what he has to do in each situation. And the 
consequence of such misinterpretations is disastrous: he could endanger his life. Even 
worse, if this type of person were a ruler of a country or an otherwise politically 
influential person, he would endanger his country too. There would be hardly any more 
inauspicious thing than this. 
There are two further details in these stories that deserve our special attention. 
The first concerns the family history of aforementioned Dàozǐ 悼子, who belonged to the 
Shí 石 family and whose indifference at his father’s death made Kǒng Chéngzǐ predict 
that he would not be able to maintain his family line. Nine years after the prediction, he 
happens to flee to a neighboring country Jìn 晉 avoiding his political enemies’ attack, 
becoming no longer able to preside the sacrificial ceremonies for his ancestors as the 
head of his family. He does not seem to have had any children, or perhaps his children 
did not survive this political turmoil, because his political enemies who are now 
controlling his home country allow to establish his nephew as the new head of the Shí 石 
family, so that the Shí 石 family could at least subsist.83  Interestingly enough, what 
procured this exceptional kindness from its enemies for the Shí 石 family was the 
political merit of Shí Què 石碏, an ancestor of the Shí 石 family, who helped stabilizing 
the country by killing the usurper Zhōu Yū 州吁84 and his supporter Shí Hòu 石厚, the 
latter being his own son. The author of the Zǔozhuàn praises Shí Què through the mouth 
of the nobleman (jūnzǐ 君子)—the general commentator on the historical events 
throughout the book—as a “pure vassal” or “vassal of utmost loyalty” (chúnchén 純臣), 
who acted on the ancient dictum that “great duty should override familial affection (dàyì 
mièqīn 大義滅親).”85
Now, we need to think about what is meant exactly by “great duty” (dàyì 大義) 
here. In the previous section, we have seen that “treating close people as close” or 
                                                 
83 Zǔozhuàn, Xiānggōng 襄公 28. Yáng Bójùn, Chūnqiū Zǔozhuàn zhù, p. 1142. 
84 There are three tones for this character (xū, yū, and yù), but I am not clear which one is used for personal 
name. 
85 Zǔozhuàn, Yǐngōng 隱公 4. Yáng Bójùn, Chūnqiū Zǔozhuàn zhù, pp. 37–38. 
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“giving primary consideration to close people” (qīnqīn 親親) is an important principle to 
organize ancient Chinese society. However, the case of Shí Què seems to imply that 
qīnqīn 親親 is not the only principle important in ancient China. Then, in order to find 
out what “great duty” refers to in Shí Què’s case, we need to know exactly why he killed 
his own son and the usurper Zhōu Yū. Zhōu Yū was Wèi Zhuānggōng’s 衛莊 公 
concubine’s son, and Duke Zhuāng liked him. Zhōu Yū, as a concubine’s son who was 
usually ineligible to become a ruler, liked military affairs (hàobīng 好兵), and one day 
Shí Què remonstrated with Duke Zhuāng about such Zhōu Yū. He said: 
 
I heard that [if one] loves one’s son, [one should] teach him with right ways, [so that he] 
does not fall into wickedness. Arrogance, extravagance, lewdness, and dissipation are the 
sources of wickedness, and these four [vices] come from excessive favor and allowances. 
[If you] are going to establish him [as your heir], determine it soon. Otherwise, you are 
leading him to bring about a disaster. There are few who are favored but do not get 
arrogant, are arrogant but can lower their statuses, stay at low ranks but  do not conceive 
rancor, and have rancor but can restrain from expressing it. Moreover, the humble 
harming the noble, the young presuming against the elder, the distant slandering the 
close, the new slandering the old, the small attacking the great, the lewd defeating the 
righteous—these are the so-called six kinds of insubordination….The  ruler of men [is 
supposed to] make efforts to eradicate the disaster, but [you are instead] accelerating it. 
Is this not unacceptable?86
 
However, Duke Zhuāng did not listen to this advice, and later his wife’s sister’s son—far 
more eligible to become a ruler than Zhōu Yū—succeeded him as Duke Huán 桓. Sixteen 
years later, Zhōu Yū killed Duke Huán and usurped the dukedom. But he failed to 
harmonize the people of his country and get support from them, and eventually got killed 
by Shí Què. 
Considering this story and Shí Què’s specific comments on Zhōu Yū’s character 
above together, the reason why Shí Què killed Zhōu Yū and his son Shí Hòu seems to be 
that Zhōu Yū broke the zōngfǎ 宗法 system, and consequently weakened his country by 
stirring up social disorder. Moreover, his fondness of military force and arrogant and 
                                                 
86 “臣聞愛子, 敎之以義方, 弗納於邪. 驕, 奢, 淫, 泆, 所自邪也. 四者之來, 寵祿過也. 將立州吁, 乃定之
矣; 若猶未也, 階之爲禍. 夫寵而不驕, 驕而能降, 降而不憾, 憾而能眕者, 鮮矣. 且夫賤妨貴, 少陵長, 遠
間親, 新間舊, 小加大, 淫破義, 所謂六逆也….君人者, 將禍是務去, 而速之, 無乃不可乎?” Ibid., pp. 3
1–33. 
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brutal character did not gather many people around him, and he could not get the social 
turmoil he created under control. In short, Zhōu Yū’s usurpation of his ruler’s power was 
for nothing but realizing his personal ambition, and it was against almost everyone’s 
interest in the country. In this context, the injunction of “great duty” (dàyì 大義) would 
be to promote the overall benefit of the country and its people, even if it involves 
harming one’s own family members. However, as we have seen in the previous section, 
the core principle of the zōngfǎ 宗法 system is qīnqīn 親親 or giving priority to those 
closely related to oneself, and Zhōu Yū’s breaking of the zōngfǎ system was actually 
breaking this qīnqīn principle. For from the perspective of the Duke Zhuāng, the 
relationship between his two sons Zhōu Yū and Duke Huán was that between the humble 
and the noble, the young and the elder, the distant and the close, and so forth, and the 
former was supposed to be fully subordinate to the latter. Seen in this light, “great duty” 
refers to keeping the lineage of the royal house strong and undisturbed, and it requires 
one to sacrifice one’s family members if they were involved in the conspiracy against the 
royal house.  
In short, the conceptual distinction between “great duty” and the qīnqīn principle 
in the Zǔozhuàn indicates that family ties were not the only important principle for social 
organization in ancient China, although Shí Què’s killing his own son was in some aspect 
to protect another lineage. On the other hand, Shí Què’s sacrifice of his son was still an 
extremely difficult and extraordinary deed, and the way Dàozǐ’s 悼子 enemies treated 
Dàozǐ acknowledges it respectfully. 
Now, I would like to go back to the story of Gōngzi Chóu 公子綢 and ponder the 
relationship between his emotional insensitivity and his unfortunate political failure. As 
we have seen above, he was not only not sad but also playful during the mourning period 
for his deceased father, and Mùshū 穆叔 complained that he was an aberrant man and 
would bring about troubles later to the Jì 季 family.87 However, Jì Wúzǐ 季武子—the 
head of the Jì 季 family at that time—did not listen to this advice, and Gōngzǐ Chóu 
公子綢 became the duke of Lǔ (Zhāogōng 昭公 hereafter). As Mùshū predicted, twenty 
                                                 
87 The Jì family was one of the noble families of Lǔ, and had been actually dominating the Lǔ dukedom 
already for generations. 
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five years later he allied with other noble families of Lǔ and attacked the Jì 季 clan, and 
managed to capture the head of the Jì 季 family. One of his allies recommended allowing 
the captured head of the Jì 季 family to exile himself, but Zhāogōng decided to kill his 
influential captive. This reckless decision made other noble families of Lǔ fearful of their 
own fates, and they got together to protect their shared interests against the duke. 
Consequently, Zhāogōng 昭公 failed and was now himself forced to flee to neighboring 
countries and face lonely death in exile eight years later.88
It is not very clear at the beginning how much relationship there could be between 
Zhāogōng’s emotional insensitivity as a teenager and his eventual political failure. 
However, the author of the Zǔozhuàn reports an episode of his mischievous conduct 
during the mourning period: Until the burial of his deceased father, he changed his 
funeral garments three times, but he saw to it that the lower part of his skirt looked as old 
as the previous one, so that nobody could notice the change of his garments.89 The author 
of the Zǔozhuàn comments on this:  
 
At this time Zhāogōng 昭公 was already nineteen, but he still had a childish mind 
[tóngxīn 童心]. It was by seeing this that the nobleman knew Zhāogōng 昭公 would not 
be able to have a proper death.90
 
A charitable interpretation of this comment that could bridge Zhāogōng’s early episode of 
playfulness in mourning and his later political failure would be the following: While in 
mourning, one is normally drawn to such features as one’s parent’s death and the grave 
influence it will have on one’s future life, often experiencing a set of typical affective or 
physiological reactions that accompany sorrow. However, Zhāogōng 昭公 was different. 
He was instead concerned with his clothing and his appearance to others, and this 
revealed that his mind was still childish. For being distracted by trivial aspects of the 
mourning rituals and even playing with them is a good sign of emotional immaturity. And 
since he was not able to grasp the salient features of the situation correctly, it was not an 
                                                 
88 Zǔozhuàn, Zhāogōng 昭公 25. Ibid., especially pp. 1462–1465. 
89 Zǔozhuàn, Xiānggōng 襄公 31. Ibid., p. 1185. 
90 “於是昭公十九年矣, 猶有童心. 君子是以知其不能終也.” Zǔozhuàn, Xiānggōng 襄公 31. Ibid., p. 
1186. 
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unreasonable guess that as long as Zhāogōng was not going to correct this shortcoming, 
this flaw in character would be carried onto the later stages of his life and affect his life 
unfavorably. In short, the capacity to feel sorrow in a sorrowful situation constitutes a 
larger and more general ability to grasp the correct salient features of a situation with 
appropriate emotional response, and those who lack this ability can hardly lead a 
desirable life in the world. Moreover, the author of the Zǔozhuàn seems to have thought 
that this capacity of emotional perception can grow by cultivation, because he called the 
emotional immaturity of Zhāogōng’s kind “tóngxīn” 童心 or “children’s mind.” 
  
(2) The second sense of āi 哀 is the feeling of pity or sympathy at the suffering of 
others, and āi is used only once in this sense in the Analects: 
 
Those in authority have lost their way, and the commoners [consequently] have been 
drifting digressively for a long time. If you could extract any truth from them [in 
interrogation], be sorrowful and pitiful instead of being joyful [about your ability]!91
 
This is Zēngzǐ’s 曾子 advice to one of his disciples when this disciple became a judge 
(shìshī 士師) in the Lǔ dukedom. According to Zēngzǐ, the ruling class of Lǔ had long 
since lost the proper way to govern its people, having the people of Lǔ suffer for long 
time and eventually end up committing crimes just to make their living. So, Zēngzǐ 
advises his disciple that even if he could solve a crime by successfully finding out what is 
true about the case, he should feel sad about or pity the criminals instead of feeling joyful 
about his ability as a judge. In this passage “āi” 哀 seems to be used synonymously with 
“jīn” 矜, which means pity for the suffering of others, because the intentional object of 
both “āi” 哀 and “jīn” 矜 is clearly the miserable situation of the commoners—the 
originally innocent people turned into criminals due to the ruling class’s misgovernment. 
However, “āi” 哀 is used in this sense only once in the Analects, and it is difficult 
to determine what is the correct semantic boundary of this term, especially whether there 
is any slight difference in meaning between “āi” 哀 and “jīn” 矜. However, the usages of 
“āi” 哀 in the sense of pity or sympathy abound in the Zǔozhuàn, and there are more 
                                                 
91 “上失其道, 民散久矣. 如得其情, 則哀矜而勿喜!” Lunyu 19:19. The underlining is mine. 
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usages of “jīn” in the Zǔozhuàn than in the Analects. So, analyzing the instances of “āi” 
哀 in the Zǔozhuàn in comparison to the usages of “jīn” 矜 in both the Analects and the 
Zǔozhuàn might clarify how the term “āi” 哀 were used by Kongzi’s predecessors and 
contemporaries. 
First, we need to determine whether “āi” 哀  and “jīn” 矜  can be used 
interchangeably with each other, or there is any substantial semantic difference between 
them. Along with the passage just quoted above, “jīn” as a verb seems to mean “feeling 
sympathy for” or “pity” in Lunyu 19:3: 
 
The nobleman respects the worthy and tolerates the multitude, praises the good and pities 
the incapable.92
 
What is noteworthy about this passage is that the object of the nobleman’s pity is 
incapable people or their miserable situation—probably in the ethical context here, and 
the fact that they are morally inferior to the nobleman is what makes the nobleman jīn 矜 
or feel “pity” for them. In other words, in this passage the feeling of jīn 矜 or “pity” is the 
nobleman’s feeling sorry that those people cannot make themselves better persons, and 
one’s jīn 矜 or “pity” in general seems to involve the following two components: 1) the 
recognition that the object of one’s “pity” is in a bad situation, and 2) the evaluative 
attitude that being in such a situation is pitiful, in the sense that it deserves pity on the 
part of the observer. This generalization also applies to the case of the criminals who 
were originally innocent commoners in the previous passage. 
At this point, one might wonder whether the feeling of jīn 矜 possibly involves a 
modicum of contempt about its object, just as the English word “pitiful” can mean 
“despicable” or “deserving contempt,” and “pitiable” means “arousing or deserving pity, 
sometimes mixed with scorn or contempt.”93 Although it is not initially clear whether this 
is also the case for jīn 矜, it is interesting to see that “jīn” 矜 is used twice in the Analects 
                                                 
92 “君子尊賢而容衆, 嘉善而矜不能.” Lunyu 19:3. 
93 Webster’s New World Dictionary and Thesaurus Version 2.0, Accent Software International, Macmillan 
Publishers, 1998. 
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to mean something like “feel proud of oneself” or “self-conceit.” First, as a noun, “jīn” 
seems to mean “self-conceit” or “self-admiration” in the following passage: 
 
The self-conceited in the antiquity was dignified, but the self-conceited today is [merely] 
irascible and quarrelsome.94
 
As Yáng Bójùn points out, “lián” 廉 originally meant a sharp edge or point of a thing, 
and by analogy it came to mean a person’s correct and dignified behavior.95 In other 
words, The metaphor of the sharp edge conveys that the self-admiration of the person 
who is lián 廉 is based on his moral character, and his self-admiration does not allow 
himself to engage in lowly, immoral activities. However, “jīn” or “self-admiration” is not 
necessarily intertwined with the moral quality of lián 廉, and Kongzi says that the self-
conceited people of his time are just self-conceited for whatever reason, and tend to fight 
with other people because of their self-conceit and quick temper.  
In another passage from the Analects, “jīn” is used as a verb, and seems to mean 
“feel proud” without any negative connotation: 
 
The nobleman is proud [of himself] but not quarrelsome, gets along well with others but 
does not form factions.96
 
The character “jīn” in this passage is often interpreted as solemnness or seriousness 
expressed through one’s posture or countenance, probably because “jīn” as “self-conceit” 
carries a negative connotation which should not be found in the nobleman’s character.97 
However, as we have just seen in Lunyu 17:16, “jīn,” even in the sense of “self-
admiration,” does not always carry a negative connotation, and it is more consistent to 
interpret “jīn” in this passage as feeling proud of oneself rather than being serious in 
countenance and posture, although the latter is not totally unrelated with the former. 
                                                 
94 “古之矜也廉, 今之矜也忿戾.” Lunyu 17:16. 
95 Yáng Bójùn, Lúnyǔ yìzhù, p. 187. 
96 “君子矜而不爭, 羣而不黨.” Lunyu 15:22. 
97 For example, see Hé Yàn’s 何晏 quotation of Bāo Xián’s 包咸 gloss and Zhū Xī’s gloss on this character, 
which can be found in Chéng Shùdé 程樹德, Lúnyǔ jíshì 論語集釋 (Běijīng 北京: Zhōnghuá shūjú 中華書
局, 1990). Yáng Bójùn also seems to follow this view in his Lúnyǔ yìzhù, p. 166. 
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A speculation about the relationship between these two senses of “jīn” 矜 is that 
they are like two sides of a coin. In other words, one might think that when a person feels 
“pity” for another person, she might feel proud of herself simultaneously, no matter how 
faint that feeling would be. For her pity for another person involves her recognition that 
that person is in a miserable situation, and this recognition is sometimes just the other 
side of the recognition that she—the one who feels pity—is not in that situation, or that 
she does not deserve to be in that situation. However, this speculation is wrong. For on 
one hand, one can still feel pity for another person even if she finds herself in the same 
situation as the other’s, as the victims of the Holocaust might have done for each other; 
on the other hand, one can feel pity for another person’s miserable situation even if, or 
especially when, that person does not deserve to be in that situation but nonetheless could 
not help falling into that situation, as it is the case in Lunyu 19:19 (footnote 91). So, we 
could conclude that although “jīn” sometimes means “self-conceit,” “self-admiration,” or 
“feel proud of oneself,” that meaning is not necessarily intertwined with “jīn” as “pity” or 
“sympathy” in the Analects.  
This point seems to be also true in the Zǔozhuàn, and it can be proven by citing a 
passage from the text. Earlier in this section, we have seen that Zhāogōng 昭公, who was 
playful as a prince during the mourning period for his father’s death, was ousted out by 
the Jì family and fled to a neighboring country. Now in the 32nd year of his partly nominal 
reign, we witness his facing a shameful death in a foreign land. Concerning his death, 
Zhào Jiǎnzǐ 趙簡子, a powerful minister of Jìn 晉, asks Shǐ Mò 史墨 why the people of 
Lǔ still obey the Jì family and no country punishes the Jì family. To this question, Shǐ Mò 
says that it is appropriate for the people of Lǔ to obey the Jì family, because the Jì family 
has helped the dukes of Lǔ for long time. Moreover, he continues, the dukes of Lǔ have 
been licentious and delinquent in governance for generations, while the Jì family has 
been sincere in performing their duties generation after generation. Consequently, Shǐ Mò 
says, “The people of Lǔ forgot about their ruler. Even if he died in a foreign country, who 
would feel sorry for (jīn 矜) him?”98 This remark of Shǐ Mò’s shows that 1) jīn 矜 or 
“pity” can be felt by subordinates for their superiors, and therefore that 2) “jīn” as “pity” 
                                                 
98 “天生季氏, 以貳魯侯, 爲日久矣. 民之服焉, 不亦宜乎! 魯君世從其失, 季氏世修其勤, 民忘君矣. 雖
死於外, 其誰矜之?” Zǔozhuàn, Zhāogōng 32. Yáng Bójùn, Chūnqiū Zǔozhuàn zhù, p. 1519. 
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or “sympathy” is primarily an other-oriented emotion that does not always have the 
connotation of condescending or does not necessarily involve such emotions as pride or 
self-conceit. 
Since the meaning of “jīn” 矜 as “pity” or “sympathy” is quite clear now in the 
Analects and the Zǔozhuàn, let us compare it to “āi” 哀 as “pity” or “sympathy” and see 
whether there is any semantic difference between them. Based on the pattern “āi” 哀 is 
used in the Zǔozhuàn, it seems that “āi” 哀 and “jīn” 矜 are used synonymously in this 
text too: Out of its total 30 instances (except for its use in proper names and titles such as 
“āigōng” 哀公), “āi” 哀 is used at least nine times to mean “pity” or “sympathy.” And in 
most such cases, the “pitying” person and the “pitied” one are of equal social status, and 
the feeling of “pity” of the former is focused on the miserable situation or bad luck of the 
latter. For example, when the earl of Qín 秦 died in 620 B.C.E., many people were buried 
alive with him according to the ancient custom. Among the victims of this brutal custom 
were Yǎnxī 奄息, Zhòngháng 仲行, and Zhēnhǔ 鍼虎, who all belonged to the noble 
family Zǐjūshì 子車氏 and had been known as the three good men (sānliáng 三良) of Qín 
秦. According to the author of the Zǔozhuàn, people of the capital city (guórén 國人) of 
Qín 秦 felt pity for (āi 哀) them and composed a poem.99 The compound noun “guórén” 
國人 here refers to those who belonged to the ruling class living in the capital city, and no 
particular hierarchical relationship is mentioned between these people and the three sons 
of the Zǐjūshì 子車氏. Their dominant feelings about these three victims were most likely 
regret for the loss of good “fellow citizens” for no purpose and pity for their bad luck, 
and āi 哀 in this passage does not seem to have any connotation of condescending on the 
part of those who felt that emotion. 
The Zǔozhuàn contains an unclear case, though. In 596 B.C.E., the viscount of 
Chǔ 楚 invaded Zhèng 鄭. After fighting for three months, the earl of Zhèng surrendered. 
He declared himself to be the vassal of the viscount of Chǔ 楚, speaking in humble words 
befitting his subordinate position, wishing that the viscount of Chǔ would withdraw his 
                                                 
99  “秦伯任好卒, 以子車氏之三子奄息, 仲行, 鍼虎爲殉, 皆秦之良也. 國人哀之, 爲之賦黃鳥.” 
Zǔozhuàn, Wéngōng 文公 6. Ibid., pp. 546–547. 
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soldiers and not destroy Zhèng.100 Against his vassals’ advice to annex Zhèng and not to 
forgive its ruler, the viscount of Chǔ granted the earl’s request to save Zhèng. A while 
later, Jìn 晉, an ally country of Zhèng, sent troops to save Zhèng, but the generals of Jìn 
晉 army found out that Zhèng had already made peace with Chǔ. Having their troops 
return to Jìn 晉 without battling with Chǔ, Shì Huì 士會, a general leading the Jìn army, 
commented on the generosity of the viscount of Chǔ: 
 
I heard that [when] using military force, [one is supposed to] move [only] after finding a 
gap [in one’s enemy]. One cannot fight [an enemy] whose generosity and punishment…do 
not deviate [from the correct way]; it is not right to fight such an enemy. The ruler of Chǔ 
punished Zhèng [because] he felt anger for its double dealing, but he felt pity for the 
earl’s humbling himself. When betraying, he punished it; when submitting, he forgave it. 
[By doing so], his generosity and punishment were established.101
 
According to Shì Huì’s interpretation, the viscount of Chǔ saved Zhèng because he felt āi 
哀 for the earl of Zhèng, and when feeling that emotion, he was responding to the earl’s 
humble manner and speech. Of course, anyone would feel pity for someone if that person, 
as a ruler of a country, knelt down before somebody else because he lost a war. However, 
what is at issue here is whether the viscount of Chǔ was looking at the humbled earl only 
from this third person’s point of view, when he felt the emotion of āi 哀. Perhaps not, 
because he was the very person in front of whom the earl knelt. That is, he might very 
well have felt noble in relation to the humbled earl, and it is not clear whether the feeling 
of importance or self-conceit the viscount of Chǔ might have felt was part of his āi 哀. 
However, based on my analysis, this is only one case throughout the Zǔozhuàn. The other 
eight instances of āi 哀 tell us that the feeling of importance the viscount of Chǔ might 
have felt is not part of āi 哀, or at least that “āi” 哀 usually means “pity” or “sympathy” 
without having any connotation of condescending or involving such emotion as self-
conceit. Since we have already seen that this is also the case with “jīn” 矜, we can now 
conclude that “āi” 哀 and “jīn” 矜 are synonyms, and both mean “pity” or “sympathy” in 
                                                 
100 Zǔozhuàn, Xuāngōng 宣公 12. Ibid., pp. 718–720. 
101 “會聞用師, 觀釁而動. 德, 刑,…不易, 不可敵也, 不爲是征. 楚君討鄭, 怒其貳而哀其卑. 叛而伐之, 
服而舍之, 德刑成矣.” Zǔozhuàn, Xuāngōng 宣公 12. Ibid., p. 722. 
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the Analects and the Zǔozhuàn. 
 
 
3.3 “Fear” (Jù 懼, Kǒng 恐, and Wèi 畏) 
 
Fear is primarily a feeling of terror or dread that we feel at the presence or nearness of 
danger. And we seem to share a large part of this emotion with other animals, although 
different species might find different situations especially fearful. For us human beings, 
though, direct physical threat to our existence is not the only cause of fear. A businessman 
might fear that the stock market will collapse tomorrow, and a religious person fears his 
god in a different way than he fears a bear. That is, we often use the concept of fear 
broadly so as to refer to a feeling of uneasiness or apprehension that something bad might 
happen, or a feeling of reverence or awe in front of awesome things.102 The three ancient 
Chinese emotion terms that I will discuss in this section fall into this broad category of 
fear, and they will turn out to cover roughly the same areas of fear that I just described.  
As in the case of the English term “fear,” these ancient Chinese terms are often 
used for directly threatening situations in many ancient Chinese texts. For example, we 
find in the Zǔozhuàn 左傳 that “kǒng” 恐 is used as the fear felt anticipating an interstate 
battle103 and the fear of one’s own death,104 “jù” 懼 as the fear of the enemy’s sudden 
attack105 and the fear of the deadly punishment for one’s misdeed,106 and “wèi” 畏 as the 
fear of the enemy’s invasion of one’s territory.107 However, I would not try to catalogue 
such fearful situations and find out which situations usually go with which of these terms 
in ancient Chinese texts. Such effort is not likely to be successful in general, because 
                                                 
102 I consulted the entry of “fear” in Webster’s New World Dictionary and Thesaurus for delineating fear 
this way. 
103 “夏, 齊孝公伐我北鄙…齊侯曰: ‘魯人恐乎?’ 對曰: ‘小人恐矣, 君子則否.’” Zǔozhuàn, Xīgōng 僖公 
26. Ibid., p. 439. 
104 “聲伯夢涉洹…懼不敢占也…曰: ‘余恐死, 故不敢占也…’” Zǔozhuàn, Chénggōng 成公 17. Ibid., p. 
899.  In this passage, we can also see that jù 懼 and kǒng 恐 share the same object, namely, one’s own 
death. 
105 “北戎侵鄭. 鄭伯禦之, 患戎師, 曰: ‘彼徒我車, 懼其侵軼我也.’” Zǔozhuàn, Yǐngōng 隱公 9. Ibid., p. 
65. 
106 “宋督攻孔氏, 殺孔父而取其妻. 公怒, 督懼, 遂弑殤公.” Zǔozhuàn, Huángōng 桓公 2. Ibid., p. 85. 
107 “宣子與諸大夫皆患穆嬴, 且畏偪, 乃背先蔑而立靈公, 以禦秦師.” Zǔozhuàn, Wéngōng 文公 7. Ibid., 
p. 559; “許靈公畏偪于鄭, 請遷于楚.” Zǔozhuàn, Chénggōng 成公 15. Ibid., p. 877. 
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these three terms are largely interchangeable and often used in similar situations. 108  
Moreover, such effort does not serve a good purpose in this section, because it is often in 
one of the aforementioned extended senses that fear matters in the ethical context of the 
Analects, and even when fear is discussed in its primary sense, its detail does not matter 
very much. 
In the following, I examine various passages from the Analects containing these 
three terms, and think about what is Kongzi’s view of the place of fear in ethical life. 
Specifically, Kongzi often says that the fully cultivated nobleman is courageous and 
consequently has no fear, but he also seems to think that certain kinds of fear are 
indispensable for leading a fully virtuous life. My following discussion, arranged by the 
three terms in question, partly aims to present this theoretical tension in detail and think 
about how it could be resolved consistently in the context of the Analects. 
 
(1) Jù 懼 
 
In the Analects, two typical situations in which people feel, or are supposed to feel, fear 
are mentioned. First, in Lunyu 4:21 Kongzi says: 
 
One should not forget the age of one’s parents. [Of their old age,] one gets joyful on one 
hand, and fearful on the other.109
  
That is, Kongzi recommends not forgetting the age of one’s parents, because 
remembering the age of one’s parents is a source of joy and fear. Suppose that your 
parents are getting old, and you realize on a New Year’s day that they just turned, say, 75 
and 72 respectively. You will be happy on the one hand that they survived another year, 
but at the same time you will be also afraid that they got one year closer to their death. 
This is a good case that Rawls’s conception of attitude, which I introduced in the previous 
chapter (Section 2.1.3), applies to. Rawls proposes that an attitude is a set of ordered 
families of dispositions, and that love is a good example of such an attitude. According to 
this view, love consists of a set of dispositions such as the disposition to feel joy at the 
                                                 
108 For example, see the entries for these three terms in Hànyŭdàcídiăn, vol. 7, p. 490, p. 798, and p. 1310. 
109 “父母之年, 不可不知也. 一則以喜, 一則以懼.” Lunyu 4:21. 
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presence of the person one loves and the disposition to feel sorrow when one’s loved one 
suffers, and now it is clear that the disposition to feel fear at the imminent misfortune of 
the person one loves is also an important constituent of one’s love. Seen in this light, and 
also considering the importance of one’s love for one’s parents in Kongzi’s ethics, fear 
(and other emotions such as joy and sorrow) directed at the right objects seems to be an 
important part of the nobleman’s moral character. 
Second, in Lunyu 7:11 Zǐlù 子路 asks Kongzi whom he would lead the Three 
Armies (sānjūn 三軍) with, if he were given an opportunity to do so. Zǐlù was one of 
Kongzi’s advanced disciples, and he was always proud of his own courage and military 
prowess. To Zǐlù’s disappointment, though, Kongzi says the following: 
 
I am not with one who would not regret to die while fighting a tiger with bare hands or 
[trying to] walk across the Yellow River. [The person to lead the Three Armies] should be 
one who is afraid of failure when given a task and manages to complete it successfully by 
careful deliberation.110
 
Those who fight a tiger with bare hands or try to walk across a great river might be 
considered brave, but their courage hardly helps anything because it comes either from 
their overestimation of their strength or from their insufficient concern for themselves. 
Such people do not deserve to lead a great army in a battle, because they are not likely to 
collect all the information about the battle and analyze it correctly, and they would not 
take enough care about the welfare of their soldiers either. On the other hand, just as the 
virtuous (rén 仁) person would deal with the other nobles as if receiving an important 
guest and employ the commoners for a public service as if officiating at a great 
sacrifice,111 the person to lead the Three Armies would engage in his battle with great 
care, because the result of his battle will greatly affect not only the lives of his soldiers 
but also the future of his own country. A person in charge of such a great task should feel 
afraid of his failure, and this type of fear, rather than working as a debilitating factor, 
makes him stay alert to every possible mistake and be careful in deliberation and action. 
                                                 
110 “暴虎馮河, 死而無悔者, 吾不與也. 必也臨事而懼, 好謀而成者也.” Lunyu 7:11. 
111 “仲弓問仁. 子曰: ‘出門如見大賓, 使民如承大祭…’” Lunyu 12:2. 
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What is noteworthy in these two passages is that fear is not delineated here as a 
harmful or painful feeling that one should remove from oneself. On the contrary, it 
contributes to the Confucian virtuoso’s character traits and is a useful guidance for how to 
lead one’s life. Ironically, though, Kongzi also says that fear has no room in a virtuous 
person’s mind. For example, Kongzi is quoted twice in the Analects saying that “A brave 
man has no fear,” 112  and he also says that “The nobleman does not worry or fear 
anything.” 113  What does he mean by these remarks? Apparently Kongzi cannot be 
contradicting what he said in the two previous passages and mean that a virtuous person, 
as a fragile creature vulnerable to various kinds of physical harm, does not fear anything; 
it would be insane to think that a virtuous person would not fear a natural predator or the 
overpowering stream of a great river. He does not dare to fight a tiger with his bare hands 
or try to cross the Yellow River without a proper device, and it is because he fears them. 
Then, what does Kongzi mean by these remarks exactly? 
As I see it, Lunyu 12:4 might supply a clue for solving this puzzle. The passage is 
a conversation between Kongzi and Sīmǎ Niú 司馬牛, a disciple of Kongzi’s, about the 
nobleman’s (jūnzǐ 君子) characteristics. It goes as follows: 
 
Sīmǎ Niú asked about the nobleman. The Master said, “The nobleman does not worry or 
fear.” [Sīmǎ Niú] said, “If one simply does not worry or fear, can he be called a 
nobleman?” The Master said, “[The nobleman] introspects and does not feel troubled; 
what would he worry about and fear?114
 
In this passage, Kongzi’s initial cryptic statement that the nobleman has no fear or worry 
gets clarified to some extent by his further remarks. According to him, the nobleman has 
no fear or worry because on introspection he does not find anything wrong or 
reproachable in himself, and this remark of Kongzi’s in turn implies two things. First, it is 
worrisome to a nobleman to have done anything wrong or reproachable or to have an 
intention or an inclination to do such things, and he tries to keep free of such worry and 
fear—fear in the sense of apprehension—by constantly monitoring himself and correcting 
                                                 
112 “勇者不懼.” Lunyu 9:29 and 14:28. 
113 “君子不憂不懼.” Lunyu 12:4. 
114 “司馬牛問君子. 子曰: ‘君子不憂不懼.’ 曰: ‘不憂不懼, 斯謂之君子已乎?’ 子曰: ‘內省不疚, 夫何憂
何懼?’” Lunyu 12:4. 
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himself if necessary. Second, the possibility to get morally defective is the only thing that 
the nobleman should worry about or be afraid of; as long as the nobleman keeps away 
from moral taints, he has nothing to worry about or fear.115 Admittedly, though, Kongzi’s 
initial statement interpreted this way is still too strong, because it cannot explain away the 
nobleman’s natural fear for such things as a tiger or a great river. Moreover, as we have 
seen in Lunyu 7:11 above, Kongzi clearly thinks that this kind of natural fear is 
indispensable not only for a nobleman but also for any ordinary human beings, because 
otherwise human beings would not survive. Then, again, how shall we interpret Kongzi’s 
sweeping statement that the nobleman has no fear at all? If it were not merely a careless 
overstatement, it remains to be explained what would be the nobleman’s state of mind 
exactly when he happens to be in a naturally fearful situation. 
Although not directly commenting on fear (jù 懼), Lunyu 12:5 concerns worry 
(yōu 優) and provides a further clue to this problem. Specifically, this passage tells us 
what kind of worry Sīmǎ Niú was subject to, and how he might deal with it: 
 
[One day] Sīmǎ Niú said in worry, “Others all have brothers, but I alone have none.” 
Zǐxià 子夏 (another disciple of Kongzi’s) responded, “I heard this: Life and death is a 
matter of destiny, and [achieving] wealth and high position depends on [the will of] 
Heaven. [If] a nobleman is reverent and makes no mistake, and is respectful towards 
others and follows the rituals, all within the Four Seas are his brothers. Why would a 
nobleman worry that he has no brothers?”116  
 
According to Mark E. Lewis, men in early China mainly presented themselves and were 
recognized by others as members of families or states, and the obligation to avenge any 
offense done to one’s superiors by a different family or state was a basic element of the 
bond between the members of these social groups, particularly between the lord and the 
retainer or the father and the son (and presumably also between the elder and younger 
brothers in a family). In addition, not only did any unrequited offense remove the bases of 
ordinary social commerce or conviviality between members of the offended and 
                                                 
115 One is reminded of Yán Yuān, a virtuous disciple of Kongzi’s, who was happy to live in a shabby street 
on a bowlful of rice and a gourdful of water. See my discussion of this person and the character of the 
nobleman in general in Section 2.2.2.3 of Chapter 2 above. 
116 “司馬牛憂曰: ‘人皆有兄弟, 我獨亡.’ 子夏曰: ‘商聞之矣: 死生有命, 富貴在天. 君子敬而無失, 與人
恭而有禮 ,  四海之內 ,  皆兄弟也 .  君子何患乎無兄弟也?’”  Lunyu 12:5. I slightly modified Lau’s 
translation. See Lau, The Analects, p. 113. 
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offending groups, but it also turned those groups into enemies who could not live 
together “under the same Heaven.”117 In this socio-historical situation, legal justice was 
secondary to familial justice, so to speak, and having no personal kinship ties that would 
protect oneself from frequent social violence would have been a great source of fear and 
worry: you are more vulnerable to constant physical threat and various types of social 
disadvantages if you do not belong to any current lineage. Perhaps Sīmǎ Niú was so 
worried about not having any brothers for this reason, and the point Zǐxià was trying to 
make was something like this: “They won’t hurt you buddy, as long as you don’t make 
any mistake and are nice to them. And you shouldn’t worry too much about what is not 
fully under human control, such as the matter of life and death or social success.”  
That is, as a nobleman one can keep away from much of the trouble by being nice 
and respectful in dealing with others, but if sometimes it does not help and one 
consequently gets in trouble, one should not worry about the misfortune. It might be 
terrible to be in such a trouble, but since it is not due to one’s moral fault, one should be 
able to face one’s misfortune without losing one’s composure. I will discuss this theme 
further when I discuss Wèi 畏 below. 
 
(2) Kǒng 恐 
 
According to Wáng Lì gǔhànyǔ zìdiǎn 王 力 古 漢 語 字 典 , while often used as an 
intransitive verb, “kǒng” 恐 is also sometimes used as a transitive verb accompanied by a 
fairly long object (chángbīnyǔ 長賓語).118 If what is meant by “chángbīnyǔ” here is a 
sentential phrase as opposed to a single word, this observation applies well to the 
instances of “kǒng” 恐 in the Analects as we will see in this section. Moreover, it is also 
remarkable that three out of the total four usages of “kǒng” in the Analects are used in the 
sense of an anxiety or apprehension that is required to learn and practice the Confucian 
teaching properly. Look at the following three passages: 
                                                 
117 Mark Edward Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Ancient China (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990), pp. 80–
94. 
118 Wáng Lì 王力 et al., ed., Wáng Lì gǔhànyǔ zìdiǎn 王力古漢語字典 (Běijīng 北京: Zhōnghuá shūjú 中
華書局, 2000), p. 742. 
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When Zǐlù had any precept that he had not yet put into full practice, he was afraid of 
hearing [another]. 119  
 
The Master said, “Learn as though not capable of reaching it, [retain it] being afraid of 
losing it.”120
 
Zǐxià 子夏 said, “Even minor arts surely have their own worthwhile aspects, but [the 
person wanting to] go a long way fears that [they might] bog him down. This is why the 
nobleman does not practice them.121
 
In the first passage, Zǐlù, who was mentioned above for his courage, was afraid to be 
taught a new lesson from Kongzi whenever he had not fully mastered what he had 
previously learned from his teacher. In the second passage, Kongzi recommends his 
disciples to engage in learning as if they were on a hunt.122 That is, one should make a 
great effort in learning something, as if chasing an animal that is hard to catch; and once 
having learned it, one should keep oneself familiar with it by periodically practicing it, as 
if trying not to lose an animal that one has caught. Finally, in the third passage Zǐxià (a 
disciple of Kongzi’s mentioned above) says that the nobleman does not practice minor 
arts such as pottery or chess-playing because he fears that despite their contribution to his 
moral cultivation in some aspects, they will generally hinder him from accomplishing a 
great task. 
There are two points that deserve our attention here. First, we can notice that kǒng 
in these three passages equally arise at the thought of a somewhat abstract situation or 
fact (viz. learning a new thing, forgetting what is learned, or petty skills’ distracting one 
from pursuing a greater goal), and that those situations or facts as the intentional objects 
of kǒng are articulated in each of these passages as the grammatical objects of the verb 
“kǒng.” Furthermore, the objects of the verb “kǒng” in these three Analects passages are 
in the form of implicit sentences. That is, a student in the Confucian tradition is supposed 
to be afraid that he will learn a new thing very soon, afraid that he might lose what he 
has already learned, and afraid that practicing minor arts will hinder him from achieving 
                                                 
119 “子路有聞, 未之能行, 唯恐有聞.” Lunyu 5:14. 
120 “子曰: ‘學如不及, 猶恐失之.’” Lunyu 8:17. 
121 “子夏曰: ‘雖小道, 必有可觀者焉, 致遠恐泥, 是以君子不爲也.’” Lunyu 19:4. My translation is a 
slight modification of D. C. Lau’s. See his The Analects, p. 153. 
122 I adopt Yáng Bójùn’s interpretation here. See his Lúnyǔ yìzhù, p. 83. 
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a far greater goal. 123 In short, kǒng in the Analects is a “higher cognitive emotion” in the 
sense that it is a fear about highly abstract situations or observations rather than a fear 
coming from the visceral perception of physical threats, and the classical Chinese 
language had a linguistic tool to articulate this particular type of fear successfully through 
the usage of kǒng, in the case of the Analects.124
 
(3) Wèi 畏 
 
According to Wáng Lì gǔhànyǔ zìdiǎn, “wèi” 畏 comes from the same root as “wēi” 威 
(“awesome”), and one comes to feel wèi 畏 (“awe”) at awesome (wēi 威) things.125 As a 
ground for explaining “wèi” 畏 in terms of “wēi” 威 and vice versa, Wáng Lì gǔhànyǔ 
zìdiǎn quotes the following passage from the Zǔozhuàn: “‘wēi’ 威 is to have wēi 威 and 
deserve awe”—in other words, “‘wēi’ 威 is to have attributes of awesomeness and inspire 
awe.” 126 However, with this tautological explanation of “wèi” 畏 and “wēi” 威 we cannot 
tell what kinds of things are generally considered awesome and what kinds are not in 
ancient China, unless we have an independent explanation of either “wēi” 威 or “wèi” 畏. 
Fortunately, though, this circular definition of “wēi” 威 in the Zǔozhuàn is part of a long 
conversation between the duke of Wèi 衛 and his vassal Běigōng Wénzǐ 北宮文子 about 
the meaning of “wēiyí” 威儀, and Běigōng Wénzǐ’s explanation of “wēi” 威 there is not 
totally circular. According to him, “wēi” 威 is “having attributes of awesomeness so as to 
                                                 
123 Interestingly, the fourth instance of kǒng in the Analects (Lunyu 16:1) takes a complete sentence as its 
object. However, although it could be still translated as “afraid that,” it does not seem to express an 
emotional state at all. Rather, as we sometimes use “I’m afraid that…” in order to disagree politely with 
someone else, Kongzi uses “kǒng” here to make his points modestly while scolding his two disciples, Zǐlù 
and Rǎnqiú 冉求, for serving his superior improperly. 
124 This thesis, though, should not be taken to mean that only kǒng is used in the ancient Chinese texts to 
represent fear as a higher cognitive emotion. On the contrary, we find numerous examples of jù also taking 
somewhat abstract considerations in a sentential form as its intentional objects. For example, in the 
Zǔozhuàn, A woman named Luánqí 欒祁, having committed adultery, fears that her son might take severe 
measures for that (qí jù qí tǎo 祁懼其討), and accuses him of hatching a conspiracy against her father. She 
also tells her father that she cannot but reveal this conspiracy, which was only invented by her, because she 
was worried that her son would harm him (jù hài yú zhǔ 懼害於主). See Zǔozhuàn, Xiānggōng 襄公 21. 
Yáng Bójùn, Chūnqiū Zǔozhuàn zhù, pp. 1058–1059. 
125 Wáng Lì gǔhànyǔ zìdiǎn, p. 193. 
126 “有威而可畏謂之威.” Zǔozhuàn, Xiānggōng 襄公 31. Yáng Bójùn, Chūnqiū Zǔozhuàn zhù, p. 1194. 
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deserve awe” (as we have just seen), and his prime example of things that inspire awe is 
King Wén’s 文 military power. He quotes a passage praising King Wén’s virtue from the 
Documents that “Great countries fear his power, and small countries embrace his 
generosity,”127 and says that King Wén’s military expedition to Chóng 崇 deserves awe 
because it made all of the southern and eastern barbarian tribes surrender to him.128  
This view of wèi 畏 as primarily the feeling of fear at such things as brutal 
military force can also be found in the Analects. Kongzi traveled a lot from one country 
to another trying to persuade rulers of his time to adopt his moral and political vision, and 
one day Kongzi and his disciples came under siege at a border town called Kuāng 匡 
between the Chén 陳 and Cài 蔡 dukedoms. According to Bāo Xián 包咸, the people of 
Kuāng surrounded them with arms and tried to starve them out because they had 
mistaken Kongzi for Yáng Huò 陽貨 of Lǔ 魯 who had plundered the region in the past, 
and coincidently one of Kongzi’s disciples who were driving Kongzi’s chariot had 
participated in Yáng Huò’s plunder before he became Kongzi’s disciple.129 The Analects 
mentions this event three times, and two of them are the following: 
 
The Master was threatened in Kuāng. He said, “[Since] King Wén has already died, isn’t 
the Culture here with me? [If] Heaven had wanted to throw this culture away, I would not 
have been able to partake in this culture; [since] Heaven has not thrown this culture away, 
what the people of Kuāng do to me?”130
 
The Master was threatened in Kuāng, and Yán Yuān 顏淵 fell behind. [When they got 
together again] the Master said, “I thought you were dead!” Yán Yuān 顏淵 said, “You 
are still alive; how can I dare to die?”131
 
At the beginning of the original text of both passages, the same phrase is used: “zǐ wèi yú 
kuāng” 子畏於匡. A literal translation of this phrase would be “The Master got 
                                                 
127 “大國畏其力, 小國懷其德.” Ibid. 
128 See ibid., p. 1195. 
129 Xíng Bǐng 邢昺, Lúnyǔ zhùshū 論語注疏, in Shísānjīng zhùshū 十三經注疏, ed. Ruǎn Yuán 阮元 
(Běijīng 北京: Zhōnghuá shūjú 中華書局, 1980), p. 2490. 
130 “子畏於匡, 曰: ‘文王旣沒, 文不在玆乎? 天之將喪斯文也, 後死者不得與於斯文也; 天之未喪斯文
也, 匡人其如予何?’” Lunyu 9:5. 
131 “子畏於匡, 顔淵後. 子曰: ‘吾以女爲死矣.’ 曰: ‘子在, 回何敢死?’” Lunyu 11:23. 
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frightened at Kuāng” and I chose to translate it a little more modestly, but many scholars 
seem to prefer to translate it as something like “The master was under siege.”132 They 
provide different reasons for their rendering of “wèi” 畏 this way, but what they equally 
seem to want to avoid by doing so is to attribute the emotion of fear to Kongzi in that 
situation. For as we have seen above, it is a recurring theme in Kongzi’s teaching that a 
virtuous person has no fear, or is supposed to feel fear only for appropriate objects. 
For example, Waley thinks that wèi 畏 as fear or awe does not make sense here, 
and he suggests that it could be a mistake of “wéi” 圍, ‘to be surrounded.’133 For cross-
reference he points out a passage in the Zhuāngzǐ that describes the same anecdote in 
more detail,134 but “wéi” 圍 in that passage is used in a different syntax from that of the 
two Analects passages in question that contains the character “wèi” 畏. Consequently, it is 
unlikely that the transcribers of the Analects have confused these two characters even 
twice due to their similarity in pronunciation. However, Chén Qíyóu 陳奇猷 makes a 
different but even stronger proposal. There is a passage in the Huáinánzǐ that mentions 
this anecdote of Kongzi’s, and that passage starts with the phrase “kǒngzǐ wéi yú kuāng” 
孔子圍於匡. The syntax of this phrase is exactly the same as the beginning of the two 
Analects passages in question, and citing this passage Chén Qíyóu suggests that “wèi” 畏 
and “wéi” 圍 were interchangeable in the antiquity.135 I think that this is possible, but the 
case would be more convincing if there were more textual evidence of this kind. 
On the other hand, Yáng Bójùn argues—following Yú Yuè 兪樾—that wèi 畏 
here means the situation of being under siege. He quotes two phrases mentioning 
Kongzi’s predicament in Kuāng, one from the Xúnzǐ 荀子 and the other from the Shǐjì 
史記. The former one is “kǒngzǐ jū kuāng” 孔子拘匡 (“Kongzi was arrested in Kuāng”), 
and the latter is “jū yān wǔrì” 拘焉五日 (“[Kongzi] was arrested there for five days”). 
According to Yáng Bójùn, the use of “wèi” 畏 in the sense of “jū” 拘 (“to be arrested”) is 
                                                 
132 James Legge, Confucian Analects, p. 217. Also see Lau, The Analects, p. 96; Waley, The Analects, p. 
131; and Yáng Bójùn, Lúnyǔ yìzhù, p. 88. 
133 Waley, The Analects, pp. 245–246. 
134 This passage is in the “Autumn water” chapter of the Zhuāngzǐ, and it starts with the following phrase: “
kǒngzǐ yóu yú kuāng, sòngrén wéi zhī shù zā” 孔子游於匡, 宋人圍之數帀. Zhuāngzǐ, “Qiūshuǐ” 秋水. 
Guō Qìngfān 郭慶藩, Zhuāngzǐ jíshì, p. 595. 
135 Chén Qíyóu, Lǚshì chūnqiū jiàoshì, pp. 203–204, originally quoted in Hànyŭdàcídiăn, vol. 7, p. 1310. 
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the same as the way “wèi” 畏 is used in the Lǐjì 禮記 as one of the three situations for 
untimely death. That is, if one dies in a wèi 畏 situation, people are not supposed to go to 
his funeral and express condolences for him, because he died when he was not supposed 
to die.136 Concerning the question of what is the distinctive characteristics of a wèi 畏 
situation, Zhèng Xuán 鄭玄 (127–200) suggests that wèi 畏 is a situation where A attacks 
B because A has mistakenly judged that B is guilty of some harm done to A, and B dies 
without being given a chance to prove his innocence.137 On the other hand, Sūn Xīdàn 
孫希旦 suggests that wèi 畏 is a situation where somebody is severely threatened and 
eventually commits suicide out of fear and terror.138  These traditional commentators’ 
explanations of the wèi 畏 situation in the Lǐjì seem to be based on their speculations on 
the story of Kongzi’s predicament in Kuāng, but they seem to support to some extent 
Yáng Bójùn’s view that “wèi” 畏 in the two Analects passages mean the situation of 
being under siege. 
 However, as I said earlier, many previous scholars’ interpretations of “wèi” 畏 in 
the two Analects passages as either “being surrounded” or “being under siege” seem to be 
driven by their assumption that Kongzi, as a sage, should feel no fear at all. This 
assumption is well illustrated in Xíng Bǐng’s 邢昺 (932–1010) gloss on “wèi” 畏 in 
Lunyu 9:5: 
 
The author described it [i.e. the event in Kuāng] from the ordinary people’s perspective, 
and that is why he wrote “The Master was frightened in Kuāng.” However, Kongzi 
actually had nothing to fear. The reason that he said “[Since] King Wén has already died, 
isn’t the Culture here with me?” was because his disciples were frightened; he wanted to 
address it [and assure them that there was nothing to fear].139
 
However, it is at least two centuries after Kongzi’s death that he started to be depicted as a 
sage, and the Kongzi that we meet in the Analects is a well-cultivated, but a very live, 
human being with full emotions. For example, we have seen above that when Yán Yuān 
                                                 
136 Yáng Bójùn, Lúnyǔ yìzhù, p. 88. 
137 Sūn Xīdàn 孫希旦, Lǐjì jíjiě 禮記集解, p. 182. 
138 Ibid. 
139 “記者以衆情言之, 故云子畏於匡, 其實孔子無所畏也. 曰文王旣沒文不在玆乎者, 孔子以弟子等畏
懼故, 以此言論之.” Xíng Bǐng, Lúnyǔ zhùshū. See Shísānjīng zhùshū, p. 2490. 
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顏淵—the most advanced disciple of Kongzi’s—joined Kongzi after being left behind in 
the turmoil at Kuāng, Kongzi exclaimed in tears that “I thought you had died!” In addition, 
when Yán Yuān later died young of a disease, Kongzi cried, “Alas! Heaven is ruining me! 
Heaven is ruining me!”140 According to the authors of the Analects, Kongzi wailed for 
Yán Yuān so excessively (tòng 慟) that one of his followers at the funeral brought this 
point to his attention. But what Kongzi said was: “Have I? But if not excessive for him, 
for whom?”141  
We do not really know what Kongzi’s emotional state was when he was 
surrounded by the Kuāng people. Perhaps he was frightened, or perhaps not, or more 
significantly, both. On one hand, it is natural for humans to feel fear when they are 
threatened to be killed, and as we have seen above when discussing jù 懼, Kongzi does 
not think that humans should get rid of such natural fears. On the other hand, though, 
Kongzi’s remark that Kuāng people would be no harm to him because he is the 
transmitter of the Zhōu 周 culture that Heaven approves clearly shows Kongzi’s thinking 
that the fearful situation at Kuāng is not something to be afraid of. In this light, what is 
important in interpreting these two Analects passages is not determining whether to 
ascribe natural fear to Kongzi or not, but focusing on the fact that Kongzi dismisses his 
fear in Kuāng which would be very natural and even indispensable for the flourishing 
human life in many other situations. Some of the questions to be asked, then, will be 1) 
when one should judge one’s natural, therefore often appropriate, emotions to be 
inappropriate; 2) whether fear disappears instantly in one’s mind when dismissed as 
inappropriate; and 3) what should be done or could be done if it does not disappear 
immediately. These questions concern the general issues of emotions and moral judgment, 
moral motivation, and moral cultivation, and I discuss them in the following chapters. 
If wèi 畏 discussed so far is a natural emotion of fear that everyone would feel in 
certain situations, the Analects is remarkable in presenting an emotion of quite distinct 
nature also by the same name. I would like to render it as “awe” because I think it is a 
kind of fear, but the feeling also seems to have some relations with respect. The first 
characteristic of this emotion is that it is a kind of fear which is not caused by any direct 
                                                 
140 “顔淵死. 子曰: ‘噫! 天喪予! 天喪予!’” Lunyu 11:9. 
141 “顔淵死, 子哭之慟. 從者曰: ‘子慟矣!’ 曰: ‘有慟乎? 非夫人之爲慟而誰爲?’” Lunyu 11:10. 
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threat to the existence of the person who feels it. For example, in Lunyu 20:2 Kongzi 
explains to his disciple Zǐzhāng 子張 the nobleman’s qualifications for participating in 
the government, and Kongzi includes dignity without fierceness (wēi ér bù měng 威而不
猛) as one of the five beautiful virtues (wǔměi 五美) required for the nobleman. And at 
Zǐzhāng’s request for further explanation, Kongzi says the following: 
 
The nobleman straightens his robe and hat and maintains his gaze solemn, so that those 
who see his dignified [bearing] from afar will be afraid of him. Is this not being dignified 
but not fierce? 142
 
Previously we have seen that “wèi” 畏 and “wēi” 威 are usually defined in terms of each 
other, and we have also seen that a typical example of things that capture people in awe 
or fear (wèi 畏) in ancient China was King Wén’s military power. In other words, the 
crucial element of awesomeness (wēi 威) that made people fear King Wén was the 
fierceness (měng 猛) of his military power, and this relationship between fierceness and 
fear or awe is well illustrated in the following passage from the Zǔozhuàn: 
 
Zǐchǎn 子產 of the Zhèng dukedom was sick, and he said to Zǐdàshū 子大叔, “If I die, 
you will be certainly in charge of the government. Only the man of virtue can control the 
commoners with mercy; for the second class [of rulers], the best [policy] is fierceness. In 
general, fire is blazing and the commoners rarely die from it because they see the fire 
afar and fear it; [on the other hand,] water looks weak and the commoners look down 
upon it, make sport of it, and consequently many of them die from it. This is the reason 
why mercy is difficult.”…Zhòngní 仲 尼  [i.e. Kongzi] commented, “Good! If the 
government gets lenient, the commoners become haughty; [if they become] haughty, [the 
ruler needs to] tie them up with fierceness. If fierce, the commoners get harassed; when 
[they are] harassed, [the ruler should] give them bounties generously. Modulate one’s 
fierceness with mercy, and modulate one’s mercy with fierceness; it is through this way 
that government becomes balanced.”143
 
According to this passage, the ruler’s awesomeness (wēi 威) comes from his fierceness 
                                                 
142 “君子正其衣冠, 尊其瞻視, 儼然人望而畏之, 斯不亦威而不猛乎?” Lunyu 20:2. 
143 “鄭子産有疾, 謂子大叔曰: ‘我死, 子必爲政. 唯有德者能以寬服民, 其次莫如猛. 夫火烈, 民望而畏
之, 故鮮死焉; 水懦弱, 民狎而翫之, 則多死焉, 故寬難.’…仲尼曰: ‘善哉! 政寬則民慢, 慢則糾之以猛. 
猛則民殘, 殘則施之以寬. 寬以濟猛, 猛以濟寬, 政是以和.’” Zǔozhuàn, Zhāogōng 昭公 20. Yáng Bójùn, 
Chūnqiū Zǔozhuàn zhù, pp. 1421–1422. 
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(měng 猛), and his fierceness is what makes people fearful and obedient. Perhaps this was 
the dominant view of the ruler’s awesomeness (wēi 威) and the subjects’ corresponding 
awe (wèi 畏) in ancient China. Interestingly, the author of this Zǔozhuàn passage makes 
Kongzi concur to this view of the proper way of governing the commoners, but we have 
already seen in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.2.3) that Kongzi never recommends a forceful 
means such as killing for regulating the commoners. Moreover, the view that the 
awesomeness (wēi 威) of the socio-political authorities comes from the fierce exercising 
of their military power does not agree with Kongzi’s view of awesomeness just presented 
in Lunyu 20:2: According to Kongzi, the nobleman’s awesomeness comes from his 
dignified manners, but such manners are not coercive because they do not pose direct, 
forceful threat to other people. 
The second characteristic of this wèi 畏 feeling is that this emotion is available 
only to those who have a properly cultivated sense of reverence. It seems to be a kind of 
moral or religious awe, and Kongzi suggests three typical objects of it: 
 
The nobleman fears three things: he fears the mandate of Heaven, fears persons in 
authority, and fears the words of the sages. The petty man is ignorant of the mandate of 
Heaven and therefore does not fear it, looks down upon those in authority, and insults the 
words of the sages.144
 
Heaven (tiān 天) was originally the name of the highest god of the Zhōu 周 tribe, but 
when the Zhōu people conquered the Shāng 商 dynasty, it came to be equated with 
Shàngdì 上帝, the highest god in the Shāng 商 pantheon. According to the founding 
fathers of the Zhōu 周 dynasty, Heaven or Shàngdì gives its mandate—the authorization 
to rule the world—only to the virtuous rulers, and this explains why the Shāng 商 dynasty 
that got degenerate during its last period was overthrown by the Zhōu 周 dynasty. Since 
then Heaven had long been considered as the utmost patron of the virtuous government, 
and the rulers who wanted to protect their royal lineage were supposed to be afraid of 
                                                 
144 “君子有三畏: 畏天命, 畏大人, 畏聖人之言. 小人不知天命而不畏也, 狎大人, 侮聖人之言.” Lunyu 
16:8. 
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Heaven’s will.145 By Kongzi’s time, the mandate of Heaven started to be understood also 
at the level of an individual, and the mandate of Heaven understood at this level referred 
to the nobleman’s life-long task of moral self-cultivation and his effort to revive the ideal 
moral-political order embodied in the high culture of the Zhōu 周 dynasty. According to 
this picture of the ideal society, the nobility should govern the commoners with virtue and 
rituals rather than edicts and punishments, and the commoners are supposed to follow 
their superiors out of sincere respect rather than from the fear of punishment.146 However, 
according to Kongzi’s diagnosis, the petty men (xiǎorén 小人) of his time were so much 
obsessed with making profit that they did not know to fear Heaven while acting against 
Heaven’s will, and did not know to appreciate the dignity of their superiors and respond 
properly. 
The contrast between the nobleman’s and the petty man’s attitudes toward Heaven 
and their social superiors is well illustrated in the following exchange between Kongzi 
and Wángsūn Jiǎ 王孫賈, a powerful minister of the Wèi 衛 dukedom: 
 
Wángsūn Jiǎ asked, “Better to be obsequious to the kitchen stove than to the south-west 
corner of the house. What do you think of this saying?” The Master said, “The saying has 
got it wrong. When you have offended against Heaven, there is nowhere to pray [for the 
atonement of your crime].”147
 
According to Yáng Bójùn, the ancient Chinese believed that the kitchen stove and the 
south-west corner of the house had their own gods residing inside, and people in ancient 
China made a periodical sacrifice to these gods. 148  And according to Zhū Xī’s 
interpretation, the god of the south-west corner of the house referred to the duke of Wèi, 
and the god in the kitchen stove to Wángsūn Jiǎ, who was overpowering the duke and 
was really in charge of the government at the time.149 By quoting the popular saying in 
the Wèi representing the power-relationship between the duke of Wèi and Wángsūn Jiǎ 
                                                 
145 For example, one finds in the Shījīng 詩經 the following phrase: “畏天之威, 于時保之.” For an 
insightful explication of the pre-Confucian notions of Heaven and the mandate of Heaven, see Schwartz, 
The World of Thought in Ancient China, pp. 46–55. 
146 Cf. Lunyu 2:3. 
147 “王孫賈問曰: ‘與其媚於奧, 寧媚於竈, 何謂也?’ 子曰: ‘不然. 獲罪於天, 無所禱也.’” Lunyu 3:13. I 
modified Lau’s translation in his The Analects, p. 69. 
148 Yáng Bójùn, Lúnyǔ yìzhù, p. 28. 
149 Zhū Xī 朱熹, Lúnyǔ jízhù 論語集註, in Yasui Kō, Rongo shūsetsu, 卷1, p. 41. 
 139 
himself, Wángsūn Jiǎ was implicitly telling Kongzi that if he had wanted to get an office 
in Wèi, he needed to get together with Wángsūn Jiǎ rather than going to the duke. This is 
exactly what Kongzi condemned as “looking down upon those in authority” (xiá dàrén 
狎大人), and it is a source of great social disorder that Heaven would condemn too. So 
Kongzi extended the metaphor and warned him that Heaven would not forgive such a 
presumption. 
In contrast, the nobleman does not only deeply understand Heaven’s mandate for 
himself, but can also appreciate other people’s moral merit and respond with appropriate 
feelings. For example, he feels wonder at a young man of great promise, and feels 
sublime when encountering a sage. Kongzi says: 
 
The young generation is wonderful! How do we know that they won’t be as good as us? 
But if they don’t distinguish themselves until the age of forty or fifty, they don’t deserve 
our awe.150
 
While Kongzi feels wonder at his young disciples, his virtue hits sublime even his most 
advanced disciple. Yán Yuān 顏淵 says the following with a sigh: 
 
It gets higher as I look up at it, it gets harder as I bore into it. I see it before me, but 
suddenly it is behind me. The Master leads one well step by step; he broadens me with 
culture, restrains me with rites; I cannot give up even if I wanted to. [However,] having 
already used up my resources, [I see him] as if standing magnificently. Although I want to 
follow him, I can’t find a way to.151
 
Kongzi’s erudition, discipline, and pedagogical skills inherently attract good students like 
Yán Yuān to the study of his teachings, but Kongzi’s grandeur also raises a kind of 
“imaginative vertigo”152 in the student’s mind. As Yán Yuān describes, the student makes 
great efforts to improve oneself by emulating Kongzi and reflecting on his teachings, but 
as one goes deeper and deeper in study, Kongzi’s unfathomable greatness gets more and 
                                                 
150 “後生可畏! 焉知來者之不如今也? 四十五十而無聞焉, 斯亦不足畏也已.” Lunyu 9:23. 
151 “仰之彌高, 鑽之彌堅. 瞻之在前, 忽焉在後. 夫子循循然善誘人; 博我以文, 約我以禮; 欲罷不能. 旣
竭吾才, 如有所立卓爾. 雖欲從之, 末由也已.” Lunyu 9:11. 
152 I borrow this term from Philip. J. Ivanhoe, “Nature, Awe, and the Sublime,” chap. in Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy: Volume XXI, Philosophy of Religion (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1997), p. 101. I also owe a lot to this article for describing my second kind of wèi 畏 feeling in the Analects. 
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more clear. In front of Kongzi, the student feels as if looking up at a soaring mountain 
without finding a pathway to get to its peak. As Kant describes the experience of the 
sublime, experience of this kind “raise[s] the soul’s fortitude above its usual middle 
range,”153 and makes the student feel great awe and respect for the moral qualities of his 
teacher. Moreover, this feeling of awe and respect can be among the greatest motivations 
for the student to continue on the path of moral self-cultivation, believing that he can be a 
match for his virtuous teacher someday. 
In short, unlike the first kind of wèi 畏 feeling which is felt at things that directly 
threaten one’s existence, the second kind of wèi 畏 discussed so far includes such feelings 
as religious awe for Heaven as the utmost supporter of morality and moral awe or respect 
for the virtues of a well-cultivated nobleman. We have seen that a point distinguishing the 
second kind of wèi 畏 from the first kind is that it is not a natural emotion shared by 
everyone, but a special kind of emotion that is available only to those having a properly 
cultivated sensibility. In this light, we have to say that as in the case of certain kinds of jù 
懼 and kǒng 恐, Kongzi also recommends the second type of wèi 畏 as an important 
constituent of the nobleman’s character. Consequently, we also have to say that Kongzi’s 
famous dictum that “the nobleman has no worry or fear” actually applies to a narrower 
domain of cases than it appears to. That domain covers only the situations where one’s 
natural feeling of fear or apprehension becomes ethically inappropriate. Once in such a 
situation, the nobleman judges his natural fear to be ethically wrong and tries to dismiss it, 
and his feeling of the other kind of fear provides the necessary criteria and motivation for 
his doing so. That is, paradoxically, the courage Kongzi shows in Kuāng comes from his 
fear of Heaven: Kongzi’s fear of Heaven, based on his understanding of Heaven’s 
mandate for him, tells him that he has been a faithful practitioner of Heaven’s will, and 
that as long as he remains faithful to Heaven’s moral project, there is nothing to fear. 
                                                 
153 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1987), pp. 12
0–121; Ak. 261–162, quoted in Ivanhoe, “Nature,” p. 102. 
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Chapter Four 
Qíng 情, Hàowù 好惡, and Sìduān 四端 in Mengzi 
 
 
4.1 Qíng 情 in the Mengzi 
 
In Chapter 2 above (Section 2.1), I have argued that in addition to 1) ‘facts’ of a situation 
and 2) ‘characteristic features’ of a certain category of things, “qíng” in early Chinese 
texts also sometimes refers to 3) what is sitting deeply in an individual’s mind in the 
forms of sincere opinions, goals or aspirations, desires for certain objects, emotional or 
affective reactions toward a certain object, evaluative judgments, or certain characteristic 
behavioral patterns. I have also argued that the qíng conceived this way are not the 
features commonly found in the species of human beings in general but the features 
uniquely belonging to an individual human being, and consequently qíng in this third 
sense seems roughly equivalent to the concept of character that distinguishes its possessor 
from others. 
Besides making these points, I have also argued that this sense of qíng as referring 
to various “psychological items” can be ascribed to one of the two usages of “qíng” in the 
Analects (Lunyu 13:4), and that this sense of qíng is semantically commensurable with 
the other two senses of qíng as referring to ‘facts’ about a situation or ‘characteristic 
features’ of a certain category of things. Moreover, I have also showed that there exists a 
strong connection between these earlier senses of qíng and its later use as referring to 
prima facie emotions such as hào 好 (“liking”), wù 惡 (“disliking”), xǐ 喜 (“joy”), nù 
怒 (“anger”), āi 哀 (“sorrow”), and lè 樂 (“pleasure”), and I argued that these earlier 
and later senses of qíng are held together by the concept of hàowù 好惡, which I 
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proposed to interpret as a broad conception of emotions or some sort of attitudes that are 
expressed as particular emotions depending on what kind of object one encounters. 
The character “qíng” 情 is used four times in the Mengzi, and Mengzi’s usage of 
the term is quite consistent with the way “qíng” is used in other early Chinese texts, 
which I just summarized. First, take a look at the following two passages: 
 
It is an essential characteristic of things that they are unequal. Some are twice or five 
times, some ten or a hundred times, some a thousand or a myriad times [as valuable as 
other things].1
 
The nobleman feels shameful when his reputation goes beyond the reality.2
 
The first remark is what Mengzi said to Chén Xiāng 陳相, who advocated an economic 
policy that things of the equal amount (e.g. rice and barley), of the equal length (e.g. 
cotton and silk), of the equal size (e.g. roughly and finely made shoes), and so forth 
should be priced equally. The motivation for this policy is to prevent fraud in the market 
place, but Mengzi points out that natural inequality is one of the characteristic features of 
things, and that pricing things of different value equally will cause great confusion in 
commerce and make people lose the motivation for making good things. While the 
“qíng” in the first passage refers to ‘characteristic features’ of a certain category of things, 
the same term in the second passage seems to refer to ‘facts’ or ‘reality’ about a certain 
thing or a situation, because Mengzi says that the nobleman feels shameful when his 
reputation is exaggerated beyond what is real (qíng 情), viz. his true character. It is 
significant and interesting in this second passage that “qíng” refers to both reality and a 
person’s character at the same time; it seems to corroborate my previous argument about 
“qíng” that the sense of “qíng” as referring to various “psychological items” that 
constitute a person’s character is connected with the sense of the term as referring to 
‘reality’ about a situation or ‘characteristic features’ of a certain category of things. 
However, Mengzi does not just remain with these earlier senses of qíng. As I have 
argued in Chapter 2, an instance of “qíng” in the Analects can be interpreted to refer to 
                                                 
1 “夫物之不齊, 物之情也. 或相倍蓰, 或相什百, 或相千萬.” Mengzi 3A:4. 
2 “聲聞過情, 君子恥之.” Mengzi 4B:18. 
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certain “psychological items” that constitute a person’s character, and I have showed in 
Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2 that emotions make an important constituent of a person’s 
character in Kongzi’s ethical thought. Now, in the following passage, we see Mengzi 
going one step further and using the word “qíng” to designate his famous “four sprouts” 
(sìduān 四端) or four types of moral emotions explicitly. The passage is very long, but 
let me quote it in its entirety: 
 
Gōngdūzǐ 公都子 [a disciple of Mengzi’s] said, “Gàozǐ 告子 [a theoretical rival of 
Mengzi’s] says, ‘[Human] nature is neither good nor bad.’ Some say, ‘[Human] nature 
can become good, and can become bad. Therefore, when [the sage kings] Wén 文 and 
Wǔ 武 arose, their people were fond of goodness; when [the bad kings] Yōu 幽 and Lì 
厲 arose, their people were fond of atrocity.’ Others say, ‘Some people are good by 
nature, and some are bad by nature. Therefore, with Yáo 堯 as ruler, there was [a wicked 
vassal] Xiàng 象; with the Blind Man as father, there was [an extremely filial son] Shùn 
舜; and with Zhòu 紂 as nephew, and also as ruler, there were [righteous uncle-cum-
vassals] Viscount Qǐ 啓 of Wēi 微 and Prince Bǐgān 比干.’ Now you say that [human] 
nature is good. Then are those others all wrong?” 
Mengzi said, “[If one] follows one’s qíng, [one] can do what is good; hence the 
dictum that [human nature is] good. As for doing what is not good, [it] is not the fault of 
one’s natural endowment. The feeling of compassion, everyone has it; the feeling of 
shame and disgust, everyone has it; the feeling of respect, everyone has it; the feeling of 
approval and disapproval, everyone has it. The feeling of compassion is humaneness, the 
feeling of shame and disgust is righteousness, the feeling of respect is propriety, and the 
feeling of approval and disapproval is wisdom. Humaneness, righteousness, propriety, 
and wisdom are not welded to us from the outside, we originally have them. It is just that 
people do not really pay attention to them. Hence it is said, ‘Seek and you will get it, 
abandon and you will lose it.’ Those who do not see that others become twice or five 
times [as worthy as themselves] are those who cannot exhaust their natural endowment. 
The Poetry says, ‘Heaven gave birth to the numerous people, and there is a principle [to 
go by] in each case. People have grasped this unchanging [principle, and this is why they] 
like this beautiful virtue.’ Kongzi said, ‘The person who wrote this poem, perhaps he 
understood the Way!’ So, if there is a thing, there definitely is a principle. It is because 
those people have grasped the unchanging [principle] that they liked beautiful virtue.”3
                                                 
3 “公都子曰: ‘告子曰: “性無善無不善也.” 或曰: “性可以爲善, 可以爲不善. 是故文武興, 則民好善, 
幽厲興, 則民好暴.” 或曰: “有性善, 有性不善. 是故以堯爲君而有象, 以瞽瞍爲父而有舜, 以紂爲兄
之子, 且以爲君, 而有微子啓, 王子比干.” 今曰性善, 然則彼皆非與?’ 孟子曰: ‘乃若其情, 則可以爲
善矣, 乃所謂善也. 若夫爲不善, 非才其罪也. 惻隱之心, 人皆有之; 羞惡之心, 人皆有之; 恭敬之心, 
人皆有之; 是非之心, 人皆有之. 惻隱之心, 仁也; 羞惡之心, 義也; 恭敬之心, 禮也; 是非之心, 智
也. 仁義禮智, 非由外鑠我也, 我固有之也. 弗思耳矣. 故曰: “求則得之, 舍則失之.” 或相倍蓰而無
算者, 不能盡其才者也. 詩曰: “天生蒸民, 有物有則. 民之秉彛, 好是懿德.” 孔子曰: “爲此詩者, 其
知道乎!” 故有物必有則; 民之秉彛也, 故好是懿德.’” Mengzi 6A:6. My translation of this passage owes 
 144
What we are interested in for now in this rich passage is that the character “qíng” in 
Mengzi’s remark clearly refers to the four types of moral emotions, namely the feeling of 
compassion (cèyǐn zhī xīn 惻隱之心), the feeling of shame and disgust (xiūwù zhī xīn 羞
惡之心), the feeling of respect (gōngjìng zhī xīn 恭敬之心), and the feeling of approval 
and disapproval (shìfēi zhī xīn 是非之心). According to Mengzi, it is by following the 
guidance of these four ethical emotions that one can do what is good and become good. 
Human beings are equally endowed with these emotions by nature, but some people are 
not even aware of having this good endowment (cái 才), whereas some people become 
good by carrying it through to the utmost degree (jìn 盡). In the following passage, 
which is also quite long, Mengzi says that this good natural endowment is what 
distinguishes humans from the other animals: 
 
The trees of Ox Mountain were once beautiful, but being at the suburb of a great city, 
hatchets and axes cut them down. Could it remain beautiful? [Due to] the rest it got 
during the day or night and the moistening of rain and dew, it is not that there are no 
sprouts or shoots growing there. But oxen and sheep time and again come and graze on 
them, so that it is barren like that. People see its being barren, and think that there had 
never been any timber, but how could this be the nature of the mountain? [It is also the 
case] even for what resides in humans; how could there be no heart of humaneness and 
righteousness? [However,] the way that people discard their good heart is like hatchets 
and axes to the trees; with its trees being cut down day by day, could it remain beautiful? 
Thanks to the rest they get during the day or night and the qì of the calm morning, people 
have a modicum of liking and disliking that are close to [those of] others. But what they 
do during the day fetters and destroys those [feelings]. If the fettering is repeated, then 
their nocturnal qì is insufficient to preserve [those feelings]. If their nocturnal qì is 
insufficient to preserve, then they become not far from birds and beasts. People see their 
being [like] birds and beasts, and think that the natural endowment has never been in 
their mind, but how could this be the characteristic feature of human beings? So, with the 
right nourishment, there is nothing that would not grow; without the right nourishment, 
there is nothing that would not diminish. Kongzi said, “Grasp then preserved, abandon 
                                                                                                                                                 
a lot to Bryan W. Van Norden’s translation, but mine digresses from his over several important interpretive 
issues. For example, I interpret the first “ruò” 若 in Mengzi’s remark as “to follow,” whereas Van Norden 
interprets it as part of the compound “nǎiruò” 乃若, which is sometimes used in the Mengzi to introduce a 
subject matter and thus can be rendered as “as for.” I also interpret both instances of “wéishàn” 為善 in 
Mengzi’s remark as “doing what is good,” as opposed to Van Norden’s “becoming good.” There is no 
conclusive evidence favoring one interpretation over the other, but I prefer my interpretation because it 
supports the philosophical view of emotions that I want to attribute to Mengzi later. For a detailed 
discussion of a number of interpretive issues in this passage, see Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 
pp. 212–222. For Van Norden’s translation of the passage, see Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, 
ed., Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (New York, NY: Seven Bridges Press, 2001), pp. 143–144. 
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then lost. It comes and goes at no fixed time, nobody knows its home.” Wasn’t he talking 
about the mind?4
 
In this passage, Mengzi says that the characteristic feature (qíng 情) of human beings is 
to have proper affective attitudes of liking and disliking (hàowù 好惡) in various 
situations of everyday life. Mengzi seems to equate these attitudes with the heart of 
humaneness and righteousness (rén yì zhī xīn 仁義之心), which is apparently a generic 
term referring to the first two of the four moral emotions suggested in the previous 
passage, and he says that these feelings grow naturally in the human mind just as the 
sprouts and shoots grow naturally in the mountains. It is not immediately clear how one’s 
affective attitudes of liking and disliking can be equated with one’s particular feelings 
such as compassion, shame, or disgust, and we do not know yet what Mengzi means 
exactly by his statement that these attitudes or feelings grow naturally in one’s mind. 
However, the point that I would like to make here by combining this and the previous 
passage about the usage of “qíng” 情 in the Mengzi is the following: First, “qíng” in 
Mengzi sometimes explicitly refers to the aforementioned four moral emotions or the 
proper affective attitudes of liking and disliking, and in this sense Mengzi’s use of the 
term anticipates the more frequent and explicit reference of the term to typical emotions 
like joy, anger, sorrow, and fear in later texts such as the Xúnzǐ and the Lǐjì. Second, while 
referring to moral emotions or proper affective attitudes, “qíng” in the Mengzi still retains 
its earlier sense of ‘characteristic features of a certain category of things,’ and 
consequently makes one’s moral emotions or proper affective attitudes the unique feature 
of the human beings.  
Now, if “qíng” in Mengzi refers to moral emotions such as the four sprouts or 
one’s proper affective attitudes of hàowù as the crucial characteristic of human beings, 
what is the relationship between the four sprouts and the attitudes of hàowù in Mengzi’s 
                                                 
4 “牛山之木嘗美矣, 以其郊於大國也, 斧斤伐之, 可以爲美乎? 是其日夜之所息, 雨露之所潤, 非無
萌蘖之生焉. 牛羊又從而牧之, 是以若彼濯濯也. 人見其濯濯也, 以爲未嘗有材焉, 此豈山之性也哉? 
雖存乎人者, 豈無仁義之心哉? 其所以放其良心者, 亦猶斧斤之於木也. 旦旦而伐之, 可以爲美乎? 
其日夜之所息, 平旦之氣, 其好惡與人相近也者幾希; 則其旦晝之所爲, 有梏亡之矣. 梏之反覆, 則
其夜氣不足以存. 夜氣不足以存, 則其違禽獸不遠矣. 人見其禽獸也, 而以爲未嘗有才焉者, 是豈人
之情也哉? 故苟得其養, 無物不長; 苟失其養, 無物不消. 孔子曰: ‘操則存, 舍則亡. 出入無時, 莫知
其鄕.’ 惟心之謂與?” Mengzi 6A:8. I consulted Van Norden’s translation for translating this passage also 
to some extent. See Ivanhoe and Van Norden, ed., Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, pp. 145–146. 
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ethical thought? Are they merely two different labels referring to the same category of 
things, or is there any important difference between them? In the next section, I turn to 
this question and try to make it clear why this question is important in understanding 
Mengzi’s moral psychology and his ethical thought correctly. 
 
 
4.2 Hàowù 好惡 and Sìduān 四端: A Problematic Relationship 
 
We have seen in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.2) above that what distinguishes the character of 
the nobleman (jūnzǐ 君子) from that of the petty person (xiǎorén 小人) in the Analects 
is primarily their distinctive affective responses of liking and disliking or long-term 
desire and aversion for different kinds of things. That is, whereas the nobleman likes 
virtue and hates pursuing profits by immoral means, the petty person is keen to promote 
his personal interests and ready to violate social norms to avoid living in poverty and 
distress. We have also seen that the nobleman’s affective attitudes of hàowù 好惡 are 
deeply intertwined with his evaluative judgments, and that as long as he stays away from 
the passionate effects of his own desires and aversions, the nobleman’s emotional 
attitudes of hàowù can be said to embody the correct standard of liking and disliking 
things for human beings in general. 
This view of hàowù in the Analects as embodying one’s evaluative judgment of 
things and thus revealing one’s character is also conspicuous in Mengzi. For example, 
Mengzi 1B:1 records the conversation between King Xuān 宣 of the Qí 齊 dukedom 
and Mengzi about liking music (hào yuè 好樂), and it starts as follows: One day Zhuāng 
Bào 莊暴, a vassal of King Xuān’s, visits Mengzi to ask about liking music. He tells 
Mengzi that he was at a loss in a previous meeting with King Xuān, where the king 
wanted to discuss liking music. Mengzi comments that if the king likes music so much, 
then he will govern his country well (i.e., govern the country according to the spirit of the 
good music composed by the ancient sage kings), and a few days later he has an audience 
with King Xuān. However, when Mengzi brings this topic on, the king blushes and 
confesses that the music he likes is not that of the ancient sage kings but merely the 
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vulgar music of the world.5 The king’s embarrassment here shows an interesting point: 
King Xuān likes the vulgar music, and to that extent he is a petty man valuing the 
satisfaction of his sensual desires. However, he also expresses his evaluative belief that 
being fond of such music is shameful by blushing, and in that sense he has some element 
of the nobleman’s character. 
What is new about Mengzi’s view of hàowù, though, is that whereas Kongzi 
regards the nobleman’s correct hàowù to be primarily the result of his life-long moral 
self-cultivation, Mengzi believes that the correct affective attitudes of liking and disliking 
are not unique to the cultivated noblemen but inherent in every human being by nature. 
According to Mengzi, as we have seen in Mengzi 6A:8 above (footnote 4), what 
distinguishes humans from lower animals is the modicum (jīxī 幾希) of proper affective 
attitudes of hàowù shared by everyone, and humans should nourish this natural affective 
endowment properly in order to become creatures of full moral integrity and remain such. 
However, what I am particularly interested in exploring in this chapter is not what 
Mengzi’s metaphysical claim that human beings have inherent moral traits by nature 
means; I am interested in clarifying what is the relationship between one’s proper 
attitudes of hàowù 好惡 and her “four moral sprouts,” no matter what their origin.  
As we have noticed in Mengzi 6A:8 above, after comparing the heart of 
humaneness and righteousness (rén yì zhī xīn 仁義之心)—i.e. the feeling of compassion 
and the feeling of shame and disgust—to the naturally growing shoots and sprouts of Ox 
Mountain, Mengzi says that humans can remain human only by nurturing their proper 
affective attitudes of hàowù 好惡. As I have pointed out in the previous section, Mengzi 
here seems to think that one’s proper affective attitudes of liking and disliking and one’s 
moral emotions such as compassion and the feeling of shame and disgust equally grow 
naturally in the human mind, and are equally to be nourished. However, does this also 
mean that the formation of a good character by nurturing one’s proper attitudes of hàowù 
is the same process as nurturing one’s four sprouts? In other words, does Mengzi think 
that one’s proper affective attitudes of hàowù are equivalent to her four moral sprouts? 
                                                 
5 “莊暴見孟子, 曰: ‘暴見於王, 王語暴以好樂, 暴未有以對也.’ 曰: ‘好樂何如?’ 孟子曰: ‘王之好
樂甚, 則齊國其庶幾乎!’ 他日見於王曰: ‘王嘗語莊子以好樂, 有諸?’ 王變乎色, 曰: ‘寡人非能好先
王之樂也, 直好世俗之樂耳.’” Mengzi 1B:1. 
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This is a highly important question for understanding Mengzi’s view of moral 
emotions and his theory of moral psychology correctly, but unfortunately many scholars 
in Chinese philosophy did not give the right answer to this question, and this in turn led 
them to propose either incomplete or mistaken interpretations of Mengzi’s theory of 
emotions and moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral cultivation. As I will present 
in the next section in more detail, previous scholars seem to regard the four sprouts as 
similar to hàowù; they interpret Mengzi’s four sprouts as some sort of desires or 
behavioral tendencies, and equivocate on how one’s hàowù and the four sprouts are 
related in Mengzi’s thought exactly. However, we have seen in Chapter 2 that one’s 
hàowù (liking and disliking or desire and aversion) are distinct from other particular 
emotions such as joy, sorrow, anger, and fear in two ways: First, hàowù can be considered 
as emotions in a broad sense or as “attitudes” in Rawls’s terms, from which particular 
types of emotions arise in various situations. For example, one feels joyful when one gets 
what one wants, feels angry when one’s desire is frustrated, or can sometimes feel fear 
that one might not get what one wants, and so forth. Second, hàowù as occurrent feelings 
of liking and disliking for diverse objects can be considered as one’s emotional response 
to those objects at the most generic level, from which we could further identify a range of 
particular emotions by specifying the conditions and evaluative beliefs involved in the 
occurrence of these emotions. If this view of the relationship between one’s hàowù and 
particular emotions had been inherited to Mengzi and further developed into a more or 
less self-contained theory of moral emotions, it is an important task to bring this theory to 
light as clear as possible.  
In order to accomplish this task successfully, we first need to know what Mengzi’s 
four sprouts really are. Specifically, I devote the next section to analyzing the first three 
of Mengzi’s four sprouts, and propose a partial picture of the relationship between hàowù 
好惡 and sìduān 四端 in my discussion of xiūwù zhī xīn 羞惡之心 or the feeling of 
shame and disgust in Mengzi. 
 
 
4.3 The Four Sprouts 
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Previous scholarship on Mengzi has much focused on clarifying what his conception of 
human nature is, especially what his thesis that human nature is good (xìng shàn 性善) 
means in comparison to the other competing theses on human nature in ancient China.6 
As we have seen in Mengzi 6A:6 above, Mengzi’s argument against these alternative 
theses is based on his view of the four sprouts or the four types of feelings or emotions 
(xīn 心), namely that they are inherent in every human being, and humans can do what is 
morally good by following their guidance. For this reason, Mengzi’s four sprouts have 
been an indispensable topic in the previous scholarship on Mengzi’s arguments about 
human nature, and the question of how one could cultivate these sprouts into four 
cardinal virtues has also been widely discussed. At the same time, though, it is also true 
that given the central place of the four sprouts in Mengzi’s theory of human nature and 
moral self-cultivation, Mengzi’s concept of four sprouts has not been given as thorough 
and consistent a treatment as it deserves.  
Specifically, the previous scholarship on Mengzi’s four sprouts is not fully 
satisfactory at least in two aspects. First, previous scholars seem to assume that Mengzi’s 
four sprouts are more or less homogeneous in nature. Their discussion is often focused on 
Mengzi’s first sprout, cèyǐn zhī xīn 惻隱之心, thus failing to do justice to the special 
character of the second sprout, xiūwù zhī xīn 羞惡之心, or the fourth sprout, shìfēi zhī 
xīn 是非之心.7 Second, the four sprouts are often viewed as some sort of desires for or 
instinctive inclinations toward virtues or virtuous acts. This view is not only incompatible 
with the recently proposed more sound views (e.g. Wong 1991) that regard Mengzi’s four 
sprouts as a particular type of emotions or feelings having some “cognitive” or “rational” 
aspects, but it also somehow influences these latter views so that they fail to reach what I 
think to be the correct picture of moral cultivation of emotions in Mengzi’s thought. 
Angus C. Graham’s account of the four sprouts well represents this “inclinational 
view” of the four sprouts. In his seminal paper on the philosophical development of the 
                                                 
6 For a paradigmatic work on this topic in English, see Graham, “The Background of the Mencian 
[Mengzian] Theory of Human Nature.” 
7 An important exception is Donald J. Munro. He says that whereas the first and the third sprout 
(“commiseration” and “respect” in his terms) are behavioral tendencies, the other two sprouts (“shame and 
dislike” and the “sense of right and wrong”) denote covert evaluative activities of the mind. See Munro, 
The Concept of Man in Early China, pp. 74–75. I elaborate and modify this insight of Munro’s in later 
sections of this chapter. 
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Mengzian theory of human nature in ancient China, Graham interprets “sìduān” 四端 as 
“incipient moral impulses”8 to do what is morally good or right, or “spontaneous 
inclinations”9 toward virtues or moral good. According to Graham, such inclinations to 
moral good are “desires”10 that we come to prefer to all other desires as we approach 
moral maturity, and the “moral energy”11 in those inclinations which inspires us to do 
good grows naturally as we do right acts while taking pleasure in those actions. In other 
words, the four sprouts in Mengzi as interpreted by Graham are basically one’s natural 
inclinations or even long-term desires for humaneness, righteousness, propriety, and 
wisdom. Such desires or inclinations for these four cardinal virtues urge one to do 
humane, right, ritually appropriate, or wise acts, and the strength of the moral power that 
enables one to do virtuous acts is proportionate to the degree of one’s “craving” for 
virtues. Moreover, there exists a certain kind of feedback system between one’s moral 
inclinations and her virtuous acts: One’s virtuous acts nurture their corresponding moral 
inclinations by satisfying the moral appetites of those inclinations, and as one’s moral 
inclinations grow bigger and bigger through the accumulation of virtuous acts, they 
provide stronger and stronger motivations for virtuous acts. 
Although quite plausible, Graham’s account of the four sprouts remains equivocal 
by its loose use of such concepts as desire, inclination, or impulse for describing the four 
sprouts, and it is important to note that this view of the four sprouts as desires or 
inclinations for virtues or virtuous acts is largely shared by many scholars in the history 
of Chinese philosophy in varying degrees and manners. For example, while Donald J. 
Munro considers Mengzi’s first and third sprout—“commiseration” and “respect” in his 
terms—to denote behavioral tendencies, saying that “commiseration and respect both 
emerge in behavioral forms”,12 Chad Hansen proposes a more radical claim that all of the 
four sprouts are innate, morally discriminatory inclinations or dispositions to certain 
actions.13 On the other hand, while correctly regarding the four sprouts as “moral 
feelings” that collectively constitute one’s “innate moral sense,” Philip J. Ivanhoe also 
                                                 
8 Graham, “The Background of the Mencian [Mengzian] Theory of Human Nature,” p. 21. 
9 Ibid., p. 19. 
10 Ibid., p. 23. 
11 Ibid., p. 22. 
12 Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China, p. 75. 
13 Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, p. 164. 
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regards the four sprouts as one’s “nascent moral tendencies” manifesting themselves as 
“spontaneous reactive attitudes and actions.”14 In addition, while referring to the four 
sprouts as “moral senses” and “feelings,” Bryan Van Norden also uses “moral impulses” 
and “dispositions” for the four sprouts,15 and Kwong-loi Shun renders the four sprouts as 
“ethical predispositions” that enable human beings to be ethical and point in the direction 
of the ethical ideal.16
Of course, given the great difference between ancient China and the modern West 
in terms of culture, language, history, geography, and time, there should be some 
“slippage” between the aforementioned psychological concepts and Mengzi’s four 
sprouts. In addition, it is also understood that the previously mentioned scholars and 
others were dealing with their own important agenda in interpreting Mengzi, and using 
such terms as “impulse,” “inclination,” “disposition,” “tendency,” or “desire” the way 
they used them might have been sufficient for their purposes. Nevertheless, interpreting 
Mengzi or any other ancient Chinese thinkers in a Western language is not an “all or 
nothing” task; while using the same set of concepts in contemporary moral psychology, 
we could get a clearer view of Mengzi’s four sprouts by using these concepts in a more 
systematic way, and we can test such a way of using these concepts against the relevant 
textual evidence from the Mengzi to some extent. Moreover, considering the great 
importance of the four sprouts in Mengzi’s theory of moral agency and moral cultivation, 
understanding Mengzi’s view of the four sprouts more clearly will also enable us to have 
a better understanding of Mengzi’s ethical thought in general. 
In the following, I provide a new account of Mengzi’s four sprouts, especially of 
the first three in this section in the order of cèyǐn zhī xīn (“compassion”), gōngjìng zhī xīn 
(“respect”), and xiūwù zhī xīn (“shame and disgust”). A general thesis that I defend 
throughout this section is that moral emotions like compassion or respect in Mengzi are 
basically construals of certain situations in the light of particular concerns. Specifically, 
in Section 4.3.1 I argue that cèyǐn zhī xīn is primarily construing another being’s 
                                                 
14 Philip J. Ivanhoe, Ethics in the Confucian Tradition: The Thought of Mengzi and Wang Yang-mi
ng, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2002), pp. 88–89. 
15 Bryan Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency,” in Virtue, Nature, and Agency in 
the Xunzi, ed. Thornton C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 
2000), pp. 111–112. 
16 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, pp. 136–139. 
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misfortune with sympathetic concern, and show that cèyǐn zhī xīn is neither to be 
identified with certain physiological reactions one might have when observing another 
being’s misery nor with one’s feeling of empathy at the suffering of others. After making 
these points I introduce Robert Roberts’s view of emotions as concern-based construals 
with the appearance of truth (Section 4.3.1.2), and explain in Section 4.3.2 how Roberts’s 
view of emotions as concern-based construals works well for interpreting Mengzi’s 
conception of respect. Besides doing so, I also critically examine David Nivison’s view 
of respect as a desire for respectful action and Donald Munro’s view of respect as a 
behavioral tendency to act respectfully, and show that respect in Mengzi is a distinct 
psychological entity from both desire and behavioral disposition. And finally in Section 
4.3.3, I discuss two aspects of xiūwù zhī xīn. I argue that xiūwù zhī xīn is the mixture of 
two distinct emotional components of shame and dislike, and try to show that 1) the 
shame element of xiūwù zhī xīn can be interpreted as a construal of the relevant situation 
as disgraceful, whereas 2) the dislike (wù 惡) element responds more broadly to what 
one finds to be ethically undesirable or unacceptable. I hope that my discussion of wù 惡 
in xiūwù zhī xīn will also illuminate the hierarchical relationship between hàowù and 
other particular moral emotions in Mengzi. 
 
4.3.1 Cèyǐn zhī xīn 惻隱之心 and the Construal View of Emotion 
 
4.3.1.1 Cèyǐn zhī xīn 惻隱之心 
 
In this section, I analyze Mengzi’s conception of cèyǐn zhī xīn 惻隱之心. The term 
“cèyǐn zhī xīn” is used five times throughout the Mengzi,17 and it is the most standard 
term that Mengzi uses to refer to his first moral sprout. It is often translated as the 
“feeling of compassion” or simply “compassion” (or “sympathy” or “commiseration” to 
the same effect), but we should remain careful about the important discrepancy in 
denotation between cèyǐn zhī xīn and compassion (or sympathy or commiseration). An 
important difference between cèyǐn zhī xīn and compassion is that although both refer to 
                                                 
17 Three times in Mengzi 2A:6 and two times in Mengzi 6A:6. 
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the painful feelings that one feels at the misfortune of others, cèyǐn zhī xīn can also 
denote one’s familial affection toward one’s family members, especially the filial 
affection a child has towards her parents. Mengzi declares that “cèyǐn zhī xīn is the sprout 
of the virtue of rén 仁”18—or even that “cèyǐn zhī xīn is the virtue of rén 仁,”19 and rén 
仁 in Mengzi sometimes denotes one’s affection for family members20 or one’s serving 
one’s parents.21 In short, cèyǐn zhī xīn as (the foundation of) the virtue of humaneness has 
both elements of familial affection and general sympathy, and one can anticipate a 
theoretical tension between the partialistic and universalistic tendencies contained in 
these two components of cèyǐn zhī xīn.22
Another important point that we should keep in mind to understand cèyǐn zhī xīn 
correctly is that besides “cèyǐn zhī xīn,” Mengzi also uses other terms such as “bùrěnrén 
zhī xīn” 不忍人之心, “chùtì cèyǐn zhī xīn” 怵惕惻隱之心, and “ēn” 恩 quite a few 
times, and these terms shed light on different aspects of Mengzi’s first sprout that we 
usually refer to by “cèyǐn zhī xīn” or “compassion.” This means that the proper 
understanding of cèyǐn zhī xīn or Mengzi’s first sprout can be acquired not by merely 
discussing one or two relevant anecdotes such as “the baby falling into a well” (Mengzi 
2A:6) or “King Xuān and his ox” (Mengzi 1A:7) by way of rephrasing what Mengzi says, 
but by interpreting these stories in the light of the philosophical implications of the terms 
just mentioned and combining such implications of these terms across passages into a 
consistent picture of cèyǐn zhī xīn. For this purpose I examine three passages from the 
Mengzi consecutively, and my analysis of these passages will show that 1) cèyǐn zhī xīn is 
a painful feeling based on one’s sympathetic or filial concern for the object of cèyǐn zhī 
xīn, and 2) the painfulness of cèyǐn zhī xīn comes from the fact that cèyǐn zhī xīn is 
basically a construal of relevant situations in a way peculiar to sympathy or filial 
affection. 
 
                                                 
18 “惻隱之心, 仁之端也.” Mengzi 2A:6. 
19 “惻隱之心, 仁也.” Mengzi 6A:6. 
20 “吾弟則愛之, 秦人之弟則不愛也. 是以我爲悅者也, 故謂之內.” Mengzi 6A:4. This is the reason 
Gàozǐ gives for his thesis that rén 仁 is internal or part of the human nature (rén nèi 仁內), and Mengzi 
does not object to it. 
21 “孟子曰: ‘仁之實, 事親是也.’” Mengzi 4A:27. 
22 I discuss this issue later in Chapter 6. 
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Our first passage is Mengzi 2A:6, and I deal with the first half of it in this section. 
This part contains Mengzi’s famous thought experiment about a baby about to fall into a 
well: 
 
Mengzi said, “Humans all have the feeling of not being able to endure other people’s 
[suffering harm]. The former kings had the government not indifferent to people’s [harm], 
probably because they had the feeling of not being able to endure other people’s 
[suffering harm]. [If one] runs a government that is not indifferent to people’s [harm] with 
the feeling of not being able to endure other people’s [harm], [one could] rule the world 
as if moving it on one’s palm. The reason that I say humans all have the feeling of not 
being able to endure other people’s [suffering harm] is this: Now [suppose that] someone 
suddenly saw a child about to fall into a well. Anyone seeing this would have the feeling 
of alarm and pain, and [one’s running to the well to save the child] is not to get in good 
relationship with the child’s parents, not to seek fame in the neighborhood and among 
friends, or not because one would hate the crying sound of the child. From this, we can 
see that anyone who lacks the feeling of compassion is not a human being.23
 
In this passage, “cèyǐn zhī xīn” is used four times out of its total five usages throughout 
the Mengzi, and Mengzi provides us with two clues to the meaning of the term: On one 
hand, Mengzi uses “cèyǐn zhī xīn” interchangeably with “bùrěnrén zhī xīn” 不忍人之心; 
on the other hand, he rephrases “cèyǐn zhī xīn” as “chùtì cèyǐn zhī xīn” 怵惕惻隱之心 in 
the context of the story of the baby falling into a well. First, concerning “bùrěnrén zhī 
xīn” 不忍人之心, although “rěn” 忍 in the phrase means “to endure,” the character can 
also mean “brutal” or “cruel.” So, the phrase “bùrěnrén zhī xīn,” which I translated above 
as “the feeling of not being able to endure other people’s [suffering harm],” can be 
alternatively rendered as “the heart of not being cruel to others,” or “tenderheartedness” 
for short.24 The connotation of this alternative rendering is that one is not cruel so as to 
inflict harm on others personally, but it is not clear on this reading what would be one’s 
response if one were to see other people’s suffering from a third-personal standpoint. In 
other words, this reading of the phrase does not exclude the possibility that one is not 
                                                 
23 “孟子曰: ‘人皆有不忍人之心. 先王有不忍人之心, 斯有不忍人之政矣. 以不忍人之心, 行不忍人
之政, 治天下可運於掌上. 所以謂人皆有不忍人之心者, 今人乍見孺子將入於井, 皆有怵惕惻隱之心;
 非所以內交於孺子之父母也, 非所以要譽於鄕黨朋友也, 非惡其聲而然也. 由是觀之, 無惻隱之心,
 非人也.’” Mengzi 2A:6. 
24 For example, Sūn Shì 孫奭 interprets the phrase this way. See his commentary on Mengzi 2A:6 in Sūn 
Shì 孫奭, Mèngzǐ zhùshū 孟子注疏, ed. Mǎ Xīnmín 馬辛民 (Běijīng 北京: Běijīng dàxué chūbǎnshè 
北京大學出版社, 2000), p. 114. 
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cruel enough to harm others personally, but remain indifferent to others’ suffering when 
one is not directly responsible for their suffering. On the other hand, my translation of the 
phrase above—“the feeling of not being able to endure other people’s [suffering 
harm]”—makes the following reading possible: Not only does one find it unbearable to 
inflict harm on others oneself, but one cannot bear to see others suffering no matter what 
the cause of their suffering. Between these two readings, Mengzi’s story about the baby 
falling into a well supports the latter, more inclusive interpretation, because it is clear in 
the story that it is not the fault of the person going to the rescue of the baby that the baby 
was crawling to the well in the first place.  
Now, switching to our second clue, we find Mengzi saying that anyone suddenly 
seeing a baby about to fall into a well has “chùtì cèyǐn zhī xīn” 怵惕惻隱之心. 
According to traditional commentators, “chù” 怵  and “tì” 惕  both mean the 
spontaneous reactions of alarm and surprise, whereas “cè” 惻 and “yǐn” 隱 equally 
mean some sort of pain, presumably at the sight of the baby endangered in the current 
case.25 This phrase (“chùtì cèyǐn zhī xīn”) indicates that Mengzi’s first sprout is an 
emotion consisting of two parts, but previous scholars seem to have rarely given careful, 
balanced attention to both constituents of cèyǐn zhī xīn.26 Some focus on the first element 
of cèyǐn zhī xīn (alarm and surprise) and emphasize its spontaneity untainted by the 
agent’s ulterior motives, and others consider cèyǐn zhī xīn primarily as a kind of vicarious 
knowledge or perception of the suffering of another sentient being combined with a 
judgment of what is the right thing to do in that situation. The latter group of scholars 
does mention the first element of cèyǐn zhī xīn (alarm and surprise), but they do not take 
those spontaneous responses seriously into their account of cèyǐn zhī xīn. 
                                                 
25 For example, see Jiāo Xún 焦循, Mèngzǐ zhèngyì 孟子正義 (Běijīng 北京: Zhōnghuá shūjú 中華書局, 
1987), p. 233; Yáng Bójùn, Mèngzǐ yìzhù 孟子譯注 (Běijīng 北京: Zhōnghuá shūjú 中華書局, 1960; 
reprint, 1992), p. 81. Both commentators quote various traditional glosses that take “chùtì” 怵惕 to be 
either “kǒngjù” 恐懼 (fear and alarm) or “jīnghài” 驚駭 (alarm and surprise), and they do not bother to 
distinguish “kǒngjù” and “jīnghài” clearly from each other. 
26 My use of “cèyǐn zhī xīn” in this section is equivalent to “Mengzi’s first sprout.” I do not mean it to 
designate only the pain (cèyǐn) element of the chùtì cèyǐn zhī xīn. When I want to refer to the “pain” 
element of the chùtì cèyǐn zhī xīn, I use “compassion” or “sympathy” with “cèyǐn” in parentheses. 
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Many traditional commentators and Sòng 宋 dynasty Confucians belong to the 
first group of scholars,27 and Kwong-loi Shun’s view of the four sprouts is one of the 
clearest examples well representing this first group. He renders the four sprouts as 
“ethical predispositions” and makes the following comments: 
 
[Mencius argues] that our recognition of yi [yì 義, righteousness] derives from certain 
features of the heart/mind, more specifically, from shared predispositions that already 
point in the direction of the ethical ideal….How do these ethical predispositions indicate 
an ethical direction?...Consider first the spontaneous reactions that Mencius highlighted, 
such as King Hsüan’s compassion for the ox (1A:7), one’s alarm at seeing an infant 
about to fall into a well (2A:6), one’s response to the sight of the bodies of deceased 
parents being devoured by wild animals (3A:5)….Unlike ongoing activities shaped by 
pre-existing goals, such as King Hsüan’s oppressing the people (1A:7) or someone 
accepting ten thousand bushels of grain contrary to propriety (6A:10), such reactions 
reveal something deep in the heart/mind and show one the kind of person one really is. 
Since one is caught unprepared, the reactions are not guided by ulterior motives but 
come directly from the heart/mind....The reactions under consideration not only lead one 
to see what is proper in an immediate context of action but also can guide one’s future 
behavior or behavior in other contexts.28
 
A problem that I find in this otherwise well-thought and highly insightful description of 
Mengzi’s four sprouts is that Shun seems to confuse the spontaneity of such reactions as 
alarm and surprise at the sight of the baby falling into a well with the purity of motive in 
one’s compassion for that baby. In other words, Shun seems to think that the motivational 
purity of one’s compassion for the baby—in the sense that it is not tainted by one’s selfish 
desires to take advantage of one’s act of rescuing the baby—comes from the purported 
suddenness or spontaneity of one’s compassionate response to the endangered baby 
accompanied by one’s alarm and surprise in the situation. However, as I will argue later, 
compassion (cèyǐn 惻隱) in Mengzi has to be neither sudden nor fully spontaneous, 
whereas one’s responses of alarm and surprise at the falling baby are so by definition. As 
I see it, one’s responses of alarm and surprise (chùtì 怵惕) at the baby about to fall into a 
well are close to what some psychologists call “affect programs.” According to Paul 
                                                 
27 For example, see Zhào Qí’s 趙岐 (?–201) and Sūn Shì’s 孫奭 commentaries on this passage in Sūn Shì, 
Mèngzǐ zhùshū, pp. 112–114; and also see Xiè Liángzuǒ’s 謝良左 (1050–1103) and Zhū Xī’s 朱熹 views 
on this matter in Yasui Kō 安井 衡, Mōshi teihon 孟子定本 (Tokyo 東京: Fuzanbō 富山房, 1972), 
卷三, p. 28. 




The central idea of affect program theory is that emotional responses are complex, 
coordinated, and automated. They are complex because they involve several elements. 
These are usually taken to include (a) expressive facial changes, (b) musculoskeletal 
responses such as flinching and orienting, (c) expressive vocal changes, (d) endocrine 
system changes and consequent changes in the level of hormones, and (e) autonomic 
nervous system changes….The affect program responses are coordinated because the 
various elements occur together in recognizable patterns or sequences. They are 
automatic because they unfold in this coordinated fashion without the need for conscious 
direction. 
 [Paul Ekman] claims to have uncovered six species-typical human affect 
programs. He has called these surprise, anger, fear, disgust, sadness, and joy….Affect 
programs are adaptive responses to events that have a particular ecological significance 
for the organism. The fear response is adapted to dangers, the disgust response to 
noxious stimuli, the anger response to challenges, the surprise response to novel 
stimuli….If affect programs are to be of significant adaptive advantage to an organism 
over an evolutionarily significant time period, it might well have been advantageous for 
them to be linked to some mechanism which can interpret the broad ecological categories 
of danger, novelty, and so forth, in the light of local conditions. So it is unsurprising that 
organisms have to learn which events in their particular environment should trigger the 
affect programs.29
 
According to this description, we could regard one’s responses of alarm and surprise 
(chùtì 怵惕) at the baby falling into a well to be close to Paul Ekman’s affect programs 
of fear and surprise. For chùtì 怵惕, or alarm and surprise, would certainly involve initial 
flinching and subsequent bodily orientation and movement toward the baby, certain 
hormonal changes and more rapid heartbeat and so forth, and these symptoms occur in a 
coordinated manner without being directed by one’s conscious mind. Moreover, one’s 
responses of alarm and surprise at the endangered baby in Mengzi’s story seem to be the 
expression of affect programs naturally encoded in mature human beings of ancient 
China, because being behaviorally protective of the younger and therefore weaker 
members of human species has clear adaptive advantage to the species in general. The 
peculiar responses of alarm and surprise at the baby falling into a well might have been 
the result of ancient Chinese’s learning to interpret being near at a well (especially one 
without a fence around it) to be a dangerous situation.  
                                                 
29 Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are, pp. 77–78, and 89–90. 
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However, I think that compassion (cèyǐn 惻隱) in Mengzi is markedly distinct 
from spontaneous reactions of alarm and surprise, and consequently that it is not the kind 
of spontaneity these latter responses embody as a kind of affect programs that provides 
compassion with its motivational purity. The main reason that I think this is the 
following: These responses are probably the result of biological adaptations of human 
organisms to their environmental hazards. They are largely pre-linguistic, they do not 
involve such concepts as self versus others or selfishness as opposed to altruism, and they 
express themselves spontaneously or even automatically. In this light, those spontaneous 
responses are reactions but not actions whose motives are subject to ethical approval or 
disapproval, and consequently they cannot be contributing to the motivational purity of 
compassion.30 As I see it, what provides compassion with its motivational purity is not its 
concomitant spontaneous reactions but the special character of compassion, which 
Mengzi sometimes refers to by “bùrěnrén zhī xīn” or “the feeling of not being able to 
endure other people’s [suffering harm],” or sometimes by the feeling of “pain” (cèyǐn) 
which is part of his “chùtì cèyǐn zhī xīn” 怵惕惻隱之心. What is clear to us so far is that 
this feeling of “pain” is caused by the danger of the baby in Mengzi’s story quoted above, 
but we are not yet clear what is the nature of this feeling of “pain” exactly. In order to 
have the answer to this question, we need to analyze another passage from the Mengzi. 
The next passage to look at is Mengzi 1A:7, and it contains Mengzi’s dialogue 
with King Xuān 宣 of the Qí 齊 dukedom about how to become a benevolent king. 
Again, I quote here only a half of the long passage which I think is most relevant to our 
purpose: 
 
[King Xuān] asked, “What must one’s virtue be like in order to be the king [of the 
world]?” [Mengzi] answered, “If one becomes a king by taking care of his people, no one 
can stop it.” Asked, “Can someone like me take care of the people?” Answered, “Yes, you 
can.” Asked, “How do you know that I can?” Answered, “I heard it from Hú Hé 胡齕 
[King Xuān’s attendant]. He said, ‘The king was sitting up in his hall, and there was a 
                                                 
30 In addition, there are certainly some spontaneous human reactions that are detrimental to maintaining 
harmonious, flourishing society, when not properly regulated. For example, everyone has natural desires for 
food, sex, warm and safe shelter, and so forth, and it is possible that one’s urge to satisfy such desires is the 
first thing occurring in one’s mind, and one’s efforts to satisfy those desires are the first behavioral 
responses one shows in an ethically relevant situation. However, apparently, this does not make one’s 
efforts to satisfy such desires motivationally “pure” or altruistic. 
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person passing below leading an ox. The king saw it and asked, “Where is the ox going?” 
Answered, “I am going to consecrate a bell with its blood.” The king said, “Spare it! I 
cannot bear [to see] it cowering, like an innocent [man] going to the execution ground.” 
Asked, “Then, shall I abandon the consecrating of the bell?” [The king] said, “How can 
it be abandoned? Replace it with a sheep!”’ I’m not sure, was there such an event?” [The 
king] said, “Yes, there was.” [Mengzi] said, “This feeling is sufficient to become a king. 
People all think that your majesty were stingy, but I surely know that your majesty were 
not able to bear [the sight]. The king said, “Right. There really were some people [who 
thought so]. But although Qí is a small country, how could I be stingy about an ox? I just 
couldn’t bear [to see] it cowering, like an innocent [man] going to the execution ground; 
that’s why I replaced it with a sheep.” [Mengzi] said, “Your majesty shouldn’t surprise at 
people’s taking you to be stingy. You replaced a big one with a small one; how could they 
know it [i.e. your true motive]? If your majesty were pained at its going to the execution 
ground while being innocent, what is there to choose between an ox and a sheep?” The 
king laughed and said, “What is this mind really? I didn’t care about its material value 
and replace it with a sheep. [But] it certainly makes sense for people to say that I was 
being stingy.” [Mengzi] said, “It doesn’t hurt [your being humane]; it is a [proper] way of 
practicing humaneness. You saw the ox but didn’t see the sheep. As for the nobleman to 
beasts, once he sees them alive, he cannot bear to see them die; once he hears their 
sounds, he cannot bear to eat their meat. This is the reason that the nobleman keeps away 
from the kitchen.” The king was pleased and said, “The saying in the Poetry that 
‘another person’s motive, I measure it,’ this is just for you. It’s me who did it, but I 
couldn’t get my motive when I sought it out in introspection. [It’s only when] you said it 
that [the motive] became clear in my mind. [Now,] why is it that this feeling is fitting for 
[someone to be] a [true] king?” [Mengzi] said, “If there were someone reporting to you 
that ‘my strength is sufficient to lift a hundred jūn 鈞, but not enough to lift a feather; my 
eyesight is sufficient to examine the tip of an autumn hair, but I cannot see a cartload of 
firewood,’ would your majesty accept that?” [The king] said, “No, I wouldn’t.” “Now, 
your kindness is sufficient to reach animals, but your benefits do not reach your people; 
why [should this case] alone [be an exception]? Therefore, not lifting a feather is due to 
not using [one’s] power; not seeing a cartload of firewood is due to not using [one’s] 
eyesight; people’s not getting taken care of is due to not using [your] kindness. So, your 
majesty’s not becoming the king [of the world] is [due to] your refusal to act, not due to 
your inability [to act].”31
                                                 
31 “[齊宣王問]曰: ‘德何如則可以王矣?’ 曰: ‘保民而王, 莫之能禦也.’ 曰: ‘若寡人者, 可以保民乎
哉?’ 曰: ‘可.’ 曰: ‘何由知吾可也?’ 曰: ‘臣聞之胡齕. 曰: “王坐於堂上, 有牽牛而過堂下者. 王見之, 
曰: ‘牛何之?’ 對曰: ‘將以釁鐘.’ 王曰: ‘舍之! 吾不忍其觳觫, 若無罪而就死地.’ 對曰: ‘然則廢釁鐘
與?’ 曰: ‘何可廢也? 以羊易之!’” 不識, 有諸?’ 曰: ‘有之.’ 曰: ‘是心足以王矣. 百姓皆以王爲愛也, 
臣固知王之不忍也.’ 王曰: ‘然, 誠有百姓者. 齊國雖褊小, 吾何愛一牛? 卽不忍其觳觫, 若無罪而就
死地, 故以羊易之也.’ 曰: ‘王無異於百姓之以王爲愛也. 以小易大, 彼惡知之? 王若隱其無罪而就死
地, 則牛羊何擇焉?’ 王笑曰: ‘是誠何心哉? 我非愛其財而易之以羊也. 宜乎百姓之謂我愛也.’ 曰: 
‘無傷也, 是乃仁術也; 見牛未見羊也. 君子之於禽獸也, 見其生, 不忍見其死; 聞其聲, 不忍食其肉. 
是以君子遠庖廚也.’ 王說曰: ‘詩云, “他人有心, 予忖度之,” 夫子之謂也. 夫我乃行之, 反而求之, 不
得吾心. 夫子言之, 於我心有戚戚焉. 此心之所以合於王者, 何也?’ 曰: ‘有復於王者曰: “吾力足以擧
百鈞, 而不足以擧一羽; 明足以察秋毫之末, 而不見輿薪,” 則王許之乎?’ 曰: ‘否.’ ‘今恩足以及禽獸, 
而功不至於百姓者, 獨何與? 然則一羽之不擧, 爲不用力焉; 輿薪之不見, 爲不用明焉; 百姓之不見
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Two points are initially relevant to our purpose of clarifying the nature of Mengzi’s 
compassion. First, unlike the previous passage where Mengzi uses the phrase “bùrěnrén 
zhī xīn” 不忍人之心, the author of this passage uses “bùrěn” 不忍 instead, and four of 
its five usages in this passage take an image of a suffering creature as their intentional 
object. That is, King Xuān says twice that he saved the ox because he could not bear 
(bùrěn 不忍) to see the ox cowering like an innocent man going to the execution ground, 
and Mengzi says that the nobleman cannot bear to see animals die once he saw them alive, 
and the nobleman cannot bear his eating the meat of an animal once he heard its crying 
sound. Second, we see in this passage that the character “yǐn” 隱, which we have seen 
above is some sort of pain, takes the same intentional object as “bùrěn” does. That is, 
Mengzi asks King Xuān, “If your majesty were pained (yǐn 隱) at its going to the 
execution ground while being innocent, what is there to choose between an ox and a 
sheep?” 
It is very tempting to interpret these data to indicate that Mengzi’s compassion 
(bùrěn 不忍 or cèyǐn 惻隱) is a kind of empathy-based concern for the object of one’s 
compassion. What I mean by “empathy” is a kind of sharing of the other’s mental 
states,32 and Stephen Darwall points out that there are several different kinds of simple 
and advanced types of empathy. Darwall calls his first kind of empathy “emotional 
contagion,” because it denotes our capacity to share another person’s emotion or feeling 
in a direct manner. Some examples are people tending to feel an emotion by assuming 
facial positions that are characteristic of that emotion (facial mimicry), or babies tending 
to cry in response to the recording of other babies’ crying.33 The second kind of empathy 
is called “projective empathy”; it denotes our capacity to put ourselves into another 
person’s situation and work out what to feel from that person’s perspective. According to 
Darwall, we can have this kind of empathy in different levels or degrees, but I think that 
citing an example illustrating a low-level projective empathy is sufficient for my 
discussion of the current Mengzi passage: Suppose that two men, Mr. Crane and Mr. Tees, 
both missed their flight due to a traffic jam on their way to the airport, but were informed 
                                                                                                                                                 
保, 爲不用恩焉. 故王之不王, 不爲也, 非不能也.’” Mengzi 1A:7. 
32 Stephen Darwall, “Empathy, Sympathy, Care,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for 
Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 89, no. 2–3 (March 1998), p. 263. 
33 Ibid., pp. 264–266. 
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that Mr. Crane’s flight departed as scheduled whereas Mr. Tees’s flight was delayed and 
departed right before his arrival at the airport. For such a case we normally think that Mr. 
Tees should feel more frustrated than Mr. Crane, and we would feel the same way if we 
put ourselves in Mr. Tees’s situation.34
Among the previous scholars writing on the topic of compassion in Mengzi, 
Shirong Luo explicitly argues that King Xuān’s feeling of pain or distress at the ox’s 
apparent suffering and fear is triggered by his capacity for both primitive and advanced 
modes of empathy.35 Luo spends no time explaining how King Xuān’s feeling of pain or 
distress is caused by his capacity for a simple form of empathy, but Luo might think that 
just as people can have the same kind of feeling as the subject of a feeling (say, joy) by 
mimicking the facial expression of that person (say, smile), King Xuān can have a painful 
feeling mirroring that of the ox’s by his (imaginative) mimicking of the ox’s cowering 
behavior. On the part of advanced empathy, Luo suggests that the king could have heard a 
story in the past about an innocent man wrongly put to death, and now puts himself in the 
situation of the wronged man in the story helped by recalling his memory in youth of 
being wrongly punished by his father. So, King Xuān’s feeling of distress actually 
represents the way the innocent man in the story would feel as imagined by King Xuān, 
but this feeling can be transferred to the case of the ox by the king’s initial association of 
the ox with an innocent man wrongly put to death.36
The convolutions of this explanation should not make it fully unlikely, because in 
the current passage Mengzi says that the nobleman controls his feeling of distress for 
dying animals by keeping a distance from them. If not seeing an animal that is about to be 
killed or avoiding hearing a dying animal’s crying sound helps one reduce one’s feeling 
of distress at those animals, then King Xuān’s feeling of distress at the ox should also be 
considered, at least partly, as a feeling acquired through empathy. For as Luo correctly 
points out following Michael Slote, empathy is characterized by “perceptual immediacy”: 
We are more compelled to save a child drowning in front of us than to save a child dying 
                                                 
34 Ibid., p. 268. 
35 Shirong Luo, “Early Confucian Ethics and Moral Sentimentalism” (Ph. D. diss., University of Miami, 
2004), p. 81. 
36 Ibid., pp. 78–79. 
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of a disease in a third-world country, and King Xuān replaced the ox with a sheep 
because he did not feel, or felt little, empathy for the sheep.37  
However, there is an issue of whether King Xuān’s feeling of distress at the ox’s 
suffering is wholly empathy or is also to be considered as sympathy. According to 
Darwall’s definition, sympathy is “a feeling or emotion that (a) corresponds to some 
apparent threat or obstacle to an individual’s good or well-being, (b) has that individual 
himself as object, and (c) involves concern for him, and thus for his well-being, for his 
sake.”38 On the other hand, empathy merely consists in feeling what one imagines 
another person feels, or perhaps should feel, or in some imagined copy of these feelings 
in a certain situation, and one may or may not come thereby to be concerned for that 
person.39 Based on Luo’s account of King Xuān’s feeling summarized above, King 
Xuān’s feeling of distress at the ox seems to fit this narrow sense of empathy: He came to 
have this feeling by initially associating the ox with an innocent man wrongly put to 
death, and then by projecting himself into the position of this wronged man and working 
out what this man would feel. Moreover, he did not feel this painful feeling for the sheep 
that was not present, and he did not bother to care about its welfare. However, if this were 
what King Xuān’s feeling of distress at the ox is all about, that feeling of King Xuān’s 
remains to be empathy as distinct from sympathy, and it is hard to consider King Xuān’s 
saving the ox to be a genuinely altruistic action aiming at the removal of the ox’s 
suffering rather than a self-directed action to remove the source of his own mental pain.  
However, at the beginning of the current passage Mengzi says that this feeling of 
King Xuān’s is sufficient to motivate him to take care of his people and eventually 
become a true king, and Mengzi is apparently talking about the genuine feeling of care 
and not merely about a self-directed uneasy or painful feeling the resolution of which can 
happen to bring some benefits to his people. Two things support the view that King 
Xuān’s feeling of distress at the ox can be considered as sympathy as opposed to empathy. 
First, at the end of the current passage Mengzi asks King Xuān how come his benefits do 
not reach his people when he can show kindness to mere animals. The Chinese character 
standing for “kindness” in the original passage is “ēn” 恩, and it can mean benefit or 
                                                 
37 Ibid., p. 34 and p. 81. 
38 Darwall, “Empathy,” p. 261. 
39 Ibid. 
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bounty but more importantly the benevolence of the person who gives the bounty. This 
indicates that King Xuān saved the ox not merely because he did not like his uneasy 
feeling at the sight of the frightened ox (empathy) but because he cared about the ox 
(sympathy).40
Second, King Xuān’s painful feeling (bùrěn 不忍 or yǐn 隱) does not seem to be 
merely a representation of what the king imagines to be the ox’s feelings, but the feeling 
of some sort of motivational resistance. That is, earlier I said that King Xuān’s feeling of 
unbearableness (bùrěn 不忍) takes the image of the ox cowering like an innocent man 
going to the execution ground as its intentional object, and I believe that this feeling of 
the king’s is focused not on the imagined fear and despair of the wronged man but on the 
fact that he was innocent. In other words, I think that the king’s feeling of distress comes 
from his construal of the situation in terms of an innocent creature facing undeserved 
death, and this construal of the situation is made possible in the first place by the king’s 
concern for a sentient being, no matter how incomplete and capricious it could be at the 
current stage of the king’s moral cultivation.  
This last point can also be made by Mengzi 2A:6 interpreted in the light of Mengzi 
3A:5, a passage to be quoted below shortly. That is, although one’s bùrěnrén zhī xīn 不
忍人之心 or compassion for the baby at the well is sometimes interpreted as empathy, 
i.e. one’s vicarious knowledge of the baby’s imminent fear and pain,41 I think that what is 
at the core of one’s compassion for the baby is one’s construal of the situation as one in 
which an innocent sentient being is endangered. As Mengzi clearly says in the passage to 
be quoted in full length below, “it is not the fault of the baby that it crawls toward a well 
[and eventually drowns in it],”42 and anyone who sees the situation this way and cares 
about the welfare of the baby cannot bear (bùrěn 不忍), or would find it painful (yǐn 隱), 
to let this disaster happen. In short, I think that Mengzi’s compassion (cèyǐn 惻隱, bùrěn 
                                                 
40 Also consider Mengzi’s saying in 2A:6 above that it is not because one hates the crying sound of the 
endangered baby that he goes to the rescue of the baby. 
41 For example, see Luo, “Early Confucian Ethics,” pp. 72–75. In addition, although strongly denying that 
compassion in Mengzi is not a form of empathy, Sin yee Chan says that compassion embodies the 
judgment that the object of compassion is in suffering, and this judgment results from our vicarious 
knowledge of the others’ mental states. See Sin yee Chan, “An Ethic of Loving: Ethical Particularism and 
the Engaged Perspective in Confucian Role-Ethics,” (Ph. D. diss., University of Michigan, 1993), pp. 201–
202. 
42 “赤子匍匐將入井, 非赤子之罪也.” Mengzi 3A:5. 
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不忍, or yǐn 隱) is essentially an uneasy or even painful feeling at the thought of 
imminent harm to another sentient being whose welfare one cares about, and it is 
misguided to interpret compassion in Mengzi as merely a form of empathy. 
Now, let us turn to our third and the final passage, Mengzi 3A:5, which contains a 
conversation between Mengzi and a Mohist named Yí Zhī 夷之. Unlike the two passages 
previously discussed, this passage is not about compassion but the question of what the 
proper degree of one’s love for parents should be in proportion to one’s love for others. 
However, the emotion to be discussed in the following passage is crucial for clarifying 
Mengzi’s concept of cèyǐn zhī xīn, because 1) it is an emotion grounded on one’s care for 
its object (i.e. one’s parents) just like compassion, and 2) it is grouped together with 
compassion as an important constituent of humaneness (rén 仁) in Mengzi’s thought. 
Read the following passage focusing on Mengzi’s account of how the practice of burying 
the deceased parents has started in the antiquity: 
 
A Mohist Yí Zhī sought to see Mengzi through [the help of] Xú Bì 徐辟. Mengzi said, “I 
am definitely willing to see [him], but today I am still ill. I will go and see [him] when my 
illness gets better. [Tell] Master Yí not to come!” 
Another day, [Yí Zhī] sought to see Mengzi again. Mengzi said, “Today I can see 
[him]. [However,] without being straightforward, the Way will not be manifest; so, I will 
put it straightforward. I heard that Master Yí is a Mohist. Mohists, when conducting a 
funeral, take frugality as their proper way [to do it]. [If] Master Yí aspires to change the 
world with [this principle], he must not be regarding it as wrong and despicable. But 
Master Yí buried his parents lavishly, and this is serving one’s parents with what one 
despises.” 
Master Xú reported this to Master Yí. Master Yí said, “As for the way of the 
Confucians, [they often say that] the ancients [took care of others] as if taking care of a 
baby. What does this saying mean? I take it to mean that although there is no gradation 
in love, its application starts from one’s parents.” 
Master Xú reported this to Mengzi. Mengzi said, “Does Master Yí really think that 
one’s affection for one’s brother’s child is like [one’s] affection for one’s neighbor’s baby? 
[It is a different point that we should] glean from that [saying]: When a baby crawls 
[toward a well] and is about to fall into the well, it is not the baby’s fault. Moreover, when 
Heaven was giving birth to things, it had [each of] them [come from only] one source; 
[Master Yí’s misunderstanding is] due to his [considering them to have] two sources. 
Probably in the antiquity there were some who did not inter their parents. [Suppose that] 
when their parents died, they just took them up and abandoned them in a ditch. Days 
later they were passing by their dead parents, and [happened to see that] foxes and wild-
cats were devouring them, and flies and gnats biting on them. Sweat broke on their 
foreheads, and they [only] squinted at them without being able to look at them directly. 
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That sweat, it was not the kind for others [to see], but [the result of] their innermost 
feelings reaching their faces and eyes. Probably they went home and came back with 
baskets and spades and covered the bodies. Covering them is correct indeed, and [this 
shows that] there is also definitely a reason for filial sons and humane people to inter 
their parents.” 
Master Xú reported that to Master Yí. Master Yí looked lost for a while, and said, 
“[I appreciate] his teaching me.”43
 
In response to Yí Zhī’s attempt to ground the Mohist doctrine of “universal love” on a 
Confucian saying, Mengzi argues that although general compassion for others is an 
important part of the Confucian moral ideal, one’s love for kin cannot be the same as 
one’s love for non-kin. Mengzi provides a speculative account of the origin of the 
practice of burying one’s deceased parents as a ground for this view, and his point seems 
to be that 1) the spontaneous arousals described in the quoted passage made the ancient 
people invent the burial practice, and 2) these special feelings are what one feels only for 
those with whom one stands in a special relationship. As Kwong-loi Shun points out, 
such feelings are felt only for those one loves and values, and one would have merely felt 
disgusted and wanted to stay away from the corpses if they were those of strangers.44
It is acceptable that the feelings in question are what one would exclusively feel 
for the case of parents and the other family members, and in that sense these feelings are 
different from compassion that is felt for the misfortune of others indiscriminately. 
Despite the difference between these two constituents of cèyǐn zhī xīn, though, there 
seems to be an important similarity between the feelings based on one’s familial affection 
and those on one’s universal caring attitude toward others, and I think that discussing this 
similarity will further clarify the nature of cèyǐn zhī xīn as an emotion.  
Comparison of the current passage with Mengzi 2A:6 will be especially 
illuminating for this purpose. In my previous discussion of the passage, we have seen that 
                                                 
43 “墨者夷之因徐辟而求見孟子. 孟子曰: ‘吾固願見, 今吾尙病. 病愈, 我且往見, 夷子不來!’ 他日, 
又求見孟子. 孟子曰: ‘吾今則可以見矣. 不直, 則道不見, 我且直之. 吾聞夷子墨者. 墨之治喪也, 以
薄爲其道也. 夷子思以易天下, 豈以爲非是而不貴也? 然而夷子葬其親厚, 則是以所賤事親也.’ 徐
子以告夷子. 夷子曰: ‘儒者之道, 古之人若保赤子, 此言何謂也? 之則以爲愛無差等, 施由親始.’ 徐
子以告孟子. 孟子曰: ‘夫夷子信以爲人之親其兄之子爲若親其隣之赤子乎? 彼有取爾也. 赤子匍匐
將入井, 非赤子之罪也. 且天之生物也, 使之一本, 而夷子二本故也. 蓋上世嘗有不葬其親者. 其親
死, 則擧而委之於壑. 他日過之, 狐狸食之, 蠅蚋姑嘬之. 其顙有泚, 睨而不視. 夫泚也, 非爲人泚, 
中心達於面目. 蓋歸反蘽梩而掩之. 掩之誠是也, 則孝子仁人之掩其親, 亦必有道矣.’ 徐子以告夷子. 
夷子憮然爲閒曰: ‘命之矣.’” Mengzi 3A:5. 
44 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, p. 133 and p. 134. 
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one’s cèyǐn zhī xīn at the baby falling into a well consists of spontaneous responses of 
alarm and fear (chùtì 怵惕) on one hand and one’s sympathy or compassion for the baby 
(cèyǐn 惻隱) on the other. I argued that the motivational purity of one’s saving the baby 
comes from the element of sympathy rather than from the spontaneous reactions of alarm 
and fear, because what makes the action in question motivationally “pure” should be the 
compassion springing from the altruistic concern of a human agent, rather than certain 
spontaneous reactions biologically encoded in a human organism. When discussing King 
Xuān and his ox, I have further argued that the core of compassion is the construal of a 
relevant situation in terms of an innocent being wrongly endangered, and what makes one 
construe the situation this way is one’s concern for the endangered being. Now in Mengzi 
3A:5, we seem to find some similar patterns: Just as one feels alarm and fear when 
suddenly seeing a baby on the verge of falling into a well, so a person who dumped the 
corpses of his parents in a ditch sweats and squints at the bodies feasted on by wild 
creatures; just as one goes to the rescue of the baby because she cares about the welfare 
of the baby, so the one who initially dumped his parents’ bodies in a ditch comes back to 
bury his deceased parents because he cares for his parents even after they have passed 
away. 
Now, besides the physiological and behavioral components and the action 
components common to both instances of cèyǐn zhī xīn, we know that for the former case 
what motivates one’s action of saving the baby is primarily one’s feeling of sympathy, 
which construes the situation as one where an innocent being’s life is at stake. Then, 
based on the parallel between these two instances of cèyǐn zhī xīn, could we also find 
some emotion in the latter case corresponding to the sympathy in the former? In Mengzi 
3A:5 no emotion like sympathy is specified besides certain physiological or behavioral 
changes such as sweating and squinting, but Mengzi does say that those physiological 
changes and spontaneous behaviors are the expression of the innermost feelings (zhōng 
xīn 中心, literally “inner heart”). We have seen earlier in Chapter 2 that “qíng” in early 
Chinese texts can refer to what is sitting deeply in an individual’s mind in the forms of 
sincere opinions, goals or aspirations, desires for certain objects, emotional or affective 
reactions toward a certain object, or evaluative judgments, and I propose that there is a 
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significant overlap between the meaning of zhōng xīn 中心, or just xīn 心 sometimes, 
and that of qíng. For example, look at the following passage from the Analects:  
 
[One day] the Master was playing stone-chimes in the Wèi 衛 dukedom, and a person 
with a basket passing by the gate of Kongzi’s house said, “How meaningful, [his] playing 
the stone-chimes!” And shortly he added, “How petty, the stubborn sound! If no one 
knows oneself, one should give it up. If [the water is] deep, cross it by wading [and never 
mind getting wet]; if shallow, just hold up your skirt and cross it.” The Master said, 
“How resolute! No dispute with such a man.”45
 
It seems from his comments that the passer-by not only knew about Kongzi’s frustration 
at his repeated failure to get an office in the government but also was sensitive to the 
sounds of the stone-chimes indirectly conveying Kongzi’s mental states. The original 
phrase that I translated as “how meaningful!” is “yǒu xīn zāi” 有心哉 (literally, “[The 
music] is full of mind!”), and xīn 心 here apparently refers to Kongzi’s frustrated 
aspiration to political recognition and the realization of his political vision. Likewise, it 
seems that zhōng xīn 中心 of the dead people’s child in Mengzi 3A:5 refers to some sort 
of feeling or emotion, specifically the feeling of unbearableness at the sight of one’s 
parents’ bodies devoured by wild animals and filthy insects.46 Furthermore, in parallel to 
the case of sympathy that sees the baby at the well as an innocent being endangered, I 
suggest that the uneasy feeling based on one’s filial affection in Mengzi 3A:5 also 
involves the construal of the situation in question as one in which one’s parents—not 
merely unconscious lumps of flesh—are eaten by animals and insects, and this concern-
based construal is the source of one’s uneasiness. In short, I propose that what 
characterizes both instances of cèyǐn zhī xīn—i.e. sympathy and familial affection—is 
this concern-based construal of the situation in question, and I think that this is the core 
characteristic of cèyǐn zhī xīn as an emotion. 
                                                 
45 “子擊磬於衛. 有荷蕢而過孔氏之門者, 曰: ‘有心哉, 擊磬乎!’ 旣而曰: ‘鄙哉, 硜硜乎! 莫己知也,
 斯己而已矣. 深則厲, 淺則揭.’ 子曰: ‘果哉! 末之難矣.’” Lunyu 14:39. The underlining is mine. 
46 The author(s) of the “frugal funeral” (jiésàng 節喪) chapter of Lǚshì chūnqiū 呂氏春秋 writes that the 
ritual of burying the deceased was invented because by nature human beings cannot bear to abandon those 
they love and value (i.e. their parents and children) in a ditch when they are dead: “所重所愛, 死而棄之溝
壑, 人之情不忍爲也, 故有葬死之義.” Chén Qíyóu, Lǚshì chūnqiū jiàoshì, p. 524. This passage has been 
originally mentioned and discussed in relation to Mengzi 3A:5 in Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese 
Thought, p. 134. 
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The final topic to discuss about cèyǐn zhī xīn is the relationship between one’s 
sympathy or filial affection, which construes a relevant situation in a special way, and the 
physiological or behavioral responses such as sweating and squinting or surprise and 
alarm. As we have already seen above, these spontaneous physiological or behavioral 
reactions do not contribute to the motivational purity of the actions motivated by the 
emotions they accompany. Those responses sometimes seem to be part of the affect 
programs that are much closer to reflexes than deliberate actions (thus we cannot ascribe 
a motive to them which requires the concept of agency), and when these responses are 
not part of the affect programs, it is the peculiar way of emotional construal of a certain 
situation rather than these spontaneous reactions that makes one’s action motivated by the 
emotion in question distinct from an action based on a prudential concern or self-interest. 
(One’s burial of the dead parents due to the construal that wild creatures are a serious 
threat to the welfare of one’s parents is a good illustration of this case.) Then, what is 
Mengzi’s view of the place of these involuntary responses in one’s emotional life? 
Unlike the alarm and surprise in Mengzi 2A:6 that I regarded as affect programs 
which are parallel with but arising independently of one’s construal of the baby to be 
facing an undeserved death, Mengzi seems to think that the reactions of sweating and 
squinting in Mengzi 3A:5 are consequent on or expressive of one’s construal of the wild 
creatures eating the corpses of one’s parents—which are no longer conscious—as though 
harming one’s parents. We have similar cases throughout the Mengzi. For example, 
besides Mengzi 1B:1 cited above (footnote 5) where King Xuān 宣 of Qí 齊 revealed 
his view that it was shameful to like vulgar music by 1) blushing, the authors of the 
Mengzi observe that the ancient Chinese express their anger by 2) an angry countenance 
(nù…jiàn yú qímiàn 怒…見於其面)47 such as 3) glancing sideways (juànjuàn 睊睊),48 
4) frowning (cù’è 蹙頞),49 or 5) blushing (fúrán 艴然)50; express uneasiness by 6) 
assuming uneasy countenance or posture (cùrán 蹴然)51; express embarrassment by 
certain behaviors such as 7) looking around and saying something off the topic (gù 
                                                 
47 Mengzi 2B:12. 
48 Mengzi 1B:4. 
49 Mengzi 1B:1. 
50 Mengzi 2A:1. 
51 Mengzi 2A:1. 
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zuǒyòu ér yán tā 顧左右而言他); 52  and express joy by 8) a happy countenance 
(xīnxīnrán yǒu xǐsè 欣欣然有喜色).53
In Mengzi 1B:1 and 1B:4 (cases 3, 4, and 8) people get angry or joyful depending 
on whether or not the ruler shares his source of pleasure such as good music and hunting 
parks with his people, and people’s anger and joy accompanied by their angry or happy 
countenance seem to involve the concept of fairness or desert at least in an implicit 
manner.54 On the other hand, the rest of the cases are related with a certain conception of 
honor or shame: In Mengzi 1B:1 (case 1) King Xuān blushes because he finds his 
fondness of vulgar music shameful; in Mengzi 2B:12 (case 2) Mengzi says that he is not a 
petty man whose anger gets written all over his face when the king slights his advice;55 in 
Mengzi 2A:1 (case 5 and 6) Zēng Xī expresses anger by blushing when compared with 
Guǎn Zhòng whom he greatly despises, and assumes an uneasy posture or countenance 
when compared with Zǐlù whom he greatly admires;56 and finally in Mengzi 1B:6 (case 7) 
Mengzi forces King Xuān with logic to adopt that he misgoverned his country and 
therefore does not deserve to rule his country, and King Xuān makes an embarrassed 
gesture betraying his agreement to Mengzi’s point.  In short, the emotions that construe 
various social situations in the light of such concepts as fairness, desert, shame, dignity, 
or honor seem to entail the involuntary physiological or behavioral responses enumerated 
above. In addition, Mengzi is unlikely to have singled out the responses of alarm and 
surprise in Mengzi 2A:6 as distinguished in kind from the other spontaneous reactions 
57
                                                 
52 Mengzi 1B:6. 
53 Mengzi 1B:1. 
54 For example, Mengzi says to King Xuān that it is wrong for the ruler not to share music (or p
leasure) with his people: “爲民上而不與民同樂者, 亦非也.” Mengzi 1B:4. 
55 “予豈若是小丈夫然哉? 諫於其君而不受, 則怒, 悻悻然見於其面, 去則窮日之力而後宿哉?” 
Mengzi 2B:12. 
56 “或問乎曾西曰: ‘吾子與子路孰賢?’ 曾西蹴然曰: ‘吾先子之所畏也.’ 曰: ‘然則吾子與管仲孰賢?’ 
曾西艴然不悅, 曰: ‘爾何曾比予於管仲? 管仲得君如彼其專也, 行乎國政如彼其久也, 功烈如彼其卑
也. 爾何曾比予於是.?’” Mengzi 2A:1. A further discussion of this passage can be found in Section 4.2.2.2 
above. 
57 “Mengzi said to King Xuān of Qí, ‘Suppose that a subject of your majesty’s went on a trip to Chǔ having 
entrusted his wife and children to his friend, but when he came back, [he found out that his friend] left his 
wife and children in cold and hunger. What shall he do about this?’ The king said, ‘Break up with that 
friend.’ [Mengzi] said, ‘If the chief criminal judge cannot regulate his subordinates, what shall be done 
about it?’ The king said, ‘Dismiss him.’ [Mengzi] said, ‘If the inside of [your] four borders are not governed 
[well], what shall be done?’ The king looked around and changed the topic.” “孟子謂齊宣王曰: ‘王之臣有
託其妻子於其友而之楚遊者, 比其反也, 則凍餒其妻子, 則如之何?’ 王曰: ‘棄之.’ 曰: ‘士師不能治
士, 則如之何?’ 王曰: ‘已之.’ 曰: ‘四境之內不治, 則如之何?’ 王顧左右而言他.” Mengzi 1B:6. 
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discussed above; he is more likely to have considered all of them as expressions of their 
corresponding emotional construal. Then, what would Mengzi think the implications of 
these involuntary reactions are in one’s emotional life? 
Mengzi does not say much about this topic, but we can speculate on a clue found 
again in Mengzi 3A:5: Commenting on the sweating of the person who happened to see 
wild animals devouring his parents’ bodies in a ditch, Mengzi makes it clear that that 
person’s sweat was not to show to others. In other words, that person did not sweat 
because he was afraid of other people’s criticism for his inhumanity, for dumping dead 
parents was an accepted custom of that time. That person’s sweat and squinting behavior 
must have rather come from the sudden and unexpected realization, against his 
contemporaries’ as well as his own belief, that he has done something heinous to his 
parents and he should do something about it. Mengzi’s saying that “burying them is 
correct indeed”58 also implies that this was the way the person now started to see the 
bodies of his parents in a ditch, and it is possible for Mengzi to think that there is a close 
relationship between one’s physiological or behavioral responses in a certain situation 
and the way things look to one in that situation. That is, the physiological and behavioral 
responses the man had at the sight of his parents’ corpses originally came from his 
sudden realization that he harmed his parents greatly, but his awareness of his own 
spontaneous responses might have in turn made the way things started to look to him now 
more convincing. Moreover, if other people had been observing his spontaneous 
responses and his consequent action of burying his parents, they might have suspected 
that his action was motivated by something deeper and more powerful than the widely 
accepted parents-dumping custom and the evaluative belief behind it, namely that it is all 
right to abandon one’s parents once they have passed away. 
 
4.3.1.2 The Construal View of Emotion 
 
When discussing Mengzi 2A:6 in the previous section, I have pointed out that Mengzi’s 
first sprout consists of two parts: spontaneous reactions of alarm and surprise (chùtì 怵惕) 
and some sort of painful feeling (cèyǐn 惻隱) at the sight of the baby falling into a well. 
                                                 
58 “掩之誠是也.” Mengzi 3A:5. 
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Against Kwong-loi Shun and some traditional Chinese commentators on Mengzi who 
emphasize the spontaneity of alarm and surprise as the locus of one’s altruistic motive, I 
argued that the motivational purity of cèyǐn zhī xīn comes from the painful feeling at the 
sight of the endangered baby, and I proposed to interpret this painful feeling as primarily 
one’s construal of the situation in question that the welfare of an innocent being is 
threatened. I also argued that since this construal is based on one’s caring for the welfare 
of the baby, one’s feeling of unbearableness should be interpreted as one’s finding it hard 
to let the baby drown in the well rather than one’s vicarious feeling of pain and fear that 
the drowning baby is anticipating. I suggested a similar view for interpreting Mengzi 
3A:5: I proposed that the feeling of unbearableness at the sight of one’s parents’ bodies 
eaten by wild animals is mainly one’s construal that those wild animals are harming one’s 
parents, and that this construal is in turn based on one’s love for parents. 
My view of cèyǐn zhī xīn as a concern-based construal relies on Robert Roberts’s 
theory of emotions, which I think is closest to Mengzi’s implicit theory of emotions and 
therefore the best tool for explaining Mengzi’s view of emotions. Roberts summarizes his 
theory of emotions as follows: 
 
A construal, as I use the word, is a mental event or state in which one thing is grasped in 
terms of something else. The “in terms of” relation can have as its terms any of the 
following: A perception, a thought, an image, a concept….Most of our experiences, as 
well as most of our unconscious states of mind, are a hard-to-specify structure of percept, 
concept, image, and thought. All such synthetic crossings of percepts, images, thoughts, 
and concepts are construals; only some of these, however, are emotions. My formula is 
that emotions are concern-based construals or…serious concern-based construals or, to 
speak more precisely but less well, verisimilar concernful construals—that is, construals 
imbued, flavored, colored, drenched, suffused, laden, informed, or permeated with 
concern and possessing a certain verisimilitude. By “verisimilar” I mean to say that the 
construal has, for the construer, the appearance of truth, whether or not she would affirm 
the truth of the construal.59
 
Three terms are important in this quotation: (1) construal, (2) concern, and (3) 
verisimilitude. First, Roberts explains emotional construal partly by comparing it to 
Wittgenstein’s seeing a duck-rabbit picture either as duck or as rabbit. According to 
Roberts, seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck is not simply knowing or judging that it can be 
                                                 
59 Roberts, “What an Emotion Is,” pp. 190–191. Emphasis is original. 
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seen as a duck, but construing the picture as one of a duck. It reveals that construing 
involves dwelling on or attending to some aspect of the object in question, namely the 
“duckiness of the duck-rabbit” so to speak, and this in turn means that construing is 
“bringing some perceived paradigm, or some concept or image or thought, to bear.”60 
This idea applies well to the three instances of cèyǐn zhī xīn discussed above: One goes to 
the rescue of the baby falling into a well thinking that it is unbearable for an innocent 
being to be harmed (Mengzi 2A:6); King Xuān saves the ox because he saw the image of 
an innocent man to be killed (Mengzi 1A:7) in the fearful ox; and one prevents wild 
animals from reaching the corpses of his parents by burying them, perhaps because he 
sees his deceased parents as if still alive (Mengzi 3A:5). 
Second, though, construing a situation in a particular way is not sufficient to 
become an emotion until it is combined with a concern for the object or the subject of a 
related emotion. For example, seeing a baby about to fall into a well as an innocent being 
encountering a danger due to nothing of his fault is compatible not only with sympathy 
but also with cruel sadism,61 and it is one’s concern for the welfare of the baby that 
makes one feel sympathy instead of joy or excitement at the sight of the baby crawling 
toward the well. Similarly, feeling guilty is not merely construing oneself as culpable; the 
feeling of guilt comes from one’s having “a concern about being in the condition [of guilt] 
one construes oneself to be in”,62 and the concern here can be a number of things ranging 
from a desire to stay free of blame or an aversion to violating other people’s rights. 
Roberts suggests that this “concern” can denote “desires and aversions, and the 
attachments and interests from which many of our desires and aversions derive”;63 these 
concerns can be instinctive or learned, general or specific, ultimate or derivative, and 
dispositional or occurrent, and all these categories of concerns except for dispositional 
ones can ground emotions.64
                                                 
60 Ibid., p. 187. 
61 I owe this point to Darwall, “Empathy,” p. 261. 
62 Roberts, “What an Emotion Is,” p. 188. 
63 Ibid., p. 202.  
64 Ibid. Among these concerns, Roberts specifies love and revulsion or disgust as two typical kinds of 
concern. He says as follows on love: “[I]f we mean [by “love”] the kind of attachment that lovers have for 
one another, and parents for their children and children for their parents, and good friends for one another, 
love is not an emotion. The responses characteristic of such attachment are too various and conflicting for it 
to be an emotion. They can be joy when the beloved is flourishing, indignation when she is insulted, 
gratitude when she is benefited, fear when she is threatened, hope when her prospects are good, grief when 
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Third, emotions as concern-based construals have a compelling degree of 
verisimilitude or the appearance of truth. According to Roberts, this is partly because 
emotions share a propositional content with beliefs, and the seriousness of this 
propositional content of an emotion is often confused with the truth-asserting character of 
a belief. For example, a person B who is angry at A usually believes that A has culpably 
offended, but sometimes B can be angry at A while thinking that his anger does not make 
any sense. In such a case B does not believe that A has wronged him, but as long as he is 
angry at A, he is still compelled to see A as if having culpably offended.65 According to 
Roberts, A’s appearing to be culpable to B is more like an optical illusion by which B is 
not taken in than like an affirmation B would make about how things are,66 and this 
seriousness of construal is a crucial characteristic of emotions. 
It seems that besides cèyǐn zhī xīn, respect and the feeling of shame and disgust—
Mengzi’s second and third sprout—can also be explained in terms of this construal view 
of emotion. In the following section, I show that respect is a concern-based construal of 
another person as deserving one’s respect due to his social status or merit, and also 
discuss how this view of respect works better than the so-called “inclinational” or 
“dispositional” explanations of respect proposed by David S. Nivison and Donald J. 
Munro. Specifically, in Section 4.3.2.1 below I introduce and examine Nivison’s 
interpretation of Mengzi 6A:5, and argue that one’s respect for an admirable person is a 
distinct psychological entity from one’s desire for respectful action. In Section 4.3.2.2, I 
introduce Munro’s thesis that respect is a behavioral disposition to act respectfully, and 
argue that respect in Mengzi is not merely a behavioral tendency but an emotional 
sensibility responding to a person’s social status or merit that makes that person 
respectable. And finally in Section 4.3.2.3, I show that the view of respect as a kind of 
emotional sensibility is highly compatible with the view of respect as a concern-based 
construal. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
she dies, and much more. Love in this sense is not an emotion, but a disposition to a range of emotions. 
Which emotion occurs is a function of how the beloved is construed.” (Ibid., p. 203) Note that this view of 
love coincides to be exactly the same as Rawls’s view of love as a natural attitude, which I introduced in 
Chapter 2 above to explain the relationship between hàowù (desire and aversion or liking and disliking) and 
particular emotions in the Analects and other early Chinese texts. 
65 Ibid., p. 201. 
66 Ibid., p. 196. 
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4.3.2 Respect, Desire, and Behavioral Disposition 
 
4.3.2.1 Desire and Respect 
 
In Mengzi 6A:5, Mèngjìzǐ 孟季子, a disciple of Gàozǐ, and Gōngdūzǐ 公都子, a disciple 
of Mengzi, dispute whether yì 義 (the virtue of righteousness or the right act) is internal 
or external. As has been mentioned in Mengzi 6A:6 above, Gaozi was Mengzi’s 
theoretical rival who argued that human nature is neither good nor bad originally, and 
morality (yì 義) is imposed upon human beings from the outside. On the other hand, we 
have seen Mengzi arguing that human nature is good; he thinks that humans are born 
with the four moral sprouts that can develop into four cardinal virtues, and in this sense 
the virtue of righteousness, or the capacity to enact what is right, is inherent in every 
human being. Now, treating elders respectfully is considered as a right thing to do, and 
Mèngjìzǐ and Gōngdūzǐ disagree about what makes one treat elders respectfully and 
whether the thing that causes a respectful act is internal (i.e. part of human nature) or 
external (i.e. imposed upon human nature from the outside). The passage starts as follows: 
 
Mèngjìzǐ asked Gōngdūzǐ, “Why do you say that morality is internal?” [Gōngdūzǐ] said, 
“I enact my respect, so I say it’s internal.” “If a villager is a year older than your eldest 
brother, whom do you respect?” [Gōngdūzǐ] said, “I respect my eldest brother.” “When 
you serve wine, whom [do you serve] first?” [Gōngdūzǐ] said, “I serve the villager first.” 
“The one to respect is here, and the one to treat as elder is there. [This shows that 
morality] is obviously on the outside, not from the inside.”67
 
Gōngdūzǐ’s act of serving wine to the villager first at a village ceremony is a right act 
prescribed by morality or social norms, but as Mèngjìzǐ points out, what makes him do so 
is not his feeling of respect for his brother, but the fact that the villager is older than 
Gōngdūzǐ’s brother and the social consensus that that fact makes the villager deserve 
being served first. Gōngdūzǐ fails to handle this attack properly, and tells Mengzi what 
happened. So, now in the rest of the passage, we have Mengzi coaching his disciple about 
how to win the second round of the battle: 
                                                 
67 “孟季子問公都子曰: ‘何以謂義內也?’ 曰: ‘行吾敬, 故謂之內也.’ ‘鄕人長於伯兄一歲, 則誰敬?’ 
曰: ‘敬兄.’ ‘酌則誰先?’ 曰: ‘先酌鄕人.’ ‘所敬在此, 所長在彼, 果在外, 非由內也.’” Mengzi 6A:5. 
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Mengzi said, “[If you ask him] whether he respects his uncle or his younger brother, he 
will say, ‘I respect my uncle.’ [Then you] say, ‘If your brother is an impersonator (of an 
ancestor at a sacrificial ceremony), whom do you respect?’ He will say, ‘I respect my 
brother.’ [Then] you say, ‘Where is your respecting of your uncle?’ He will say, ‘It is 
because [my brother] is in a [special] position.’ [Then] you also say, ‘It was [also] 
because [the villager] was in a [special] position. [My] ordinary respect is for my elder 
brother, but [my] temporary respect was for the villager.’” [Mèng]jìzǐ, having heard this, 
said, “[When having to] respect one’s uncle, one respects [one’s uncle]; [when having to] 
respect one’s brother, one respects [one’s brother]. [This shows that morality] is obviously 
on the outside, not from the inside.” Gōngdūzǐ said, “[One] drinks hot water in winter, 
and drinks cool water in summer. Then are drinking and eating also on the outside?”68
 
Mèngjìzǐ’s point here again is that morality should be considered to be external, because 
the right person to respect in a certain situation is determined by considering the most 
relevant factor of that situation—for example, who the eldest person is when serving 
wine at a village ceremony, or who the impersonator of an ancestor is at a sacrifice. 
However, this time Gōngdūzǐ argues back by saying that drinking hot water in winter and 
drinking cool water in summer does not make one’s drinking activity fully external, i.e. 
depending on the external condition of the weather that makes hot water preferable in 
winter and cool water preferable in summer. In other words, Gōngdūzǐ seems to think that 
what is more important about the act of drinking water is that it quenches one’s thirst, not 
the fact that one had better drink hot water in winter and cool water in summer. Moreover, 
by comparing the act of drinking water to the act of respecting people, he also seems to 
imply that what is more important about respecting people is one’s inner feeling of 
respect for them rather than how one’s respect is expressed toward them.  
Now, instead of participating in this debate myself and trying to decide whose 
view is right, I would like to focus on Gōngdūzǐ’s analogy between drinking water and 
respecting people, and think about what is really meant by this analogy. For as I said 
earlier, this passage, especially this analogy, seems to be interpreted to support the view 
that Mengzi’s four sprouts are some sort of inclination or disposition to do four types of 
ethical behaviors. For example, David S. Nivison interprets this passage as follows: 
                                                 
68 “孟子曰: ‘“敬叔父乎? 敬弟乎?” 彼將曰, “敬叔父.” 曰, “弟爲尸, 則誰敬?” 彼將曰, “敬弟.” 子
曰, “惡在其敬叔父也?” 彼將曰, “在位故也.” 子亦曰, “在位故也. 庸敬在兄, 斯須之敬在鄕人.” 季
子聞之, 曰: ‘敬叔父則敬, 敬弟則敬, 果在外, 非由內也.’ 公都子曰: ‘冬日則飮湯, 夏日則飮水, 然
則飮食亦在外也?’” Ibid. 
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[T]he Mencius party looks at the dispositional cause, and the Gaozi party looks at the 
occasional cause: The latter insists that the disposition (“inside”) counts only if it makes 
a difference in different situations; if it does not, then it must be that the occasion 
(“outside”), involving what is socially required, is the significant factor….[On the other 
hand, the former insists that] though how we satisfy the “inner” disposition of thirst is 
determined by the (specious) occasion, winter vs. summer, satisfying it in some way is 
demanded by my being thirsty. Similarly with respect (Mencius hopes): the objects may 
differ in different situations, but respect is shown anyway, because I feel respectful.69
 
In this remark, Nivison clearly takes Gōngdūzǐ to think that respect, Mengzi’s third 
sprout, is similar in kind to thirst. As Nivison sees it, Gōngdūzǐ thinks that just as thirst is 
one’s inner disposition to drink something to satisfy one’s thirst, respect is basically one’s 
inner disposition to respect those who deserve one’s respect. One might need to drink hot 
water when cold and cool water when hot to satisfy one’s thirst better, but the act of 
drinking itself is demanded by one’s thirst, the inner disposition, or even desire, to drink 
something good for one’s thirst. Likewise, one might need to shift one’s respect from 
one’s uncle to one’s younger brother as the changing circumstances require, but one’s 
respectful act is primarily the expression of one’s inner desire to act respectfully when the 
situation requires. 
However, if Nivison is right in saying that Gōngdūzǐ’s metaphor of drinking water 
implies the view of respect as a kind of desire, this analogy between thirst and respect 
should be rejected as a mistake that does not fit Mengzi’s general picture of the 
relationship between the four sprouts and one’s proper attitudes of hàowù 好惡. For as I 
will argue below, what befits the metaphor of thirst well in Mengzi’s thought is not the 
four sprouts but hào 好 or yù 欲, one’s affective attitude of liking or long-term desire 
for what one finds good. In addition, as an alternative interpretation to Nivison’s, it is 
possible that Gōngdūzǐ’s metaphor of drinking water is not to view respect as a kind of 
desire but merely to point out that respect, which I will argue below to be some sort of 
emotional sensibility responsive to another person’s dignity or merit, always involves a 
                                                 
69 David S. Nivison, “Problems in the Mengzi: 6A3–5,” in The Ways of Confucianism, p. 165; emphasis is 
original. The omitted part is Nivison’s personal comment on this debate: “But of course, any instance of yi 
behavior needs both an adequate disposition (“inside”) and an appropriate occasion (“outside”). The 
Mencius party, insisting on the priority of the former, and the Gaozi party, insisting on the priority of the 
latter, are both begging the question whether yi is “inside” or “outside.”” For my current purpose of 
analyzing Gōngdūzǐ’s analogy between drinking and respecting, I do not need to defend either of the 
positions presented in this debate, and consequently I omitted this part to avoid any unnecessary confusion. 
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disposition to act respectfully toward the person in question. In order to prove this point, 
in the following I first take a closer look at Mengzi’s view of desire (hào 好 or yù 欲) 
by discussing two passages from the Mengzi, and then resume my discussion of Mengzi 
6A:5 and show how one’s respect cannot be identified with any desiderative elements 
that might well be still closely related to one’s respect. 
Then, let us first look at the following passage, where Mengzi compares sensory 
desires and one’s desire for morality: 
 
There are some among flavors that mouths commonly like. Yì Yá 易牙 was the first to 
discover what our mouths like. If it were the case that the natures of mouths regarding 
flavors varied among people—just as dogs and horses are different species from us—then 
why is it that throughout the world all likings follow Yì Yá in flavors? The fact that, when 
it comes to flavors, the whole world looks to Yì Yá is due to the fact that mouths 
throughout the world are similar. Ears are like this too….Eyes are like this too….Hence, I 
say that there are some among flavors that mouths commonly like, there are some among 
sounds that ears commonly [like to] listen to, there are some among colors that eyes 
commonly regard to be beautiful. When it comes to minds, would they alone have nothing 
to approve in common? What is it that minds approve in common? They are principles 
and righteousness. Sages are no other than those who first found what our minds 
commonly approve. So, it is just as the meat of grass-fed or grain-fed animals delight our 
mouths that principles and righteousness delight our minds.70
 
In this passage, Mengzi says that the delight one feels at the satisfaction of her sensory 
desires is similar to the delight one feels at the satisfaction of her moral desires. 
According to him, just as people’s palates normally find the foods made by a great cook 
preferable to those made by mediocre ones, people’s minds normally find acts that are in 
accordance with principles and righteousness preferable to those that are against 
principles and righteousness. The character used in the Mengzi for people’s liking of good 
food is “shì” 耆 (same as 嗜 “like”), and he also says that the meat of grass-fed or 
grain-fed animals delights (yuè 悅) people’s mouths. On the other hand, while Mengzi 
also uses “yuè” 悅 for people’s delight at principles and righteousness, he uses the word 
                                                 
70 “口之於味, 有同耆也, 易牙先得我口之所耆者也. 如使口之於味也, 其性與人殊, 若犬馬之與我
不同類也, 則天下何耆皆從易牙之於味也? 至於味, 天下期於易牙, 是天下之口相似也. 惟耳亦然….
惟目亦然….故曰, 口之於味也, 有同耆焉; 耳之於聲也, 有同聽焉; 目之於色也, 有同美焉. 至於心,
 獨無所同然乎? 心之所同然者何也? 謂理也, 義也. 聖人先得我心之所同然耳. 故理義之悅我心, 
猶芻豢之悅我口.” Mengzi 6A:7. 
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“rán” 然 for the common attitude people take about principles and righteousness. 
Nivison seems to take “rán” as an adjective meaning “so” and renders the phrase “xīn zhī 
suǒ tóngrán” 心之所同然 as “the way in which our hearts are alike,” providing Zhū 
Xī’s 朱熹 alternative reading of the character as a verb meaning “to approve” (kě 可), 
which renders the same phrase as “what all hearts (or minds in my translation) alike 
approve.”71 However, as Kwong-loi Shun points out, there is a parallelism between 
“tóngshì” 同耆, “tóngtīng” 同聽, “tóngměi” 同美, and “tóngrán” 同然, and this makes 
it likely that “rán” 然 is also used here as a verb referring to a special function of the 
mind. 72  Moreover, translating “rán” as “to approve” following Zhū Xī reveals an 
important philosophical point of the passage: Just as the meat of grass-fed or grain-fed 
animals delights (yuè 悅) people’s mouths because people enjoy (shì 耆) it, principles 
and righteousness delight people’s minds because people approve (rán 然) them. 
This point might remind the reader of my suggestion in Chapter 2 above (Section 
2.2.2.1) that one’s liking (hào 好) and disliking (wù 惡) in the Analects are directed at 
what one finds good (hǎo 好) or bad (è 惡), and that these emotional attitudes involve 
one’s evaluative thoughts of what is valuable or what is more valuable than other things. 
Now, Mengzi also seems to think in a similar way, because in the current passage he says 
that the sense organs and the mind are alike in appreciating the relative value of their 
respective objects and taking pleasure in relishing or contemplating what they find good. 
In addition, I have also pointed out in Chapter 2 that there can be some complex cases 
where the demand of morality conflicts with some important non-moral values, and I 
submitted that Kongzi’s solution to this problem was the view that the nobleman’s 
emotional attitudes of hàowù 好惡, which always give priority to morality over other 
non-moral values, provide the affective standard that the other members of the society 
should follow. This point raises an interesting issue of comparing values of things not 
only within a category of the same kind but across categories, and in the following 
passage Mengzi provides some interesting ideas: 
 
                                                 
71 David S. Nivison, “On Translating Mencius,” in The Ways of Confucianism, p. 184. 
72 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, p. 137. 
 179
Fish is something I want, and bear’s paw is also something I want. But if I cannot have 
both, I forsake fish and choose bear’s paw. Life is something I desire, and honor is also 
something I desire. But if I cannot have both, I forsake life and choose honor. Life is what 
I want, but there is something that I want more than life, so I do not do anything to get it 
[i.e. life]. Death is what I hate, but there is something that I hate more than death, so 
there are some troubles that I do not avoid. If there were nothing that people desire more 
than life, why do they [sometimes] not use those means that could save their life? If there 
were nothing that people hate more than death, why do they [sometimes] not do what 
could let them avoid troubles? [But] there are [definitely] things that people can use and 
save their lives but do not do so, and there are things that people can use and avoid 
troubles but do not do so. Therefore, [it is clear that] there are things that people desire 
more than life, and there are things that people hate more than death. It is not that only 
the worthy person has this heart; everyone has it, but [only] the worthy person is able to 
not lose it.73
 
In this passage, we see it more clearly that one’s sensory desire can involve a calculation 
of the relative value of things, and one desires what one finds of more value more than 
what one finds of less value. However, the passage also shows that one can desire things 
across categories at the same time, and sometimes the situation can be such that those 
objects of one’s now generic desire compete with each other and demand one to choose 
one of them at the expense of the others. For example, life is among the primary objects 
of people’s desire, and death is among the things that people dislike most. However, 
given that honor is also an extremely important thing for human beings as it was for 
Mengzi and his contemporaries, people from time to time face the situation where they 
can save their life by sacrificing their honor and vice versa, but not save both. In such a 
situation, Mengzi’s ideal agent would always choose honor over life, and Mengzi even 
argues that this is the way human beings originally, and also normally, feel. The only 
difference between Mengzi’s ideal agent—the worthy person or the nobleman—and the 
ordinary people is that the former keeps this feeling and constantly nourishes it, whereas 
the latter does not.  
Now, the first point that I would like to make concerning Mengzi’s conception of 
desire (hào 好 or yù 欲) to highlight the special character of respect is that one’s desire, 
                                                 
73 “魚, 我所欲也, 熊掌亦我所欲也. 二者不可得兼, 舍魚而取熊掌者也. 生亦我所欲也, 義亦我所欲
也. 二者不可得兼, 舍生而取義者也. 生亦我所欲, 所欲有甚於生者, 故不爲苟得也. 死亦我所惡, 
所惡有甚於死者, 故患有所不辟也. 如使人之所欲莫甚於生, 則凡可以得生者, 何不用也? 使人之所
惡莫甚於死者, 則凡可以辟患者, 何不爲也? 由是則生而有不用也, 由是則可以辟患而有不爲也. 是
故所欲有甚於生者, 所惡有甚於死者. 非獨賢者有是心也; 人皆有之, 賢者能勿喪耳.” Mengzi 6A:10. 
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whether it is towards material things or the proper way of dealing with those material 
things, always involves 1) the evaluative belief about the goodness or desirability of its 
intentional object and 2) the wish that that object should come into one’s possession or 
continue to be in one’s possession. In contrast, the feeling of respect for elders or those 
who are respectable otherwise involves a different kind of evaluative belief (and attitude), 
and therefore respect is not a kind of desire or inclination toward its intentional object as 
hào 好 or yù 欲 is. Based on the similarity between respect and the other three sprouts 
(or at least compassion and the feeling of shame and disgust) in nature, this difference 
between desire and respect applies also to the case of the other sprouts, and it gives us a 
good reason to think that Mengzi’s four sprouts are a special kind of emotions but are not 
desires themselves. 
To illustrate this point, I would like to go back to Mengzi 6A:5 introduced above 
(see especially footnote 68) and further discuss Mengzi’s remark there. According to him, 
one is usually supposed to respect one’s uncle rather than one’s younger brother, 
apparently because the former is older and the latter is younger than oneself. However, on 
a special occasion where one’s younger brother performs the role of the impersonator of a 
dead ancestor at a sacrificial ceremony, one is supposed to respect one’s younger brother 
more than one’s uncle because one’s younger brother is considered as one’s ancestor at 
the moment. Mèngjìzǐ takes this point to support Gàozǐ’s doctrine that righteousness is 
external (yì wài 義外), but it is not clear whether Mengzi would have granted it. For 
Mengzi’s view that righteousness is somehow inherent in human beings may very well 
take this seemingly external factor about respect into its theoretical scheme. That is, 
Mengzi can be interpreted to hold that respect is essentially an emotional capacity 
inherent in everyone that enables one to focus on the respect-invoking features of the 
situation and respond to them appropriately.  
Interpreted this way, respect in Mengzi can remain significantly internal without 
being forced to downplay the role the salient features of the “external” situations play in 
one’s emotional life. Moreover, respect viewed this way distinguishes itself clearly from 
desire: Whereas one’s desire, say, for a good food is one’s wish that one had that food 
accompanied by one’s evaluative belief that this food is good, one’s respect for an elderly 
man in the village involves one’s evaluative belief that this man deserves respect, which 
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is also one’s evaluative attitude about the elderly man, expressed by one’s treating him 
respectfully. In other words, the kind of value that one’s desire finds in its intentional 
object—goodness or desirability—is different from that found by respect—the quality of 
deserving respect, and this shows that respect is a different kind of emotion from desire. 
The second point about Mengzi’s conception of desire that would also show the 
difference between desire and respect is that one’s desire can take righteousness or a right 
action (yì 義) as its intentional object. As we have seen in Mengzi 6A:7 (footnote 70) and 
6A:10 (footnote 73) quoted above, Mengzi says that one can have a long-term desire for 
righteousness and feel pleasant approbation when she contemplates righteousness 
expressed in one’s or another person’s character or action. In addition, we have seen in 
Mengzi 6A:5 (footnotes 67 and 68) that Mèngjìzǐ and Gōngdūzǐ discuss respecting people 
as an example of a right action, and this means that both Mèngjìzǐ and Gōngdūzǐ consider 
respect as a constituent or a subcategory of righteousness. Now, by combining these 
points we see that one can want to be a respectful person in appropriate situations and 
feel pleasant approbation contemplating one’s or another person’s respectful character 
expressed by appropriate actions, and this again shows that one’s moral desire, which 
takes the feeling of respect and respectful acts as its intentional objects, cannot be 
identified with respect. 
 
4.3.2.2 Respect and Behavioral Disposition 
 
So far, I have argued that respect in Mengzi is not a kind of desire but emotion conceived 
in a narrow sense, and my argument was based on the assumption that Nivison interprets 
Gōngdūzǐ’s last remark in Mengzi 6A:5 to be an analogy between respect and thirst, 
which is a typical desire. Nivison talks about acting with respect in Mengzi as if it were 
similar to satisfying one’s thirst, and for this reason, my assumption that Nivison takes 
Gōngdūzǐ to consider respect as a kind of desire is warranted. However, Gōngdūzǐ 
actually never mentions thirst in his remark; he only talks about the activity of drinking 
hot water in winter and drinking cool water in summer. As I see it, this implies the 
possibility that Gōngdūzǐ was basing the thesis of internality of morality not on the 
similarity between respect and desire but on the close relationship between respect and 
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one’s behavioral disposition to act respectfully. 74  Nivison actually uses the word 
“disposition” three times (including the adjective “dispositional”) in his short remark 
cited above (footnote 69), and I suspect that he was inclined to use “disposition” in the 
place of “desire” because he, as one of the most perceptive readers of the Mengzi, saw the 
connection between respect and the behavioral disposition to act with respect. However, 
Nivison does not elaborate this point, and it may well have been overshadowed by his 
alternative reading that Gōngdūzǐ considered respect as a kind of desire. In this section I 
consider this second possibility, and argue that although respect certainly involves a 
behavioral tendency to act respectfully, respect is not itself a kind of behavioral tendency 
or disposition. 
In his influential book The Concept of Man in Early China, Munro introduces 
“constancy” as a convenient term for referring to regularly appearing actions or acts in an 
organism. According to him, eating is a constant in every human being and growing 
leaves is a constant of trees, and such “constants” of an organism partly constitute the 
nature (xìng 性) of that organism.75  In addition, Munro distinguishes between the 
constancies human beings share with other animals or plants and those unique to humans, 
and says that respect or “showing honor to the aged” is one of such uniquely human 
constancies.76 Furthermore, Munro proposes that those constancies designate not only 
acts but also behavioral tendencies toward such acts: 
 
[I]n the ancient Chinese texts words indicating constant acts were sometimes preceded by 
terms expressing desire or ability—e.g., man “desires to eat,” a tree “can grow leaves.” 
Use of a term like “desire” was largely a way of indicating potentiality or behavioral 
tendency, of showing that if the individual in question were unimpeded he would 
repeatedly perform the action or type of action.…Therefore, in a secondary sense, I will 
use “constancy” to mean the potentiality for repeated action, action that will emerge if 
conditions permit.77
 
                                                 
74 One might object that there is no real distinction between desire and behavioral disposition here, because 
one’s desire can be a desire to act in a certain way, and this desire would be nothing but a behavioral 
disposition. However, Mengzi’s concept of desire that I discussed in the previous section is in a much 
narrower sense, which involves some sort of conscious appraisal of the object of one’s desire. This kind of 
desire can take respect or even one’s behavioral tendency to act respectfully as its intentional object, and is 
not identical with a desire to act in a certain way as we casually say. 
75 Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China, p. 67. 
76 Ibid., pp. 68–70. 
77 Ibid., p. 67. 
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And he further comments on the distinctively human constancies: 
 
[T]hese phenomena were described sometimes as overt activities, sometimes as 
tendencies. They were among the constants characterizing human “life”; but like all 
constants, their existence was chiefly potential, since, although they were practiced 
regularly, they were not continually being performed. A constant action distinctive in the 
life of man, such as “showing honor to the aged,” was rooted in a permanent tendency, 
the “font” (tuan [端]) of reverence and respect. When a man gave honor to another, he 
could say, “I implement my tendency of reverence” (hsing wu ching [行吾敬]).78
 
That is, Munro thinks that respect, as a uniquely human constancy, does not only refer to 
respectful acts but more often to one’s tendency to do such acts, and his conception of 
desire is indistinguishable from the concept of behavioral tendency or disposition. 
Moreover, according to Munro, there is an important distinction between 
Mengzi’s first and third sprout (“commiseration” and “respect”) and his second and 
fourth sprout (“shame and dislike” and the “sense of right and wrong”): 
 
“Mind” in the first two cases denoted potentiality or behavioral tendency, since 
commiseration and respect both emerge in behavioral forms....But the other two “minds” 
denoted purely covert evaluative activity. “Shame and dislike” (the third mind)79 are 
associated with i [yì 義], the innate moral sense—that is, the sense of what is proper and 
improper, together with the feeling of an obligation to act accordingly. As for the roots of 
this innate moral sense, “dislike” suggests an innate sense of repugnance at some acts, 
and “shame” suggests the feelings (considered to be universal) that follow transgressions. 
Mencius spoke of i as man’s straight path, meaning that obedience to its judgments keeps 
a person from abandoning the moral way. The fourth mind, the “sense of right and 
wrong” (shih-fei-chih-hsin [shìfēi zhī xīn 是非之心]), manifests itself as “knowledge” 
(chih [zhī 知]).80
 
In this remark, Munro seems to think that Mengzi’s first and third sprout, compassion and 
respect, are simply behavioral tendencies without containing any elements of evaluative 
judgment. What judges whether one’s behavioral tendency of compassion or respect is 
appropriate or not in a certain situation is the function of the other two sprouts, “shame 
and dislike” and the “sense of right and wrong” in Munro’s terms. He continues: 
                                                 
78 Ibid., p. 70. 
79 The second sprout in Mengzi’s original order. For example, see Mengzi 2A:6 and 6A:6. 
80 Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China, p. 75. 
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[T]hese two types of activity, the covert evaluative and the overt social, go hand in hand, 
inasmuch as the evaluations of the mind are necessary to guide the social behavior 
(commiseration and respectfulness) in specific manifestations. The evaluating mind 
determines what response is right for a particular situation, and when the behavior 
actually occurs, humanheartedness [rén 仁] and good form [lǐ 禮] are realized. Thus it 
is that one often finds in the texts phrases combining the terms for the overt social 
behavior and the covert evaluative sense—jen-i [rényì 仁義] and li-i [lǐyì 禮義], for 
example. “Morality” requires the innate social tendencies to be guided by the 
discriminations of the evaluating mind.81
 
According to this view, respect is simply a behavioral tendency to act deferentially to the 
aged, and nothing guarantees that one’s deference to an elderly person is a correct action 
in a certain situation unless it is combined with one’s “evaluation” of the situation. As 
Munro sees it, it is one’s evaluating mind that examines the situation in question and 
guides one’s behavioral tendency so that it is expressed as an appropriate action in the 
situation, and it is not that one’s deference is either ethically right or wrong in itself. 
One’s social tendencies such as commiseration and respect are different from ordinary 
biological drives in that they always require the function of the evaluating mind,82 but 
commiseration and respect are not different from the animal biological drives in that they 
are also natural urges to achieve the goals that are naturally encoded in them—helping 
out people in need and respecting the elders. To reiterate, the question of whether one’s 
commiseration and respect are right or wrong can be raised only in terms of whether it is 
appropriate for one to implement one’s tendency of commiseration or respect in a certain 
situation, and to what degree and in which manner one is supposed to do so. However, it 
is illegitimate to ask whether one should react compassionately or respectfully in a 
certain situation, as much as it is wrong to ask whether one should feel hungry when he 
has not eaten anything for days. 
However, this seems to be a wrong view of respect (and compassion) to ascribe to 
Mengzi at least for two reasons. First, this view postulates only one generic motive for a 
person’s respectful act, namely one’s tendency to behave respectfully, but this view 
conflicts with the fact that there are a variety of possible motives for one’s deferential 
                                                 
81 Ibid., p. 76. 
82 Ibid. 
 185
behavior, and respect is only one of them. Let me explain this point further by discussing 
the following passage: 
 
Mengzi had an audience with King Xiāng of Liáng 梁. Having come out [of the king’s 
place], Mengzi told someone, “When I looked at him from afar, he didn’t look like a ruler; 
when I drew near to him, I didn’t see anything to be afraid of….”83
 
“To be afraid of” here is the translation of “wèi” 畏. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, wèi 畏 in this passage is not the kind of fear that one feels at a directly 
threatening thing, but the feeling of awe or reverence that corresponds to the dignity of a 
royal person. Now, Mengzi’s remark just quoted should be interpreted to mean that the 
king of Liáng did not look like a ruler at all and did not have any royal dignity that would 
raise a feeling of respect and awe in Mengzi’s heart, rather than that Mengzi had an 
innate tendency to act deferentially toward a ruler but this tendency of Mengzi’s was 
frustrated due to the king’s lack of royal dignity. Although we cannot tell by looking at 
the passage, it goes without saying that Mengzi showed his deference to King Xiāng 
properly as the social norms and etiquette of his time prescribed, but Mengzi clearly did 
not do so with sincere respect for the king. On the contrary, as Mengzi makes it clear, 
Mengzi’s deference to the king lacked sincere respect that the king did not deserve; his 
deference to the king was not motivated by his respect for the king, but his desire to 
conform to the social norms governing the proper manner of addressing one’s ruler. This 
shows that one’s respectful behavior does not have to be always grounded in one’s 
respect, and this is good proof that respect in its full sense (i.e. not merely at the 
behavioral level) is not the behavioral tendency to act respectfully, if there were any such 
a generic, mysterious tendency in human beings.  
Second, Munro’s view of respect (and compassion) as a behavioral tendency 
cannot accommodate the full conception of action that we can find in Mengzi’s thought. 
According to Munro, one’s respect and compassion denote one’s deferential and 
compassionate behaviors towards others as well as one’s tendencies or dispositions to do 
such behaviors, and it is only when these behaviors are regulated by “evaluating mind” 
                                                 
83 “孟子見梁襄王, 出, 語人曰: ‘望之不似人君, 就之而不見所畏焉….’” Mengzi 1A:6. 
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that they become actions. In other words, just as sometimes it can be an appropriate 
action to satisfy one’s hunger to a moderate degree so that everyone in one’s group can 
have something to eat, Munro’s “evaluating mind” examines the situation in question and 
guides one’s tendency to deferential or compassionate behaviors so that it is expressed as 
an appropriate action in that situation. However, just as one’s inclinational behavior such 
as eating or sleeping cannot be judged as either right or wrong in itself, one’s deference 
or compassion cannot be an either ethically right or wrong action in itself. As I see it, 
though, this view of respect and compassion is not well supported by textual evidence 
from the Mengzi. For example, in his famous thought experiment about a baby falling 
into a well (Mengzi 2A:6), Mengzi says the following: 
 
Now [suppose that] someone suddenly saw a child about to fall into a well. Anyone 
seeing this would have the feeling of alarm and pain, and [one’s running to the well to 
save the child] is not to get in good relationship with the child’s parents, not to seek fame 
in the neighborhood and among friends, or not because one hates the crying sound of a 
child. From this, we can see that anyone who lacks the feeling of compassion is not a 
human being.84
 
This passage shows that one’s behavior of saving the baby from the danger of falling can 
be done with a range of motives, and this behavior of saving the baby becomes a different 
kind of action depending on what kind of motive it is combined with. As Mengzi says in 
this quotation, it could be a prudential action to promote one’s interests by taking 
advantage of the social standing and power of the baby’s parents, or an action to satisfy 
one’s desire to be known as a compassionate person, or a yet another kind of egoistic 
action to remove the source of one’s mental pain, but Mengzi makes it clear that saving 
the baby out of compassion for that baby is a kind of action distinct from all of these. 
Now, the Mengzi does not provide us with a good similar example for the case of respect. 
However, based on the characteristics compassion and respect share as emotions, we 
could infer that respect is also one among many possible motives that can motivate one’s 
deferential behavior. This point in turn shows that 1) Mengzi’s conception of action is 
much broader than what Munro ascribes to him, i.e., the proper degree and manner of 
                                                 
84 “今人乍見孺子將入於井, 皆有怵惕惻隱之心; 非所以內交於孺子之父母也, 非所以要譽於鄕黨朋
友也, 非惡其聲而然也. 由是觀之, 無惻隱之心, 非人也.” Mengzi 2A:6. 
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actualization of one’s behavioral tendency in a certain situation; and it also reiterates the 
point that I made in the previous paragraph that 2) respect (and compassion) should not 
be equated with behavioral tendencies. 
For these reasons, I think that Munro’s view of respect (and compassion) as a 
behavioral tendency is misguided. As an alternative to Munro’s view, I submit that 
respect in Mengzi is an emotion or emotional sensibility primarily responsive to 1) a 
person’s worth as a person, 2) a person’s worth deriving from his social status or his role 
in society, and 3) a person’s merit due to his ethical or political accomplishment.85
First, Mengzi often recommends the rulers of his time not to take innocent 
people’s lives even if doing so would benefit them greatly. For example, Mengzi says that 
what the ancient sages Bó Yí 伯夷 and Yī Yǐn 伊尹 shared with Kongzi in character 
was that although they were equally capable of taking possession of the entire world if 
they had governed only a territory of a hundred Chinese square miles (lǐ 里), they would 
have refused to gain the world if doing so had required them to do a single wrong act or 
kill one innocent life.86 In addition, after commenting on King Xiāng’s lack of royal 
dignity in Mengzi 2A:1 Mengzi says he told the king that the world could be unified by 
the ruler who does not like killing people,87 and Mengzi also recommends Prince Diàn 
墊 of the Qí dukedom to follow humaneness and righteousness, which he codifies 
                                                 
85 This thesis is informed by Stephen Darwall’s distinction between recognition respect and appraisal 
respect. According to him, recognition respect consists in a disposition to weigh appropriately in one’s 
deliberations some feature of the object of one’s respect and to act accordingly. So, “to say that persons as 
such are entitled to respect is to say that they are entitled to have other persons take seriously and weigh 
appropriately the fact that they are persons in deliberating about what to do” (Stephen Darwall, “Two Kinds 
of Respect,” Ethics 88, no. 1 [October, 1977], p. 38), and recognition respect in the context of morality is 
“to regard [the object of one’s respect] as requiring restrictions on the moral acceptability of actions 
connected with it.” (Ibid., p. 40) In addition, what is important about moral recognition respect, as Darwall 
emphasizes, is to regard such a restriction as not incidental but as arising because of the feature or fact itself. 
That is, respecting persons as such is to regard them as deserving to be not treated in certain ways, due to 
the fact that they are persons (Ibid.). On the other hand, appraisal respect “consists in an attitude of positive 
appraisal of that person either as a person or as engaged in some particular pursuit.” For example, “one may 
have such respect for someone’s integrity, for someone’s good qualities on the whole, or for someone as a 
musician.” (Ibid., p. 38) I believe that respect (jìng 敬) in Mengzi can arguably accommodate both kinds of 
respect, at least to some extent. 
86 “得百里之地而君之, 皆能以朝諸侯, 有天下; 行一不義, 殺一不辜, 而得天下, 皆不爲也. 是則
同.” Mengzi 2A:2. 
87 “[梁襄王]問曰: ‘天下惡乎定?’ 吾對曰: ‘定于一.’ ‘孰能一之?’ 對曰: ‘不嗜殺人者能一之.’” Mengzi 
1A:6. 
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respectively as not killing an innocent person (rén 仁) and not taking what is not one’s 
own (yì 義).88
Mengzi’s classification of not taking an innocent life to the realm of rén 仁 
(mainly benevolence or caring in this context) reveals his thinking that the ruler’s 
refraining from taking his people’s lives is to be based on his benevolence for his people, 
and this benevolence could be seen as mono-directional in the sense that whether to treat 
people benevolently or not is up to the ruler, and that the people have no demand on it. 
However, this is actually a wrong view, because what is important in Mengzi’s advice is 
people’s innocence. That is, Mengzi’s thought underlying his recommendation not to take 
innocent lives seems to be that the ruler should view people’s innocence as a factor 
making them beings at least worthy of not being killed for no fault, and that the ancient 
sages’ refusing to accept the entire world at the expense of one innocent life shows that 
these sages were responsive to the factor of people’s innocence and acted according to its 
requirements. This seems to show that respect is basically being responsive to certain 
relevant factors the object of one’s respect has, and viewing these factors as imposing 
some restrictions on one’s treatment of that object. 
Second, in Mengzi 6A:5 discussed above, at a village ceremony one respects a 
villager who is a year older than one’s elder brother by pouring wine to him first, and at a 
sacrificial ceremony for ancestors one shows respect to one’s younger brother who acts as 
the impersonator of an ancestor. Mengzi says that one’s respect (jìng 敬) changes its 
proper object from one’s uncle to one’s younger brother as the situation changes, and it is 
one’s respect that at least partly tells one whether a person deserves respect in a certain 
situation, and if he does, how much respect he deserves in that situation. 
I said only “partly,” though, and it is important to note that respect as an 
emotional sensibility can be often inaccurate about what is the proper degree to which 
one is supposed to feel and express one’s respect toward a person who clearly deserves 
one’s respect. For example, Yǒuzǐ 有子, a disciple of Kongzi’s, says that “one can stay 
away from shame and disgrace if one’s [expression of] respect closely [follows the 
                                                 
88 “仁義而已矣. 殺一無罪, 非仁也; 非其有而取之, 非義也. 居惡在? 仁是也; 路惡在? 義是也. 居
仁由義, 大人之事備矣.” Mengzi 13:33. 
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prescription of] the rituals.”89 I take this saying to mean the following: Even if it were 
correct for one to feel respect toward another person, one can be uncertain about to what 
degree exactly one should feel respect for that person, and consequently one can express 
one’s respect for that person too much or too little in terms of the appropriate manner of 
expressing one’s respect prescribed by the social norms. This social “prescriptions” take 
into consideration not only the status and merit of that person but also one’s relationship 
to that person in society, and make sure that one’s expression of respect is always 
appropriate in a certain situation. If one fails to follow such social norms and happens to 
express one’s respect for a person “too much,” that person might misinterpret one’s 
intention and respond with domineering behaviors or unjust requests of favor. On the 
other hand, if one happens to express her respect for that person “too little,” that person 
might feel offended and try to pay her back, say, by insulting her. In the sense that one’s 
feeling of respect is not sufficient guidance for proper expression of one’s respect, Munro 
is definitely right in pointing out that proper expression of respect needs to follow the 
guidance of one’s evaluating mind that considers all of the fine factors contributing to the 
merit and status of the person to be respected and the social norms concerning the proper 
manner and degree of expressing one’s respect to that person in a certain situation. 
However, as I argued above, respect as an action is significantly different from respect as 
a mere behavior, and one’s feeling of respect for another person’s status or merit is what 
distinguishes a respectful action from other kinds of actions, which can still be equally 
respectful or deferential at the level of behavior. 
Moreover, I think that although respect as an emotional sensibility can be 
inaccurate about the fine degree to which one should feel respect, it is still reliably 
responsive to clear enough distinctions in the quality of respectability. For example, 
Mengzi tells the following episode: 
 
Someone asked Zēng Xī 曾西, “Between you and Zǐlù 子路, who is more worthy?” Zēng 
Xī said uneasily, “[Even my late father] was afraid of him.” “Then, who is more worthy 
between you and Guǎn Zhòng 管仲?” Zēng Xī, expressing displeasure [this time], said, 
“How can you ever compare me to Guǎn Zhòng? Guǎn Zhòng enjoyed his ruler’s 
confidence so exclusively and governed the country for so long, but his achievements are 
                                                 
89 “恭近於禮, 遠恥辱也.” Lunyu 1:13. 
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so insignificant. How dare you compare me to this man?”90
 
Zēng Xī 曾西 is the son of Zēng Shēn 曾參, a worthy disciple of Kongzi’s who is even 
sometimes addressed as “Master Zēng” 曾子 in the Analects. Zǐlù 子路, another 
advanced disciple of Kongzi’s, was much senior to Zēng Shēn,91 and according to his son 
(Zēng Xī), Zēng Shēn had great reverence (wèi 畏) for Zǐlù presumably not just for his 
seniority but more importantly for his great moral character. Now, Zēng Xī’s uneasiness 
at the thought of comparing himself to Zǐlù whom even his worthy father showed great 
respect reveals that he feels greater respect for Zǐlù than his father, and one can imagine 
how much respect Zēng Xī would feel for Kongzi, the great teacher of both Zǐlù and his 
father. On the other hand, Zēng Xī’s displeasure at the question of who is more worthy, 
he or Guǎn Zhòng, the famous seventh century minister of the Qí 齊 dukedom, shows 
his deep-seated disrespect for Guǎn Zhòng. In short, this passage shows the point that one 
can feel different degrees of respect (and disrespect) towards different people’s 
corresponding merits. And I think that this “rational” or “cognitive” aspect of respect—i.e. 
one’s feeling of respect more or less correctly representing different grades of people’s 
merits—constitutes the core of respect as an emotion, which Munro’s view of respect as 
merely a behavioral tendency cannot explain. 
 
4.3.2.3 Respect as a Concern-Based Construal 
 
So far, I have argued that respect in Mengzi is basically an emotional sensibility 
responsive to a person’s worth or merit, and I also explained how respect conceived this 
way is different both from desire for respectful action (Nivison) and from a behavioral 
tendency to act respectfully (Munro). As I see it, respect in this sense can be also well 
explained in the light of the construal view of emotion introduced earlier, and in this 
section I try to explain how it is so. As has been said in Mengzi 6A:5, at a village 
                                                 
90 “或問乎曾西曰: ‘吾子與子路孰賢?’ 曾西蹴然曰: ‘吾先子之所畏也.’ 曰: ‘然則吾子與管仲孰賢?’ 
曾西艴然不悅, 曰: ‘爾何曾比予於管仲? 管仲得君如彼其專也, 行乎國政如彼其久也, 功烈如彼其卑
也. 爾何曾比予於是.?’” Mengzi 2A:1. In the original text, the foot radical (zú 足) of “cù” 蹴 is at the 
bottom of the character rather than its left-side. 
91 According to Qián Mù’s 錢穆 calculation, Zǐlù (542–480 B.C.E.) was thirty seven years older than Zēng 
Shēn (505–436 B.C.E.). See his Xiānqín zhūzǐ xìnián, vol. 2, pp. 615–616. 
 191
ceremony one respects a villager who is a year older than one’s elder brother by pouring 
wine to him first, and at a sacrificial ceremony for ancestors one shows respect to one’s 
younger brother who acts as the impersonator of an ancestor. It can be said that one’s 
feeling of respect toward the villager in the first occasion is basically one’s construal of 
the villager as deserving a respectful treatment due to his age. This construal is not 
merely a neutral-minded acknowledgment of the villager’s elderliness (Gàozǐ-Mèngjìzǐ’s 
position) but seeing the villager as really deserving respect. The villager can appear to be 
so to one if, among many other reasons, one thinks that the elders are the backbone of 
society—they set the role-models for the younger members of society and know what to 
do in social or natural emergencies, and therefore that it is important for them to be 
treated respectfully. In the second occasion, one can find it a marvelous and grateful fact 
that one’s ancestors are the source of one’s existence here and now, and this in turn makes 
one think that one’s younger brother, presently an impersonator of one’s ancestors at the 
ceremony, really deserves one’s most sincere respect. 
In addition, while arguing against Munro’s behaviorist interpretation of respect in 
the previous section, I proposed that respect has some “rational” or “cognitive” aspect in 
the sense that respect is a kind of emotional sensibility responsive to people’s merit and 
social status in varying degrees. For example, we have earlier seen in Mengzi 1A:6 that 
after his audience with King Xiāng of Liáng, Mengzi reported that the king did not look 
like a ruler at all and seemed to have nothing to be afraid of or respectful about.92 This 
remark of Mengzi’s can be interpreted that 1) Mengzi’s sense of respect detected nothing 
in King Xiāng of Liáng that would make him construe the king to deserve respect, and 
that 2) the fact that he was a king without any corresponding merit exacerbated the 
situation and made it more convincing that he did not command Mengzi’s sincere respect.  
On the other hand, we have also seen in Mengzi 2A:1 that Zēng Xī felt increasing 
degree of respect toward his father Zēng Shēn, his father’s senior colleague Zǐlù, and 
presumably Kongzi who taught both Zēng Shēn and Zǐlù, whereas he felt great disrespect 
for Guǎn Zhòng who made his country Qí dukedom the most powerful country and the 
center of the international politics for decades in seventh century China. For this case too, 
                                                 
92 “孟子見梁襄王, 出, 語人曰: ‘望之不似人君, 就之而不見所畏焉….’” Mengzi 1A:6. For a detailed 
discussion of this passage, see Section 4.3.2.2 of this chapter. 
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it could be said that the reasons Zēng Xī gave for both his increasing respect toward his 
father, Zǐlù, and Kongzi and his great disrespect for Guǎn Zhòng were basically his 
construals, or his particular way of assessing the merits of these figures. This point is 
especially conspicuous with the case of Guǎn Zhòng: His merit was so great that even 
Kongzi highly praised him in the Analects, but both Mengzi and Zēng Xī are not 
described to think so highly of him in the Mengzi. For example, Kongzi says that Guǎn 
Zhòng might be a humane (rén 仁) person because he helped Duke Huán of Qí convene 
the other rulers of his time without recourse to forceful means,93 and Kongzi also says 
that it is thanks to Guǎn Zhòng who helped Duke Huán become the leader of the feudal 
lords and protect China from the barbarians that China could preserve its high culture.94 
However, Kongzi also once severely criticized Guǎn Zhòng for having violated the 
Rituals (lǐ 禮) which Kongzi thought to be the foundation of his ideal, harmonious 
society,95 and this might have contributed to Mengzi’s and Zēng Xī’s—both the sincere 
followers of Kongzi—negative appraisal of Guǎn Zhòng.96  
In other words, if Kongzi’s positive appraisal of Guǎn Zhòng was focused on the 
benefits people had reaped from his maintaining a stable political system in seventh 
century China mainly through the military power of the Qí dukedom, Zēng Xī’s (and also 
Kongzi and Mengzi’s) negative appraisal of Guǎn Zhòng was focused on his lack of 
moral character that would have enabled Duke Huán of Qí to practice benevolent 
government (xíng rénzhèng 行仁政) and consequently become a true king of the world 
(wáng 王) instead of remaining merely a leader of the feudal lords (bà 霸).97 In short, 
the fact that different people (or even a single person like Kongzi) gave seemingly 
                                                 
93 “桓公九合諸侯, 不以兵車, 管仲之力也. 如其仁, 如其仁.” Lunyu 14:16. 
94 “管仲相桓公, 覇諸侯, 一匡天下, 民到于今受其賜. 微管仲, 吾其被髮左衽矣.” Lunyu 14:17. 
95 “邦君樹塞門, 管氏亦樹塞門. 邦君爲兩君之好, 有反坫, 管氏亦有反坫. 管氏而知禮, 孰不知禮?”
 Lunyu 3:22. 
96 We have already seen how contemptuous Zēng Xī was of Guǎn Zhòng in my previous discussion of 
Mengzi 2A:1. As for Mengzi, we find at the beginning of the same passage that it was Mengzi himself who 
told the story of Zēng Xī to one of his disciples when this disciple asked whether Mengzi would be able to 
equal Guǎn Zhòng if he were given a chance to govern the Qí dukedom: “公孫丑問曰: ‘夫子當路於齊, 
管仲晏子之功, 可復許乎?’ 孟子曰: ‘子誠齊人也. 知管仲晏子而已矣. 或問乎曾西曰…” Mengzi 
2A:1. 
97 Cf. “[孟子]曰: ‘管仲, 曾西之所不爲也, 而子爲我願之乎?’ [公孫丑]曰: ‘管仲以其君覇, 晏子以其君
顯. 管仲晏子猶不足爲與?’ [孟子]曰: ‘以齊王, 由反手也.’… [孟子]曰: ‘…行仁政而王, 莫之能禦也. 
且王者之不作, 未有疏於此時者也…’” Mengzi 2A:1. 
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conflicting but not unlikely appraisals of Guǎn Zhòng seems to show the following two 
points: 1) Zēng Xī’s sense of respect and disrespect responding to each figure’s merit or 
demerit is significantly informed by Zēng Xī’s conception of what is really valuable or 
estimable, and that 2) Zēng Xī’s conviction that his feeling of respect or disrespect 
toward each of these figures is warranted can be nothing more than an indication of how 
firmly Zēng Xī holds to his value system. 
 
4.3.3 Xiūwù zhī xīn 羞惡之心, Sìduān 四端, and Hàowù 好惡 
 
In the previous sections, we have seen that cèyǐn zhī xīn and respect, Mengzi’s first and 
third sprout, can be well explained by the construal view of emotion. According to this 
view, emotions are concern-based construals having the appearance of truth, and I argued 
that cèyǐn zhī xīn is construing another being’s misfortune with sympathetic concern (or 
finding it unbearable for one’s family members to be harmed), whereas respect is 
construing another person as deserving respect due to her worth or merit. In this section, I 
turn to the discussion of Mengzi’s second sprout, namely xiūwù zhī xīn 羞惡之心. “Xiū” 
羞 is similar in meaning to another term “chǐ” 恥 (“shame”), and both terms often mean 
the emotion of shame that one feels in a disgraceful or humiliating situation (“rǔ” 辱). 
On the other hand, we have seen earlier in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.2) that wù 惡 is one’s 
affective response of dislike or long-term aversion for various objects, and a person’s 
character can be known by observing what kinds of things the person in question feels 
averse to—together with his hào (liking or desire) response. My following discussion 
focuses on these two aspects of xiūwù zhī xīn: First, in Section 4.3.3.1, I discuss several 
key passages from the Mengzi concerning this concept and argue that shame (xiū 羞 or 
chǐ 恥) in Mengzi is well explained by the construal view of emotion, just as we have 
earlier seen it to be the case for compassion and respect. Second, I devote Section 4.3.3.2 
to discussing the hierarchical relationship between the four sprouts and hàowù by 
conducting a conceptual analysis of the term “xiūwù zhī xīn.” 
 
4.3.3.1 Shame (Xiū 羞 or Chǐ 恥) and Emotional Control in Mengzi 
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The term “xiūwù zhī xīn” is used four times throughout the Mengzi, twice each in Mengzi 
2A:6 and 6A:6. What its usage in these two passages tells us is that xiūwù zhī xīn is 
deeply related with the virtue of yì 義.98 Yì is often rendered as “righteousness” both in 
the sense of a quality of a moral person and a quality of a moral action, and Mengzi’s 
prime example of right act is not taking another person’s property.99 So, Mengzi says, “If 
people can extend their intention not to bore holes [to peep through] or climb over walls, 
there will be an over-abundance of righteousness.”100 However, yì sometimes seems to 
mean “honor” in some ancient Chinese texts. For example, the Mòzǐ contains a passage 
where Mòzǐ observes that honor is the most valued for human beings. According to him, 
no one would let his life be taken in exchange for the whole world, but human beings 
often fight over a single word (i.e. insult) risking their lives; this shows that they value 
honor more than their lives.101 We find a similar thought in the Mengzi too. Look at the 
following passage, which has been already quoted partly above: 
 
Fish is something I want, and bear’s paw is also something I want. But if I cannot have 
both, I forsake fish and choose bear’s paw. Life is something I desire, and honor is also 
something I desire. But if I cannot have both, I forsake life and choose honor. Life is what 
I want, but there is something that I want more than life, so I do not do anything to get it 
[i.e. life]. Death is what I hate, but there is something that I hate more than death, so 
there are some troubles that I do not avoid. If there were nothing that people desire more 
than life, why do they [sometimes] not use those means that could save their life? If there 
were nothing that people hate more than death, why do they [sometimes] not do what 
could let them avoid troubles? [But] there are [definitely] things that people can use and 
save their lives but do not do so, and there are things that people can use and avoid 
troubles but do not do so. Therefore, [it is clear that] there are things that people desire 
                                                 
98 “羞惡之心, 義之端也.” Mengzi 2A:6; “羞惡之心, 義也.” Mengzi 6A:6. 
99 “殺一無罪, 非仁也, 非其有而取之, 非義也.” Mengzi 7A:33. 
100 “人能充無穿踰之心, 而義不可勝用也.” Mengzi 7B:31. 
101 “子墨子曰: ‘萬事莫貴於義. 今謂人曰: “予子冠履, 而斷子之手足, 子爲之乎?” 必不爲. 何故? 則
冠履不若手足之貴也. 又曰: “予子天下而殺子之身, 子爲之乎?” 必不爲. 何故? 則天下不若身之貴
也. 爭一言以相殺, 是貴義於其身也. 故曰: 萬事莫貴於義也.’” Mòzǐ, “Guìyì” 貴義. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ 
xiángǔ, p. 439. Of course, the point Mòzǐ wants to make in this passage is that the correct principle (yì) 
with which one conducts oneself is more important than one’s life. However, as Nivison correctly points 
out, no ancient Chinese philosopher would have wanted to settle a dispute by sword-fighting. This shows 
that the original sense of “yì” in this passage was “honor” rather than “righteousness” or “principle,” and 
Mòzǐ could make his point only by taking advantage of the semantic ambiguity of the character “yì.” 
Nivison also quotes a passage from the Shǐjì 史記 where “gāoyì” 高義 is used in the sense of “high 
honor” or “a lofty sense of honor.” See David S. Nivison, “The Classical Philosophical Writings,” in The 
Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C., ed. Michael Loewe and 
Edward L. Shaughnessy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 765–766. 
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more than life, and there are things that people hate more than death. It is not that only 
the worthy person has this heart; everyone has it, but [only] the worthy person is able to 
not lose it. 
A basket of rice, and a bowl of soup—[suppose that] one can live by getting them, 
but otherwise one will die. But if they are given with a humiliating voice, even a wayfarer 
will not accept them; if given by kicking the bowls, even a beggar will not be happy [to 
take them]. However, when it comes to ten-thousand bushels [of grain], many people will 
accept it without seeing whether ritual propriety and righteousness [would allow to do 
so]. What do ten-thousand bushels [of grain] add to me? Is it for the sake of the beauty of 
houses, the service of a wife and concubines, and the gratitude my needy acquaintances 
will show me? But earlier I did not accept [the offer] despite my own death, but now I do 
it because of the beauty of houses; earlier I did not accept it despite my own death, but 
now I do it for the service of my wife and concubines; earlier I did not accept it despite 
my own death, but now I do it for the gratitude my needy acquaintances will show me—is 
this indeed something that I cannot help quitting? This is called losing one’s original 
heart.102
 
In the first paragraph of this passage, Mengzi says that he desires yì more than his life, 
and I translated “yì” as “honor.” Furthermore, Mengzi also says that his preference for 
honor to life is actually shared by everyone, and in the second paragraph of the passage 
he illustrates this point by saying that even a beggar would refuse to accept foods if they 
were given in an insulting manner. This shows that my translation of “yì” as “honor” here 
is warranted. However, in the second paragraph we find another instance of yì concerning 
the acceptance of ten-thousand bushels of grain, and since accepting this is not either 
right or wrong in itself, Mengzi says that one needs to check whether accepting it would 
be in accordance with ritual propriety (lǐ 禮) and righteousness (yì 義). The use of “lǐ” 
禮 (ritual propriety) here implies that it would be wrong to accept things that were given 
in violation of ritual prescriptions, and since the rituals or social norms do not cover the 
whole span of proper behavior, one should also consult the standard of righteousness as 
necessary in order to see whether accepting a gift would be appropriate in a certain 
                                                 
102 “魚, 我所欲也, 熊掌亦我所欲也. 二者不可得兼, 舍魚而取熊掌者也. 生亦我所欲也, 義亦我所欲
也. 二者不可得兼, 舍生而取義者也. 生亦我所欲, 所欲有甚於生者, 故不爲苟得也. 死亦我所惡, 
所惡有甚於死者, 故患有所不辟也. 如使人之所欲莫甚於生, 則凡可以得生者, 何不用也? 使人之所
惡莫甚於死者, 則凡可以辟患者, 何不爲也? 由是則生而有不用也, 由是則可以辟患而有不爲也. 是
故所欲有甚於生者, 所惡有甚於死者. 非獨賢者有是心也; 人皆有之, 賢者能勿喪耳. 一簞食, 一豆
羹, 得之則生, 弗得則死, 嘑爾而與之, 行道之人弗受, 蹴爾而與之, 乞人不屑也. 萬鍾則不辯禮義
而受之. 萬鍾於我何加焉? 爲宮室之美, 妻妾之奉, 所識窮乏者得我與? 鄕爲身死而不受, 今爲宮室
之美爲之; 鄕爲身死而不受, 今爲妻妾之奉爲之; 鄕爲身死而不受, 今爲所識窮乏者得我而爲之. 是
亦不可以已乎? 此之謂失其本心.” Mengzi 6A:10. 
 196
situation. This makes us translate the second instance of “yì” in the passage as 
“righteousness.” As I see it, the fact that yì is used both in the sense of honor and 
righteousness in one passage implies that acting in accordance with righteousness (yì 義) 
is an important source of one’s dignity or honor (yì 義). And it must be in this light that 
Mengzi says the following: “If one can extend [one’s unwillingness to provide others 
with] grounds for addressing oneself by ‘thou’ or ‘thee’ (an insulting way of addressing 
the second person in ancient China), there is no place where he goes and not do what is 
right.”103
As we are now clear that 1) the virtue of righteousness in Mengzi is deeply related 
with honor and that 2) an important source of honor for the nobleman is conducting 
himself according to the demand of righteousness, it is not hard to understand why 
“xiūwù zhī xīn,” the sprout of righteousness, contains a character (i.e. “xiū” 羞) that 
denotes the feeling of shame. Except for its four times of usage in Mengzi 2A:6 and 6A:6 
as part of the term “xiūwù zhī xīn,” “xiū” 羞 is used three times throughout the Mengzi. 
It is used to describe the character of Liǔxià Huì 柳下惠, an ancient sage who did not 
feel ashamed of serving a corrupt ruler in a low office,104 and that of Wáng Liáng 王良, 
an ancient chariot driver who found it shameful to break the proper rules of driving to 
help an inexperienced archer cheat in a ritual hunt.105 In addition, Mengzi 4B:33 tells a 
story of a man who was returning home everyday full of meat and wine, telling his wife 
and concubine that he dined with rich and eminent people. The wife and concubine 
thought it strange, and one day they followed their husband secretly to find out that their 
husband had been filling his stomach by begging remnants of sacrificial offerings here 
and there at a graveyard. The wife and concubine came back home full of shame and 
wept together, but the husband, not knowing this, came home pleasantly and behaved 
arrogantly toward his wife and concubine. The author of the passage concludes with a 
remark that “in the view of the nobleman, among the means by which people pursue 
                                                 
103 “人能充無受爾汝之實, 無所往而不爲義也.” Mengzi 7B:31. 
104 “柳下惠不羞汚君, 不卑小官.” Mengzi 2A:9. 
105 “良…曰: ‘吾爲之範我馳驅, 終日不獲一; 爲之詭遇, 一朝而獲十.…我不貫與小人乘…’ 御者且
羞與射者比…” Mengzi 3B:1. 
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wealth, honor, profit, and promotion, there are few that their wives and concubines do not 
weep together feeling shameful about.”106
As is clear in the last example, the feeling of shame (xiū 羞) in Mengzi is directed 
at shameful situations not only of oneself but also of others who stand “in some special 
relation to oneself.”107 In addition, the last example also shows that people often disagree 
about whether one should feel shameful in a certain situation, and people feel shame only 
when they construe certain features of the situation in question as deserving shame. So, 
while the husband in Mengzi 4B:33 apparently thought it all right to have food and wine 
by begging them at a graveyard, the wife and concubine felt shameful about their 
husband’s deed because they found it disgraceful.108 However, as we have seen in 
Section 4.3.1.2 above, one’s construing oneself or someone closely related to oneself to 
be in a shameful situation does not necessarily make one feel shame; in order to feel 
shame, one needs to be concerned about being in a humiliating situation oneself, or 
concerned about the other person’s being in a similar situation. So, again we have the 
wife in Mengzi 4B:33 saying the following to the concubine: “A husband is what [people 
like us] are supposed to look up to until the end of our lives, but now [we have one] like 
this.” After saying this, the wife reviled her husband with the concubine and wept 
together with her.109 In the phrase “like this” (rú cǐ 如此) is implied their deep contempt 
and frustration about their husband who did not care about conducting himself like that, 
and the wife and concubine’s shame, contempt, and frustration about their husband show 
how much they were concerned about being in such a humiliating situation, whether it 
was either of themselves or their husband who was found in that kind of situation. 
Besides “xiū” 羞, “chǐ” 恥 is another term frequently used in the Mengzi to 
denote what we would normally call the feeling of shame. It is sometimes used with “rǔ” 
辱 (“disgrace”), and makes it conspicuous that the feeling of shame (xiū 羞 or chǐ 恥) 
in Mengzi involves construing the relevant features of a certain situation as bringing 
                                                 
106 “由君子觀之, 則人之所以求富貴利達者, 其妻妾不羞也, 而不相泣者, 幾希矣.” Mengzi 4B:33. 
107 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, p. 60. 
108 Or alternatively, the husband might have thought that begging foods was a shameful deed, but he did not 
care much about acting shamefully as long as he could have good foods, and did not care about looking 
disgraceful to others as long as those ‘others’ did not include his wife and concubine. 
109 “其妻歸, 告其妾, 曰: ‘良人者, 所仰望而終身也, 今若此.’ 與其妾訕其良人, 而相泣於中庭.” 
Mengzi 4B:33. 
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disgrace (rǔ 辱) to oneself or those closely related to oneself. For example, in Mengzi 
1A:5 King Huì 惠 of Liáng 梁 talks about a series of military defeats his country has 
recently suffered. Specifically, he says that he was humiliated by Chǔ 楚 in the south 
and feels shameful about those defeats.110 In addition to defeat in a battle, the author of 
the Mengzi observes that one can find it disgraceful to serve other people111 or to receive 
orders from a big country (as the ruler of a small state)112 and feel shameful about them, 
and these instances of shame seem to be of the same kind as being shameful of one’s poor 
clothes and coarse foods113 or asking questions of one’s subordinates114 in the Analects. 
What is common to all of these instances of shame seems to be the thought that it is 
disgraceful to be in an inferior position in terms of power, social status, or knowledge, 
and it is often the case that one’s assuming an inferior position in these aspects is 
observable by the public. Bryan Van Norden calls this kind of shame “conventional 
shame”, 115  and Kwong-loi Shun calls the standards by which people judge the 
aforementioned situations to be shameful “social standards.”116  
On the other hand, we can find another kind of shame in the Mengzi. The 
standards of this shame are not necessarily shared by everyone, and one does not need to 
be in the presence of others to feel this kind of shame. For example, King Wǔ’s 武 
feeling of shame at the outrageous behaviors of Zhòu 紂 (the last, wicked ruler of the 
Shāng 商 dynasty who was dethroned by King Wǔ),117 the nobleman’s shame at his 
reputation exceeding his real merits,118 feeling shameful about taking an office without 
being able to put the Way into practice,119 and feeling shameful about not being as 
worthy as others120—all of these could be grouped into one category, and Van Norden 
                                                 
110 “東敗於齊, 長子死焉; 西喪地於秦七百里; 南辱於楚. 寡人恥之…” Mengzi 1A:5. 
111 “人役而恥爲役,” Mengzi 2A:7. 
112 “小國師大國而恥受命焉,” Mengzi 4A:7. 
113 “恥惡衣惡食,” Lunyu 4:9. 
114 “恥下問,” Lunyu 5:15. 
115 Bryan W. Van Norden, “The Virtue of Righteousness in Mencius,” in Confucian Ethics, ed. Kwong-loi 
Shun and David B. Wong (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 161. 
116 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, p. 60. 
117 “一人衡行於天下, 武王恥之.” Mengzi 1B:3. 
118 “聲聞過情, 君子恥之.” Mengzi 4B:18. 
119 “立乎人之本朝, 而道不行, 恥也.” Mengzi 5B:5. 
120 “不恥不若人, 何若人有?” Mengzi 7A:7. 
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calls it “ethical shame.” According to Van Norden, one feels this kind of shame when one 
believes that one has some significant character flaw,121 and Shun proposes to call the 
standards for this type of shame “ethical standards” to distinguish them from the “social 
standards” corresponding to the “conventional shame.”122 Although arguing against the 
possibility that human beings are subject only to ethical shame but not to conventional 
shame,123 Van Norden is correct to point out that “early Confucians are at pains to 
minimize the significance of conventional shame and to emphasize the importance of 
ethical shame.”124 Similarly, Shun is also correct in saying that the social and ethical 
standards for assessing the propriety of one’s shameful feeling often diverge from each 
other, and that the nobleman’s primary concern in Mengzi is with the ethical standards of 
shame.125
However, both Shun and Van Norden are silent about how Mengzi’s nobleman 
achieves his goal, viz. minimizing the significance of conventional shame and making 
himself not vulnerable to ethical shame. Van Norden does talk about several ways in 
which one could cope with one’s feeling of conventional shame: A person suffering from 
conventional shame can try to feel differently by telling herself that 1) ‘others do not 
really look down upon me,’ 2) ‘the opinions of those who look down upon me do not 
really matter,’ or 3) ‘I should not share the standard of appearance that makes them look 
down upon me,’ and the like.126 However, for some reason Van Norden does not further 
develop this idea in the context of the Mengzi, and in the following I will explain how 
Mengzi’s nobleman would deal with his feeling of conventional shame and develop his 
sense of ethical shame. What I mean by “sense of ethical shame” is some sort of 
emotional sensibility that is responsive to actions or situations prone to bring shame on 
the agent, and developing this kind of emotional sensibility is supposed to help the ideal 
Mengzian agent avoid doing ethically embarrassing acts. After all, my discussion of this 
topic in the following several paragraphs—i.e. how Mengzi’s nobleman would cope with 
                                                 
121 Van Norden, “The Virtue of Righteousness in Mencius,” p. 162. 
122 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, pp. 61–62. 
123 Van Norden, “The Virtue of Righteousness in Mencius,” p. 164. 
124 Ibid., p. 168. 
125 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, p. 61. 
126 Van Norden, “The Virtue of Righteousness in Mencius,” p. 162. 
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his conventional shame and develop the sense of ethical shame—should show that the 
construal view of emotions is a highly useful tool to interpret Mengzi’s view of emotions. 
In Mengzi 1B3, we find a conversation between King Xuān 宣 of Qí 齊 and 
Mengzi about courage and shame. The king asks Mengzi about how to maintain a good 
relationship with other states, and Mengzi suggests two models. One is the model of the 
humane ruler (rénzhě 仁者) who is willing to serve a smaller country than his own, and 
the other is the wise ruler (zhìzhě 智者) who serves another country if it is bigger than 
his own. According to Mengzi, the person who can serve a smaller country than his own 
is joyful in [following the way of] Heaven (lètiān 樂天),127 and the one who serves a 
bigger country than his own is in awe of Heaven (wèitiān 畏天); and the person who 
delights in [the way of] Heaven protects the whole world, while the one who stands in 
awe of Heaven protects his country.128 In other words, the humane ruler prefers to keep 
the peace of the world by not invading smaller countries even when he has the capacity to 
do so, while the wise ruler manages to protect his country by acting appropriately in the 
power relationship with bigger countries. However, although approving Mengzi’s 
suggestions, the king also says that he cannot follow Mengzi’s advice because of his 
pathological fondness of courage.129 That is, the king means that he cannot adopt either 
of the suggested models because he wants to conquer the other countries with his military 
power. Mengzi responds to this by saying the following: 
 
I beg your majesty not to be fond of small courage. To put one’s hand on a sword with a 
furious look [at the enemy] and say “how dare he stand in my way!”—this is the courage 
of an ordinary man, which can meet only a single person. Your majesty should make it 
bigger please!...The Documents says, “Heaven populated the earth with the ordinary 
people, and it made them a ruler, and made them a teacher. They [i.e. the ruler and the 
teacher] are only supposed to assist Shàngdì 上帝 [the highest deity in the Shāng 商 
pantheon] in loving them [i.e. the people]. All the culpable and the innocent in the four 
directions are only in my [responsibility]; how dare anyone under the heaven resist His 
will?” There was a man [i.e. King Zhòu 紂 of Shāng 商] doing outrageous things in the 
                                                 
127 Alternatively we can read “樂天” as “yàotiān,” which is grammatically parallel to “wèitiān” (verb-
object construction) and means “to like [the way of] Heaven.” 
128 “惟仁者爲能以大事小…惟智者爲能以小事大…以大事小者, 樂天者也; 以小事大者, 畏天者也. 
樂天者保天下, 畏天者保其國.” Mengzi 1B:3. 
129 “王曰: ‘大哉言矣! 寡人有疾, 寡人好勇.’” Ibid. 
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world, and King Wǔ 武 felt shame about it. This was the courage of King Wǔ. By a burst 
of wrath, King Wǔ also brought peace to the people under the heaven. Now if your 
majesty also bring peace to the people of the world by a burst of wrath, people will be 
afraid only of your majesty’s not being fond of courage.130
 
The author of this passage seems to postulate a close relationship between shame, 
anger, and courage. As has been briefly mentioned above (Mengzi 1A:5 quoted in 
footnote 110), frequent battles in the Warring States period China often led to the 
defeated country being humiliated by the victorious one, and the shamed ruler of the 
former often conceived anger at the ruler of the latter. The expression of this anger often 
meant another war for revenge, and it was understood that engaging in a vengeful activity 
required some sort of courage (yǒng 勇). It seems that despite the difference in scale, the 
rancorous transactions between states were not different in nature from the vengeful 
dealings between individuals, and Mengzi is explicit that the kind of courage that is 
mustered up for fighting private battles, whether between ordinary people or between 
rulers of different states, is petty courage (xiǎoyǒng 小勇). This being the case, it was 
natural for Mengzi to view both the shame and anger related to this “petty courage” to be 
petty ones too, and Mengzi’s exhortation to the king to enlarge his courage (dà zhī 大之) 
must postulate that 1) there are great or admirable kind of shame and anger, and that 2) 
the king can transform his petty shame and anger to great or admirable ones. Now, it 
seems that what Mengzi regards as petty shame and anger are equivalent to conventional 
shame and anger, and the admirable kind of shame and anger to ethical shame and anger. 
For whereas many people would find it appropriate to feel shameful and angry if they 
were beaten (in public) by their enemy, it is not even easy for many to have the admirable 
kind of shame and anger that Mengzi exhorts the king to cultivate. 
Then, how could the king minimize the influence of his ordinary shame and anger 
on himself and cultivate the ethical shame and anger instead? We find a clue to this 
question in Mengzi 2A:2, where Mengzi discusses the difference between small courage 
                                                 
130 “王請無好小勇. 夫撫劍疾視曰, ‘彼惡敢當我哉!’ 此匹夫之勇, 敵一人者也. 王請大之!...書曰: ‘天
降下民, 作之君, 作之師, 惟曰其助上帝寵之. 四方有罪無罪惟我在, 天下曷敢有越厥志?’ 一人衡行
於天下, 武王恥之. 此武王之勇也. 而武王亦一怒而安天下之民. 今王亦一怒而安天下之民, 民惟恐
王之不好勇也.” Ibid. 
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and great courage. In that passage he mentions a warrior named Běigōng Yǒu 北宮黝 as 
exemplary of small courage, and Mengzi describes this man’s character as follows: 
 
Běigōng Yǒu’s [way of] cultivating courage: He never flinched [from being stabbed on] 
his body, and never turned his eyes from any thrusts at them. He thought of the tiniest bit 
of slight from another person as if being beaten in the market place; and he would not 
tolerate [any insult] from a common fellow coarsely clad, as he would not tolerate [any 
insult] from a ruler who could summon ten-thousand war-chariots. He viewed stabbing a 
ruler of ten-thousand chariots as if stabbing a person poorly clad; he was not afraid of 
feudal lords, and made sure to return any obscenities coming his way.131
 
And Mengzi compares this “method” of cultivating courage with another person’s 
method, which he comments as not necessarily better but more simple than Běigōng 
Yǒu’s method: 
 
[As for] Mèng Shīshè’s 孟施舍 way of cultivating courage, [he] said, “I look on defeat 
as victory. To advance after measuring the enemy, and to engage after calculating [the 
chances of] victory—this is to stand in awe of the three armies. How could I always win 
[every battle]? All I can do is to remain without fear.” Mèng Shīshè is similar to Zēngzǐ 
曾子, and Běigōng Yǒu is similar to Zǐxià 子夏. Between these two men’s courage, I 
don’t know which one is better, but Mèng Shīshè kept [the method] simple.132
 
Despite the difference in style between these two methods of courage-cultivation, we can 
see that both methods also share a significant commonality by focusing on the underlined 
part of the text. What I wanted to highlight above is the psychological activity of 
“thinking of A as B” or “regarding A as B,” and this is expressed by such patterns as “sī 
思 A ruò 若 B” or “shì 視 A yóu 猶 B” in the original text. As should be already clear 
to the perceptive reader, this is exactly the method of construing something in terms of 
something else which I described in Section 4.3.1.2 above, viz. attending to some aspect 
of the object in question so that some image, concept, or thought is brought to bear as an 
interpretive paradigm. So, it is by this method that Běigōng Yǒu interpreted any insult 
                                                 
131 “不膚橈, 不目逃, 思以一毫挫於人, 若撻之於市朝. 不受於褐寬博, 亦不受於萬乘之君; 視刺萬
乘之君, 若刺褐夫. 無嚴諸侯, 惡聲至, 必反之.” Mengzi 2A:2. The underlining is mine. 
132 “孟施舍之所養勇也, 曰: ‘視不勝猶勝也. 量敵而後進, 慮勝而後會, 是畏三軍者也. 舍豈能爲必
勝哉? 能無懼而已矣.’ 孟施舍似曾子, 北宮黝似子夏. 夫二子之勇, 未知其孰賢, 然而孟施舍守約
也.” Ibid. The underlining is mine. 
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from other people as grave as being beaten in public, so that the feeling of shame 
emerging thereby could fuel his corresponding anger, and the anger thus aroused in turn 
provide the motivational energy for engaging in vengeful actions. Likewise, besides his 
prudent strategic analysis of the situation in every battle, Mèng Shīshè could remain 
fearless and calm also by adopting the attitude of regarding defeat as victory and vice 
versa. This shows that both Běigōng Yǒu and Mèng Shīshè used basically the same 
method for different purposes, and it also seems to derive that one can control one’s 
shame and anger or develop a special kind of shame and anger by practicing to see things 
in a different light. 
Let us return to Mengzi 1B:3 (quoted in footnote 130) and pursue this point a little 
further. In that passage we have seen Mengzi saying that looking furiously at one’s 
enemy and saying “how dare he challenge me!” is an ordinary man’s courage useful only 
for fighting against a single person, and we now know from the example of Běigōng Yǒu 
that behind this kind of “courage” is the feeling of conventional shame and anger that 
find any kinds of slights from other people disgraceful and intolerable. However, Mengzi 
contrasts this kind of shame and anger with those of King Wǔ’s, which found the 
misgovernment of Zhòu, the last flagrant ruler of the Shāng dynasty, disgraceful and 
intolerable. King Wǔ’s shame comes from his considering the entire world as his 
responsibility—“all the culpable and the innocent in the four directions are only in my 
responsibility,” and he might have felt shameful about his failure to protect the people 
from the misgovernment of the Shāng king. And his anger, or wrath, is apparently 
directed at this wicked Shāng king—“how dare anyone under the heaven resist His will?” 
Besides Mengzi 1B:3, there are two more passages from the Mengzi that describe the 
ancient sage kings as considering their people’s misfortune to be due to their faults using 
the grammatical structure of “sī 思 A yóu 由 B”,133 and passages like these show that it 
is by practicing to see things in a different light that one can mitigate the force of one’s 
conventional shame and develop a proper sense of shame. 
                                                 
133 Mengzi 4B:29 writes that Yǔ 禹, an ancient sage entrusted with the task of preventing big rivers from 
flooding, thought of any drowning of a person in the world as due to his fault; and Jì 稷, another sage in 
charge of teaching agriculture to the people, thought of any starving of a person in the world as due to his 
fault. Note that in the following text “yóu” 由 is used interchangeably with “yóu” 猶: “禹思天下有溺者, 
由己溺之也; 稷思天下有飢者, 由己飢之也.” Mengzi 4B:29. The same idea is conveyed by the 
construction “sī 思 A ruò 若 B” in Mengzi 5A:7. 
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4.3.3.2 Xiūwù zhī xīn 羞惡之心 and the Hierarchical Structure of Moral Emotions 
 
So far, I have discussed Mengzi’s conception of shame as part of the sprout of xiūwù zhī 
xīn 羞惡之心. However, as it is clear from its name “xiūwù zhī xīn,” Mengzi’s second 
sprout is not a homogeneous emotional response of shame (xiū) but a mixture of shame 
and dislike (wù 惡), and previous scholars have occasionally tried to reach the correct 
understanding of the distinction between xiū 羞 and wù 惡. Zhū Xī 朱熹 proposed that 
“xiū 羞 is feeling shameful (chǐ 恥) about one’s badness whereas wù 惡 is hating other 
people’s badness”,134 and Kwong-loi Shun corrects this view by pointing out that wù 惡 
can be also directed at one’s own moral failure such as one’s ethical inferiority to others 
(Mengzi 6A:12), one’s getting a government job through improper means (Mengzi 3B:3), 
and one’s failing to act in accordance with righteousness (Mengzi 6A:10).135 According to 
Shun, the response of wù 惡 can be directed at any object of dislike including one’s own 
and other people’s misdeeds or character flaws, whereas xiū 羞 and chǐ 恥 can be 
directed only at “things that one regards as reflecting adversely on oneself” or those who 
stand “in some special relation to oneself.”136 In objection to these efforts to clarify the 
distinction between xiū 羞 and wù 惡, though, Bryan Van Norden says that “any effort 
to make a precise distinction between xiu and wu is doomed to fail because Mencius 
sometimes uses the terms interchangeably.137 For evidence, he points out that Mengzi 
2A:9 and 5B:1 write that Liǔxià Huì was not shameful of (xiū) serving a corrupt ruler, 
whereas Mengzi 6B:6 writes that Liǔxià Huì did not dislike (wù) serving a corrupt 
ruler.138 Van Norden argues that besides the ordinary sense of dislike as in dislike of 
dampness (Mengzi 2A:4) or dislike of death (Mengzi 4A:3 and 6A:10), one’s response of 
wù sometimes involves regarding something to be ethically condemnable as opposed to 
just undesirable, as in disdaining disgrace (Mengzi 2A:4) or disdaining the violation of 
                                                 
134 “羞, 恥己之不善也; 惡憎人之不善也.” Zhū Xī 朱熹, Mèngzǐ jízhù 孟子集註, in Yasui Kō, Mōshi 
teihon, 卷三, p. 28. 
135 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, p. 60. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Van Norden, “The Virtue of Righteousness in Mencius,” p. 164. 
138 Ibid.  
 205
ritual (Mengzi 3B:7).139 In addition, Van Norden distinguishes between two senses of 
shame. According to his definition, a sense of shame in a narrow sense is “a disposition to 
feel shame in situations that one recognizes are shameful for oneself or for those with 
whom one identifies,” whereas a sense of shame in a broad sense is “a disposition to 
recognize when actions or situations are shameful…, and to have appropriate emotional 
and behavioral reaction to this recognition.” 140  Although rejecting any clear-cut 
distinction between xiū 羞 and wù 惡, Van Norden agrees with Shun in thinking that xiū 
羞 is basically concerning oneself or those closely related to oneself whereas wù 惡 can 
be about oneself as well as unrelated others. Based on this idea, Van Norden proposes that 
by using the binome “xiūwù” 羞惡 instead of inventing “xiūchǐ” 羞恥 for the attitude 
corresponding to the virtue of righteousness, Mengzi intended to mean that the virtue of 
righteousness is a sense of shame in a broad sense rather than in a narrow sense, which is 
responsive not only to one’s own but also other people’s moral failure.141
However, it seems that Van Norden’s view of xiūwù 羞惡 as a sense of shame in 
a broad sense cannot be fully correct to the extent that he characterizes wù 惡 as 
particularly a shame response. For as I have argued in Chapter 2 above, Mengzi’s 
predecessors like Kongzi and the authors of the Zǔozhuàn postulate a hierarchical 
relationship between hàowù 好惡 and other particular emotions, and this makes it 
unlikely that wù 惡  in Mengzi is at the same level as xiū 羞  or chǐ 恥 . More 
specifically, we have examined in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1.3) an account of emotions from 
the Zǔozhuàn, which proposes that particular emotions such as “joy” (xǐ 喜), “anger” (nù 
怒), “pleasure” (lè 樂), and “sorrow” (āi 哀) originate from another set of broad 
conception of emotions, namely liking and disliking or desire and aversion (hàowù 好惡). 
In addition, dealing with Kongzi’s conception of emotions in Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2, I 
have argued that we could ascribe to Kongzi the view that one’s opposite attitudes of 
liking and disliking represent one’s emotional reactions to diverse stimuli in the most 
general and basic way, and one’s particular emotions can be further distinguished out of 
                                                 
139 Ibid., p. 167. 
140 Ibid., p. 153. 
141 Ibid., p. 167. 
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these two basic categories by specifying the conditions and evaluative beliefs involved in 
the occurrence of the respective particular emotions. In other words, Kongzi seems to 
hold that human beings experience emotions on two different levels, i.e. on the lower 
level of the generic responses of liking and disliking and on the higher level of particular 
emotions, and this again makes it hard to accept that the response of wù 惡 in xiūwù zhī 
xīn 羞惡之心 is simply reducible to a sense of shame in a broad sense. 
Then, what is the distinctive function of wù 惡 in xiūwù zhī xīn 羞惡之心, and 
how shall we interpret it? I think that just as we have seen it to be the case in Kongzi, so 
the response of wù 惡 in Mengzi denotes one’s negative emotional response to diverse 
objects in the most general way, and in the ethical context it denotes specifically one’s 
aversion to what is morally undesirable or wrong in a broad sense. For instance, we can 
see from a number of passages in the Mengzi that ordinary people’s dislike or aversion 
(wù) in Mengzi is directed at a wide range of things such as disgrace, dampness,142 the 
crying sound of a drowning child,143  the benevolent government of a neighboring 
country,144 death, drunkenness,145 and even one’s own child for some parents.146 But in 
the broadly ethical context wù is felt about not only being in ethically disgraceful 
situations such as not being as worthy as others147 and taking office in the government 
through improper means,148 but the suffering or misery of other beings such as famine,149 
other people’s vice,150 the breach of a social norm about requesting an audience with 
another person,151 hair-splitting scrutiny of intelligence for no purpose,152 and ethically 
specious entities such as a glib person who can be mistaken as righteous or faithful and 
                                                 
142 “仁則榮, 不仁則辱. 今惡辱而居不仁, 是猶惡濕而居下也.” Mengzi 2A:4. 
143 “今人乍見孺子將入於井, 皆有怵惕惻隱之心…非惡其聲而然也.” Mengzi 2A:6. 
144 “宋, 小國也. 今將行王政, 齊楚惡而伐之, 則如之何?” Mengzi 3B:5. 
145 “今惡死亡而樂不仁, 是猶惡醉而强酒.” Mengzi 4A:3. 
146 “‘父母愛之, 喜而不忘; 父母惡之, 勞而不怨.’” Mengzi 5A:1. 
147 “指不若人, 則知惡之, 心不若人, 則不知惡.” Mengzi 6A:12. “Xīn” 心 here refers to the heart and 
mind that embody certain ethical character traits, and Mengzi is saying that for one’s heart and mind to be 
not as good as others’ is a bad thing to feel averse to. 
148 “古之人未嘗不欲仕也, 又惡不由其道.” Mengzi 3B:3. 
149 “庖有肥肉, 廐有肥馬, 民有飢色, 野有餓莩, 此率獸而食人也. 獸相食, 且人惡之, 爲民父母, 行
政, 不免於率獸而食人, 惡在其爲民父母也?” Mengzi 1A:4. 
150 “伯夷, 非其君, 不事; 非其友, 不友. 不立於惡仁之朝, 不與惡人言; 立於惡人之朝, 與惡人言, 
如以朝衣朝冠坐於塗炭. 推惡惡之心, 思與鄕人立, 其冠不正, 望望然去之, 若將浼焉.” Mengzi 2A:9. 
151 “陽貨欲見孔子而惡無禮.” Mengzi 3B:7. 
152 “所惡於智者, 爲其鑿也. 如智者若禹之行水也, 則無惡於智矣.” Mengzi 4B:26. 
 207
those known as good and sincere among the villagers who are wrongly considered as 
virtuous.153 So far, though, there might seem to be little difference between Van Norden’s 
position and mine, because 1) the examples that I just cited as instances of the ethically 
undesirable or wrong largely overlap with Van Norden’s examples of the ethically 
condemnable in oneself or others, and 2) we have seen in the previous section that an 
important source of shame for the nobleman is failing to act in accordance with what is 
right (yì 義). In other words, Mengzi’s nobleman finds it shameful for one’s character 
traits to be morally defective or one’s doing anything morally wrong, and in this light it 
seems that the nobleman’s sense of ethical shame in a broad sense seems to coincide to be 
his moral sense that distinguishes what is morally right from wrong. 
However, I think that despite the strong connotation of yì 義 as “honor,” we still 
need to pay balanced attention to the concern of yì 義 with righteousness or what is right, 
and I also think that although the nobleman would find it most shameful to fail to live up 
to the standards of righteousness, disgracefulness is only a vague or at most secondary 
feature to ethical wrongness or undesirability in many of the objects of one’s ethical wù 
惡 response cited above. Let me prove this point by going through each of those 
examples. First, the following two passages are favorable to Van Norden’s view: 
 
Now [if] a person’s fourth finger is bent and does not stretch straight, [even if] it does not 
hurt or cause harm to one’s work, if there is anyone who could make it straight, [the 
person would go to him] without finding it far to travel from Qín to Chǔ; this is because 
of the finger that is not like others’. [However, many people] know to hate it when one’s 
finger is not like others’, but do not know to hate it when one’s heart and mind are not 
like others’—this is called not knowing the categories.154
 
When a boy is born, [his parents] wish to find a wife for him [someday]; and when a girl 
is born, [her parents] wish to find a husband for her [in the future]. [This is] how parents 
feel [about their children], and everyone has that feeling. However, if [some couple] 
should wait for neither their parents’ orders nor the matchmakers’ arrangements and 
bore holes [in the wall] to see each other or climb over the wall to meet illicitly, not only 
their parents but also others in town would all despise them. It’s not that people in the 
antiquity didn’t want to serve in the government, but they also disliked not going through 
                                                 
153  “孔子曰: ‘惡似而非者: 惡佞, 恐其亂義也; 惡利口, 恐其亂信也;…惡鄕原, 恐其亂德也.’” 
Mengzi 7B:37. 
154 “今有無名之指屈而不信, 非疾痛害事也, 如有能信之者, 則不遠秦楚之路, 爲指之不若人也. 指
不若人, 則知惡之; 心不若人, 則不知惡, 此之謂不知類也.” Mengzi 6A:12. 
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the proper means. [For] advancing without recourse to the proper means is of the same 
category as boring holes [in the wall].155
 
In the first passage none of Mengzi’s shame terms is used, but Mengzi’s message there is 
clearly that the reason that one seeks to cure one’s bent finger is because he finds it 
shameful for one’s finger to be worse than others’. However, Mengzi makes it also clear 
that if one knows it to be shameful to have a malfunctioning finger, one should know that 
having malfunctioning heart and mind is also a shameful thing, because a malfunctioning 
finger and malfunctioning heart and mind are of the same category. Likewise, in the 
second passage Mengzi says that taking an office by recourse to improper means is as 
despicable as premarital sex, because both equally belong to the category of shameful 
deeds. As I see it, these two passages provide clear cases where one’s response of wù 惡 
in the ethical context is directed at the disgracefulness of its objects as the primary 
characteristic, but the following two passages would tell a different story: 
 
There is fat meat in your kitchen and there are well-fed horses in your stables, but your 
people look hungry and your fields are scattered with people who died of famine; this is 
driving animals to devour humans. Even animals’ eating each other is repugnant; [but if 
your majesty,] as the parent of your people, govern your country and fail to avoid driving 
animals to devour human beings, where is your being the parent of your people?156
 
What is brought to the fore in this passage is the miserable situation where animals are 
fed well at the expense of human beings starving to death, and the first emotions one is 
expected to feel in response to this situation should be empathy and sympathy for the 
starving people. However, Mengzi says that this kind of situation also provokes some sort 
of repugnance (wù 惡 ), which probably derives from the painful feeling one 
empathically feels at the suffering of the people, and this kind of repugnance is similar to 
what one would feel when seeing animals brutally devoured by other kinds of animals. 
Or alternatively, the repugnance could come from one’s sympathy, which involves the 
                                                 
155 “丈夫生而願爲之有室, 女子生而願爲之有家; 父母之心, 人皆有之. 不待父母之命, 媒妁之言, 鑽
穴隙相窺, 踰牆相從, 則父母國人皆賤之. 古之人未嘗不欲仕也, 又惡不由其道. 不由其道而往者, 
與鑽穴隙之類也.” Mengzi 3B:3. 
156 “庖有肥肉, 廐有肥馬, 民有飢色, 野有餓莩, 此率獸而食人也. 獸相食, 且人惡之; 爲民父母, 行
政, 不免於率獸而食人, 惡在其爲民父母也?” Mengzi 1A:4. 
 209
thought that the suffering of the people is terrible, undeserved, and therefore unacceptable. 
Admittedly, Mengzi could have urged his interlocutor (the king) to cultivate ethical 
shame by trying to see the starving of his people as his responsibility; but in this passage 
Mengzi does not do so, and neither do we find any apparent connection here between the 
feeling of repugnance and disgracefulness. The feeling of wù 惡 here rather seems to be 
a form of disapproval, which is grounded on one’s sympathy or empathy at the misery of 
the people and finds that situation morally undesirable or unacceptable. 
 
Master Wàn asked, “The whole village calls [them] good and sincere people, and there is 
no place where they go and are not considered as good and sincere people. But Kongzi 
regarded them as thieves of virtue. Why is that so?” [Mengzi] said, “[You want to] blame 
them but there [seems to] be no ground, [you want to] criticize them but there [seems to] 
be nothing to criticize. They agree with the current customs, and are in harmony with the 
impure age. They seem to abide by sincerity and trustworthiness, and seem to conduct 
themselves with moral dignity and purity. The multitude all likes them, and they 
themselves think they are right, but it is impossible to get on the way of Yáo and Shùn 
with them. So we say [they are] thieves of virtues. Kongzi said, “I hate the specious: I 
hate the darnel, because they might be confused with the rice plant; I hate the adroit, 
because they might be confused with the righteous; I hate the glib, because they might be 
confused with the trustworthy; I hate the sound of Zhèng, because it might replace the 
[proper] Music; I hate purple, because it might be confused with vermilion; I hate those 
known as good and sincere in the village, because they might be confused with the 
virtuous.157
 
In this passage, Kongzi and Mengzi’s feeling of wù 惡 at the people known as 
good and sincere among the villagers (xiāngyuàn 鄉愿) is focused on their bad effect as 
“thieves of virtue.” According to Mengzi, their hypocrisy leaves no trace of vice to blame 
them for, and their claim to sincerity, trustworthiness, and moral purity deceives not only 
the villagers but even themselves, so that the genuinely virtuous like Kongzi and Mengzi 
has little room for moral influence and honor among the villagers. Kongzi’s repetitive 
usage of “kǒng” 恐 (“I’m afraid that”) throughout the passage reveals his fear for the 
bad influence of those people in their villages, and we can guess from the phrase “thieves 
                                                 
157 “萬子曰: ‘一鄕皆稱原人焉, 無所往而不爲原人, 孔子以爲德之賊, 何哉?’ 曰: ‘非之無擧也, 刺之
無刺也; 同乎流俗, 合乎汚世; 居之似忠信, 行之似廉絜; 衆皆悅之, 自以爲是, 而不可與入堯舜之
道; 故曰德之賊也. 孔子曰: “惡似而非者: 惡莠, 恐其亂苗也; 惡佞, 恐其亂義也; 惡利口, 恐其亂信
也; 惡鄭聲, 恐其亂樂也; 惡紫, 恐其亂朱也; 惡鄕原, 恐其亂德也.”’” Mengzi 7B:37. 
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of virtue” (dé zhī zéi 德之賊) that Kongzi (or the author of the passage) might have felt a 
bit of jealousy about those people. Apparently, Kongzi and Mengzi’s wù 惡 at them is 
predominantly hatred of their viciousness tinged with some degree of fear and jealousy, 
but it is hard to say that it also carries a sign of contempt. 
So far, we have seen two passages (Mengzi 6A:12 and 3B:3) where wù 惡 is 
used for things that one find despicable, and two other passages where wù 惡 is used for 
things that are hard to describe as despicable or disgraceful but equally undesirable for 
other reasons, such as that they are unacceptable from the perspective of sympathy or 
empathy (Mengzi 1A:4) or that they are vicious and morally dangerous (Mengzi 7B:37). 
The fact that wù 惡 is used for things that are hardly disgraceful seems to make Van 
Norden’s position that “wù” 惡 and “xiū” 羞 are interchangeable untenable. But then, 
how shall we understand the fact that “wù” 惡 and “xiū” 羞 are sometimes used for the 
same objects? Earlier in this section, I have reminded the reader of my argument in 
Chapter 2 that Kongzi postulates two levels of emotional experience for human beings, 
namely the generic responses of liking and disliking (hàowù 好惡) at the lower level and 
the particular emotions at the higher level. According to this view, wù 惡 or “dislike” is 
a negative kind of “blanket” response to various objects, and one’s wù 惡 response can 
be re-described as sympathy, empathy, or morally grounded hatred and worry, and so 
forth by looking at what kinds of objects it is responding to and what kinds of evaluative 
beliefs are involved. However, I do not think that this is the whole picture of the 
relationship between wù 惡 and other particular emotions like xiū 羞. As I see it, there 
exists a more complex relationship between hàowù 好惡 (liking and disliking) and other 
particular emotions in Mengzi, namely the hierarchical relationship in which one’s liking 
and disliking function as some sort of second-order emotions accompanying either the 
approval or the disapproval of one’s particular emotional responses in various situations. 
According to this view, for example, it is possible that one feels averse (wù 惡) to the 
commoners’ suffering from famine because she feels sympathy about it, but at the same 
time likes (hào 好) the fact that she can feel sympathetic concern for the welfare of the 
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people. And her liking of this fact means that she approves her sympathetic concern for 
the people.  
There is convincing evidence to support this view throughout the Mengzi. First, 
look at the following passage: 
 
Mengzi said, “Bó Yí 伯夷 would not serve a ruler if he was not the right ruler, and 
would not befriend a person if he was not the right person to associate with. He would 
not take a position at a wicked man’s court, nor would he speak with a wicked man. 
Standing in a wicked man’s court and speaking with a wicked man would have been to 
him as if sitting in mire and pitch wearing court robes and hat. [He] extended his 
aversion to vice [to the extent that] if he happened to stand together with a villager whose 
hat was awry, he would move away from that man in disgust as if he were going to be 
polluted by that man. So, even though there were some rulers who offered an office in 
polite words, he would not accept them. [The reason] that he did not accept [their offers] 
was because he was not glad to go to them.  
“Liǔxià Huì 柳下惠 did not feel shameful about [serving] a corrupt ruler, and 
did not find a low office debasing. When advanced to employment, he did not conceal his 
talent, and made sure to do as he was supposed to; he did not conceive rancor when 
neglected and staying without office, and did not worry when straitened by poverty. So he 
said, “You are you, I am I; even if you stand naked beside me, how could you defile me?” 
That’s how he did not lose himself while gladly associating with others, and why he 
would stay in office when he was insisted to stay. [His] staying in office when insisted to 
do so was also because he was not glad to leave.” 
Mengzi [again] said, “Bó Yí was narrow-minded, and Liǔxià Huì was not solemn. 
Narrow-mindedness and lack of solemnness, the nobleman does not go by.”158
 
This passage contrasts two types of attitudes toward ethical or political corruptness. On 
one hand we have Bó Yí who was almost paranoid about being affected by the villainy of 
the time, and on the other hand there is Liǔxià Huì who was happy to do his best to 
realize his ideal political vision in whatever place he was given by the rulers of his time. 
It also seems that this passage is about xiūwù zhī xīn 羞惡之心, for the authors of this 
passage use wù 惡 as Bó Yí’s response to the “wicked people” (èrén 惡人), whereas 
they use xiū 羞 as a possible response one might have about the corrupt rulers of the 
                                                 
158 “孟子曰: ‘伯夷, 非其君, 不事, 非其友, 不友. 不立於惡人之朝, 不與惡人言; 立於惡人之朝, 與
惡人言, 如以朝衣朝冠坐於塗炭. 推惡惡之心, 思與鄕人立, 其冠不正, 望望然去之, 若將浼焉. 是
故諸侯雖有善其辭命而至者, 不受也. 不受也者, 是亦不屑就已. 柳下惠不羞汙君, 不卑小官. 進不
隱賢, 必以其道; 遺佚而不怨, 阨窮而不憫. 故曰: “爾爲爾, 我爲我; 雖袒裼裸裎於我側, 爾焉能浼
我哉?” 故由由然與之偕而不自失焉, 援而止之而止. 援而止之而止者, 是亦不屑去已.’ 孟子曰: ‘伯
夷隘, 柳下惠不恭. 隘與不恭, 君子不由也.’” Mengzi 2A:9. 
 212
time. This passage provides a good case where “wù” 惡 and “xiū” 羞 are used for the 
same kind of objects (wicked rulers), and the distinction between wù 惡 and xiū seems 
to get murky when Bó Yí’s hatred of wicked people is described in terms of his thought 
that serving in a wicked ruler’s court and speaking with a wicked man are like sitting in 
mire and pitch wearing court robes and hat. In other words, Bó Yí hates wicked people 
because he thinks that associating with them blemishes his reputation, and one might 
think that at least in this passage we cannot draw a clear distinction between Bó Yí’s 
aversion to the wicked people of his time and his finding it disgraceful to associate with 
them. 
However, we can avoid this interpretation by looking at the same passage more 
closely. Besides the character “wù” 惡, the author of this passage also uses “bú xiè” 不
屑 (“not eager to,” “do not like,” or “do not approve”) to designate one’s general 
negative emotional response to certain objects. Both Zhào Qí 趙岐 and Jiāo Xún 焦循 
give a concrete meaning to the term “xiè” 屑 by interpreting it as “jié” 絜 (“pure” or 
“to consider to be pure”), and render the phrase “bú xiè jiù yǐ” 不屑就已 as “[Bó Yí] did 
not consider the rulers to be pure and so did not go to them.”159 According to this 
interpretation, the reason that Bó Yí did not accept the offers from the rulers of his time 
was specifically because he considered accepting those offers to be ethically impure or 
polluting, rather than just because he did not like (i.e., did not approve) accepting them. 
However, the same interpretation does not work very well for interpreting Liǔxià Huì’s 
case: They interpret “bú xiè qù yǐ” 不屑去已 as “[Liǔxià Huì] did not consider leaving 
his office to be pure”—that is, the reason that Liǔxià Huì did not leave his office was 
because he thought that doing so is ethically impure, or because he thought that leaving 
the corrupt rulers is not really the right way to keep himself pure.160 However, this 
interpretation is too strained, because Liǔxià Huì’s concern was not to keep himself clean 
in the first place. He did not worry about being polluted by the bad rulers, because he did 
not think it possible for someone to pollute another. This makes us interpret “bú xiè” as a 
more general kind of aversion, and consequently the correct interpretation of “bú xiè qù 
                                                 
159 Jiāo Xún, Mèngzǐ zhèngyì, pp. 243–244. 
160 Ibid., pp. 247–249. 
 213
yǐ” 不屑去已 should be “[Liǔxià Huì] did not like (i.e. did not approve) leaving [his 
office].” In short, the fact that “bú xiè” 不屑 can take an object unrelated to ethical 
impurity shows that wù 惡, a general negative emotional response like bú xiè 不屑, can 
take a broad range of objects that are not always disgraceful; and this in turn makes it 
possible that Bó Yí’s dislike (wù 惡) of the wicked people was directed not specifically 
to their ethical foulness but more abstractly to their badness (è 惡). 
Moreover, Mengzi’s critical comment on Bó Yí’s and Liǔxià Huì’s attitudes to 
moral corruptness at the end of the passage clearly shows that wù 惡 can be a second-
order emotion directed at what one judges to be a misguided emotional response. In 
Mengzi 3B:3 quoted above (footnote 155), we have seen Mengzi saying that although it is 
not that people in the antiquity did not want to serve in the government, they also disliked 
not going through the proper means (yòu wù bù yóu qí dào 又惡不由其道). What I want 
to get out of this passage is the point that one’s dislike (wù 惡) can take not going 
through (bù yóu 不由) the proper means as its intentional object, and this allows us to 
infer that Mengzi’s remark in Mengzi 2A:9 that the nobleman does not go by narrow-
mindedness and lack of solemnness (ài yǔ bùgōng jūnzǐ bù yóu 隘與不恭, 君子不由) 
implies his disgust at both Bó Yí’s and Liǔxià Huì’s attitudes towards moral corruption. 
In other words, Mengzi says that the nobleman rejects both Bó Yí’s extreme hatred of 
vice (wù’è 惡惡) and Liǔxià Huì’s indifference to corruptness as either too narrow-
minded or as lacking any self-respect, and this shows that the nobleman’s dislike (wù 惡) 
can take another person’s misguided aversion (wù 惡) or lack of aversion to vice as its 
intentional object. 
As I see it, this hierarchical relationship between the second-order dislike (wù 惡) 
and the first-order emotions or the lack of them for certain objects could be easily 
extended to a similar relationship between the second-order liking (hào 好) and its target 
emotions. Throughout the Mengzi, one’s proper attitudes of hào and wù, as much as they 
are in the Analects, seem to be used as one’s liking and disliking or long-term desire and 
aversion for virtues and vices respectively, or things that represent those virtues or vices. 
For example, in Mengzi 6A:6 quoted above Gōngdūzǐ 公都子 reports a view that people 
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like what is morally good (hàoshàn 好善) when their nature is good,161 and in the same 
passage Mengzi says that people like virtue (hàodé 好德) because they grasped an 
unchanging principle.162 In addition, Mengzi advises the rulers of his time to like 
humaneness (hàorén 好仁) in Mengzi 4A:7163 and 4A:9,164 and he praises people’s 
liking moral good (hàoshàn 好善) in Mengzi 6B:13165 and 7A:8166. Furthermore, in 
Mengzi 4B:20 Mengzi contrasts the ancient sage king Yǔ’s 禹 fondness of good advice 
(hào shànyán 好善言) with his disliking of good wine (wù zhǐjiǔ 惡旨酒),167 and we 
have just seen in Mengzi 2A:9 that he talks about the ancient sage Bó Yí’s 伯夷 hatred 
of vice (wù’è 惡惡). Now, since we know Mengzi’s view that the four moral sprouts 
respectively constitute the virtues of humaneness, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom 
(Mengzi 6A:6), by combining this view and Mengzi’s usage of “hào” and “wù” just 
described, we come to see that the four moral sprouts—compassion, the feeling of shame 
and disgust, respect, and the feeling of approval and disapproval—can be the desiderative 
objects of one’s proper attitudes of hàowù in Mengzi. In other words, we could postulate 
a rough kind of hierarchical relationship between one’s hàowù and her four moral sprouts, 
such that one likes (hào 好) the four cardinal virtues and feels pleasant (yuè 說) when 
one finds the emotional constituents of these virtues in one’s or another person’s mind. 
However, it does not seem to be the case that one only feels pleasant approbation 
for one’s (or another person’s) moral emotions; one can feel disapprobation for one’s (or 
another person’s) moral emotions if they are not fully appropriate in a certain situation. 
Mengzi 2A:9, which we have just examined, provides an illustrative example of this case. 
In that passage, Bó Yí’s aversion to vice (wù’è zhī xīn 惡惡之心) seems to be a form of 
Mengzi’s second sprout (the feeling of shame and disgust), because Mengzi says that Bó 
                                                 
161 “或曰: ‘性可以爲善, 可以爲不善. 是故文武興, 則民好善, 幽厲興, 則民好暴.’” Mengzi 6A:6. 
162 “有物必有則; 民之秉彛也, 故好是懿德.” Ibid. 
163 “夫國君好仁, 天下無敵.” This is Mengzi’s quotation of Kongzi’s remark. See Mengzi 4A:7. 
164 “今天下之君有好仁者, 則諸侯皆爲之敺矣. 雖欲無王, 不可得已.” Mengzi 4A:9. 
165 “魯欲使樂正子爲政. 孟子曰: ‘吾聞之, 喜而不寐.’…曰: ‘其爲人也好善.’” Mengzi 6B:13. 
166 “古之賢王好善而忘勢.” Mengzi 7A:8. 
167 “禹惡旨酒而好善言.” Mengzi 4B:20. It might have been just that Yǔ liked good advice more than good 
wine, but the use of “wù” 惡 for good wine (zhǐjiǔ 旨酒) in the passage suggests that Yǔ might have 
disliked good wine because it hindered him from making sober judgments. 
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Yí extended (tuī 推) his hatred of vice even to a counterfactual case of standing together 
with a villager whose hat was askew. As we will see later, Mengzi is famous for 
proposing a theory of emotional cultivation where he says that one can become fully 
virtuous by “extending” one’s four moral sprouts, and “tuī” 推 is one of Mengzi’s 
technical terms that he uses for cultivation of one’s four moral sprouts. And we have also 
seen that unlike Bó Yí, Liǔxià Huì was not ashamed of (xiū 羞) serving a corrupt ruler, 
and we know that xiū 羞 is a crucial component of xiūwù zhī xīn 羞惡之心. Now, 
Mengzi’s criticism of Bó Yí and Liǔxià Huì could be re-described as that the nobleman 
disapproves it when one’s feeling of shame and disgust gets too rigid or too loose, and 
this in turn reveals the following point: Although one likes (hào 好) the four cardinal 
virtues and usually feels pleasant (yuè 說) about one’s (or another person’s) emotional 
constituents of these virtues, one also dislikes (wù 惡) vices and feels disapprobation 
when one’s (or another person’s) moral emotions are not fully appropriate. 
 
So far, I have argued for the distinctive characteristic of xiūwù zhī xīn. Similarly 
to cèyǐn zhī xīn and respect, xiūwù zhī xīn has the element of shame that is basically 
construing a certain situation to be disgraceful, but unlike cèyǐn zhī xīn and respect, xiūwù 
zhī xīn has the element of dislike (wù 惡) that is a general negative response to a certain 
object or a kind of second-order emotion directed at one’s or another person’s emotional 
response. I have argued that one can have this kind of wù 惡 response for what one finds 
to be morally undesirable or unacceptable, but moral undesirability or unacceptability in 
a broad sense is not reducible to ethical disgracefulness in Mengzi’s thought. For as we 
have seen above, Mengzi says that one’s ethical dislike can take a wide range of objects 
such as people’s suffering from famine, the viciousness of the xiāngyuàn 鄉愿 (“good 
and sincere people in the village”) and the moral danger they bring about, and the 
narrow-mindedness or lack of self-respect in dealing with moral corruptness. My 
argument that one can have this wù 惡 response for what one finds to be morally 
undesirable or unacceptable implies a close relationship between one’s ethical dislike of a 
certain object and one’s assessment of it in terms of morality, or between xiūwù zhī xīn 
(the feeling of shame and disgust) and shìfēi zhī xīn (the feeling of approval and 
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disapproval). However, this does not mean that one’s ethical dislike is always grounded 
on a correct moral judgment. As we have seen in Mengzi 2A:9 above, Bó Yí’s ethical 
dislike of moral corruptness and Liǔxià Huì’s indifference to it are both based on wrong 
or excessive assessment of their ethical situations, and are thus subject to the nobleman’s 
dislike which is free of such ethical defects. This means that despite its close relationship 
with shìfēi zhī xīn or the correct moral judgment, xiūwù zhī xīn belongs with the other two 
moral emotions of cèyǐn zhī xīn and respect, in the sense that the feeling of ethical dislike 
in one’s xiūwù zhī xīn is directed at what one finds or construes to be morally undesirable 
or unacceptable. However, since nothing guarantees that what one finds to be morally 
undesirable or unacceptable are always really so, we need to know what the criteria are 
that make one’s ethical dislike appropriate, and what the relationship is exactly between 
one’s moral emotions including one’s ethical dislike and her correct moral judgment. This 
is one of the questions that I turn to in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
Emotions and Moral Agency in Mengzi 
 
 
My aim in this chapter is to investigate what role emotions play in moral judgment and 
moral motivation in Mengzi’s ethical thought. What I mean by ‘moral judgment’ is 
basically a judgment of what is morally right and wrong, but my use of both ‘moral’ and 
‘right’ in this work is much broader than their common usage in contemporary ethics. So, 
I will use ‘morality’ or ‘moral’ throughout this and the next chapter not only as referring 
to “universal norms of right and wrong conduct that are held to obligate all persons,”1 but 
also as involving broader ethical concerns such as what kinds of actions and characters 
are worthy, virtuous, or good. In addition, I think that ‘righteousness’ or ‘right’ (as an 
adjective) in a broad sense is the best rendering of the ancient Chinese term yì (義). For 
example, yì is perfectly translatable as ‘what is right’ in a broad sense in the following 
Analects passage: “In his dealings with [the affairs of] the world, the nobleman considers 
nothing as absolutely right or absolutely wrong. He follows only what is right [in a given 
circumstance].”2 And the author of the Zhōngyōng 中庸 glosses righteousness (yì 義) 
as propriety (yí 宜)3 and says that respecting the worthy is one of the most important 
                                                 
1 Stephen Darwall, Philosophical Ethics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), p. 14. Emphasis is 
mine. 
2 “君子之於天下也, 無適也, 無莫也, 義之與比.” Lunyu 4:10. Lau translates the last part as “He is on 
the side of what is moral.” (Lau, The Analects, p. 73) However, his translating yì as ‘moral’ is not well 
supported by the context of the sentence, because yì is contrasted here with the problematic attitude of 
taking something to be invariably right or wrong. 
3 Basically this gloss is based on the similarity between yì 義 and yí 宜 in their pronunciation. According 
to Guǎngyùn 廣韻 (a rhyme dictionary compiled in 1008 C.E.), these characters were pronounced exactly 
the same except for tone: “ngjeH” (“-H” indicating the “departing tone” or qùshēng 去聲) for yì 義 and 
“ngje” in a level tone or píngshēng 平聲 for yí 宜. Their similarity in pronunciation indicates that they are 
cognates coming from the same root; according to William H. Baxter, the departing tone (qùshēng 去聲) of 
yì 義 indicates that its Old Chinese (from eleventh to seventh centuries B.C.E.) pronunciation might have 
included an *-s suffix (*ŋ(r)aj-s) that was used for making a derived noun. This explains the fact that yì 義 
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among right actions,4 and we also know from Mengzi 6A:5 discussed in the previous 
chapter that respecting the elders was considered as a typical instance of righteousness (yì 
義) by both Mengzi and his contemporaries.5 This implies that righteousness or what is 
right (yì) in ancient China could refer to not only what one is morally required to do in a 
narrow sense but also virtuous actions or characters that one should do or adopt in order 
to live a fully virtuous life. And in a deliberative context, this kind of judgment becomes 
the judgment of what is the right thing to do in a certain situation and gets connected with 
the issue of moral motivation. 
The questions that I am specifically interested in answering in this chapter are the 
following: First, do ethical emotions like Mengzi’s three sprouts discussed in Chapter 4 
constitute the sole source of moral judgment and moral motivation? Second, if such 
emotions are not the only ground for one’s moral judgment and are not the only source of 
moral motivation, what else would there be, besides those ethical emotions, that 
contributes to the making of a moral judgment and motivates one to act according to that 
judgment? And third, if there are additional sources of moral judgment and moral 
motivation besides ethical emotions, how are these extra sources related with one’s 
ethical emotions in the process of moral judgment and concerning moral motivation?  
My formulation of the chapter’s leading questions this way is both informed by 
and responding to the recent trend in the scholarship on Mengzi that emphasizes the 
positive roles emotions play in one’s ethical life and argues for “no distinction between 
reason and emotion” in Mengzi’s thought. For example, David B. Wong says: 
 
Mencius does not, as Plato and Aristotle do, employ the contrast between reason and 
emotion to assert the need for the primacy of reason. He takes neither the Humean 
position of denying nor the Kantian position of affirming the motivational efficacy of pure 
practical reason. What stands out in Mencius’ work is the absence of any to-do about the 
                                                                                                                                                 
in early Chinese texts—especially our received versions of them—is predominantly used as a noun 
(“righteousness” or “what is right”) whereas yí 宜 is often used as a stative verb (“to be right” or “to be 
appropriate”) or an auxiliary verb (“should”). For an overview of the notation for Middle Chinese and Old 
Chinese pronunciations of Chinese characters, see William H. Baxter, A Handbook of Old Chinese 
Phonology (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1992), Chapter 2 and Chapter 5. For a description of 
the function of *-s suffix, see pp. 315–317 of the same book. 
4 “義者, 宜也; 尊賢爲大.” Zhōngyōng 中庸. Yasui Kō, Chūyōsetsu, p. 13. 
5 “孟季子問公都子曰: ‘何以謂義內也?’ 曰: ‘行吾敬, 故謂之內也.’ ‘鄕人長於伯兄一歲, 則誰敬?’ 曰: 
‘敬兄.’ ‘酌則誰先?’ 曰: ‘先酌鄕人.’ ‘所敬在此, 所長在彼, 果在外, 非由內也.’” Mengzi 6A:5. 
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issue of reason versus emotion….Mencius held a picture of the role of emotion in moral 
motivation that militates against a general separation of reason from emotion.6
 
According to Wong, having an emotion such as compassion in Mengzi involves the 
recognition of reasons to act in certain ways, and this connection between emotion and 
recognizing reasons for certain actions has important implications for the question of 
what would be the correct conception of practical reason we ought to have.7  
In a similar vein, David S. Nivison identifies two “sources” of morality in ancient 
Chinese ethical thought—i.e. “maxims” or “doctrines” acquired through moral reasoning 
and the “heart” as the locus of moral emotions or feelings, and argues that the only source 
of morality in Mengzi is “heart.”8 Nivison says: 
 
…“Two Roots or One?” Mencius’s answer was, “One.” And I take him to mean that my 
right judgments about what I ought to do, if I probe, and how I really feel about such 
things, if I dig, both turn out to have their source or “root” in the “heart,” which is at the 
same time for him the mind.9
 
That is, Nivison here seems to think that the “heart” as the source of one’s ethical feelings 
provides the only and sufficient grounds for one’s correct moral judgments, and therefore 
the “heart” is also the only source of moral motivation in Mengzi. And Nivison seems to 
support his thesis of “one-source morality” in Mengzi by endorsing the long-held belief 
among Sinologists that xīn 心—which is often translated as something like “heart-
mind,” 10  “heart/mind,” 11  or “heart and mind” 12 —is the faculty in charge of both 
cognition and affection. 
Besides Wong and Nivison, a number of scholars in Chinese philosophy have 
written on the positive roles, or even the primacy, of emotions in Kongzi and Mengzi’s 
ethical thought13 and in some excavated ancient Confucian materials such as Xìng zì mìng 
                                                 
6 Wong, “Is There a Distinction Between Reason and Emotion in Mencius?” p. 31. Emphasis is original. 
7 Ibid. 
8 David S. Nivison, “Motivation and Moral Action in Mencius,” in The Ways of Confucianism, pp. 101–104. 
9 Nivison, “Two Roots or One?” ibid., p. 147. 
10 For example, see ibid., p. 141. 
11 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, p. 48. 
12 Ivanhoe, “Confucian Self Cultivation and Mengzi’s Notion of Extension,” p. 222. 
13 For example, see Amy Olberding, “The Consummation of Sorrow: An Analysis of Confucius’ Grief for 
Yan Hui,” Philosophy East and West 54, no. 3 (2004). In this article, Olberding describes “the way in which 
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chū 性自命出 (“Human Nature Is Mandated by Heaven”)14 and its almost identical 
variant Xìngqínglùn 性情論 (“On Human Nature and Emotion”).15 And it seems that 
this recent trend in the study of Chinese philosophy has something to do with the burst of 
research on emotions in the West during the past two decades, which focused on the 
positive roles emotions play in diverse aspects of human life and thus brought into 
question the traditional, negative conception of emotion as dangerously subversive and 
distracting in the ethical life of human beings. However, this exaltation of emotions in the 
field of Chinese philosophy seems to have gone too far by now, and needs to be balanced 
by more careful work. In this chapter, I critically review Wong’s view of the Mengzian 
conception of practical reason centering on the four moral sprouts (sìduān 四端) on one 
hand and Nivison’s thesis of “one-source morality” in Mengzi on the other hand, each 
under the separate heading of emotions and moral judgment (Section 5.1) and emotions 
and moral motivation (Section 5.2). And the theses I defend in each section will be 
respectively that 1) moral emotions provide an important but only partial basis for all-
things-considered ethical judgment in Mengzi, and that 2) Mengzi’s conception of moral 
agency requires “practical reason” to play significant roles as an important additional 
source of moral motivation to ethical emotions, and Mengzi’s conception of moral 




                                                                                                                                                 
Confucius valorizes grief as a constituent of a flourishing life” (p. 279). For an argument for the primary 
role emotions play in moral judgment in Mengzi, see Eric L. Hutton, “Moral connoisseurship in Mengzi,” 
chap. in Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi, ed. Xiusheng Liu and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Indianapolis, 
IN: Hackett, 2002). See also Franklin Perkins, “Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy,” Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy 29, no. 2 (June 2002) for the view that the “Western tension between emotion and autonomy” 
fails to arise in Mengzi’s thought (p. 207). 
14 Xìng zì mìng chū has been found in 1993 with other bamboo manuscripts in an elite tomb at Guōdiàn 郭
店 in Húběi 湖北 province of China, and it is often considered to be datable to around 300 B.C.E. For a 
partial translation of the Xìng zì mìng chū and a discussion of the concept of qíng (情) there, see Michael 
Puett, “The Ethics of Responding Properly: The Notion of Qing in Early Chinese Thought,” chap. in Love 
and Emotions in Traditional Chinese Literature, ed. Halvor Eifring (Brill; Leiden, 2004). 
15 Xìngqínglùn is one of the bamboo texts that Shanghai Museum has bought in 1994 at a market in Hong 
Kong, and it is considered to be a text in circulation in Chǔ 楚 area sometime during the Warring States 
period (475–221 B.C.E.). For a further description of this text, see Mǎ Chéngyuán 馬承源, ed., Shànghǎi 
bówùguǎn cáng Zhànguó Chǔ zhúshū 上海博物館藏戰國楚竹書, vol. 1 (Shànghǎi 上海: Shànghǎi gǔjí 
chūbǎnshè 上海古籍出版社, 2001). 
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5.1 Emotions and Moral Judgment 
 
5.1.1 Is There No Distinction Between Reason and Emotion in Mengzi? 
 
As I have briefly mentioned above, David Wong ambitiously proposes that the Mengzian 
conception of practical reason does not require a sharp contrast between reason and 
emotion as has been conceived in the West for so long. He introduces Ronald de Sousa’s 
theory of emotion as an example of a new kind of research that illuminates emotion in a 
positive light, and argues that Mengzi’s view of moral emotions can be interpreted to take 
de Sousa’s theory of emotion one step further and thus to contain a more advanced theory 
of emotion than de Sousa’s. According to Wong, de Sousa has argued for a positive role 
emotions play in our deliberation by pointing out that emotions have a cognitive function 
addressing the so-called “frame problem.” The frame problem is that we have too much 
information around us that may or may not be relevant to our deliberation of what to do 
in a certain situation, and we had better not be distracted or even paralyzed by 
unnecessary information to arrive at a sensible decision. According to de Sousa, reason 
cannot help us sort out the information we need from what we do not need, and emotions 
fill the gap left by reason through their capacity to make certain features of the situation 
in question appear more salient, and thus look more relevant to our deliberation, than 
other features of the same situation.16
According to Wong, Mengzi’s picture of moral emotions takes de Sousa’s theory 
one step further, not only because moral emotions as conceived by Mengzi solve de 
Sousa’s frame problem by their influence on salience, but also because they recognize the 
salient features of the situations in question as compelling reasons to act in the ways 
characterized by those emotions.17 Wong takes compassion (cèyǐn zhī xīn 惻隱之心) as 
described in Mengzi 2A:6 to illustrate this thesis: When one sees a child about to fall into 
a well, the observer of the disquieting scene would normally feel compassion for the 
child. And her compassion, as Wong sees it, besides the phenomenal quality of alarm and 
                                                 
16 De Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion, Chapter 7 as summarized in Wong, “Is There a Distinction 
Between Reason and Emotion in Mencius?” p. 33. 
17 Ibid. 
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distress and its accompanying physiological changes, contains also the perception of the 
child in suffering or in danger. In other words, one’s compassion for the child focuses on 
the endangered child as its intentional object, and makes the child’s suffering, whether 
actual or forthcoming, appear to be the salient feature of the situation (thus the frame 
problem is solved). However, Wong argues, the cognitive function of compassion has 
more to contribute to our moral deliberation, because one’s compassion for the 
endangered child recognizes the child’s suffering as a reason to act to prevent or stop the 
suffering. In other words, “[t]he intentional object of compassion identifies the suffering 
of a sentient being not only as the salient feature of the situation, but as a reason for 
acting in helping ways.”18
The conception of practical reason that Wong argues to be found in Mengzi’s 
view of compassion is theoretically attractive in two respects, as Wong himself points out 
in comparison to the Humean means-ends reasoning model of practical reason. Under 
this model, the agent’s desires set the motivating ends of action, and practical reason 
simply tries to find out which action would serve as the best means to achieve the end set 
by one’s desire in a certain situation. And in the current case of compassion, this means-
ends reasoning model of practical reason would have it that 1) one’s compassion for the 
child involves a desire to save the child, and that 2) the motivating reason to perform a 
compassionate action for an agent is not the fact that the child is endangered but the fact 
that the agent has a desire to save the child. However, Wong argues that the picture of 
practical reason he attributes to Mengzi is better than the means-ends reasoning model in 
two respects: First, phenomenologically, it is more likely that the mental focus of the 
compassionate person who recognizes a reason to act is focused on the suffering of the 
child rather than turned inward to his own desire. And second, it is truer to our conception 
of what a compassionate person should be like that such a person would try to justify his 
compassionate action by referring to the other’s suffering rather than to the contingent 
fact that he happens to have a desire to free the child of its suffering. In other words, it 
should be the case that “the other’s suffering is for compassionate persons a reason to 
desire to help.”19
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 32. 
19 Ibid., p. 33. Emphasis is original. 
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With all its attractiveness, though, there is a huge discrepancy between 1) Wong’s 
delineation of compassion in Mengzi as significantly “cognitive” on one hand and 2) 
what his proposal—viz. that there is no distinction between reason and emotion in 
Mengzi—amounts to on the other hand. For arguing that moral emotions in Mengzi have 
important cognitive aspects does not prove that there is no additional conception of 
reason playing a crucial role in Mengzi’s moral philosophy, which is of a different kind 
than what Wong would find as embodied in Mengzi’s four sprouts. Furthermore, as I will 
argue later, the authors of the Mengzi are aware of cases where competing moral 
emotions pull the agent in different directions with reasons each characteristic of their 
corresponding emotions, and such cases require a radically different conception of 
practical reason from what Wong finds in Mengzi, which could arbitrate between 
different emotions with their own ethical demands. This in turn reveals the possibility 
that this latter conception of practical reason might appeal to certain kinds of moral 
standards or ethical concerns that do not derive from moral emotions in adjudicating the 
competing demands of those emotions. 
Moreover, I believe that it is not even true that all of Mengzi’s four sprouts are 
explicable as Wong explains compassion or cèyǐn zhī xīn. As I have argued in the 
previous chapter, the three moral emotions discussed there—compassion or familial 
affection (cèyǐn zhī xīn), respect (gōngjìng zhī xīn), and the feeling of shame and dislike 
(xiūwù zhī xīn)—are best interpreted as concern-based construals with the appearance of 
truth. The implication of ‘the appearance of truth’ here is that these emotions are not 
themselves beliefs or even judgments about how things are but merely a way in which 
things present themselves to the person who feels these emotions. In contrast, I think that 
shìfēi zhī xīn 是 非 之 心 , Mengzi’s fourth sprout, is largely equivalent to the 
psychological state we would call judgment, and that when shìfēi zhī xīn gets combined 
with any of Mengzi’s other three moral emotions, it elevates that emotion, previously a 
mere presentation of things to the person feeling that emotion, to the status of a kind of 
moral judgment that is subject to rational justification. In the following two sections, I 
argue for these points by discussing Mengzi’s conception of shìfēi zhī xīn 是非之心 and 
wisdom (zhì 智). 
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5.1.2 Shìfēi zhī xīn 是非之心 As Moral Judgment 
 
It has been a seldom doubted assumption among the students of Chinese philosophy that 
Mengzi’s four sprouts are similar in nature to each other, differing only in terms of the 
kinds of excellences or virtues they are supposed to develop into. Consequently, it has 
also usually been assumed that they can be treated together as a homogeneous group 
when explaining their nature. This assumption is implicit in Wong’s treatment of 
compassion as if his discussion of the “cognitive” aspects of compassion were also 
applicable to the case of the other three sprouts, and most recently Franklin Perkins joins 
this long tradition by saying that the four sprouts are equally natural emotions, and 
therefore one way to understand shìfēi zhī xīn is viewing it as analogous to the other three 
sprouts.20 However, this is an erroneous assumption, and by examining various pieces of 
evidence from the Mengzi we will see in the following that shìfēi zhī xīn denotes a 
markedly different psychological state than the other three sprouts do. 
Let us begin with the basic meaning and usage of the characters “shì” 是 and 
“fēi” 非: “Shì” usually means “this” (as either pronoun or adjective) and it is often used 
in the grammatical structure of “shì 是 A yě 也,” meaning “This is A.” On the other 
hand, “fēi” is a negative usually preceding a noun, and used in such a structure as “shì 是 
fēi 非 A yě 也” that means “This is not A.”21 In addition, “shì” is sometimes used as a 
copula (like the be-verb in English) connecting two nouns and thus establishing some sort 
of relationship between the two things these two nouns refer to, and “fēi” used as a 
negative in the place of such a “shì” to deny the relationship between two nouns before 
and after “fēi.”22 Moreover, “shì” can also mean “right” as an adjective or “to regard 
                                                 
20 Perkins, “Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy,” p. 219. 
21 For example, “挾太山以超北海, 語人曰, ‘我不能,’ 是誠不能也. 爲長者折枝, 語人曰, ‘我不能,’ 是
不爲也, 非不能也.” Mengzi 1A:7; “鄧文公問曰: ‘鄧, 小國也, 間於齊楚. 事齊乎? 事楚乎?’ 孟子對
曰 : ‘是謀非吾所能及也…’” Mengzi 1B:13. And alternatively, “shì” 是  is sometimes used as a 
pronominal predicate in the pattern of “A shì 是 yě 也,” meaning “A is this.” An example can be found in 
Mengzi 1B:10: “取之而燕民悅, 則取之. 古之人有行之者, 武王是也. 取之而燕民不悅, 則勿取. 
古之人有行之者, 文王是也.” I owe this point to William H. Baxter. 
22 Against the common assumption that the usage of “shì” 是 as a copula is quite late, we find two 
instances of such a usage of “shì” in the Mengzi: “王之不王, 非挾太山以超北海之類也; 王之不王, 是
折枝之類也 .” Mengzi 1A:7; “鈞是人也, 或爲大人, 或爲小人, 何也?” Mengzi 6A:15. In the first 
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(something) as right” as a verb, corresponding to “fēi” that can mean “wrong” or “to 
regard (something) as wrong.”23  Based on the meaning of these words, we could 
tentatively say that Mengzi’s shìfēi zhī xīn might denote a function of the mind (xīn 心) 
that is concerned with judgment about the nature or identity of a certain thing (e.g., “This 
is A.” or “This is not A but B.”); and when applied to the matters of morality, we could 
consider shìfēi zhī xīn to be about distinguishing right actions from wrong ones, a 
benevolent character from a selfish one, a shameful deed from an estimable one, and so 
forth. 
However, one might object, this explanation of shìfēi zhī xīn does not disprove 
previous scholars’ view of it as an ethical feeling that is similar in nature to the other 
three sprouts, because nothing said so far shows that shìfēi zhī xīn is really a judgment 
rather than some sort of special feeling or sensibility, or even a concern-based construal, 
that construes things in a particular way that may or may not represent the way things 
really are correctly. Moreover, as the objection might continue, if shìfēi zhī xīn is merely a 
moral feeling (i.e. a concern-based construal with the appearance of truth), it is highly 
possible that the person who feels shìfēi zhī xīn in a certain ethical situation sincerely 
holds a moral judgment that actually goes against what his shìfēi zhī xīn tells him. So, for 
example, a soldier can feel that his superior underestimated his services in a recent battle 
and consequently wronged him by not promoting him to the rank he deserves, while 
sincerely believing that his superior did not actually do anything wrong to him. Now, let 
me try to refute this objection. 
Previous scholars have sometimes complained that Mengzi said too little about 
his fourth sprout, leaving his view of this concept largely in the dark.24 This is a 
reasonable complaint to some extent, but if we could legitimately assume that Mengzi’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
passage, “shì” 是 is used in parallel with the negative copula “fēi” 非; and in the second passage, “shì” is 
followed by a complement (rén 人), while being modified by an adverb (“jūn” 鈞). These testify to the 
fact that “shì” 是 started to be used as a copula as early as in the Mengzi. 
23 For example, “一人則一義, 二人則二義, 十人則十義. 其人玆衆, 其所謂義者亦玆衆. 是以人是其
義, 以非人之義…” Mòzǐ 墨子, “Shàngtóng shàng” 尚同上. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzi xiángǔ, p. 74 (verb); “吾
聞夷子墨者. 墨之治喪也, 以薄爲其道也. 夷子思以易天下, 豈以爲非是而不貴也?” Mengzi 3A:5 
(noun); “掩之誠是也, 則孝子仁人之掩其親, 亦必有道矣.” Mengzi 3A:5 (noun or adjective).  
For further examples and explanation of these three uses of “shì” and “fēi,” see Wáng Lì et al. ed., 
Wáng Lì gǔhànyǔ zìdiǎn, p. 430 and p. 1623. My description of “shì” and “fēi” in this paragraph is more 
based on the explanation on p. 430. 
24 For example, see Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, p. 166. 
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shìfēi zhī xīn has much to do with his way of using the terms “shì” 是 and “fēi” 非 in 
the text, we actually have ample evidence to ground our understanding of shìfēi zhī xīn on, 
and our investigation of this evidence will show that shìfēi zhī xīn is a judgment, rather 
than merely a feeling about the way things are, with full commitment to truth. Now, let us 
examine the following passage first. In this passage, King Huì 惠 of Liáng 梁 asks 
Mengzi why the population of his country does not grow and that of the neighboring 
countries does not diminish, despite his governing his country with more benevolent 
policies than the other countries. Mengzi responds as follows: 
 
Mengzi said, “Since your majesty like war, let me explain by [an analogy to] war. Drums 
are thundering, weapons have already crossed, and [soldiers] are fleeing, having thrown 
away their armor, and dragging their weapons. One stops after [running] a hundred 
paces, and another stops after fifty paces. What would you think if the latter, having run 
fifty paces, laughed at the one who ran a hundred paces?” [The king] said, 
“Unacceptable. He merely didn’t run a hundred paces, but this is also fleeing.” [Mengzi] 
said, “If your majesty know this, you shouldn’t wish that your subjects were more 
numerous than those of the neighboring countries….Your dogs and swine eat the foods 
for humans, but you don’t know to put constraints on it; there are people dying of famine 
on the roads, but you don’t know to open your granaries; and when people die, you 
merely say ‘It’s not me, [it’s the bad] year.’ How is this different from killing a person by 
stabbing him and then saying that it’s not me, [it’s] the weapon? Don’t blame the year, 
your majesty; then all the people under the heaven will arrive at your place.”25
 
This passage contains two related factors to be discussed below that make shìfēi 
zhī xīn a kind of judgment. First, at Mengzi’s question of whether it is appropriate for the 
soldier who ran away fifty paces to laugh at the other one who went fifty paces more, the 
king says adamantly “No!” and supports his position by pointing out that the latter’s 
fleeing farther than the former does not make the former a non-coward, because both fled 
after all no matter how far they fled, and fleeing from the battlefield is an act of 
cowardice regardless of its distance. To make this point the king uses the aforementioned 
pattern “shì 是 A yě 也 (This is A)”—i.e. “this is also fleeing” (shì yì zǒu yě 是亦走
也); and from the fact that he utters this sentence as a reason for his negative attitude 
                                                 
25 “孟子對曰: ‘王好戰, 請以戰喩. 塡然鼓之, 兵刃旣接, 棄甲曳兵而走. 或百步而後止, 或五十步而
後止. 以五十步笑百步, 則何如?’ 曰: ‘不可. 直不百步耳, 是亦走也.’ 曰: ‘王如知此, 則無望民之多
於隣國也….狗彘食人食而不知檢, 塗有餓莩而不知發, 人死則曰, “非我也, 歲也.” 是何異於刺人而
殺之, 曰, “非我也, 兵也.” 王無罪歲, 斯天下之民至焉.’” Mengzi 1A:3. The underlining is mine. 
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toward the runaway soldier who laughed at another of his kind, we can see that this 
utterance of his—“This is also fleeing”—is a judgment fully loaded with commitment to 
truth rather than a mere feeling that the king may reject in the end as a mistaken thought. 
Or, we could alternatively say, this thought of the king’s becomes a judgment once the 
king regards it as a reason for his disapproval of the runaway soldier in question. 
Second, the phrase “shì 是 A yě 也” seems to be used in this passage not only 
for making a simple judgment but, with a little variance in form, also used for comparing 
more than two things and categorizing them according to their characteristic features. 
That is, at the king’s response that fleeing fifty paces and fleeing one hundred paces from 
the battlefield equally make acts of cowardice, Mengzi says that carrying out some 
benevolent policies such as moving the victims of famine to a region of relatively good 
harvest and bringing grain from that region to feed those struck by famine26 would not 
attract people towards the king, until he stops feeding his animals with the food for his 
people and opens his granaries for those starving in the streets. In doing this, Mengzi 
presses the king by asking him a rhetorical question how his blaming the year (i.e. the 
bad luck of the year) instead of blaming himself for his people’s suffering is different 
from someone’s blaming his weapon after killing a person using that weapon. In this 
question Mengzi uses “shì” 是 in the phrase “shì hé yì yú 是何異於… (how is this 
different from…),” and what Mengzi is doing here is to challenge the king to provide a 
reason that could refute Mengzi’s categorization of things. In other words, Mengzi here is 
judging that the king’s blaming bad luck for his people’s suffering is basically the same as 
blaming a mere instrument for one’s crime based on the consideration that both the king 
and the killer intentionally ignore their accountability for their misgovernment and 
murder respectively, and the word “shì” 是, which literally means “this” but which I also 
take to carry in its wake “the characteristic features” of “this thing”,27 is used by Mengzi 
in the categorization of or discrimination among things. 
                                                 
26 “河內凶, 則移其民於河東, 移其粟於河內. 河東凶亦然.” Ibid. 
27 That is, I think that when I point to a car and say to you “Tell me how this is different from the car over 
there,” your attention is not just drawn to the car in front of you (“this object”) but more importantly, at the 
same time, to the characteristic features of that car which may or may not distinguish it from the other one 
it is compared with. 
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Before moving on to the third factor that makes shìfēi zhī xīn a kind of judgment, 
I would like to elaborate this last point by quoting a portion of Mengzi 1A:7, which partly 
overlaps with what I quoted earlier when explaining cèyǐn zhī xīn. In this passage, 
Mengzi has now just pointed out to King Xuān that his compassion for the suffering of a 
mere ox is sufficient for him to become the king of the whole world, and now explains 
why it is so: 
 
[Mengzi] said, “If there were someone reporting to you that ‘my strength is sufficient to 
lift a hundred jūn 鈞, but not enough to lift a feather; my eyesight is sufficient to examine 
the tip of an autumn hair, but I cannot see a cartload of firewood,’ would your majesty 
accept that?” [The king] said, “No, I wouldn’t.” “Now, your kindness is sufficient to 
reach animals, but your benefits do not reach your people; why [should this case] alone 
[be an exception]? Therefore, not lifting a feather is due to not using [one’s] power; not 
seeing a cartload of firewood is due to not using [one’s] eyesight; people’s not getting 
taken care of is due to not using [your] kindness. So, your majesty’s not becoming the 
king [of the world] is [due to] your refusal to act, not due to your inability [to act].” 
 [The king] said, “What is the difference in form between refusal to act and 
inability to act?” [Mengzi] said, “[Concerning such a case like] holding Mount Tài under 
an arm and leaping over the North Sea, if one says to others ‘I’m not capable [of this],’ 
this is [a case of] real incapability. But as for cutting a branch [off a tree to make a 
walking stick] for an elderly person, if one says to others ‘I cannot,’ this is [a case of] 
refusing to act, not a case of being unable [to act].28 Therefore, your majesty’s not 
becoming a [true] king is not of the [same] kind as holding Mount Tài under an arm and 
leaping over the North Sea; your majesty’s not becoming a [true] king is of the [same] 
kind as cutting a branch [off a tree to make a walking stick].”29
 
In this passage, we see that Mengzi uses yet another variant of the “shì 是 A yě 也” 
pattern: “A shì 是 B zhī 之 lèi 類 yě 也” (A is of the same category as B) and “A fēi 
非 C zhī 之 lèi 類 yě 也” (A is not of the same category as C). And we also notice that 
in the first phrase “shì” 是 is used as a copula that affirms the relationship between A 
                                                 
28 The original text for “cutting a branch for an elderly person” can be alternatively interpreted as “bending 
one’s body for [bowing to] an elderly person” or “massaging the stiff joints of an elderly person.” Yáng 
Bójùn, Mèngzǐ yìzhù, p. 24. However, since bowing to an elder and massaging an elder’s body are also 
things that one can do voluntarily, Mengzi’s point remains intact with these alternative interpretations. 
29 “[孟子]曰: ‘有復於王者曰: “吾力足以擧百鈞, 而不足以擧一羽; 明足以察秋毫之末, 而不見輿薪,” 
則王許之乎?’ 曰: ‘否.’ ‘今恩足以及禽獸, 而功不至於百姓者, 獨何與? 然則一羽之不擧, 爲不用力
焉; 輿薪之不見, 爲不用明焉; 百姓之不見保, 爲不用恩焉. 故王之不王, 不爲也, 非不能也.’ 曰: 
‘不爲者與不能者之形, 何以異?’ 曰: ‘挾太山以超北海, 語人曰, “我不能,” 是誠不能也. 爲長者折枝, 
語人曰, “我不能,” 是不爲也, 非不能也. 故王之不王, 非挾太山以超北海之類也; 王之不王, 是折枝
之類也.’” Mengzi 1A:7. 
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and B, whereas in the second phrase “fēi” 非 is used to deny the relationship between A 
and C. Using these patterns, and based on his conviction that the king’s failing to show 
benevolence to his people is not because of his lacking the relevant capacity but because 
of his not making up his mind to do so, Mengzi says to the king that his not becoming the 
true king of the world does not belong to the category of impossible tasks such as leaping 
over the North Sea with Mount Tài under an arm, but to the category of highly possible 
tasks such as taking a branch from a tree to make a walking stick for an elderly person. 
And we see here that Mengzi’s categorization of things based on their similarity or 
dissimilarity acquires the status of judgment by his use of the affirmative form of copula 
(“shì” 是) and its negation (“fēi” 非). 
Now, let us turn to the third factor that makes shìfēi zhī xīn a kind of judgment: 
the use of “shì” and “fēi” as respectively “right” and “wrong” or “what is right” and 
“what is wrong,” and the rational or normative demand behind it to act consistently so 
that these terms could be consistently applied to one’s actions. Look at the following 
passage: 
 
Chén Zhēn 陳臻 asked: “Earlier [when you were] in Qí 齊, the king sent [you] a 
hundred yì 鎰 of metal, but you didn’t accept it; but in Sòng 宋, [the king] sent seventy 
yì [of metal] and you accepted it, and while in Xuē 薛, they sent fifty yì and you [also] 
accepted it. [However,] if your refusal on an earlier day were right, your accepting [a gift] 
recently should be wrong; and if your accepting it recently were right, your declining it 
on an earlier day should be wrong. I’m afraid the Master should have acted consistently 
for this matter.” 
 Mengzi said, “[My actions were] right in all of these cases. While staying in 
Sòng, I was about to go on a long journey; travelers are supposed to be [greeted] with a 
parting gift; and the message [accompanying the gift] was, ‘Presented as a parting gift.’ 
For what reason should I have refused it? While staying in Xuē, I was apprehensive [of 
my safety], and the message was ‘I heard about your taking precautions [for your safety], 
so I send this for [helping you purchase some] arms.’ For what reason should I have 
refused it? But as for [my staying] in Qí, I had no justification [for accepting a gift], and 
sending something [to a person] for no reason is bribing him. How could there be a 
nobleman who could be bought with a bribe?”30
                                                 
30 “陳臻問曰: ‘前日於齊, 王餽兼金一百, 而不受; 於宋, 餽七十鎰而受; 於薛, 餽五十鎰而受. 前日
之不受是, 則今日之受非也; 今日之受是, 則前日之不受非也. 夫子必居一於此矣.’ 孟子曰: ‘皆是
也. 當在宋也, 予將有遠行, 行者必以贐, 辭曰: “餽贐.” 予何爲不受? 當在薛也, 予有戒心, 辭曰: 
“聞戒, 故爲兵餽之.” 予何爲不受? 若於齊, 則未有處也. 無處而餽之, 是貨之也. 焉有君子而可以
貨取乎?’” Mengzi 2B:3. 
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In this passage, Mengzi’s disciple Chén Zhēn is asking his teacher whether there was any 
underlying principle behind Mengzi’s seemingly inconsistent actions on several 
occasions—accepting royal gifts here but declining them there. Chén Zhēn thinks that if 
Mengzi’s declining gifts on an earlier occasion were right (shì 是), his accepting them 
more recently should be wrong (fēi 非), and vice versa. And thinking this, Chén Zhēn 
seems to assume that one should act consistently (jūyī 居一) throughout all similar 
occasions; otherwise, one’s actions in such occasions cannot be all right, and this is 
problematic especially for a nobleman like Mengzi. However, Mengzi assures his disciple 
that there was nothing wrong or inconsistent in his actions. According to Mengzi, his 
actions on those three occasions were all right, but the reasons that made them right do 
not have to be the same throughout the occasions: Metal was given on one occasion as a 
parting gift when Mengzi was about to leave for a long journey, so it was right to accept 
it; on another occasion, Mengzi was facing a threat of attack, and the gift was sent to 
meet the expense for purchasing arms, so it was also right to accept it; but on the last 
occasion, Mengzi had no reason—or pretext as Mengzi’s critics might say—to accept a 
gift, so it was right not to accept it.  
However, we could also say that although the reasons behind Mengzi’s actions on 
those occasions were different from each other, Mengzi still acted according to a single 
principle, viz. the principle of rightness, and I think that Kongzi’s following remark, 
already once quoted above, would illustrate this point nicely: “In his dealings with [the 
affairs of] the world, the nobleman considers nothing as absolutely right or absolutely 
wrong. He follows only what is right [in a given circumstance].”31 Moreover, I also think 
that this “principle of rightness” is equivalent to the normative demand to follow 
whatever is judged to be right in a certain circumstance, and it is met in the current case 
by Mengzi’s willingness to do so. Furthermore, whether one is following this principle of 
rightness consistently or not should be checked by examining the reasons behind his 
actions, and Mengzi successfully proves that his actions were all consistent with this 
principle by providing persuasive reasons for his actions. And what all of these amount to 
concerning my discussion of shìfēi zhī xīn is that by declaring that one’s action in a 
                                                 
31 “君子之於天下也, 無適也, 無莫也, 義之與比.” Lunyu 4:10. 
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certain situation is right (shì 是) or that another person’s action is wrong (fēi 非), one is 
required or at least reasonably expected to provide a reason for declaring so, and this 
reason-giving activity makes one’s shì-ing and fēi-ing activity a judgment with full 
commitment to truth rather than a mere construal or a feeling. 
To summarize, I have argued that Mengzi’s shìfēi zhī xīn is a kind of judgment 
rather than a mere feeling by examining the way “shì” 是 and “fēi” 非 are used in the 
Mengzi. We have first seen that “shì” is used in the sense of “this” in the basic pattern of 
“shì 是 A yě 也” (This is A), which refers to the activity of making a judgment about 
the nature or identity of an object and submitting it as a reason for one’s evaluative 
attitude toward a certain event or a state of affairs. Next, we have seen that “shì” and “fēi” 
sometimes function as a copula and its negation in such grammatical patterns as “A shì 
是 B zhī 之 lèi 類 yě 也” (A is of the same category as B) and “A fēi 非 C zhī 之 lèi 
類 yě 也” (A is not of the same category as C), and that their usage in these patterns 
shows that Mengzian moral reasoning involves a more complicated judgmental activity 
of comparing more than two things and making discriminations among them according to 
their characteristic features. And finally, we have seen that “shì” and “fēi” can refer to the 
quality of rightness or wrongness of certain actions, and that when one declares one’s or 
someone else’s action to be right or wrong, one is reasonably expected to provide a 
reason for holding that view. And this fact that one is expected to provide a reason for 
taking a position about whether an action is right or wrong, and normally provides one’s 
best reason when requested to do so, in turn shows that shìfēi zhī xīn, or one’s taking a 
position about the rightness (shì 是) or wrongness (fēi 非) of a certain action, is a 
voluntary judgment rather than a feeling.32
                                                 
32 My argument so far that Mengzi’s shìfēi zhī xīn is a kind of judgment has been based on the so-called 
“internal” evidence from the text of Mengzi. However, although the term “shìfēi zhī xīn” is rarely found in 
the other ancient Chinese texts, the terms “shì,” “fēi,” and “shìfēi” seem to have been widely used across 
the philosophical “schools” in ancient China in the context of judgment and disputation. Among the extant 
writings on this topic, we find a lucid discussion in the Zhuāngzǐ that presents an interesting view that fuses 
“shì” 是 as an indexical (i.e. “this”) and “shì” in the sense of “right” (adjective) or “to consider 
(something) as right,” and I think that Zhuāngzǐ’s discussion of shì 是 and fēi 非 nicely echoes Mengzi’s 
philosophical use of the same terms. I would not delve into the discussion of the Zhuāngzǐ passages here, 
but an interested reader can find a good discussion of the relevant passages and translation of them in Chad 
Hansen, Language and Logic in Ancient China (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1983), 
pp. 91–95. 
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In principle, it seems that the usage of “shì” and “fēi” does not have to be 
confined only to the ethical realm, or to the realm of “prescription” as opposed to 
“description.” And it seems especially so when “shì” and “fēi” are used in the first two 
ways just summarized, i.e. as an indexical (“this”) and its negation (“not this”) on one 
hand and as a copula (“is”) and its negation (“is not”) on the other. For example, at the 
question of Duke Wén of Dèng 鄧文公 which country to serve in order to survive 
between two superpowers of Qí 齊 and Chǔ 楚, Mengzi simply confesses that this kind 
of deliberation is not what he is good at33; and the later Mohist logicians (roughly 
contemporaneous with Mengzi), probably concerned about the fallacy in reasoning due to 
confusion of categories, cautiously suggest that “Neither the oxen nor the horses are two 
[different categories,] but the oxen and the horses are two. Then, with the oxen being not 
non-oxen and the horses being not non-horses, there is no difficulty in [saying] that ‘the 
oxen and the horses [as grouped together] are neither oxen nor horses.’”34  
However, in the classical Chinese texts in general “shì” and “fēi” used in the third 
way, i.e. as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ or ‘to regard (something) as right’ and ‘to regard 
(something) as wrong,’ predominantly refer to the qualities that actions or moral 
teachings have35; and the later Mohist logicians’ seemingly purely theoretical interest in 
proper categorization of things is arguably driven in large part by their practical need to 
provide a guidance for proper action in everyday life and to win ethical debates with their 
rival thinkers. So, for example, the later Mohist logicians say: “Even though a thief is a 
person, there is no difficulty in [saying] that loving a thief is not loving a person, not 
loving a thief is not not loving a person, and killing a thief is not killing a person.”36  
                                                 
33 “鄧文公問曰: ‘鄧, 小國也, 間於齊楚. 事齊乎? 事楚乎?’ 孟子對曰: ‘是謀非吾所能及也…’” 
Mengzi 1B:13. 
34 “牛不二, 馬不二, 而牛馬二. 則牛不非牛, 馬不非馬, 而牛馬非牛非馬, 無難.” Mòzǐ, “Jīngshuō xià” 
經說下 (“The Explanations of the Canons”). Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiángǔ, p. 387. Cf. Angus C. Graham, 
Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1978), p. 439. 
35 For example, in the “Fēimìng” 非命 (“Criticizing Fatalism”) chapter of the Mòzǐ, Mòzǐ provides three 
criteria to examine a given doctrine with, and argues that such criteria are necessary for clearly determining 
whether a doctrine is right or wrong, and beneficial or harmful (Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiángǔ, pp. 265–266). A 
similar point is raised more frequently and explicitly in various places of Xúnzǐ 荀子 too. 
36 “雖盜人也, 愛盜非愛人也, 不愛盜非不愛人也, 殺盜非殺人也, 無難矣.” Mòzǐ, “Xiǎoqǔ” 小取 
(“Smaller Pick”). Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiángǔ, p. 418. The correction in the text follows Sūn’s emendation. 
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This use of the terms “shì” and “fēi” in the ethical context is very clear and 
frequent in the Mengzi too. For example, we have just seen a case above (Mengzi 2B:3) 
where “shì” and “fēi” respectively refer to the rightness and wrongness of certain actions, 
and a similar case can be found in Mengzi 7B:37 where Mengzi complains that the people 
known to be sincere and good among the villagers (xiāngyuàn 鄉愿) mistakenly consider 
themselves to be right (zì yǐ wéi shì 自以爲是).37 In addition, in various places of the 
Mengzi we observe that “shì” as an indexical (“this”) is used for classifying various kinds 
of actions, doctrines, or ethical positions into different categories of mistakes or vices. 
For example, Mengzi tells a hypothetical anecdote in Mengzi 3B:8 where someone’s 
stealing his neighbor’s chicken everyday is criticized by somebody else to be not the way 
of the nobleman.38 And in Mengzi 3B:9, Mengzi says that Yáng Zhū’s 楊朱 ethical 
position of egoism amounts to denying the importance of the ruler (shì wú jūn yě 是無君
也), and the Mohist doctrine of universal care ends up denying the importance of father 
(shì wú fù yě 是無父也). In other words, Mengzi’s point is that Yáng Zhū’s exclusive 
promotion of self-interest fails to see the importance of social values—represented by 
one’s duties to the ruler—in one’s ethical life, whereas Mòzǐ’s utmost altruism fails to 
appreciate the importance of family values—represented by one’s relationship with his 
father—in one’s ethical deliberation; and he concludes that those who deny the 
importance of these two kinds of values are not different from beasts (shì qínshòu yě 是
禽獸也).39  
I believe that combined with my initial assumption about the close relationship 
between the particular way “shì” and “fēi” are used in the Mengzi and Mengzi’s 
conception of shìfēi zhī xīn, the numerous instances of “shì” and “fēi” used in the Mengzi 
in the ethical context shows that shìfēi zhī xīn is not just any kind of judgment but 
primarily a kind of moral judgment. Then, my next task is to clarify what kind of moral 
judgment shìfēi zhī xīn is in Mengzi’s ethical thought. 
 
                                                 
37 Also consider Mengzi 3A:5 on the same point. 
38 “今有人日攘其鄰之雞者, 或告之曰: ‘是非君子之道.’…” Mengzi 3B:8. 
39 “楊氏爲我, 是無君也; 墨氏兼愛, 是無父也. 無父無君, 是禽獸也.” Mengzi 3B:9. The same point 
could have been made by citing Mengzi 11:10, 13:39, 13:46, 14:1, 14:23, 14:31, and 14:37. 
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5.1.3 Emotions and Wisdom (Zhì 智) 
 
According to Mengzi, shìfēi zhī xīn is the sprout of wisdom (zhì 智)40, and in order to 
acquire this intellectual virtue, one needs to “enlarge” (kuò 擴) and “feed on” (chōng 充) 
one’s shìfēi zhī xīn.41 What “enlarging” and “feeding on” exactly mean in Mengzi’s 
theory of moral cultivation is a question to be discussed in the next chapter; but since 
“zhì” 智 refers to the intellectual excellence that shìfēi zhī xīn is supposed to develop 
into, we could clarify to some extent what kind of moral judgment shìfēi zhī xīn is by 
studying the primary contents of this Mengzian wisdom and some examples showing 
how Mengzi tried to help his disciples develop their zhì 智. By doing this, in this section 
I ultimately aim to show that 1) Mengzi’s conception of practical reason deals with not 
only the reasons for action recognized by moral emotions such as compassion, but also 
other kinds of ethical concerns that can hardly be detected by moral emotions; and that 2) 
when making an all-things-considered moral judgment, the ideal Mengzian agent takes 
into consideration both kinds of reasons for action—i.e., those detected by moral 
emotions and those that are not—and arbitrates between them as appropriate. This will in 
turn show that 3) Mengzi’s conception of practical reason is not to be confined to the 
“cognitive” aspects of certain ethical emotions, and consequently that there is a clear 
distinction between reason and emotion in Mengzi’s ethical thought. 
I just rendered “zhì” 智 as “wisdom,” but “zhì” 智 is actually used in a more 
complicated way in the Mengzi. So, in order to understand Mengzi’s conception of 
wisdom properly, we need to know the various ways “zhì” is used in the Mengzi and how 
they contribute to the meaning of “zhì” as wisdom. First of all, when used as a noun, 
“zhì” can refer to “intelligence,” i.e. the intellectual capacity of human beings that makes 
knowledge or the learning of a skill possible. For example, in Mengzi 2A:2 Mengzi 
comments that Kongzi’s three disciples Zǎi Wǒ 宰我, Zǐgòng 子貢, and Yǒu Ruò 有若 
had enough intelligence (zhì 智) to appreciate Kongzi’s virtue properly.42 And in Mengzi 
                                                 
40 “是非之心, 智之端也.” Mengzi 3A:6. 
41 “凡有四端於我者, 知皆擴而充之矣…苟能充之, 足以保四海; 苟不充之, 不足以事父母.” Ibid. 
42 “宰我, 子貢, 有若, 智足以知聖人.” Mengzi 2A:2. 
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6A:9, Mengzi talks about two hypothetical people learning together to play a game called 
yì 弈: Both learn from the best player of the game in the whole country, but one fully 
concentrates on his teacher’s instructions whereas the other, though listening to his 
teacher, at the same time thinks about shooting with his bow a swan that he thinks might 
come to their place shortly. Mengzi says that the latter person can never get as good at 
playing yì as the former one, and this is not because the latter’s intelligence (zhì 智) falls 
short of that of the former’s.43
These two passages already tell us many things about wisdom in Mengzi. From 
the first passage (Mengzi 2A:2) we see that being able to appreciate a sage’s virtuous 
character (literally “knowing the sage” (zhī shèngrén 知聖人)) is part of what Mengzi 
conceives as wisdom (zhì 智), and this ability requires some degree of intelligence as a 
necessary condition. However, the second passage makes it clear that one’s having 
intelligence does not make one good at anything by itself; one also needs to exert one’s 
intelligence to the utmost to achieve anything. This is also true for the case of achieving 
wisdom, because Mengzi originally takes the example of the two people learning the yì 
game just to illustrate this point: 
 
No wonder that the king is not wise. Even a plant that most easily grows cannot survive if 
you expose it to the sun for one day and leave it in the cold for ten days. I [have the 
opportunity to] meet with him only rarely, and once I leave, those who make him cold 
arrive; what could I do if he had some sprout [of wisdom]? Now as for the game of yì 弈, 
it is a small art; but you cannot master it if you don’t [engage in it] with full 
concentration…44
 
Mengzi is clear in this passage that wisdom is not what one is fully born with, but what 
one should cultivate and grow through a long period of incessant training. 
Second, Mengzi is aware of the possibility that intelligence can be misused or 
abused. He seems to think that intelligence can easily get off the track and fiddle with 
wrong things, and only the proper use of intelligence leads to “great” wisdom: 
                                                 
43 “奕秋, 通國之善奕者也. 使奕秋誨二人奕, 其一人專心致志, 惟奕秋之爲聽; 一人雖聽之, 一心以
爲有鴻鵠將至, 思援弓缴而射之. 雖與之俱學, 弗若之矣. 爲是其智弗若與? 曰, 非然也.” Mengzi 
6A:9. 
44 “無或乎王之不智也. 雖有天下易生之物也, 一日暴之, 十日寒之, 未有能生者也. 吾見亦罕矣, 吾
退而寒之者至矣, 吾如有萌焉何哉? 今夫奕之爲數, 小數也, 不專心致志, 則不得也.” Ibid. 
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The discourses on the nature [of things] in the world are after all [the pursuit of] the 
underlying principles. What I call the “underlying principles” take ease to be their 
fundamental [characteristic]. What is to be hated about intelligence is its [potentiality to] 
investigate [things and making changes] against the nature of things. If a smart person 
[could use his intelligence] as Yǔ 禹 directed the waters, there is nothing to hate about 
intelligence. Yǔ directed the waters by doing things that could be done without much 
trouble. If a smart person could do [only] what can be done without much trouble, [his] 
wisdom would be great. Despite the height of the heaven and the distance of the stars, 
one can calculate the solstice of a thousand years hence while sitting in his seat [only] if 
he sought [and got] the underlying principles.45
 
What I rendered as “underlying principles” above is “gù” 故. According to Graham’s 
observation, “gù” 故  is phonetically and graphically descended from “gǔ” 古 
(“antiquity” or “the past”), and refers to what lies behind something either in its past or at 
its basis. And specifically in the later Mohist writings, gù 故 can refer to the further facts 
behind certain facts, which provide reasons or justifications for what one says about the 
latter group of facts, or to the facts behind certain facts, which constitute the causes from 
which the latter group of facts come about.46 Mengzi would probably agree to these 
general descriptions of “gù” 故, but Mengzi adds that gù 故 (“reasons” or “causes”) can 
be found only by those with great wisdom, and the understanding of them makes one’s 
work nice and easy (lì 利). Mengzi’s example of ease in working with one’s intelligence 
is the legendary sage king Yǔ’s 禹 treatment of the great flood. According to the 
description in the “Gāo Yáo mó” 皐陶謨 chapter of the Book of Documents, Yǔ 
deepened the channels and canals so that extra water could get into the rivers, and cut 
passages for the nine rivers so that they could [naturally] flow to the seas.47 As Legge has 
perceptively pointed out, Mengzi describes Yǔ’s treatment of the flood as “xíngshuǐ” 行
水 (“guiding the waters” or “letting the waters move”) rather than “zhìshuǐ” 治水 
                                                 
45 “天下之言性也, 則故而已矣. 故者以利爲本. 所惡於智者, 爲其鑿也. 如智者若禹之行水也, 則無
惡於智矣. 禹之行水也, 行其所無事也. 如智者亦行其所無事也, 則智亦大矣. 天之高也, 星辰之遠
也, 苟求其故, 千歲之日至, 可坐而致也.” Mengzi 4B:26. 
46 Angus C. Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1978), 
pp. 263–264. 
47 “予決九川, 距四海; 濬畎澮, 距川.” Shàngshū 尚書, “Gāo Yáo mó” 皐陶謨. Sūn Xīngyǎn, Shàngshū 
jīngǔwén zhùshū, pp. 91–92. Cf. Bernhard Karlgren, ed. and trans., The Book of Documents (Stockholm: 
Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, 1950; reprinted from The Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern 
Antiquities 22), p. 9. 
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(“controlling the waters”)48, and this description emphasizes that Yǔ’s work was done 
smoothly because Yǔ investigated water properly and got the underlying principles 
behind its movement. 
It follows from this passage that Mengzi’s wisdom involves certain amount of 
knowledge of gù 故 (reasons or causes). And in the passage just quoted above, the kind 
of knowledge involved is scientific. However, gù 故 or reasons and causes do not have 
to be confined to the realm of natural philosophy, because in the Mengzi we often find 
them meaningfully discussed in the context of moral philosophy too. For example, at 
King Huì’s 惠 response in Mengzi 1A:3 (quoted in the previous section) that there is no 
difference between running away from the battlefield fifty paces and one hundred paces, 
Mengzi says that “If your majesty know this, you shouldn’t wish that your subjects were 
more than those of your neighboring countries.” The point Mengzi is trying to make here 
is that if the king knows that running away fifty paces and running away one hundred 
paces are equally cowardly actions, the king should also know, through analogical 
reasoning, that adopting some benevolent policies in the governing of his country does 
not make his government benevolent enough to attract people in the world to his country; 
and if the king realizes this, this fact should also function as a reason for the king to stop 
wishing to have more subjects than his rivaling countries. In this light, despite no 
mentioning of “gù” 故 at all in this passage, we can clearly see that this fact—i.e. 
adopting a couple of benevolent policies does not make the king’s government 
benevolent enough—clearly plays the role of gù 故, which is the proper object of the 
king’s knowledge and the knowledge of which enables the king to assess his situation 
wisely. 
Finally, there are two miscellaneous uses of “zhì” 智 in the Mengzi. On one hand, 
in Mengzi 2A:2 Mengzi delivers a conversation purportedly between Kongzi and his 
disciple Zǐgòng 子貢, where “zhì” 智 seems to refer to love of learning. According to 
Mengzi, when Zǐgòng asked Kongzi whether he was a sage, Kongzi replied that merely 
being not sick of learning and not tired of teaching, he was not able to become a sage. 
                                                 
48 James Legge, The Works of Mencius, 2nd ed. The Chinese Classics, vol. II (Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 
2000), p. 331. 
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Despite this reply, Zǐgòng still concluded that Kongzi must be a sage, saying that not 
being sick of learning is nothing but zhì 智, and not being tired of teaching is nothing but 
benevolence (rén 仁).49 On the other hand, in Mengzi 4A:4 “zhì” 智 seems to be used 
as an effort to use one’s intelligence sincerely so as to achieve one’s desired goal. Mengzi 
says that “If others do not love you when you love them, turn inward and see whether you 
were benevolent enough; if people are not governed well when you [try to] govern them, 
turn inward and see whether you were wise enough; and if others do not return your 
courtesy [in a proper manner], turn inward and see whether you were respectful 
enough.”50 That is, Mengzi says that benevolence and respect could get more effective by 
one’s voluntary effort to be sincere in enacting or expressing them, and the parallel 
between zhì 智, benevolence, and respect in this passage makes it likely that Mengzi is 
also commenting on the voluntary aspect of zhì 智. As I see it, Mengzi’s point about zhì 
智 here is that when one fails to govern one’s country well, one should blame one’s not 
thinking carefully through all of the factors relevant to governing it, and this in turn 
makes the “zhì” 智 in the original text be interpreted not as the perfect virtue of wisdom 
but as a proper intellectual attitude required of whoever wants to become, or is already, 
wise: carefully considering all the relevant factors in a certain situation. In short, together 
with love of learning, sincerity in using one’s intellectual power constitutes an important 
character trait of anyone aspiring to wisdom. 
My analysis of “zhì” 智 in the Mengzi so far shows that wisdom (zhì 智) in 
Mengzi can be acquired by using one’s intelligence in full concentration and over a long 
period of time; those aspiring to wisdom are also fond of learning and thorough in 
deliberation considering all of the relevant factors; and “great wisdom” (dàzhì 大智) or 
wisdom in the proper sense can be acquired when one grasps gù 故 (“reasons” or 
“causes”) of things. We have also seen that in the realm of natural philosophy or practical 
science, wisdom seems to grow from the knowledge of the underlying principles (gù 故) 
behind things; but in the realm of moral philosophy, the nature of gù 故 in the ethical 
                                                 
49 “昔者子貢問於孔子曰: ‘夫子聖矣乎?’ 孔子曰: ‘聖則吾不能, 我學不厭而敎不倦也.’ 子貢曰: ‘學
不厭, 智也; 敎不倦, 仁也. 仁且智, 夫子旣聖矣.’” Mengzi 2A:2. 
50 “愛人不親, 反其仁; 治人不治, 反其智; 禮人不答, 反其敬.” Mengzi 4A:4. 
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context makes wisdom primarily 1) the capacity to focus on the crucial features of a 
certain situation that characterize the situation one way or another in ethical terms—e.g. 
judging that fleeing fifty paces and fleeing one hundred paces are equally cowardly 
actions without being distracted by their difference in distance of fleeing, 2) the capacity 
of analogical reasoning through which one can move from one case to another of a 
similar kind in ethical terms—e.g. deriving from the case of two runaway soldiers that 
adopting some benevolent policies does not make one’s government really benevolent, 
and 3) the capacity to see what kind of action or attitude one is required to do or take by 
having the knowledge of the previous two kinds—e.g. seeing that one should not expect 
to have more subjects than other countries as long as one acknowledges that adopting a 
couple of benevolent policies does not make one’s government really benevolent, just as 
fleeing fifty paces less than another does not make one less cowardly. 
Then, it is clear that the cultivation of wisdom in Mengzi’s moral philosophy at 
least involves cultivating the three kinds of intellectual capacities just described, and we 
need to see at this point whether there would be other kinds of intellectual activities that 
one should also engage in to acquire wisdom, and what the place of moral emotions is in 
all of these activities that would eventually form wisdom in one’s mind when 
successfully done over a long period of time. In the following, I will first discuss a couple 
of passages in the Mengzi that testify to the importance of emotions in moral judgment, 
but then I will argue that the activity of weighing (quán 權) different reasons for action 
in a deliberative context requires that there be certain ethical concerns in Mengzi’s 
thought that are not adequately captured by his conception of moral emotions. This will 
in turn show that Mengzi’s conception of practical reason cannot be confined to the 
“cognitive” aspects of moral emotions, and consequently that there is a clear distinction 
between reason and emotion in Mengzi’s ethical thought. 
In Mengzi 4A:27, Mengzi specifies the core behaviors of his four cardinal virtues. 
He says: 
 
The core of humaneness is to serve one’s parents; the core of righteousness is to obey 
one’s elder brothers; the core of wisdom is to know [the value of] these two and hold fast 




By comparing this passage to a similar one from elsewhere in the Mengzi, we know that 
“serving one’s parents” could stand for “treating one’s kin with affection” or more 
literally “treating close people as close” (qīnqīn 親親), and “obeying one’s elder 
brothers” could represent more broadly “respecting the elders in general” (jìngzhǎng 敬
長).52 Apparently, such elements as benevolence, self-respect, or sense of honor that we 
have previously seen constituting important components of Mengzi’s conception of 
humaneness (rén 仁) and righteousness (yì 義) are missing from his description of these 
virtues here; but it should not affect my discussion of zhì 智 below, because what I am 
trying to do for now is not to determine the full contents of rén 仁 and yì 義 in Mengzi, 
but to understand a specific way that zhì 智 relates to rén 仁 and yì 義 no matter what 
their full contents are. In the passage above, Mengzi says that the core of wisdom is “to 
know the two [virtues of humaneness and righteousness] and hold fast to them,” and the 
phrase “holding fast to them”—or literally “not abandoning them” (fúqù 弗去)—reveals 
that the kind of knowing involved here is to appreciate the values that such activities as 
serving one’s parents and obeying one’s elder brothers embody.53 And from the fact 
(discussed in the previous chapter) that these activities are not merely motivationally 
neutral behaviors but actions whose motives are expressed by the accompanying 
emotions of familial affection and respect for elders, we could also see that the kind of 
appreciation occurring here is not just of the value of these activities but the value of the 
motives carried by the relevant emotions. In other words, Mengzi is declaring in this 
passage that the core of wisdom is the capacity to appreciate the value of the humane and 
righteous motives involved in certain activities; and from the fact that such motives are 
felt in the form of emotions like familial affection and respect for elders, wisdom’s 
appreciation of the values revealed by these motives simultaneously involves its 
                                                 
51 “仁之實, 事親是也; 義之實, 從兄是也; 智之實, 知斯二者弗去是也; 禮之實, 節文斯二者是也.” 
Mengzi 4A:27. 
52 “親親, 仁也; 敬長, 義也.” Mengzi 7A:15. 
53 For my interpretation of zhì 智 as involving appreciation of values embodied in certain activities, I owe 
a lot to Stephen Darwall. See his Welfare and Rational Care (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2002), especially Chapter IV. 
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affirmation of the related moral emotions as providing reasons for action. 
We notice that this point is corroborated in several places of the Mengzi, in 
relation to several different moral emotions and desire. First, in Mengzi 1A:7, we see that 
King Xuān 宣 of Qí 齊 tells Mengzi he saved an ox from being killed for a sacrificial 
ceremony because he felt compassion for it, and the king uses the word “gù” 故 to 
specify his reason for action: “I couldn’t bear [to see] it cowering, like an innocent [man] 
going to the execution ground; that’s why I replaced it with a sheep.”54 We find similar 
examples concerning xiūwù zhī xīn 羞惡之心 and desire for honor too: In Mengzi 2A:9, 
Bó Yí is described to have declined contemporary rulers’ offers of an office based on his 
aversion to vice,55 and Mengzi says in Mengzi 6A:10 that he would choose honor over 
life when situation requires a choice between these two, because he desires the former 
more than the latter and this is also how human beings in general actually desire things 
sometimes and would always do in their original and ideal state of mind.56 Since 
Mengzi’s choice of what is honorable is based on his strong desire that finds a lofty kind 
of value in honor, and also because he claims that this is the normal way of human action, 
we could say that besides particular moral emotions such as compassion, respect, and 
shame, desire for morality in a broad sense and aversion to vice can also guide one’s 
choice behavior, and consequently are important contributors to wisdom in Mengzi’s 
ethical thought. 
However, this is not the end of the story. For in several places of the Mengzi we 
find Mengzi and his interlocutors discussing hard cases of deliberation where different 
moral emotions conflict with each other with their own characteristic ethical demands, or 
a certain ethical value embodied in an emotion competes with another ethical value 
which is not grounded in an emotion. In such cases a special function of the mind (xīn 心) 
is required that would make the final decision about what to do by weighing the 
competing ethical demands (either emotionally or non-emotionally grounded), and this 
activity is sometimes called “quán” 權 by Mengzi. In the following, I examine several 
                                                 
54 “卽不忍其觳觫, 若無罪而就死地, 故以羊易之也.” Mengzi 1A:7. Italic is mine. 
55 “伯夷, 非其君, 不事, 非其友, 不友…推惡惡之心, 思與鄕人立, 其冠不正, 望望然去之, 若將浼
焉. 是故諸侯雖有善其辭命而至者, 不受也.” Mengzi 2A:9. The underlining is mine. 
56 “生亦我所欲也, 義亦我所欲也. 二者不可得兼, 舍生而取義者也. 生亦我所欲, 所欲有甚於生者, 
故不爲苟得也…非獨賢者有是心也; 人皆有之, 賢者能勿喪耳.” Mengzi 6A:10. 
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important passages from the Mengzi where Mengzi shows his disciples and theoretical 
rivals how to engage in this activity correctly, and I will argue that Mengzi’s discussion 
of the activity of quán 權 requires that his conception of practical rationality go beyond 
the “rationality of emotions.” 
In Mengzi 4A:17, a person named Chúnyú Kūn 淳于髡 challenges Mengzi by 
asking what should be done when one’s sister-in-law is drowning. Before asking this 
question he secures the point from Mengzi that according to the social norms (lǐ 禮) men 
and women are not supposed to make a physical contact when giving and receiving 
things, and he presses Mengzi by asking whether one should rescue one’s drowning 
sister-in-law by giving a hand in violation of the social norm. At this question, Mengzi 
says that it would be a beast who just stands and lets his sister-in-law drown; according to 
Mengzi, “it is according to the social norms for men and women not to touch each other 
in giving and receiving, but it is responding to the demand of the exigency for one to 
rescue his sister-in-law with the hand when she drowns.” 57  This passage can be 
interpreted in terms of the conflict between a rule which is meant to contribute to 
maintaining social order by discouraging unnecessary physical contacts between the 
sexes and one’s moral emotion which construes one’s relative to be valuable either as a 
human being or as a member of one’s family. In other words, this passage is about the 
conflict between the ethical demand of an inculcated social norm and the demand of 
cèyǐn zhī xīn 惻隱之心, and Mengzi says that it is “responding to the demand of the 
exigency” that one finally judges the latter should have the upper hand in this situation. 
What I rendered above as “responding to the demand of the exigency” is “quán” 
權. Zhào Qí 趙岐 says that ‘quán’ 權 means ‘[bringing about] good by going against 
the normal way [of acting],’58 and probably this gloss can be traced back to the saying in 
the Chūnqiū Gōngyáng zhuàn 春秋公羊傳 that “what is called ‘quán’ 權 is to have a 
good result after going against what is normal.”59 However, any reasonable decision to go 
                                                 
57 “男女授受不親, 禮也; 嫂溺, 援之以手者, 權也.” Mengzi 4A:17. My translation of “quán” 權 this 
way is based on some traditional commentaries on the term. I discuss these commentaries and the full 
meaning of “quán” in the next paragraph. 
58 “權者, 反經而善也.” Zhào Qí 趙岐, Mèngzǐ zhù 孟子注, in Yasui Kō, Mōshi teihon, 卷七, p. 19. 
59 “權者, 反於經然後有善者也.” Chūnqiū Gōngyáng zhuàn 春秋公羊傳, Huángōng 桓公 11. Quoted in 
Yáng Bójùn, Mèngzǐ yìzhù, p. 178. 
 243
against what is a normal way of acting in a certain situation postulates a preceding 
assessment of the situation taking all of its relevant factors into consideration, and this 
leads us to exploring a more fundamental meaning of the term. According to Zhū Xī, 
“quán” 權 refers to the weight hanging from a scale; when measuring the weight of a 
certain thing, we move it back and forth on the scale until we get the point of balance.60 
In this light, “quán” 權 can also refer to the activity of weighing things using a scale 
(chèng 稱) and a weight (quán 權),61 and in the context of deliberation it refers to the 
activity of considering all of the relevant factors in a certain situation and responding to 
them appropriately by making an all-things-considered ethical judgment.62  
Now back in Mengzi 4A:17, what are being weighed are the importance of one’s 
sister-in-law’s life that is registered through one’s cèyǐn zhī xīn and the importance of a 
rule that is inculcated in oneself as a means to maintain social order. This shows that 
besides cèyǐn zhī xīn, which Mengzi claims to be a natural sprout of virtue growing in the 
heart of every individual, Mengzi also accepts the need to maintain social order by 
regulating the number of physical contacts between sexes as an important moral 
consideration. As I see it, this need to segregate different sexes according to some criteria 
originates from the observation that many humans are prone to be attracted by the 
opposite sex and can bring about problematic consequences, and in this light it could be 
said that the ancient Chinese rule discussed in this passage is grounded in the practical 
need to control this problematic human condition rather than in any spontaneous moral 
emotions. If this is correct, we could also say that Mengzi’s conception of practical 
reason is not confined to the “cognitive” aspect of moral emotions, because the Mengzian 
agent considers not only the reasons for action embodied in moral emotions like cèyǐn zhī 
xīn but also the non-emotionally grounded reasons for action such as the need to regulate 
the problematic sexual desire of human beings. 
                                                 
60 “權, 稱錘也. 稱物輕重而往來以取中者也.” Zhū Xī 朱熹, Mèngzǐ jízhù 孟子集註, in Yasui Kō, 
Mōshi teihon, 卷七, p. 20. 
61 For example, “權, 然後知輕重.” ([One] knows the weight [of a thing] after weighing [it].) Mengzi 1A:7. 
62 In his recent book, Mark Csikszentmihalyi discusses an interesting theoretical possibility that virtues in 
Mengzi could be “reducible to a common quasi-material substance” so that one can resolve seemingly 
conflicting demands of different virtues by measuring their pulls on a common scale. See his Material 
Virtue: Ethics and the Body in Early China (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004), p. 6 and Chapter 3, especially 
pp. 113–127. 
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One might argue, though, that the rule prohibiting physical contact between men 
and women in certain circumstances in ancient China is actually grounded on a moral 
emotion, and therefore the agent in Mengzi 4A:17 is dealing with nothing but emotionally 
grounded reasons for action. For Mengzi says in Mengzi 3B:3 that a couple having 
premarital sex without waiting for their parents’ orders or the matchmakers’ arrangements 
are despised not only by the people in town but also by their own parents,63 and the kind 
of contempt or disgust going on here could be what also grounds the ban on physical 
contact between the sexes in certain situations. This is a reasonable objection, but it still 
fails to refute my thesis, for two reasons.  
First, I will discuss a passage below that is about the conflict between filial piety 
and legal justice, and the fact that the concept of legal justice or fairness is hardly 
grounded in any emotions will once again prove my thesis that Mengzi’s conception of 
practical reason is more than the “rational” aspect of emotions. Second, even if we grant 
that Mengzi 4A:17 is about the conflict between two competing moral emotions, one still 
needs to accept my thesis. For when the Mengzian agent eventually decides to act on his 
cèyǐn zhī xīn for his drowning sister-in-law rather than the rule supported by his aversion 
to touching his sister-in-law illegitimately, the rationale behind his decision is different 
from the kind of reason embodied in his cèyǐn zhī xīn. In other words, what makes the 
agent choose to act on his cèyǐn zhī xīn instead of the rule is the consideration that the 
former is a concern of greater significance than the latter in that situation, and this 
consideration is markedly different from his cèyǐn zhī xīn’s construal of the situation that 
his drowning sister-in-law deserves to be saved with whatever means available. 
Before moving on to our next passage, I need to consider Eric Hutton’s 
interpretation of the current passage. For he views the situation in question as a conflict 
between two kinds of desires—i.e., emotions in a broad sense—and argues that the 
deliberative conflict involving two competing desires can be resolved at the level of those 
desires without appealing to a higher faculty or function of the mind that could assess the 
situation from a perspective different from that of either desire. According to Hutton, 
Mengzi 4A:17 could be interpreted to be about the conflict between “a desire to adhere to 
                                                 
63 “丈夫生而願爲之有室, 女子生而願爲之有家; 父母之心, 人皆有之. 不待父母之命, 媒妁之言, 鑽
穴隙相窺, 踰牆相從, 則父母國人皆賤之…” Mengzi 3B:3. For the full translation and discussion of this 
passage, see Section 4.3.3.2 of the previous chapter. 
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the dictates of ritual” and “a desire to save one’s relative”64 (the latter possibly being an 
instance of cèyǐn zhī xīn, as Hutton suggests), and it is by the weighing (quán 權) of 
these desires that the Mengzian agent comes to judge that the latter desire is more 
important to act on in the situation. Hutton acknowledges that this activity of weighing is 
a kind of deliberative reasoning, but he denies that reasoning itself decides which of these 
two impulses should have the upper hand in the situation. Instead, he argues that 
reasoning can only aid in the decision: “Reasoning does not per se provide judgments of 
right and wrong, but through analyzing and comparing the two alternatives and their 
consequences it clarifies the circumstances so that the agent can assess which of them 
ultimately engages her intuitive reactions more strongly.”65
However, the last part of this remark sounds somewhat equivocal, because Hutton 
uses a term with evaluative connotation (viz. “assess”) in a plain descriptive structure 
(“engages”). It could have been something like “…so that the agent can assess which of 
them should ultimately engage her intuitive reactions more strongly,” but Hutton would 
not allow this kind of rendering because in his view, reasoning or reflective thinking in 
Mengzi cannot produce the final judgment of which impulse is right to act on in the 
situation. Alternatively, and perhaps more charitably, what Hutton meant by this remark 
could be that once the agent understands his situation clearly in terms of the relative 
importance of his preferences’ objects and the consequences resulting from his acting on 
either of the desires, the agent’s original desires are transformed into informed ones, 
whose strengths now correspond exactly to the relative importance the agent sees in the 
objects of his desires. In other words, the role of reasoning or reflective thinking in 
Mengzi is to help the agent understand the situation in question clearly, and this 
understanding of the situation results in the readjustment of the relative strengths of 
desires. And the important point is that this readjustment occurs among the desires 
spontaneously or without the interference of any authoritative conception of practical 
reason, and as long as one has a dispassionate understanding of the situation,66 one can 
                                                 
64 Hutton, “Moral connoisseurship in Mengzi,” p. 178. 
65 Ibid. 
66 I borrow the term “dispassionate” from Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1983), pp. 94–96. What Darwall means by “dispassionate” is not that the agent is immune 
to the attractiveness of his desires’ objects, but that he can make an unprejudiced judgment between them 
by taking an impartial standpoint. 
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judge which desire to act on merely by observing which (informed) desire he feels more 
strongly in the situation as he understands now. 
However, if this is what Hutton meant, I am afraid that this is not the correct 
picture of deliberative reasoning and moral judgment that we could attribute to Mengzi. 
As I see it, this picture is too optimistic to be a description of the situations we often find 
ourselves in, and therefore we could legitimately suspect that the view of moral judgment 
just delineated, if Mengzi ever held such a view, would also be only true for the case of 
sages or highly cultivated noblemen. In other words, we often find it to be the case that 
the very thing which is in the way of our cool, dispassionate understanding of a certain 
situation is our desire that makes its object more attractive than it should look to us, and it 
is in no other than such a situation that we turn to our reasoning or reflective thinking as a 
corrective measure independent of the ways that we are compelled to see things by our 
desires. Moreover, it is often observed in the philosophical literature and sometimes 
articulated as the problem of akrasia or the weakness of will that one’s desires are 
generally too stubborn to obey one’s best judgment, and I think it unlikely that Mengzi 
would have thought very differently.  
Admittedly, in Mengzi 6A:10 Mengzi says that he would choose honor over life in 
a situation where he is allowed only to choose one because he wants the former more 
than the latter, just as he likes both a bear’s paw and fish but would choose the bear’s paw 
if he had to choose between them.67 However, as Mengzi makes it clear in the same 
passage, most people want honor more than life only sporadically or only in their 
original—which is also ideal in Mengzi—state of mind,68 and this implies that in order 
for an ordinary person (in terms of moral cultivation) to want things properly against his 
habitual stream of desires, he needs to be able to take a standpoint outside of his desires 
and weigh things differently from the way he would do if he were following either of his 
desires.  
                                                 
67 “魚, 我所欲也, 熊掌亦我所欲也. 二者不可得兼, 舍魚而取熊掌者也. 生亦我所欲也, 義亦我所欲
也. 二者不可得兼, 舍生而取義者也. 生亦我所欲, 所欲有甚於生者, 故不爲苟得也. 死亦我所惡, 
所惡有甚於死者, 故患有所不辟也…” Mengzi 6A:10. 
68 “由是則生而有不用也, 由是則可以辟患而有不爲也. 是故所欲有甚於生者, 所惡有甚於死者. 非
獨賢者有是心也; 人皆有之, 賢者能勿喪耳.” Ibid. 
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In addition, we can find in the Mengzi a good example of emotional backsliding, 
or the situation where a person of some degree of moral cultivation falls back to succumb 
to his old temptation and do what is not morally desirable: Once there was a famine in Qí 
齊, and Mengzi’s disciple Chén Zhēn 陳臻 asked Mengzi whether he would try to have 
a national granary open to the people once again (Mengzi did this before) so that the 
people could avoid starving. At this question, Mengzi said:  
 
[Doing] this would be becoming a Féng Fù 馮婦. There was a person from Jìn 晉 
whose name was Féng Fù. He was good at seizing tigers with his bare hands, but he 
eventually became a well-cultivated gentleman. One day he happened to go out to a field 
where a crowd was chasing a tiger. The tiger ended up in a corner of a hill, and no one 
dared to approach it. On seeing Féng Fù afar, the crowd ran toward him to receive him, 
and Féng Fù got off his carriage rolling up his sleeves. The crowd was all delighted, but 
the gentlemen laughed at him.69
 
Although it is not clear in the passage, Mengzi would have probably judged that it was 
not a good idea for him to persuade the king to open up the granary for his subjects at the 
time. And by the analogy to a person named Féng Fù, he makes it clear that if he tried to 
persuade the king to open up his granary against his best decision not to persuade the 
king, it would be for fulfilling an ulterior motive such as having a good reputation among 
the masses, just as Féng Fù had backslid and fell for his petty old desire to stay famous 
for his boldness and skillfulness in catching tigers with bare hands. In short, this passage 
shows that it is very hard to transform a desire completely or make it obedient to one’s 
best judgment about what to do once and for all; and together with Mengzi 6A:10 that 
points out the discrepancy between people’s usual order of preference and the order of 
preference in their ideal state of mind, this passage shows that one’s desire to save his 
sister-in-law and his desire not to touch a female relative with the hand in Mengzi 4A:17 
would still be there conflicting with each other, even after the agent has finished 
reflective, all-aspect assessment of the situation. And this in turn shows, against Hutton’s 
thesis, that the final judgment of what to do in a certain situation is made at a higher level 
than that of desires and from the perspective that takes the competing desires in view.70
                                                 
69 “是爲馮婦也. 晉人有馮婦者, 善搏虎, 卒爲善士. 則之野, 有衆逐虎. 虎負嵎, 莫之敢攖. 望見馮
婦, 趨而迎之. 馮婦攘臂下車. 衆皆悅之, 其爲士者笑之.” Mengzi 7B:23. 
70 My last five paragraphs draw upon Stephen Darwall’s insights presented in his book, Impartial Reason, 
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Now, let us move on to our next passage that deals with the conflict between filial 
piety and the demand of legal justice. First, look at the following passage: 
 
Táo Yìng 桃應 asked, “When Shùn was emperor and Gāo Yáo 皋陶 was chief minister 
of justice, if Gǔ Sǒu 瞽瞍 had killed a man, what would have been done?” Mengzi said, 
“[Gāo Yáo] would have arrested him; that’s all.” “Then, wouldn’t Shùn have stopped 
[it]?” [Mengzi] said, “How could Shùn have stopped it? He [i.e., Gǔ Sǒu] had [done] 
something that justifies his receiving that [kind of treatment].” “Then, what would Shùn 
have done [in such a situation]?” [Mengzi] said, “Shùn would have regarded abandoning 
the world as throwing away a worn shoe. He would have secretly fled carrying [his father] 
on his back, and having reached a seashore, would have lived there happily until the end 
of his life, being joyful and not caring about [the affairs of] the world.”71
 
In this passage, Mengzi’s disciple Táo Yīng postulates a hypothetical situation where Gǔ 
Sǒu—the notorious father of the legendary sage king Shùn—commits a murder, and asks 
Mengzi what Shùn, an ideal Mengzian agent, would do in such a situation. Shùn is 
praised several times in the Mengzi as the paragon of filial piety and fraternal love,72 and 
we have previously seen that familial love is an important component of cèyǐn zhī xīn. 
Nevertheless, Mengzi’s answer to his disciple’s question was that Shùn would let Gāo 
Yáo—his fair-minded minister of justice—arrest his father, because this would be what 
his murderous father deserves based on what he did.73 We could say that this passage is 
about the conflict between cèyǐn zhī xīn, an important moral emotion in Mengzi’s thought, 
and the demand of legal justice that law should be enforced impartially. And from the fact 
that Mengzi acknowledges the weight of legal justice or criminal desert as an important 
reason to consider in deliberation, we could also say that the ideal Mengzian agent takes 
into account both emotionally and non-emotionally grounded reasons. 
                                                                                                                                                 
especially Chapter 8. 
71  “桃應問曰: ‘舜爲天子, 皋陶爲士, 瞽瞍殺人, 則如之何?’ 孟子曰: ‘執之而已矣.’ ‘然則舜不禁
與?’ 曰: ‘夫舜惡得而禁之? 夫有所受之也.’ ‘然則舜如之何?’ 曰: ‘舜視棄天下猶棄敝蹝也. 竊負而
逃, 遵海濱而處, 終身訢然, 樂而忘天下.’” Mengzi 7A:35. 
72 For example, see Mengzi 4A:28, 5A:1, and 5A:2. 
73 Alternatively, “fú” 夫 and “zhī” 之 in the phrase “fú yǒu suǒ shòu zhī yě” 夫有所受之也 can be 
respectively taken to refer to Gāo Yáo and the penal law, and the whole phrase could be interpreted that 
Gāo Yáo had the proper source (probably the Heaven) from which he received his law, so that he was 
bound to enforce the law justly. For such an interpretation, see Zhū Xī’s commentary on this passage in 
Yasui Kō, Mōshi teihon, 卷十三, p. 26; Legge, The Works of Mencius, p. 470; and Lau, Mencius, p. 190. 
Although emphasizing the authority of the law rather than the demand of criminal justice, this interpretation 
does not affect the general point of the passage that the law should be administered impartially. I personally 
prefer Yáng Bójùn’s rendering of the passage. See his Mèngzǐ yìzhù, p. 317. 
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However, the ultimate action Mengzi seems to suggest as exemplary in the 
passage is not simply letting one’s culpable father be arrested and punished. For Shùn, 
according to Mengzi, abandoning the world was no more difficult than throwing away a 
worn shoe, because protecting his father was much more important to Shùn than being 
able to govern the entire world. As Mengzi imagines, Shùn would have fled to a far 
corner of the world and enjoyed a private life serving his father, forgetting all about his 
imperial wealth, privileges, and duties. In other words, despite his initial suggestion that 
Shùn was supposed to have his father arrested, Mengzi now seems to suggest that a 
virtuous person would not let his family members suffer in a prison regardless of whether 
they deserve it or not. Is there any contradiction going on here? I suspect not, at least on 
the surface, because Shùn’s letting his guilty father be arrested was due to his viewing the 
situation from the impartial perspective or the standpoint of a public man (emperor), 
whereas now by deciding to run away with his father, Shùn chooses to resign from his 
public duties and see things from the partialistic perspective or the standpoint of a private 
man (son).  
Interestingly, although the demand of justice based on the impartial perspective 
carries significant weight in Shùn’s deliberation, Shùn eventually endorses his private 
motive to protect his father at the expense of public justice. This might be controversial 
because the person killed by Shùn’s father could have been someone else’s father, but the 
aspect of Shùn’s decision that I am interested in focusing on here is that Shùn seems to 
weigh the (personal) value of public justice against the value of protecting his father, and 
comes to choose the latter by taking a third perspective that seems to transcend both the 
impartial and partial perspectives, in the sense that he holds both perspectives in view and 
decides which perspective is more appropriate or better to take in the situation in question. 
There still remains the question whether Shùn’s value judgment placing private welfare 
over public justice is really recommendable for everyone else to emulate; one might think 
that the result of doing so would be a great disaster where people try to hide their family 
members who are guilty of harm and the family members of the harmed seek for private 
vengeance. This is an important question, but I would leave it unanswered at this point. 
For now, I think it suffices to see that the demand of public justice, although ultimately 
rejected, gets seriously considered in the process of Shùn’s deliberation of what to do 
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about his father, and this reveals the structural complexity of Mengzi’s conception of 
practical reason which is not explicable only in terms of the “rationality of emotions” as 
Wong argues. 
So far, I have examined two passages from the Mengzi where Mengzi shows how 
to engage in a deliberation involving competing ethical considerations. This is quite 
different from another function of the intellect or wisdom (zhì 智) that we have noticed 
above, viz. appreciating the values revealed by the motives certain moral emotions 
embody and affirming them as important reasons for action, because the kind of 
intellectual activity going on in the last two passages is not just affirming a single ethical 
concern as an important reason for action but assessing competing reasons side-by-side 
and judging which one is a better reason to act upon all-things-considered. In Mengzi 
4A:17 (and also in 1A:7) Mengzi explicitly calls such an activity “quán” 權, and we 
have just seen that this quán 權 activity—a kind of reflective thinking that takes into 
consideration all of the relevant factors in a certain situation—deals with both 
emotionally and non-emotionally grounded reasons for action. And from the fact that 
quán activity constitutes a crucial part of Mengzi’s conception of moral judgment (shìfēi 
zhī xīn 是非之心), we can see that moral emotions provide only partial basis for all-
things-considered ethical judgment in Mengzi’s thought, and Wong’s thesis that there is 
no distinction between reason and emotion in Mengzi should be rejected accordingly. 
 
 
5.2 Emotions and Moral Motivation 
 
5.2.1 Sources of Moral Action: Two Roots or One? 
 
Previously in Chapter 2, I have argued that the proper way of desiring things for Kongzi’s 
ideal nobleman is such that he gives the top priority to morality over other things of value, 
and the order of priority among morality and other valuable things is proportionate to the 
greater and lesser degrees to which he likes morality and other things respectively. On the 
other hand, we have seen that many people who are still in the process of moral self-
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cultivation could suffer some sort of motivational malfunction, viz. that the strength of 
their recognition of morality’s value is not proportionate to the degree in which they like 
(hào 好) morality. In other words, many people know about morality’s supreme value 
and also think that they should give the highest priority to morality, but they often end up 
actually not doing so. It is not that they are not attracted to morality at all; the problem is 
that they feel they are not attracted to morality enough to choose it at the expense of other 
valuable objects (e.g. wealth, beauty, or fame). And in the context of moral action, they 
think that they are short of moral stamina that would enable them to act in accordance 
with morality in the face of various kinds of temptations, and consequently their 
recognition of the high value of morality or their thinking that they should act according 
to morality fails to help them escape their ethical predicament. 
Concerning this issue, we have considered the cases of Rǎn Qiú 冉求 and 
Zǐgòng 子貢—Kongzi’s two advanced disciples. In Lunyu 6:12, we have seen Rǎn Qiú 
complaining to Kongzi that although being delighted by his master’s teaching, he lacked 
enough strength (lì 力) to carry it through. At this, Kongzi reproached him by saying that 
those whose strength is insufficient just collapse midway, but Rǎn Qiú was now merely 
drawing a line.74 On the other hand, we have seen Zǐgòng once saying to Kongzi that he 
did not want to do things to others that he did not want others to do to him, and Kongzi 
put Zǐgòng down by saying that this stage was not what he (Zǐgòng) was capable of 
reaching yet.75 According to the interpretation that I have suggested in Chapter 2 (Section 
2.2.2.3) above, what Kongzi meant by this was not that Zǐgòng was not often successful 
in refraining from doing harm to others that he himself did not want to suffer, but that 
Zǐgòng had not yet made himself into the kind of person who would normally desire to 
act as this maxim dictates. In short, both Rǎn Qiú and Zǐgòng were mistaken about their 
moral strength: Rǎn Qiú thought that he had not enough power to practice his master’s 
moral teaching when he really had, whereas Zǐgòng thought that his moral cultivation 
was sufficient to make him desire, by character, to act according to the Kongzian version 
of golden rule. 
                                                 
74 “冉求曰: ‘非不說子之道, 力不足也.’ 子曰: ‘力不足者, 中道而廢. 今女畵.’” Lunyu 6:12. 
75 “子貢曰: ‘我不欲人之加諸我也, 吾亦欲無加諸人.’ 子曰: ‘賜也, 非爾所及也.’” Lunyu 5:12. 
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A key term that deserves our attention here is “lì” 力, which literally means 
“strength” but apparently connotes some sort of moral strength. So, when one says that he 
does not have enough power (lì 力) to practice a moral teaching, what he means is 
probably not that he is short of physical strength to do the recommended action, but that 
he is not motivated enough to do it. Now, let us suppose that the recommended action is 
to treat others benevolently, and also suppose that a person denies that he has enough 
power to do this. If the person is not simply mistaken about himself, then he might be 
either trying to deceive himself and others that he is incapable of acting benevolently 
towards others, or he sincerely means that he is incapable of such an act. Kongzi’s saying 
in Lunyu 6:12 that “those who are short of (moral) strength just collapse midway” also 
seems to acknowledge that the second possibility—i.e. genuine shortage of moral 
strength—is real at least for some people; but what is it exactly that such people do not 
have enough of?  
For such thinkers as Mòzǐ (480–390 B.C.E.) who was primarily concerned with 
the behavioral aspect of benevolent action that was supposed to bring benefits to people’s 
life in general, it would have been very difficult to understand someone saying that he 
understood Mòzǐ’s point about benevolent act but was nevertheless not sufficiently 
motivated to act benevolently toward others. For in Mòzǐ’s view, human beings are 
basically creatures of self-love who are prone to pursue benefit and avoid harm, and as 
long as they recognize another general tendency of human beings to return benevolence 
by acting benevolently and return harm by acting harmfully, they have no reason not to 
treat others benevolently. So, if there had been people who said that they were incapable 
of acting benevolently toward others while being convinced of Mòzǐ’s argument that 
benevolent act is the best policy for promoting their own self-interests, Mòzǐ would have 
found such people highly confused and unintelligible, having nothing to recommend to 
them for a remedy. 
On the other hand, later thinkers such as Mengzi (and even the later Mohist Yí 
Zhī 夷之 , who was Mengzi’s contemporary) seem to have held a quite different 
philosophical position from Mòzǐ’s. As Nivison has aptly pointed out, Mengzi’s concern 
was not simply making people behave in a certain way, but making them grow into the 
kind of people who will always do certain actions with “the right feelings and 
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dispositions.”76 For example, Mengzi once comments on the virtuous sage king Shùn’s 
舜 character as follows: 
 
It is only a modicum by which humans are distinguished from the beasts; the commoners 
abandon it, whereas the nobleman preserves it. Shùn was clear about the multitude of 
things, closely observed the relationships among humanity, and acted from humaneness 
and righteousness rather than [just] doing what is humane and what is right.77
 
In this passage Mengzi contrasts “acting from humaneness and righteousness” (yóu rényì 
xíng 由仁義行) with “doing what is humane and what is right” (xíng rényì 行仁義), and 
the point of contrast is that the former refers to the kind of actions whose motives are 
humaneness or righteousness, whereas the latter designates one’s doing certain types of 
acts because he finds them humane or right, but not necessarily out of a humane or 
righteous motive. In order to see more clearly exactly what is meant by doing something 
out of a humane or righteous motive, we need to consider the phrase “a modicum by 
which humans are distinguished from the beasts.” Earlier in Chapter 4 (Section 4.1), we 
have seen a very similar phrase: 
 
Thanks to the rest they get during the day or night and the qì of the calm morning, people 
have a modicum of liking and disliking that are close to [those of] others. But what they 
do during the day fetters and destroys those [feelings]. If the fettering is repeated, then 
their nocturnal qì is insufficient to preserve [those feelings]. If their nocturnal qì is 
insufficient to preserve [those feelings], then they become not far from birds and beasts.78
 
In this passage, Mengzi makes it clear that “the modicum” (jǐxī 幾希) by which human 
beings are considered as close to each other while being distinguished from the lower 
animals refers to one’s proper affective attitudes of liking and disliking (hàowù 好惡); 
and in the unquoted part of the same passage, Mengzi also speaks as if “the modicum” 
here could also refer to the “heart” of humaneness and righteousness (rén yì zhī xīn 仁義
之心), which we know in turn refers to Mengzi’s first two sprouts, cèyǐn zhī xīn 惻隱之
                                                 
76 Nivison, “Motivation and Moral Action in Mencius,” p. 94. 
77 “人之所以異於禽獸者幾希; 庶民去之, 君子存之. 舜明於庶物, 察於人倫, 由仁義行, 非行仁義
也.” Mengzi 8:19. 
78 “其日夜之所息, 平旦之氣, 其好惡與人相近也者幾希; 則其旦晝之所爲, 有梏亡之矣. 梏之反覆, 
則其夜氣不足以存. 夜氣不足以存, 則其違禽獸不遠矣.” Mengzi 6A:8. 
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心 and xiūwù zhī xīn 羞惡之心.79 Now, from all of these points we could infer that what 
distinguishes human beings from the other animals is their having a set of moral feelings 
such as fondness of virtue, aversion to vice, compassion, and sense of honor, and what 
Mengzi meant by “acting from humaneness and righteousness” (yóu rényì xíng 
由仁義行) in Mengzi 8:19 was probably acting out of these ethical feelings as proper 
motives for action. 
Then, we could tentatively say the following: as Mengzi sees it, what people are 
missing when they say they are incapable of doing certain moral actions would be enough 
motivations for doing those actions, and the motivations in question would be in the form 
of what Nivison calls “the right feelings and dispositions,” such as fondness of virtue, 
compassion, familial affection, sense of honor, or respect. In other words, when people 
say that they are short of moral strength required for doing moral actions, Mengzi might 
interpret them to be saying that they do not feel, say, enough compassion for the starving 
people on the street to share food with them, do not find it especially humiliating when 
they are offered ten-thousand bushels of grain in a manner which is compromising their 
moral dignity, and so forth. This sounds a very plausible view of Mengzi’s conception of 
moral strength or moral motivation, but actually this view gets problematic when it is 
combined with David Nivison’s specific thesis that moral emotions (or “feelings and 
dispositions” in Nivison’s terms) constitute the only source of moral motivation. 
According to Nivison, Mengzi postulates only one source of moral motivation (“heart” as 
the locus of moral emotions or feelings), whereas Mengzi’s rival thinkers additionally 
postulate “maxims” or “doctrines” that are produced by some sort of moral reasoning. As 
I will eventually argue later, though, this is a mistaken view: Mengzi should be 
interpreted also to postulate two sources of moral motivation, and we will see that this 
nicely echoes the important role reflective thinking (quán 權) plays in one’s moral 
judgment apart from and sometimes even overriding the workings of moral emotions. 
In order to understand Nivison’s one-source morality thesis clearly, we first need 
to know how Nivison interprets Mengzi’s concept of “emotional extension.” In the 
previous chapter (Section 4.3.1.1), we have considered Mengzi 1A:7 where Mengzi says 
                                                 
79 For a full translation and discussion of this passage, see Chapter 4, Section 4.1. 
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to King Xuān 宣 of Qí 齊 that the compassion the king showed for an ox that was 
about to be killed for a sacrificial ceremony can make him the ruler of all of China. 
According to Mengzi, no one can stop a person from becoming a ruler if he becomes one 
by protecting his people, and even a person like King Xuān, who has pathologically 
strong desires for wealth and women,80 can become a true king who cares about the 
welfare of his people. Mengzi says that this is possible by “extending” (tuī 推) his 
compassion for the ox to his people, and Nivison interprets this process of emotional 
extension as analogous to some sort of logical extension or inference. As Nivison has 
aptly pointed out, “tuī” 推 was originally a technical term in the Later Mohist logic, and 
it is defined as follows in the Mòzǐ: 
 
Extending (tuī) is [getting someone to] grant what that person has not accepted by 
[pointing out] that it is the same as something that that person does accept.81
 
For example, in order to make the points that disliking robbers is not equivalent to 
disliking humans and killing robbers is not equivalent to killing humans (so that 
eventually disliking and killing robbers do not contradict the Mohist policy of impartial 
concern), Mohists first make the uncontroversial points that disliking there being many 
robbers is different from disliking there being many people, and desiring there being no 
robber is different from desiring there being no human being. For both sets of points are 
equally supported by the fact that one’s negative attitude toward a robber is not due to the 
robber’s being a human being but due to his being a robber, and as long as one sees this 
fact, it is logically impossible for one to accept the second set of points while rejecting 
the first.82
                                                 
80 “王曰: ‘寡人有疾, 寡人好貨.’…‘寡人有疾, 寡人好色.’” Mengzi 1B:5. 
81 “推也者, 以其所不取之同於其所取者, 予之也.” Mòzǐ 墨子, “Xiǎoqǔ” 小取. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzi 
xiángǔ, p. 416. I punctuate this sentence differently from Sūn. Translation is adapted from Nivison, 
“Motivation and Moral Action in Mencius,” p. 96. For an alternative translation and further explanation of 
this passage, see Graham, Later Mohist Logic, pp. 482–485. 
82 “惡多盜, 非惡多人也; 欲無盜, 非欲無人也. 世相與共是之. 若若是, 則雖盜人也, 愛盜非愛人也, 
不愛盜非不愛人也, 殺盜人非殺人也, 無難矣.” Mòzǐ 墨子, “Xiǎoqǔ” 小取. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzi xiángǔ, 
p. 418. The same point has been made with the same example in a slightly different way in Nivison, 
“Motivation and Moral Action in Mencius,” p. 97. See also Graham, Later Mohist Logic, pp. 484–485. 
 256
Then, how does Mengzi appropriate this logical sense of “tuī” 推 for explicating 
his concept of emotional extension? Look at the following passage first, where Mengzi 
advises King Xuān on how to “extend” his compassion for the ox to his people: 
 
Treat your elders as befitting their age, and then reach out to other people’s elders; treat 
your youngsters as befitting their age, and then reach out to other people’s youngsters. [If 
you could do so, then] you would be able to [govern] the world [as if] moving it on your 
palm. The Poetry says, “[He] set the model for his consort, and [the model] reached his 
brothers, so that he could govern the fiefs and his country [accordingly].” That is, all you 
have to do is merely to take this feeling and apply it to other cases. So, [if you] extend 
your compassion, it will be sufficient for protecting [all the people] within the Four Seas; 
but [if you] don’t extend your compassion, you won’t have enough even for protecting 
your wife and children. That by which the ancients greatly surpassed others is nothing 
else; they were good at extending what they did, and that was all. Now, your compassion 
is sufficient to reach animals, but your benefits do not reach your people; why is it so?”83
 
This passage is complicated, and I will need to come back to it in the next chapter to 
provide a full analysis of it and propose my own interpretation of Mengzi’s concept of 
emotional extension. For our purpose in this section, though, it will be sufficient to 
summarize Nivison’s view of emotional extension around this and some other related 
passages from the Mengzi and see how Nivison derives his “one-source morality” thesis 
in Mengzi’s thought from his view of the Mengzian extension of moral emotions. 
According to Nivison, in this passage Mengzi urges King Xuān to think as follows: 
 
1) I ought to be compassionate toward my people if I can be; but I just can’t. But, 2) it is 
easier to be compassionate toward human beings than toward animals. And 3) here I am, 
compassionate toward this animal. Thus, 4) I can be compassionate toward animals. 
Thus, 5) I can be compassionate toward my people. Thus, 6) I ought to be compassionate 
toward my people. I have no excuse for not being.84
 
That is, from the fact that King Xuān is naturally capable of feeling compassion toward 
an animal in a poor situation, and also by pointing out that it is easier for one to feel 
compassion toward a human being in a similarly poor situation than toward a mere 
                                                 
83 “老吾老, 以及人之老, 幼吾幼, 以及人之幼, 天下可運於掌. 詩云: ‘刑于寡妻, 至于兄弟, 以御于
家邦.’ 言擧斯心加諸彼而已. 故推恩足以保四海, 不推恩無以保妻子. 古之人所以大過人者, 無他焉;
 善推其所爲而已矣. 今恩足以及禽獸, 而功不至於百姓者, 獨何與?” Mengzi 1A:7. 
84 Nivison, “Motivation and Moral Action in Mencius,” pp. 97–98. 
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animal, Mengzi derives that King Xuān should also feel compassion for his people who 
frequently suffer from natural and human disasters such as famine and irregular labor 
conscriptions.  
According to Nivison, we find a similar case in Mengzi 2A:9. Let me quote the 
relevant part of the passage first: 
 
Mengzi said, “Bó Yí 伯夷 would not serve a ruler if he was not the right ruler, and 
would not befriend a person if he was not the right person to associate with. He would 
not take a position at a wicked man’s court, nor would he speak with a wicked man. 
Standing in a wicked man’s court and speaking with a wicked man would have been to 
him as if sitting in mire and pitch wearing court robes and hat. [He] extended his 
aversion to vice [to the extent that] if he happened to stand together with a villager whose 
hat was awry, he would move away from that man in disgust as if he were going to be 
polluted by that man. So, even though there were some rulers who offered an office in 
polite words, he would not accept them. [The reason] that he did not accept [their offers] 
was because he was not glad to go to them.85
 
As Nivison sees it, this passage provides a typical case of emotional extension in Mengzi. 
According to Nivison, 1) there are paradigm cases of “evil” where I would find it 
appropriate to feel disgusted and naturally feel so when encountering a certain kind of 
objects;86 and 2) when I face a case that I would find similar enough in nature to the 
paradigm cases of “evil,” 3) I am required to “apply” my disgust (“disliking heart” in 
Nivison’s terms) to this case too, and feel disgusted in the situation. For example, in the 
passage above Bó Yí extended his disgust at wicked rulers and people of incorrect 
political allegiance so far as to the case of a person whose hat was not on right, and 
avoided standing together with that person as if his incorrect attire were going to pollute 
him. 
What I am interested in discussing here concerning Nivison’s interpretation of 
emotional extension as presented in these two Mengzi passages is the analogical 
connection one comes to make between the paradigm cases and the extended cases. That 
                                                 
85 “孟子曰: ‘伯夷, 非其君, 不事, 非其友, 不友. 不立於惡人之朝, 不與惡人言; 立於惡人之朝, 與
惡人言, 如以朝衣朝冠坐於塗炭. 推惡惡之心, 思與鄕人立, 其冠不正, 望望然去之, 若將浼焉. 是
故諸侯雖有善其辭命而至者, 不受也. 不受也者, 是亦不屑就已.” Mengzi 2A:9. 
86 Against Nivison who says that such a paradigm case for Bó Yí is not specified in this passage, I think that 
Bó Yí’s disgust at serving in a wicked man’s court and conversing with an evil man can be considered as a 
paradigmatic case of disgust. But this does not affect Nivison’s general interpretation of this passage. 
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is, in Mengzi 1A:7 it was pointed out to King Xuān that his people deserve (at least) as 
much sympathy as he feels for an ox based on the similarity in nature between the 
situations that his people and his ox are respectively in, and in Mengzi 2A:9 Bó Yí thinks 
that a person who did not put on a hat correctly is not very different from the wicked 
rulers of his time in deserving his disgust; and I am interested in seeing whether one’s 
awareness of the connection in similarity between the paradigm cases and the extended 
cases has any role to play in motivating moral actions in Mengzi’s thought. 
Mengzi calls the activity of drawing connections between related cases of action 
“filling the categories” (chōng qí lèi 充其類), and knowing the connection between 
related cases “understanding categories” (zhī lèi 知類). 87  As a noun “lèi” 類  is 
sometimes used for distinguishing various species of animals including humans88, but it 
can also generally refer to “kinds” or “categories.” The usual criterion for judging 
whether certain things belong to the same category or not is their similarity in appearance. 
So Mengzi says, “In general, things belonging to the same category all look similar to 
each other. Why shall we doubt this when it comes to the case of human beings, as if 
human beings were a solitary exception to this? Sages are of the same kind as we are.”89 
However, the criterion of similarity in shape is by no means confined to the external 
appearance of things; similarity in shape is actually conceived quite broadly in Mengzi, 
and used for talking about the similarity of various kinds of things in various respects. 
For example, Mengzi says that the ancients did not serve in the government unless the 
office was given them in a proper way, because they thought that serving in the 
government through improper means fell under the same category as such a shameful 
deed (in their view) as premarital sex.90 In addition, Mengzi says that those who are 
ashamed of their inferiority to others in physical appearance but do not know to be 
                                                 
87 This echoes what Mohists say about how properly to engage in disputation: “In disputation…one uses 
names to designate objects, uses propositions to explain ideas, and uses explanations to bring out reasons. 
One [should] argue according to the categories and concede [points] according to the categories.” “夫辯
者…以名擧實, 以辭抒意, 以說出故. 以類取, 以類予.” Mòzǐ 墨子, “Xiǎo qǔ” 小取. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzi 
xiángǔ, p. 415.
88 For example, see Mengzi 6A:7, especially such phrase as this: “Dogs and horses’ being of different 
species from us…” (犬馬之與我不同類也…). 
89 “凡同類者, 擧相似也; 何獨至於人而疑之? 聖人, 與我同類者.” Ibid. Translation adapted from 
Legge, The Works of Mencius, pp. 404–405. 
90 “古之人未嘗不欲仕也, 又惡不由其道. 不由其道而往者, 與鑽穴隙之類也.” Mengzi 3B:3. 
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ashamed of their inferiority to others in character are ignorant of the categories (bù zhī lèi 
不知類), because being inferior to others morally is an equally shameful, or even more 
shameful state of affairs than having a bent finger that would not stretch straight.91
Now back to our examples of emotional extension, Nivison correctly points out 
that drawing connections between paradigmatic cases and extended cases, or making a 
logical move from the former to the latter in deliberative reasoning, can be considered 
“filling the categories” (chōng qí lèi 充其類) in Mengzi’s terms.92 According to Nivison, 
just as we could get a horse to water but still have a problem in getting it to drink, so one 
can feel not motivated enough to do a moral action even though he clearly sees that it 
ought to be done. And in terms of Mengzi’s emotional extension, this problematic 
situation could be re-described as one where a person, while seeing that he ought to do a 
certain moral action based on its similarity to a paradigmatic case of moral action which 
he would do naturally and with full motivation, suffers from insufficient motivation to do 
the action that he thinks ought to be done. For example, as a ruler you felt natural 
compassion for an ox and saved it from being killed for a sacrificial ceremony, and you 
clearly see the connection between saving the ox and saving your people from famine, 
and judge that you should open your granary to feed the starving people; but at the same 
time you do not feel enough motivation for doing so, and end up turning your back to 
your people.93
One might ask, though, how this is possible at all. For one might think that as 
long as a person is convinced that an act ought to be done, that conviction itself should 
provide the required motivation for doing the act in question. And from this perspective, 
it would be unnecessary to postulate an additional source of motivation for doing the act 
besides the ‘pro-attitude’ toward doing it.94 However, Nivison argues that doing an act 
out of the pro-attitude for doing it, or the conviction that it has to be done for some reason, 
falls short of being the right kind of action that Mengzi had in mind. For as Mengzi sees 
                                                 
91 “指不若人, 則知惡之, 心不若人, 則不知惡, 此之謂不知類也.” Mengzi 6A:12. 
92 Nivison, “Motivation and Moral Action in Mencius,” p. 100. 
93 Ibid., p. 99. 
94 According to Donald Davidson, one’s pro-attitude toward a certain kind of action can be generated by a 
number of factors including one’s desires, urges, promptings, moral views, aesthetic principles, economic 
prejudices, social conventions, or public and private goals and values. See his Essays on Actions and Events 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 3. 
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it (Nivison argues), opening one’s granary for starving people because it is a benevolent 
act should be distinguished from doing the same act with “a lively and animated concern 
for the suffering” of one’s people, and this distinction is exactly what Mengzi tries to 
make when he contrasts “doing what is humane and what is right” (xíng rényì 行仁義) 
with “acting from humaneness and righteousness” (yóu rényì xíng 由仁義行).95
According to Nivison, this distinction between doing something because it is a 
right thing to do for some reason and doing something with a particular type of affective 
motive is crucial for understanding Mengzi’s ethical thought, and what makes Mengzi 
unique among the ethical thinkers of his time is his “one-source morality” thesis that the 
latter type of motive is to be the sole source of moral motivation. In other words, in the 
light of Mengzi’s emotional extension, 1) the decision of what to do in an “extended” 
case of moral action should be made on the basis of which paradigm case of moral action 
is most relevant to one’s current ethical situation in terms of the affective motive they 
might share; 2) and one’s act in the extended case must be supported, not merely by one’s 
pro-attitude that the act in question should be done, but specifically by the same kind of 
affective motive that would also support one’s paradigmatic case of moral action. In 
contrast, Nivison argues that Mengzi’s rival thinkers such as Gàozǐ 告子 and the Mohist 
Yí Zhī 夷之 postulate two sources of morality: the “basic affection-capacity” on one 
hand and ethical beliefs or doctrines about how to apply one’s affection-capacity in 
various situations on the other hand. In other words, Nivison says, “Morality on this view 
depends on two things, which are independent of each other: what I think I should do, and 
could state in words and reason about; and my capacity to feel certain emotions, which I 
can steer and shape so as to be moved to do what my principles tell me I should.”96
According to Nivison, this contrast between Mengzi and his opponents on the 
sources of morality is well illustrated in Mengzi 3A:5, where Mengzi debates with the 
Mohist Yí Zhī about what is the appropriate degree to which one should extend one’s 
filial affection toward others and treat them benevolently. I have discussed this passage 
extensively in the previous chapter (Section 4.3.1.1) in order to clarify the nature of cèyǐn 
zhī xīn, but I would like to have it in full again to facilitate my following discussion of it: 
                                                 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid., p. 102. Emphasis is original. 
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A Mohist Yí Zhī sought to see Mengzi through [the help of] Xú Bì 徐辟. Mengzi said, “I 
am definitely willing to see [him], but today I am still ill. I will go and see [him] when my 
illness gets better. [Tell] Master Yí not to come!” 
Another day, [Yí Zhī] sought to see Mengzi again. Mengzi said, “Today I can see 
[him]. [However,] without being straightforward, the Way will not be manifest; so, I will 
put it straightforward. I heard that Master Yí is a Mohist. Mohists, when conducting a 
funeral, take frugality as their proper way [to do it]. [If] Master Yí aspires to change the 
world with [this principle], he must not be regarding it as wrong and despicable. But 
Master Yí buried his parents lavishly, and this is serving one’s parents with what one 
despises.” 
Master Xú reported this to Master Yí. Master Yí said, “As for the way of the 
Confucians, [they often say that] the ancients [took care of others] as if taking care of a 
baby. What does this saying mean? I take it to mean that although there is no gradation 
in love, its application starts from one’s parents.” 
Master Xú reported this to Mengzi. Mengzi said, “Does Master Yí really think that 
one’s affection for one’s brother’s child is like [one’s] affection for one’s neighbor’s baby? 
[It is a different point that we should] glean from that [saying]: When a baby crawls 
[toward a well] and is about to fall into the well, it is not the baby’s fault. Moreover, when 
Heaven was giving birth to things, it had [each of] them [come from only] one root; 
[Master Yí’s misunderstanding is] due to his [considering them to have] two roots. 
Probably in antiquity there were some who did not inter their parents. [Suppose that] 
when their parents died, they just took them up and abandoned them in a ditch. Days 
later they were passing by their dead parents, and [happened to see that] foxes and wild-
cats were devouring them, and flies and gnats biting on them. Sweat broke on their 
foreheads, and they [only] squinted at them without being able to look at them directly. 
That sweat, it was not the kind for others [to see], but [the result of] their innermost 
feelings reaching their faces and eyes. Probably they went home and came back with 
baskets and spades and covered the bodies. Covering them is correct indeed, and [this 
shows that] there is also definitely a reason for filial sons and humane people to inter 
their parents.” 
Master Xú reported that to Master Yí. Master Yí looked lost for a while, and said, 
“[I appreciate] his teaching me.”97
 
Frugal or modest burial of dead people is one of the important doctrines Mòzǐ proposed 
against the Confucians or the followers of Kongzi. Mòzǐ advocated this policy because he 
                                                 
97 “墨者夷之因徐辟而求見孟子. 孟子曰: ‘吾固願見, 今吾尙病. 病愈, 我且往見, 夷子不來!’ 他日, 
又求見孟子. 孟子曰: ‘吾今則可以見矣. 不直, 則道不見, 我且直之. 吾聞夷子墨者. 墨之治喪也, 以
薄爲其道也. 夷子思以易天下, 豈以爲非是而不貴也? 然而夷子葬其親厚, 則是以所賤事親也.’ 徐
子以告夷子. 夷子曰: ‘儒者之道, 古之人若保赤子, 此言何謂也? 之則以爲愛無差等, 施由親始.’ 徐
子以告孟子. 孟子曰: ‘夫夷子信以爲人之親其兄之子爲若親其隣之赤子乎? 彼有取爾也. 赤子匍匐
將入井, 非赤子之罪也. 且天之生物也, 使之一本, 而夷子二本故也. 蓋上世嘗有不葬其親者. 其親
死, 則擧而委之於壑. 他日過之, 狐狸食之, 蠅蚋姑嘬之. 其顙有泚, 睨而不視. 夫泚也, 非爲人泚, 
中心達於面目. 蓋歸反蘽梩而掩之. 掩之誠是也, 則孝子仁人之掩其親, 亦必有道矣.’ 徐子以告夷子. 
夷子憮然爲閒曰: ‘命之矣.’” Mengzi 3A:5. 
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believed that frugal burial could save enormous social resources from being wasted and 
make them be used instead for the real benefit of the living people.98 However, the later 
Mohist Yí Zhī violated this policy and gave a lavish funeral for his mother, and Mengzi 
criticizes him for doing so. Against Mengzi’s criticism, Yí Zhī partly defends himself by 
saying that his violation of the policy of frugal burial is at least consistent with impartial 
concern or universal love—Mòzǐ’s doctrine of the highest importance, and therefore 
should not be considered as a serious departure from Mòzǐ’s teaching.99 According to Yí 
Zhī, there should be no gradation in one’s love for human beings, although its application 
may start from one’s parents (ài wú chàděng, shī yóu qīn shǐ 愛無差等, 施由親始). 
And he also says that his position is justified by the Confucian saying that the ancients 
took care of others as if taking care of a baby. Applying Nivison’s “two-source morality” 
view to this position, Yí Zhī can be interpreted to be saying that one’s natural affection 
for one’s parents should be channeled to other people, and the degree and extent to which 
one is supposed to extend his filial affection is to be determined by the ethical principle 
one approves—universal love or impartial caring for the case of Yí Zhī. 
However, according to Nivison, Mengzi criticizes Yí Zhī for postulating “two 
roots” (èr běn 二本)—or two sources—of moral action. Mengzi says that when Heaven 
gave birth to various creatures, it made them originate from only one source, or “one 
root” (yì běn 一本). Although the character “běn” 本 here seems to refer to the 
biological origin of each creature, Nivison suggests that it is “entirely possible” that 
Mengzi is criticizing the basis of Yí Zhī’s moral system as being double by insisting that 
human beings have only one source of moral action, viz. heart (xīn 心). To support this 
suggestion, Nivison cites Mengzi 6A:10 where Mengzi says that “if one accepts a gift 
without caring whether it is right to do so, one has ‘lost one’s root heart’ (běn xīn 本
心).”100 No matter how charitably we interpret this passage (Mengzi 6A:10), though, it 
does not seem to show that such a “heart” (xīn 心)—specifically the sense of honor or 
                                                 
98 Cf. Mòzǐ 墨子, “Jiézàng xià” 節葬下. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiángǔ, pp. 169–190. 
99 An alternative, more positive interpretation of Yí Zhī’s lavish burial of his mother can be found in Shun, 
Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, p. 132. 
100 Nivison, “Motivation and Moral Action in Mencius,” p. 103. Cf. “一簞食, 一豆羹, 得之則生, 弗得則
死, 嘑爾而與之, 行道之人弗受; 蹴爾而與之, 乞人不屑也. 萬鍾則不辯禮義而受之. 萬鍾於我何加
焉?...鄕爲身死而不受, 今爲宮室之美爲之…是亦不可以已乎? 此之謂失其本心.” Mengzi 6A:10. 
 263
xiūwù zhī xīn 羞惡之心 here—is the only source (běn 本) of moral action. What it 
shows is only, at most, that refusing an inappropriate gift is the way human beings are 
originally (běn 本) supposed to act. In other words, although Mengzi 6A:10 might tell us 
that one’s paradigmatic feelings such as sympathy for a baby falling into a well, feeling 
of humiliation at a gift offered in an inappropriate manner, or respect for elders and 
worthy people are the affective guidance human beings are originally supposed to have, 
the passage is silent about whether such feelings are the only source of moral action in 
Mengzi. 
However, Kwong-loi Shun develops Nivison’s “one-source morality” thesis 
further, and provides stronger and thoughtful arguments for Nivison’s original idea. 
According to Shun, previous interpretations of the character “běn” 本 in Mengzi 3A:5 
can be classified into three kinds, and only one of them is worth developing. First, Shun 
introduces the interpretation proposed by Zhào Qí 趙岐 (ca. 108–201 C.E.), Zhū Xī 朱
熹  (1130–1200), and Zhāng Shì 張栻 (1133–1180). According to this view, the 
character “běn” 本 in Mengzi 3A:5 refers to one’s biological origin, viz. one’s parents, 
and Mengzi’s criticism of Yí Zhī is that advocating universal love or impartial caring is 
treating other people as if they were one’s parents. Treating others as if they were one’s 
parents, though, is acknowledging that one has two biological origins, and this makes Yí 
Zhī’s position absurd.101 Second, Shun cites Zhū Xī’s alternative interpretation, which 
regards the character “běn” 本 in question “as referring to the basis for cultivating the 
proper form of affection for people.”102 According to this view, “the basis for cultivating 
the proper form of affection for people” in turn refers to one’s love for parents, because it 
is by consulting one’s love for parents that one comes to realize that there should be 
gradation in one’s love for others. And Yí Zhī’s error in this view is not to consider one’s 
love for parents as the sole guidance in practicing benevolence to others.103 The third 
type of interpretation Shun introduces has been proposed by some contemporary scholars 
on Mengzi. According to this view, the character “běn” 本 means a principle of conduct. 
And by advocating both impartial caring and treating one’s parents in a special way, Yí 
                                                 
101 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, pp. 129–130. 
102 Ibid., p. 129. 
103 Ibid., pp. 129–130. 
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Zhī adopts two incompatible principles of conduct and is criticized by Mengzi as having 
two roots. 
Among these three interpretations, Shun rejects the first and the third as 
inadequate, and advocates an advanced version of the second view. According to him, 
interpreting “běn” 本 as biological origin is unacceptable for two reasons. First, after 
criticizing Yí Zhī as having “two roots,” Mengzi introduces the account of the origin of 
the burial practice in antiquity. This story is supposed to illustrate why Yí Zhī is wrong in 
postulating two roots, but if the “root” (běn 本) refers to one’s biological origin, it is not 
clear how Mengzi’s point that every creature has only one biological origin is illustrated 
by his account of the beginning of the burial practice in antiquity. Second, if postulating a 
certain number of “roots” is equivalent to postulating the same number of biological 
origins, it is not clear in what sense Yí Zhī thought that everyone had two biological 
origins. For if the Mohist doctrine of impartial caring involves treating everyone as if 
they were one’s parent, Yí Zhī should have said that everyone had millions of roots. Or, 
in the other way around, if impartial caring involves caring one’s parents as if they were 
no different from others, Yí Zhī should have said that everyone had no root.104 On the 
other hand, in order to refute the third interpretation of “běn” 本 as a principle of 
conduct, Shun also provides two reasons. First, just as in the case of the view of “běn” as 
a biological origin, Shun argues that it is not clear how Mengzi’s criticism that Yí Zhī 
postulates two incompatible principles of conduct is illustrated by his account of how the 
ancients came to consider burying their deceased parents as an appropriate practice. 
Second, Shun points out that Mengzi’s reference to tiān 天 (Heaven) as producing 
things in such a way that they have only one “root” seems to be too heavy a device to 
make the point that one should be guided by consistent principles of conduct.105
Having rejected these two interpretations, Shun defends an elaborate version of 
the second type of interpretation presented above. According to him, Mengzi can be 
interpreted to postulate two kinds of ethical predispositions for human beings in Mengzi 
3A:5. One kind is compassionate reactions such as for an infant falling into a well, and a 
typical instance of the other kind is one’s love for parents. As is well illustrated in 
                                                 
104 Ibid., p. 130. 
105 Ibid., p. 131. 
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Mengzi’s remark quoted above that “when a baby crawls toward a well and is about to 
fall into the well, it is not the baby’s fault,” one does not have to be in a special 
relationship with those in a miserable situation in order to treat them benevolently. On the 
other hand, filial love is by definition a kind of love directed toward those standing in a 
special relationship to oneself, viz. parents, and this type of love is an important 
constituent of the Confucian virtue rén 仁 (humaneness). Now, according to Shun, Yí 
Zhī was so much preoccupied with the first type of predisposition that he totally 
neglected the importance of filial or familial love in one’s ethical life. And Mengzi’s 
account of the origin of the burial practice in antiquity was supposed to show that human 
beings have special feelings in a situation that affects the welfare of their parents (even 
after their death), and these special feelings, based on their filial love, should guide their 
benevolent treatment of others too. Furthermore, as illustrated by Mengzi’s rhetorical 
question quoted above whether Yí Zhī really thinks that one’s affection for one’s 
brother’s child is like one’s affection for one’s neighbor’s baby, one’s benevolence or 
compassion toward others is to be expressed in different degrees, corresponding to the 
closeness of their relationship to oneself.106 In short, Shun’s interpretation of Mengzi 
3A:5 could be summarized as follows: 1) What Mengzi meant by the term “root” (běn 本) 
was the source of moral action. 2) By saying that human beings are endowed with only 
one “root,” Mengzi was making the point that certain ethical predispositions such as 
compassion, familial love, shame, or respect are the only source of moral action. 3) 
Concerning the relationship between familial love and compassion, one’s familial love 
naturally influences the way one responds to other people’s suffering, so that one’s 
compassion or sympathy to others is expressed in different degrees corresponding to the 
closeness of their relationship to oneself. 
However, Shun’s interpretation does not seem tenable, because it suffers an 
important theoretical difficulty concerning the nature of emotions and their limit in moral 
deliberation. What Shun calls “ethical predispositions” are Mengzi’s four moral sprouts 
(sìduān 四端), and in the previous chapter I have shown that the first three of these four 
sprouts—viz. familial love and compassion (cèyǐn zhī xīn), shame and dislike (xiūwù zhī 
xīn), and respect (gōngjìng zhī xīn)—are neither desires nor behavioral dispositions but 
                                                 
106 Ibid., pp. 132–135. 
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full-fledged emotions embodying certain motives for action. Now, developing Nivison’s 
original idea, Shun argues that these ethical sprouts are the only source of moral action in 
Mengzi; and he also argues that certain of these sprouts naturally take precedence over 
the others and influence the way the latter group of emotions are acted on, hence, for 
example, one’s filial love influencing one’s general sympathy so that the latter is 
expressed toward others in ever-decreasing degrees as their relationship to oneself gets 
farther and farther. However, Shun does not clearly explain how this could be so. He says: 
 
According to Mencius, it is indeed the case that Confucians regarded one’s compassion 
toward an infant crawling toward a well as having a bearing on the proper form of 
affection for people, and that extending such reactions does not involve a gradation in 
affection. What Yi Chih [i.e. Yí Zhī] had done is to draw upon this aspect of Confucian 
teachings to criticize the Confucian idea of love with distinctions. 
But, according to Mencius, this criticism fails because Confucians also regarded 
another kind of predispositions, those directed specifically toward immediate family 
members, as having a bearing on the proper form of affection for others. An example is 
one’s affection for one’s elder brother’s child, which differs from one’s affection for a 
neighbor’s child.107
 
What this remark of Shun’s tells us, though, is only that 1) Confucians like Mengzi 
identified general sympathy and familial love as two distinct types of affection for others, 
and that 2) both emotions have a bearing on the question of what is the proper form of 
affection for others. Now, it would be a mistake for Yí Zhī to fix his attention on the first 
kind of affection and declare that there should be no gradation in love for human beings, 
but it seems equally problematic if Mengzi had fixated on the second kind of affection 
and said that familial love, or love with distinctions, should guide one’s general dealing 
with others in sympathetic terms. For this—i.e. the thesis of the dominance of familial 
love over general sympathy—does not logically follow from what Shun says about 
Confucians including Mengzi, viz. that in their thought both general sympathy and 
familial love have a bearing on what is the proper form of affection for others. In other 
words, given that sympathy and familial love occupy an equal status in Mengzi’s ethical 
system and thus have an equal vote for determining the proper form of affection for 
others, it does not make sense for Shun to ascribe to Mengzi the view that 1) familial love 
                                                 
107 Ibid., p. 133. 
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is more important than general sympathy and thus 2) one needs to consult the former in 
determining how much benevolence one should show for others who are in difficult 
situations. 
However, Mengzi is very firm and explicit about what kinds of emotions or 
feelings one should have when interacting with others in different social and familial 
relationships, and how much of such emotions or feelings are appropriate for one to have 
in different situations. For example, we have already seen Mengzi approvingly saying 
that one’s affection for one’s brother’s child cannot be the same as one’s affection for 
one’s neighbor’s baby (Mengzi 3A:5), and the same view is also well expressed in Mengzi 
7A:45, where Mengzi says that “The nobleman is sparing with things but shows no 
benevolence towards them; he shows benevolence towards the people but does not treat 
them as close. He treats his parents as close but is [merely] benevolent to the people; he is 
benevolent to the people but is [merely] sparing with things.”108 In addition, in Mengzi 
4B:29 Mengzi says that when one’s housemate is fighting with someone else, it is all 
right to rush to his aid even with one’s hair unbound and merely with a cap on; but if it 
were merely a fellow villager who is in a fight, one needs to care about one’s appearance 
first before going to his aid; and if the situation allows, it is all right just to close one’s 
door and neglect them. And importantly, Mengzi adds, “If you rush to his aid in such 
haste that you leave your hair unbound and merely have your cap on, it is being 
misguided.”109 It is clear in all of these passages that Mengzi advocates a partialistic 
morality: although he acknowledges that human beings are originally capable of 
responding to other people’s suffering with sympathy, Mengzi is also clear that there are 
some situations where one needs to be partial to one’s kin at the expense of others. But if 
one cannot reach this ethical position by simply following one’s emotions as Shun argues 
because at the level of emotions nothing warrants that familial affection always have 
priority over general sympathy, how shall we interpret Mengzi 3A:5 in order to let 
Mengzi reach this position? 
                                                 
108 “君子之於物也, 愛之而弗仁; 於民也, 仁之而弗親. 親親而仁民, 仁民而愛物.” Mengzi 7A:45. T
he translation is slightly modified from Lau’s in Lau, Mencius, p. 192. 
109 “今有同室之人鬪者, 救之, 雖被髮纓冠而救之, 可也; 鄕鄰有鬪者, 被髮纓冠而往救之, 則惑也. 
雖閉戶可也.” Mengzi 4B:29. This passage came to my attention through its citation in Kim Doil, 
“Maengja ŭi kamjŏng mohyŏng—chŭgŭnjisim ŭn wae kyŏmae wa tarŭn’ga?” [Mengzi’s emotion model: 
why is cèyǐn zhī xīn different from jiān’ài?] Tong’a munhwa [East Asian culture] 41 (2003), p. 99. 
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As I see it, as long as Shun agrees with Nivison in interpreting Mengzi to 
postulate moral emotions (ethical predispositions in Shun’s terms) as the sole source of 
moral action in Mengzi, a good solution to this problem is hardly available. For insofar as 
one allows no more than one source of moral action for Mengzi which is moral emotions 
or “ethical predispositions” in Shun’s terms, and given that other things being equal an 
emotion qua emotion cannot claim to a higher place than another emotion in one’s 
deliberation, there is no means for one to justify Mengzi’s position that familial love, at 
least in some cases, should override general sympathy and provide guidance on how to 
treat others who are not one’s kin but in difficult situations. I think that in order to find 
some theoretical grounding for Mengzi to hold a partialistic ethical position and for him 
to base this position somehow on the natural, familial affection of human beings, we need 
to ascribe some version of Nivison’s “two-source morality” view to Mengzi by 
reinterpreting the problematic character “běn” 本 and Mengzi’s related account of the 
origin of the burial practice in Mengzi 3A:5. In the following, I argue that the best 
interpretation of the character “běn” in Mengzi 3A:5 is to take it to refer to one’s 
biological origin rather than any abstract source of moral motivation or moral action. This 
view is based on the first kind of interpretation rejected by Shun above, but I will show 
that Shun’s original charges against that interpretation do not make a real threat as long as 
we correctly view Mengzi’s moral emotions as concern-based construals (explained in 
Section 4.3.1.2 of the previous chapter). Once we view Mengzi’s moral emotions this 
way, the infrequent competition or conflict between familial love and general sympathy, 
which posed a big problem for Shun and Nivison’s philosophical positions, is only 
natural and well-expected. Moreover, in the previous section we have seen that in order to 
resolve this kind of emotional conflict, Mengzi postulates reflective thinking (quán 權) 
and the subsequent making of a moral judgment as a function of the mind that could 
arbitrate between the emotions in conflict; now in my following discussion, we will see 
that this function of the mind can also provide an important additional source of moral 
motivation to moral emotions in Mengzi’s thought. 
Then, let me first revisit the interpretation of “běn” 本 as one’s biological origin 
and defend it against Shun’s criticism. To quote the relevant part of the passage again as a 
reminder, in Mengzi 3A:5 Mengzi says the following:  
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When Heaven was giving birth to things, it had [each of] them [come from only] one root; 
[Master Yí’s misunderstanding is] due to his [considering them to have] two roots.110
 
As has been mentioned above, traditional commentators including Zhào Qí 趙岐 and 
Zhū Xī 朱熹 interpret “běn” 本 here to refer to one’s biological origin, but Kwong-loi 
Shun rejects this view for two reasons. First, Shun argues that if the character “běn” 
refers to one’s biological origin, it is not clear how that point is illustrated by Mengzi’s 
subsequent account of the origin of the burial practice in antiquity. According to Shun, 
this account is supposed to show that Yí Zhī was wrong in postulating two sources of 
moral action, viz. his doctrinal position of impartial concern and his natural familial 
affection; and Yí Zhī’s error can be pointed out effectively only when Mengzi meant to 
refer to a source of moral action by the character “běn.” This argument looks plausible 
initially, because one’s special treatment of deceased parents (i.e. burying them) in 
Mengzi’s burial account is based on one’s filial affection, which construes the wild 
animals and insects on one’s parent’s corpse not as merely devouring an unconscious 
lump of flesh but as seriously compromising the welfare of one’s parent.111 In this sense, 
it is legitimate for Shun to say that Mengzi finds the special treatment of one’s parents as 
grounded on one’s filial affection.  
However, if we look at the passage more closely, it will become clear that one’s 
filial affection is even insufficient as a motivation for the action of burying one’s parents, 
because what Mengzi’s story in the passage is talking about is how the burial practice 
was first introduced among the ancients who had been taking it for granted to abandon 
one’s deceased parents in an open place. In other words, the person who discarded his 
deceased parents in a ditch in Mengzi’s story might have grown up watching his live 
parents abandoning his grandparents’ bodies in ditches or valleys and other adults in his 
village doing the same thing, and the members of this village might have collectively 
developed rational justifications for their practice or a cluster of positive feelings 
associated with the fact that they perform the same funerary practice. In such a situation, 
a bout of bad feelings one might have when seeing one’s parent’s body decaying or being 
                                                 
110 “天之生物也, 使之一本, 而夷子二本故也.” Mengzi 3A:5. 
111 For a further explanation of filial affection as a concern-based construal, see Section 4.3.1.1 of the 
previous chapter. 
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eaten by wild creatures does not necessarily motivate any action to stop it. For one might 
regard one’s bad feelings as unwarranted and suppress them by thinking that it is just the 
way things should go or that letting the corpses of one’s parents be eaten by wild 
creatures would help them return to Mother Nature, or alternatively by concentrating on 
one’s positive feelings such as the sense of belongingness or even pride associated with 
conforming to the socially-approved funerary practice. In such a situation, in order for 
one to manage to bury one’s dead parents, one first needs to undo the rational 
justifications for or counteract one’s positive feelings about discarding one’s dead parents. 
However, one’s filial affection, merely as a concern-based construal, does not enable one 
to overcome these rational and emotional obstacles for the action of burial. For as we 
have seen in the previous chapter, an emotion as a concern-based construal is merely the 
way things present themselves to the person experiencing the emotion, and an emotion as 
such does not have the power to dismiss the claims of another emotion or to make one 
renounce beliefs that one has firmly held for a long time. This makes it clear that in 
Mengzi 3A:5, one needs some additional source of moral motivation to complete the 
action of burying one’s deceased parents. 
In my view, this additional motivation comes from one’s appreciation of the 
importance of one’s parents, and this appreciation of one’s parents’ value—or their 
invaluable importance to oneself—starts from vividly recognizing that it is thanks to 
one’s parents that one came into existence, and that for this reason one’s parents are not 
interchangeable with any other human beings. I think that this was the point of Mengzi’s 
remark “when Heaven was giving birth to things, it had them each come from one root 
(yì běn 一本),” and that by saying this, Mengzi was urging Yí Zhī to come to be aware of 
this important fact. Zhào Qí glosses this remark as follows: 
 
When Heaven was producing myriad things, it had each creature come out of one root. 
Now Master Yí [mistakenly] considers other people’s parents as equal to his own parents, 
and this is why he wanted to make his love the same [for everyone].112
 
In this gloss, Zhào Qí makes it clear that every sentient being comes from its own single 
                                                 
112 “天生萬物, 各由一本而出. 今夷子以他人之親與其親等, 是爲二本. 故欲同其愛也.” Zhào Qí 趙
岐, Mèngzǐ zhù 孟子注, in Yasui Kō, Mōshi teihon, 卷五, p. 29. 
 271
biological origin, viz. its parents, and that this fact not only explains one’s natural 
tendency to love and value one’s parents more than anybody else but also makes it one’s 
duty to love and value one’s parents more than anybody else. And once one is convinced 
of the absolute value of one’s parents to oneself, this conviction makes it possible for one 
systematically to counteract the false rational justifications and positive feelings 
accumulated over generations around the practice of abandoning deceased parents.  
Moreover, I think that the psychological energy that enables one to surmount 
false rational justifications and distractive positive feelings involved in the parent-
dumping practice comes from one’s conviction or judgment that burying one’s parents, 
partially motivated by one’s filial affection, is a correct (shì 是) thing to do. The end of 
Mengzi 3A:5, quoted below, could be interpreted this way: 
 
Probably they went home and came back with baskets and spades and covered the bodies. 
Covering them is correct indeed, and [this shows that] there is also definitely a reason for 
filial sons and humane people to inter their parents.113
 
In this passage Mengzi seems quite convinced that the act of covering the bodies of one’s 
deceased parents is a correct thing to do, but it is less clear whether he also thinks that the 
ancients who initiated the burial practice would have buried their deceased parents with 
the same degree of conviction that they were doing the right thing. However, we have 
seen in Section 5.1.3 above that wisdom in Mengzi is sometimes expressed as 1) 
appreciating the value of the humane and righteous motives involved in certain activities 
and 2) holding fast to those motives as providing reasons for moral action.114 Now, in the 
passage just quoted above Mengzi says that “There is definitely a reason for filial sons 
and humane people to inter their parents,” and in combination with Mengzi’s conception 
of wisdom as accompanying one’s appreciation of virtuous motives, this remark does not 
make it unlikely to interpret Mengzi to think that the filial sons and humane people in 
antiquity—who could appreciate the invaluable importance of their parents to 
themselves—initiated and maintained the burial practice for a good reason. 
                                                 
113 “蓋歸反蘽梩而掩之. 掩之誠是也, 則孝子仁人之掩其親, 亦必有道矣.” Mengzi 3A:5. Emphasis is 
mine. 
114 “仁之實, 事親是也; 義之實, 從兄是也; 智之實, 知斯二者弗去是也.” Mengzi 4A:27. For further 
explanation of this passage, see Section 5.1.3 of this chapter.  
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Now that we are clear about what the significance of interpreting “běn” as 
referring to one’s biological origin is concerning Mengzi’s account of the origin of the 
burial practice in antiquity, let us turn to Shun’s second criticism that it is not clear what 
Yí Zhī’s “two roots” refer to if the character “běn” means one’s biological origin. 
According to Shun, if the Mohist doctrine of impartial caring involves treating everyone 
as if they were one’s parent, Mengzi should have said that Yí Zhī advocated everyone’s 
having millions of roots; or in the other way around, if impartial caring involves caring 
one’s parents as if they were no different from others, Mengzi should have said that Yí 
Zhī advocated everyone’s having no root. But what Mengzi actually said was that Yí Zhī 
postulated two roots, and it is not clear what Yí Zhī’s “two roots” refer to if it does not 
refer to his two sources of moral action, viz. his Mohist doctrine of impartial concern and 
one’s familial affection shared by everyone. However, this criticism takes the Chinese 
character “èr” 二 (“two”) so literally that it fails to notice that Mengzi’s purpose for 
using the word “two” here was to criticize Yí Zhī for denying the unique status and value 
one’s parents have to oneself. In other words, the special status of one’s parents in their 
value to oneself can be denied either by postulating multiple parties who have equal 
status to one’s parents or by postulating no party at all who has any special status or value 
to oneself, and Mengzi uses the word “two” in this passage so as to encompass both ways 
of denying one’s parents their special status to oneself.  
For an example of the first way of denying one’s parents their special status to 
oneself, take a look at Zhū Xī’s conversation with one of his disciples on how to 
understand the phrase “two roots” (èr běn 二本): 
 
[Zhū Xī’s disciple] asked: “‘There are gradations in love’: this is [the meaning] of the so-
called ‘one root.’ For the root and the branch are established [only when] one treats one’s 
parents as close, is benevolent toward the people, and uses things sparingly. Then, what 
about the so-called ‘two roots’?” [Zhū Xī] answered: “If there were no gradations in love, 
why would it just stop at there being two roots? Probably there [could be] one-thousand, 
or even ten-thousand, roots.”115
 
                                                 
115 “問: ‘愛有差等, 此所謂一本. 蓋親親, 仁民, 愛物, 具有本末也. 所謂二本, 是何如?’ 曰: ‘愛無
差等, 何止二本? 蓋千萬本也.’” Zhū Xī 朱熹, Zhūzǐ yǔlèi 朱子語類, ed. Lí Jìngdé 黎靖德 
(Táiběi 臺北: Wénjīn chūbǎnshè 文津出版社, 1986), pp. 1313–1314. 
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In this passage Zhū Xī’s disciple makes a connection between the doctrine of graded love 
and the thesis of “one root.” He understands the “root” in relation to the “branch”; the 
root alludes to what is foundational, central, and important, whereas the branch to what is 
dispensable, in the periphery, and less important. And as long as one understands the 
relationship between kin and non-kin or parents and others in these terms, it is only 
natural for one to love them in different degrees. Now, the disciple asks Zhū Xī about the 
meaning of believing that there are “two roots,” and Zhū Xī says that if one loves 
everyone equally, it does not matter whether one postulates two roots, thousand roots, or 
even ten-thousand roots. For no matter how many roots one postulates, one equally 
comes to deny the special status of one’s parents, who are supposed to be one’s single 
root from the Confucian perspective. And it should be clear now that what Mengzi meant 
by ascribing the thesis of “two roots” to Yí Zhī was not that Yí Zhī postulated two roots 
literally but that he postulated more than one root and consequently denied the 
inexchangeable importance of one’s parents to oneself. 
As for the second usage of the word “two” (èr 二) that denies or challenges the 
unique value or status of a certain thing, see the following two passages from the 
Zǔozhuàn 左傳: 
 
In the inner court [a concubine in the ruler’s] favor equals the royal consort; in the outer 
court [a vassal in the ruler’s] favor equals [the prime minister in charge of] the 
government; concubines’ sons rival the consort’s son, and a big city compares with the 
capital—[these are] the root of disorder.116
 
The viscount of Chǔ 楚 went to the state of Xī 息 to hold a feast [for the ruler of Xī and 
his consort, but he actually attacked them and] eventually destroyed Xī. He returned with 
Guī 媯 of Xī [i.e. the royal consort of Xī], and Dǔ’áo 堵敖 and King Chéng 成 were 
born from her. [However,] she never initiated any conversation with the viscount of Chǔ, 
and [one day] he asked her why. She answered, “I am one woman, but I served two 
husbands. Although I cannot die, what things could I say?”117
 
                                                 
116 “內寵並后, 外寵二政, 嬖子配嫡, 大都耦國, 亂之本也.” Zǔozhuàn, Mǐngōng 閔公 2, Yáng Bójùn, 
Chūnqiū Zǔozhuàn zhù, p. 272. The underlining is mine. 
117 “楚子如息, 以食入享, 遂滅息. 以息媯歸, 生堵敖及成王焉. 未言. 楚子問之. 對曰: ‘吾一婦人, 
而事 二夫 , 縱弗能死 , 其又奚言?’” Zǔozhuàn, Zhuānggōng 莊 公  14, Ibid., pp. 198–199. The 
underlining is mine. 
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In the first passage, the character “èr” 二 is used as a transitive verb meaning “to equal” 
or “to compare with,” in parallel with other similar terms that also mean “to equal” (bìng 
並), “to match up with” (pèi 配), and “to compare with” (ǒu 耦—originally “to make a 
pair to plow the field together”). From the usage of the other three terms in the passage, it 
is clear that “èr” 二 is also used in such a way that the subject of the verb “èr” 二 
challenges the special status of the object either in authority or capacity. However, one 
might say that this usage of “èr” 二 as a verb is not a good example for making my 
point, because it is not in a good parallel with the term “èr běn” 二本 (“two roots”) 
where “èr” is used as an adjective. To respond to this objection, we need to examine the 
second passage. The second passage is a story about a viscount of Chǔ who invaded a 
neighboring country Xī and took its ruler’s consort as his wife. The wife bore two sons 
for her new husband, but it is said that she was so ashamed of having to serve two 
husbands that she never started a conversation with the viscount of Chǔ. As I see it, the 
significance of the word “two” in this story can be found only in relation to the word 
“one” (yī 一). That is, the disgraced royal consort said that she was one woman (yī fùrén 
一婦人), and this means that she was supposed to be faithful to only one man. However, 
unfortunately, she happened to serve two husbands, and what she meant by “serving two 
husbands” was not that she served two rather than three or four husbands but that she 
happened to deny the unique status of the ruler of Xī as her husband. The usage of “èr” 
二 in the phrase “two husbands” (èr fū 二夫) is in perfect grammatical parallel with 
“two roots” (èr běn 二本), and “two husbands” in this sense is not different from saying 
“no husband” (wú fū 無夫).118
 
So far, I have argued against Nivison’s “one-source morality” view of moral 
action in Mengzi. According to this view, the only proper source of motivation for moral 
action is in the form of what Nivison calls “the right feelings and dispositions” such as 
fondness of virtue, compassion, familial affection, sense of honor, or respect, and Nivison 
                                                 
118 It is noteworthy that Mengzi once used the phrase “wú fù” 無父 (literally “no father”) to criticize Mòzǐ 
for denying the invaluable importance of one’s parents to oneself. “楊氏爲我, 是無君也; 墨氏兼愛, 是
無父也. 無父無君, 是禽獸也.” Mengzi 3B:9. 
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argues that Mengzi clearly distinguishes this type of affective motivation from other 
kinds of pro-attitudes towards moral action. For example, Nivison cites Mengzi’s 
distinction between doing what is humane and righteous (xíng rényì 行仁義) and acting 
from humane and righteous motives (yóu rényì xíng 由仁義行), and argues that the latter 
type of motive is the sole source of moral action in Mengzi’s thought. Shun inherits this 
view and tries to find its textual ground in Mengzi 3A:5. According to Shun, the phrase 
“two roots” (èr běn 二本) in the passage refers to the Mohist Yí Zhī’s two sources of 
moral action, specifically one’s natural filial affection and the Mohist doctrine of 
impartial concern; and by saying that Yí Zhī holds that there are two roots, Mengzi was 
criticizing Yí Zhī for postulating two incompatible sources of moral action. However, we 
have seen that this interpretation of Mengzi 3A:5 is mistaken: 1) I have argued that there 
are problematic cases where the ethical demands of familial affection and general 
sympathy pull the agent in different directions, and in such cases a complete moral action 
is impossible until a higher function of the mind—reflective thinking or quán 權—takes 
both emotions and the respective ethical demands in them in view and makes a decision 
of what is the correct emotion to act on in the situation in question. 2) This reveals an 
important philosophical point about the status of emotions in moral action: emotions are 
basically concern-based construals or the particular ways of interpreting things depending 
on what one is concerned about in the situations in question; and an additional source of 
moral motivation to ethical emotions, specifically a conviction or judgment of what is the 
right thing to do in a certain situation which is reached by reflective thinking, is often 
necessary for one to complete a moral action. 3) This means that in order for Mengzi to 
have a correct theory of moral action, he is required to hold a kind of “two-source 
morality” view in Nivison’s terms. In the last several paragraphs above, I partially argued 
that Mengzi held such a view by analyzing his usage of the term “běn” 本 (“root”) in 
Mengzi 3A:5. Against Shun’s argument that the character “běn” 本 in the passage refers 
to the motivational source of moral action, I have argued that “běn” 本 in Mengzi 3A:5 
actually refers to one’s parents as one’s biological origin by discussing relevant textual 
evidence from the Zhūzǐ yǔlèi 朱子語類 and Zǔozhuàn 左傳 on the one hand, and by 
explaining how this interpretation of the character “běn” makes it plausible to ascribe 
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“two-source morality” view to Mengzi on the other hand. Specifically, I have argued that 
once one realizes that one’s parents are one’s single biological origin (yì běn 一本), this 
realization leads one to appreciate the inexchangeable importance of one’s parents, and 
this appreciation of the special value of one’s parents in comparison to others in turn 
makes Mengzi’s agent take a partialistic stance in an ethical situation where his filial 
affection conflicts with his general sympathy. 
Seen in this light, it becomes clear that the two sources of moral action, moral 
emotions on one hand and doctrinal belief or judgment on the other, are often 
indispensable for a complete moral action. In a simple case where just one emotion (and 
the ethical concern embodied in it) is correctly salient, the function of the latter source of 
moral action does not have to be on the surface of one’s mind. However, in the case 
where one’s filial affection and general sympathy conflict with each other and leave the 
agent undecided about what to do (suppose the situation is whether to give food first to 
one’s parents or to an acquaintance in the village during an endemic famine), it is clearly 
when one makes a judgment or approves a doctrinal belief about who should be taken 
care of first in such a situation that the agent can act in one way or another. 
In the next section, I would like to provide further arguments for my position, but 
I also intend them to serve an independent purpose at the same time. Specifically, I try to 
provide a solution to a philosophical problem that Nivison argues Mengzi could not solve 
within his theoretical scheme, viz. the “immediate action problem.” My treatment of this 
problem aims at resolving Nivison’s worry about a dilemmatic situation where one 
should act in full accordance with morality while not feeling completely ready for it, but 
it is also supposed to show once again that the “two-source morality” view of moral 
action is a correct view to ascribe to Mengzi. 
 
5.2.2 The Problem of Immediate Action 
 
In Mengzi 1A:7 which has been quoted several times by now, Mengzi compares King 
Xuān’s saving an ox out of compassion but failing to do the same thing for his people to 
someone who claims to be incapable of seeing a cartload of firewood when he can see the 
tip of an autumn hair. Mengzi’s point in doing this is that King Xuān is capable of 
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reaching out to his people and making their living better, but he is simply refusing to do 
so; as Mengzi says, what hinders King Xuān from becoming the king of all China is not 
his incapacity, but his refusal, to enact morality. However, we also find a very different 
vein of thought in Mengzi 2A:2, where Mengzi compares moral cultivation to growing a 
plant: 
 
[In cultivating moral energy, you] should [constantly] work at it, but should not set a 
fixed timeline [about it]; you should not let the task slip out of your mind, but neither 
should you help its growing. So, do not be like the man from Sòng 宋: There was a man 
from Sòng who was so worried about his seedlings’ not growing that [one day] he pulled 
at them. Having returned home very tired, he told his family members, “I’m very tired 
today, I helped the seedlings grow!” His son rushed out [to the field] to check it, but the 
seedlings were already shriveled up. There are few in the world who do not help their 
seedlings grow. [There are] some who think their work to be useless and leave their 
seedlings unattended; they are those who do not weed their plants. [On the other hand,] 
there are some who help their seedlings grow; they are those who pull at their plants. 
[The latter act] is not only useless but also harmful to the plants.119
 
In this passage, Mengzi draws an analogy between cultivating a moral character and 
growing a plant; just as plants grow into maturity according to their proper course of 
development and one should follow this course in growing them, so the cultivation of a 
virtuous character takes time and there is a proper course of moral development one 
should follow in order to grow into a virtuous person. 
According to Nivison, these two passages reveal that Mengzi adopted two 
incompatible ethical positions that respectively address two horns of a genuine dilemma 
of moral life: Sometimes we feel that we are not motivationally ready to do a certain 
moral action, but that action is one of our important moral obligations, and it is simply 
unacceptable for us to postpone the fulfillment of it until we feel ready.120 For example, 
in Mengzi 3B:8 we see Mengzi urge an official of Sòng 宋  to reduce the tax 
immediately to ten percent of people’s gross income, when that person initially suggests 
gradual tax reduction over two years:  
                                                 
119 “必有事焉, 而勿正; 心勿忘, 勿助長也. 無若宋人然: 宋人有閔其苗之不長而揠之者, 芒芒然歸, 
謂其人曰: ‘今日病矣! 予助苗長矣!’ 其子趨而往視之, 苗則槁矣. 天下之不助苗長者寡矣. 以爲無
益而舍之者, 不耘苗者也; 助之長者, 揠苗者也. 非徒無益, 而又害之.” Mengzi 2A:2. 
120 Nivison, “Motivation and Moral Action in Mencius,” p. 109. 
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Dài Yíngzhī 戴盈之 said, “A tax of one in ten and abolishing the duties at passes and 
markets, we are not capable of doing it this year. What do you think if we were to make 
some reductions [this year] and wait until next year, when we will put an end to [these 
taxes?]” Mengzi said, “Suppose there is a person who steals his neighbor’s chicken every 
day. Someone tells him, ‘This is not the way of the nobleman.’ [He] responds, ‘Let me 
reduce it to stealing one chicken per month [for now]; I would like to wait until next year 
before quitting it.’—If you know that something is not a right thing [to do], then [you 
should] quit it as quickly as possible; why wait until next year?”121
 
Mengzi’s position in this passage is clearly that one should do a right thing to do in its 
entirety and stop wrong conduct immediately; and there is no excuse for postponing them. 
However, Nivison correctly draws our attention to a very important point: 
 
[A]cting rightly requires a process, which may take much time, of “extending” my 
embryonic emotions in directions that are delimited by their (hence my) nature. 
Meanwhile simply forcing myself to do the act because it is “right” may injure my self-
development….The ruler who is hesitant about slashing his tax rate right off might of 
course be right in a much more disturbing way: He might size himself up, conclude that 
the kind of ruler-role Mencius urges on him is one he would in the end make a mess of, 
with the result that not just he but everyone would be worse off.122
 
And Nivison concludes that “[i]t is to be regretted that Mencius, and other Confucians, do 
not seem to have the sophistication to consider problems of this kind—which are thus 
abandoned to Daoists and a very different treatment.”123 In short, Nivison suggests that 
while urging immediate action for fundamental ethical issues such as the welfare of 
people and the protection of people’s property rights, Mengzi also acknowledged, at the 
expense of self-contradiction, the legitimacy of the claim that moral maturation takes 
time and it could be disastrous to force one to act in full accordance with morality when 
he is not yet ready. 
Plausible as it is, though, I think we could find some theoretical grounds in the 
Mengzi that would allow us to find enough of the “sophistication” in question in Mengzi. 
In other words, I think that we could develop a satisfactory solution to reconcile these 
                                                 
121 “戴盈之曰: ‘什一, 去關市之征, 今玆未能; 請輕之, 以待來年, 然後已, 何如?’ 孟子曰: ‘今有人日
攘其鄰之雞者, 或告之曰: “是非君子之道.” 曰: “請損之, 月攘一雞, 以待來年, 然後已.”―如知其
非義, 斯速已矣, 何待來年?’” Mengzi 3B:8. 
122 Nivison, “Motivation and Moral Action in Mencius,” pp. 109–110. Emphasis is original. 
123 Ibid., p. 110. 
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seemingly incompatible ethical positions that Mengzi adopts, and that such a solution can 
be developed from the “two-source morality” view of moral action that is held by Mengzi 
as I have argued above. Now, it seems to me that the working out of such a solution 
should start with examining Nivison’s interpretation of Mengzi’s view of four sprouts in 
Mengzi 2A:6, and the relevant part of the passage goes as follows: 
 
The feeling of compassion is the sprout of humaneness; the feeling of shame and dislike is 
the sprout of righteousness; the feeling of deference is the sprout of ritual propriety; the 
feeling of approval and disapproval is the sprout of wisdom. A human’s having these four 
sprouts is like his having four limbs. Anyone who has these four sprouts but says that he 
is incapable [of moral life] is the one who cripples himself; [anyone who] says that his 
ruler is incapable [of moral life] is the one who cripples his ruler. As for those who have 
four sprouts in themselves, [if they] know how to develop all of them, then it would be like 
a fire starting up or a spring coming through. If one could develop them, they would be 
sufficient to protect the whole world; but if one does not develop them, they would be 
insufficient [even] to serve one’s parents.124
 
In this passage, Mengzi compares one’s having four moral sprouts to one’s having four 
limbs, and says that as long as one has these four sprouts, there is no excuse for one not 
to act in accordance with morality. As we have seen earlier, Nivison considers Mengzi’s 
four sprouts as “feelings and dispositions,” and he seems to take Mengzi’s analogy 
between four sprouts and four limbs quite literally. That is, Nivison interprets Mengzi to 
think that just as one can move one’s arms and legs as one wishes, so can one reshape 
oneself emotionally so as deliberately to feel the way one thinks appropriate in a certain 
situation. (And feeling this way would in turn provide the proper motivation for a moral 
action in Nivison’s view.)125 This interpretation of Nivison’s seems to be in accordance 
with his view that Mengzi could not solve the aforementioned dilemma, because Nivison 
further points out that even if one could shape oneself emotionally as one wishes, there is 
further requisite for one’s being able to do so: although I have these four affective or 
dispositional capacities and am aware of my having them, I also need to be moved to 
                                                 
124 “惻隱之心, 仁之端也; 羞惡之心, 義之端也; 辭讓之心, 禮之端也; 是非之心, 智之端也. 人之有
是四端也, 猶其有四體也. 有是四端而自謂不能者, 自賊者也; 謂其君不能者, 賊其君者也. 凡有
四端於我者, 知皆擴而充之矣, 若火之始然, 泉之始達. 苟能充之, 足以保四海; 苟不充之, 不足
以事父母.” Mengzi 2A:6. 
125 Nivison, “Motivation and Moral Action in Mencius,” p. 109. Cf. Nivison, “Weakness of Will in Ancient 
Chinese Philosophy,” in The Ways of Confucianism, p. 85. 
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activate those capacities.126 If I am not moved, on the other hand, the proper affections or 
dispositions to be activated will remain inactive in me, and consequently I have no 
motivation for a moral action. This means that I need moral cultivation to feel moved to 
use my affective and dispositional capacities, and until then I am not capable of any 
moral action except for such spontaneous actions as saving a baby (Mengzi 2A:6) or 
saving an ox (Mengzi 1A:7) from difficulties that are motivated by my originally active 
ethical emotions. 
However, Nivison’s view of Mengzi’s four sprouts as the sole medium of moral 
action seems to be too narrow an interpretation, and it is closely interrelated with his own 
“one-source morality” view of moral action. That is, by holding the latter view Nivison 
argues that the four sprouts as feelings or dispositions provide the sole motivational 
source of moral action in Mengzi; and in his interpretation of Mengzi 2A:6 just presented 
above Nivison says that it is only by activating the proper feelings or dispositions in one’s 
mind that one is capable of moral action, and that one cannot act morally in certain 
circumstances until she develops proper moral dispositions. The issue is again whether 
moral actions in Mengzi are to be motivated only by moral emotions (or feelings and 
dispositions in Nivison’s terms), or whether there can be another kind of moral action in 
Mengzi that does not have to be mediated by ethical emotions. In the previous section, I 
have argued that moral emotions and doctrinal beliefs or judgments are often two 
indispensable components of moral action; in the following, I argue that Mengzi 
acknowledges the existence of yet another kind of moral action, which is solely based on 
one’s conviction of what is right and wrong. 
A piece of textual evidence seems to be available in Mengzi 3B:8 (quoted above). 
In that passage, Mengzi says that if one knows that something is not a right thing to do, 
one should stop doing it immediately.127 And Mengzi would not have said this if he does 
not think that one’s knowledge of right and wrong can enable one to do a right thing to do 
and avoid the opposite, at least to some extent, or under normal conditions. However, 
Nivison might say that this point does not undermine his position, because his position is 
not that Mengzi does not have this train of thought but that this conflicts with another 
                                                 
126 Nivison, “Motivation and Moral Action in Mencius,” p. 109. 
127 “如知其非義, 斯速已矣.” Mengzi 3B:8.
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train of thought in Mengzi, viz. that moral action is not to be recommended or sometimes 
is not even possible at all unless it is properly motivated by a relevant affection or 
disposition, and any attempt of moral action that is not emotionally backed up would only 
hurt one’s moral development in the long-run. In order to meet this kind of objection, 
then, we need some passages in the Mengzi that could show that Mengzi acknowledged 
the existence of moral actions that are not motivationally grounded on affections or 
dispositions, and that this kind of non-emotionally grounded moral actions are not 
detrimental to but actually indispensable for one’s moral self-cultivation in Mengzi’s 
thought. As I see it, a close analysis of Mengzi 1A:4 and 1A:7 can prove the first point, 
and Mengzi 2A:2 provides some theoretical framework that could support the second 
point. Then, let me start by first quoting part of Mengzi 1A:7 that is relevant to our 
current problem: 
 
[King Xuān] asked, “What must one’s virtue be like in order to be the king [of the 
world]?” [Mengzi] answered, “If one becomes a king by taking care of his people, no one 
can stop it.” [King Xuān] asked, “Can someone like me take care of the people?” 
[Mengzi] answered, “Yes, you can.” [King Xuān] asked, “How do you know that I can?” 
[Mengzi] answered, “I heard it from Hú Hé 胡齕…[In the omitted part, Mengzi 
mentions the previous event where King Xuān saved an ox from being killed for a 
sacrificial ceremony, leads King Xuān to see that he did this out of his compassion for the 
ox, and says that King Xuān’s compassion for the ox is sufficient for him to become the 
king of all China.]  
The king was pleased and said, “The saying in the Poetry that ‘another person’s 
motive, I measure it,’ this is just for you. It’s me who did it, but I couldn’t get my motive 
when I sought it out in introspection. [It’s only when] you said it that [the motive] became 
clear in my mind. [Now,] why is it that this feeling is fitting for [someone to be] a [true] 
king?”  
[Mengzi] said, “If there were someone reporting to you that ‘my strength is 
sufficient to lift a hundred jūn 鈞, but not enough to lift a feather; my eyesight is 
sufficient to examine the tip of an autumn hair, but I cannot see a cartload of firewood,’ 
would your majesty accept that?” [The king] said, “No, I wouldn’t.” “Now, your kindness 
is sufficient to reach animals, but your benefits do not reach your people; why [should 
this case] alone [be an exception]? Therefore, not lifting a feather is due to not using 
[one’s] power; not seeing a cartload of firewood is due to not using [one’s] eyesight; 
people’s not getting taken care of is due to not using [your] kindness. So, your majesty’s 
not becoming the king [of the world] is [due to] your refusal to act, not due to your 
inability [to act].”128
                                                 
128 “[齊宣王問]曰: ‘德何如則可以王矣?’ 曰: ‘保民而王, 莫之能禦也.’ 曰: ‘若寡人者, 可以保民乎
哉?’ 曰: ‘可.’ 曰: ‘何由知吾可也?’ 曰: ‘臣聞之胡齕….王說曰: ‘詩云, “他人有心, 予忖度之,” 夫子
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In the first part of the passage quoted above King Xuān asks Mengzi what one’s 
virtue should be like in order to become a king who could rule the whole world, and 
Mengzi says that one can become such a king by protecting one’s people. What is 
noteworthy in Mengzi’s answer is that he characterizes the virtuous king as someone who 
protects his people, not as someone whose virtue (dé 德) motivates him to protect his 
people. In other words, at least in the first part of the passage quoted above, Mengzi 
seems to view the possessing of virtue not as having a special kind of motivation for 
moral action (specifically a sympathetic feeling or a disposition to act sympathetically) 
but as being capable of acting sympathetically no matter what kind of moral motivation is 
behind one’s acting so (i.e., one’s moral motivation in that case does not have to be in the 
form of affection or disposition). However, Nivison interprets the same part of the 
passage in a quite different way: 
 
Mencius steers Xuan—“king” of the former dukedom of Qi—into the question, What sort 
of “virtue” must he acquire to become the sort of ruler who will, as the natural result of 
the way he will be naturally disposed to act, eventually become king in fact, i.e. of all 
China.129
 
It is clear in this remark that Nivison interprets virtue (dé 德) in Mengzi 1A:7 as a 
disposition to act sympathetically in a relevant situation, because Nivison understands 
virtue (dé 德) here as the particular way one is “naturally disposed to act” that would 
lead one to become the king of all China. Apparently, also, what Nivison refers to by this 
“disposition” here is Mengzi’s first sprout, cèyǐn zhī xīn 惻隱之心. Now, Mengzi says in 
an omitted part of Mengzi 1A:7 that King Xuān can become the king of the whole world 
through his feeling of sympathy for the ox,130 and in the second part of the same passage 
quoted above King Xuān himself asks Mengzi how his feeling of sympathy for the ox is 
fitting for someone to be a true king. Then, would all these not mean that Nivison is 
                                                                                                                                                 
之謂也. 夫我乃行之, 反而求之, 不得吾心. 夫子言之, 於我心有戚戚焉. 此心之所以合於王者, 何
也?’ 曰: ‘有復於王者曰: “吾力足以擧百鈞, 而不足以擧一羽; 明足以察秋毫之末, 而不見輿薪,” 則
王許之乎?’ 曰: ‘否.’ ‘今恩足以及禽獸, 而功不至於百姓者, 獨何與? 然則一羽之不擧, 爲不用力焉; 
輿薪之不見, 爲不用明焉; 百姓之不見保, 爲不用恩焉. 故王之不王, 不爲也, 非不能也.’” Mengzi 
1A:7. 
129 Nivison, “Motivation and Moral Action in Mencius,” p. 95. Emphasis is mine. 
130 “是心足以王矣.” Mengzi 1A:7. 
 283
right—i.e. Mengzi thinks that one’s dispositions like cèyǐn zhī xīn are the only 
motivational source of moral action, and that one can be considered to be virtuous only 
when one’s action springs from such dispositions? 
My answer to this question is that I do not think so, partly because we have seen 
in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.2.1) that Nivison’s interpretation of Mengzi’s four sprouts as 
dispositions in the sense of desires for certain moral actions is mistaken. I have instead 
argued that Mengzi’s first three sprouts are a subset of emotions that should be 
considered as concern-based construals with the appearance of truth, and in Section 5.1.2 
of this chapter I have shown that the fourth sprout in Mengzi, viz. shìfēi zhī xīn 是非之
心, is not merely a construal of the situation one is in but a fully committed moral 
judgment of what is the right thing for one to do in the situation. This means that the way 
is closed for Nivison to argue that Mengzi’s four sprouts are ethical dispositions or 
desires constituting the sole motivational source of moral action, and in the previous 
section I have also argued that moral action in Mengzi often requires both the affective 
(e.g. sympathy, respect, shame) and the judgmental aspect (e.g. one’s conviction that 
one’s feeling of sympathy, respect, or shame in a certain situation is warranted), and that 
the latter element is indispensable for a complete moral action whether that element (i.e. 
moral judgment) is on the surface of one’s mind or not.  
However, we might still have a problem: If my view were right, how do I explain 
Mengzi’s saying that King Xuān’s feeling of sympathy for the ox is sufficient to make 
him act benevolently toward his people so as to become the king of all China? In other 
words, why does Mengzi not say anything explicit to the effect that King Xuān’s 
sympathy is not sufficient to motivate him toward benevolent action to his people unless 
it is combined with his judgment that helping out his people is the right thing to do? 
Would this not mean that Mengzi still somehow thinks that moral emotions constitute the 
sufficient motivational ground for moral action?  
It might be unfortunate for us that Mengzi does not always put things clearly, but 
we are fortunate enough to find some clues to the solving of this question in a related 
passage from the Mengzi: 
 
King Huì 惠 of Liáng 梁 said, “I would love to receive your instructions.” Mengzi 
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responded, “Is there any difference between killing a person with a staff and [killing a 
person] with a knife?” [King Huì of Liáng] said, “There is no difference.” [Mengzi said,] 
“Is there any difference between using a knife and using misgovernment [to kill 
someone]?” [King Huì of Liáng] said, “There is no difference.” [Mengzi said,] “There is 
fat meat in your kitchen, and there are fat horses in your stables; but your people look 
hungry, and your fields are dispersed with the corpses of those who died of starvation—
this is leading on beasts to devour humans. Even beasts devouring each other, human 
beings hate [to see] that; you, then, being the parent of your people, in governing [them], 
cannot avoid leading on beasts to devour humans. How can you be considered as the 
parent of your people? Zhòngní 仲尼 [i.e. Kongzi] said, ‘The one who first created 
burial figures in human form must not have had any offspring!’ [Kongzi condemned that 
man] because his figurines resembled human beings but he still used them [as company 
of the dead into the underworld]. Then, how shall the one [be considered] who makes his 
people die of hunger?”131
 
This passage can be considered to be in parallel with Mengzi 1A:7 in several ways: both 
passages are about Mengzi trying to persuade rulers to act benevolently toward their 
people; if Mengzi tries to persuade the king into benevolent action by appealing to his 
sympathy in Mengzi 1A:7, in this passage he does the same thing by recourse to the 
general human feeling of disgust at other beings’ misfortune or contempt for those who 
bring about such a state of affairs; and finally, if we see these passages closely, we find 
out that the kings in both passages feel their respective ethical emotion for a certain 
object naturally, but do not feel the same way for another object that equally deserves a 
similar response. In other words, just as King Xuān in Mengzi 1A:7 naturally feels 
compassion for the ox but does not feel the same way about his people, so does King Huì 
in Mengzi 1A:4 feel disgusted about an animal devouring another animal (or so assumes 
Mengzi) but does not know that his misgovernment causing his people’s suffering 
deserves greater disgust or contempt. 
On the surface Mengzi can seem, as Nivison interprets him, to be exhorting the 
kings to activate their capacity to feel appropriately in relevant situations, or at least to 
engage in moral self-cultivation so as to feel motivated to activate their four sprouts in 
right situations, so that eventually they could act benevolently toward their people. This 
                                                 
131 “梁惠王曰: ‘寡人願安承敎.’ 孟子對曰: ‘殺人以梃與刃, 有以異乎?’ 曰: ‘無以異也.’ ‘以刃與政, 
有以異乎?’ 曰: ‘無以異也.’ 曰: ‘庖有肥肉, 廐有肥馬, 民有飢色, 野有餓莩, 此率獸而食人也. 獸
相食, 且人惡之, 爲民父母, 行政, 不免於率獸而食人, 惡在其爲民父母也? 仲尼曰: “始作俑者, 
其無後乎!” 爲其象人而用之也. 如之何其使斯民飢而死也?’” Mengzi 1A:4. 
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interpretation naturally leads us to one end of the aforementioned moral dilemma, viz. 
that the cultivation of ethical emotional capacity takes time, and that in the long run it 
would be best for the kings not to disrupt this developmental process by hastily adopting 
benevolent policies that they are not ready for. However, this interpretation should be 
ruled out in both passages, because the urgency of the situation in these passages—
especially the starvation of people in Mengzi 1A:4—makes it unacceptable for Mengzi to 
think that the kings can wait without doing anything until they feel inclined to help their 
people out. Nivison says that there is no solution to this problem because this is a 
dilemma, but I think that the solution can be found if we analyze the metaphor used in 
Mengzi 1A:4 carefully. 
In terms of the degree of their seriousness, I think that Mengzi would have 
considered an animal’s eating another animal to be a less serious case comparable to 
burying clay (or wooden) figures in human form as underground servants to the deceased, 
and leading on animals to devour human beings to be a more serious case comparable to 
the more ancient custom of burying people alive as company of the deceased into the 
underworld. Apparently, the degree of ‘seriousness’ here is determined by how close the 
victims are to us human beings: from the anthropocentric perspective, animals and clay 
human figures are less important than real human beings, and so the harm done to 
animals devoured by other animals or to clay figures buried as a substitute for actual 
humans can be considered as less serious than any harm done to real human beings in 
similar situations. Likewise, it can be considered legitimate to think that the situations 
where animals are eaten by other animals or the clay figures are buried as a substitute for 
real humans deserve less disgust and uneasiness from us than more serious situations 
where animals are led to eat our fellow human beings or human beings are buried alive 
for serving their master in the underground. And it seems that this is probably the way 
Mengzi thinks in drawing all these parallels, and also the way he wants King Huì to look 
at things. Then, what is Mengzi’s point in drawing the analogy between leading on 
animals to devour human beings and making people starve to death by misgovernment, 
and what role does the pan-human feeling of disgust at animals devoured by other 
animals play in Mengzi’s exhorting the king to implement benevolent policies? 
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As I see it, the view of emotions as concern-based construals, which I have 
previously argued to be attributable to Mengzi’s first three sprouts, could provide us with 
an answer to these questions. According to the construal view of emotions, an emotion is 
basically a construal, i.e. a particular way in which things present themselves to the 
person who feels that emotion in a certain situation, and that person’s construal of the 
situation in question is largely colored by her long-term and short-term concerns—i.e. 
what kinds of values she considers to be important in general and what kinds of things 
make her concerned in a particular situation at a particular moment. So, for example, if a 
person feels disgusted at the sight of a young deer torn apart and eaten by a jaguar, it 
reveals that she is concerned about the welfare of the young deer so to speak and finds it 
unfortunate and unbearable for the poor creature to meet such a violent death. Now 
Mengzi, assuming that this is the way everyone would feel in such a situation, asks King 
Huì: “How come, as the parent of your people, can you starve them out while your horses 
are so fat in your stables?” What Mengzi is trying to do here, I believe, is not urging the 
king to activate or cultivate a desire to help his people out as Nivison says, but pointing 
out to the king that he should be more concerned about the welfare of his people than he 
is about the fate of mere animals, and otherwise he is not making any sense at all. 
In other words, as a sentient being sensitive to other creature’s suffering, the king 
is likely to feel disgusted when seeing an animal violently killed by another animal. At 
the same time, though, he is also a human being, and from Mengzi’s perspective this 
means that the king is supposed to adopt an anthropocentric viewpoint that regards 
humans as more important than other lower creatures. Moreover, according to the 
traditional Chinese notion of the ruler as the people’s parent, King Huì is also supposed to 
regard his people as if they were his children, and it is out of question that a parent would 
consider his children to be more important than lower animals. Now, the king’s tendency 
to feel upset about an animal’s violent death shows that he is considerate enough even to 
care about an animal’s well-being. Then, as not being a Daoist skeptic, the king has no 
reason to doubt that humans are more important than other lower animals, and that his 
own children (i.e. his people) are even more valuable than mere animals. This being the 
case, the king’s indifference to the suffering of his people does not make sense at all. By 
the force of logic and by the fact of being human and a ruler, he is required to take care of 
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his people. And as long as he can be made aware of the importance of his people and act 
accordingly, his benevolent action remains fully complete and virtuous, in terms of both 
its motive and effect. And it does not matter much, insofar as the welfare of his people is 
concerned, whether the king currently has an appropriate feeling that properly reflects the 
people’s value or not. 
It goes exactly the same way for Mengzi 1A:7, where Mengzi tries to persuade 
King Xuān into benevolent action towards his people by appealing to the king’s 
sympathy for the ox. In that passage Mengzi says that King Xuān’s sympathy for the ox 
is sufficient for him to act benevolently toward his people, and asks the king a rhetorical 
question “Why is it that your kindness is sufficient to reach animals, but your benefits do 
not reach your people?”132 As I see it, the point Mengzi is trying to make by these 
remarks is exactly the same as in Mengzi 1A:4: 1) The fact that King Xuān saved an ox 
about to be killed out of compassion shows that King Xuān is considerate enough in 
character to be concerned about the well-being of a mere animal. 2) As a human being, it 
would be easier for King Xuān to empathize with other human beings than with mere 
beasts when they are suffering misfortune, and as a human being King Xuān is actually 
supposed to value humans more than beasts. 3) Now, King Xuān’s people are apparently 
human beings suffering difficulties, and King Xuān already showed himself to be capable 
of reaching out even to an animal, which is of less value but more difficult to empathize 
with than a human being in a similar situation. 4) Then, it follows that King Xuān has 
really no excuse for not taking care of his people. If he says he lacks the ability to do so, 
it is like someone claiming to be unable to lift a feather when he can lift a heavy weight; 
he is either suffering irrationality or deceiving himself and others on purpose for an 
ulterior motive. 
Then, it is clear now why Mengzi says that King Xuān’s sympathy is sufficient to 
make him a true king of the world, and why Mengzi mentions the pan-human emotion of 
disgust at an animal devoured by another animal in order to make King Huì act 
benevolently toward his people. It is not because such emotions, or the cultivation of the 
capacity to feel similar emotions at the misfortune of the people, provide the sole 
motivation for the kings to act benevolently towards their people. It is because, unlike 
                                                 
132 “今恩足以及禽獸, 而功不至於百姓者, 獨何與?” Mengzi 1A:7. 
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Nivison’s interpretation, such emotions reveal what kinds of things King Xuān and King 
Huì actually value, and help the kings realize what kinds of things they are supposed to 
value more than other things as both human beings and rulers; and their value system, 
which now came to their vivid awareness through Mengzi’s help, in turn requires them to 
act in accordance with its injunctions at the expense of violating the norms of reason and 
the norms of morality. Of course it is possible that they do not listen to the voice of 
reason or follow the command of morality while being aware of their force. However, 
this is an anomaly that needs a special treatment, and I discuss this matter in the next 
chapter in the context of moral self-cultivation. What should be clear for now, though, is 
that Mengzi thinks certain moral actions originate from one’s belief about what things are 
valuable and what things are more valuable than others, and one can reach such a belief 
or judgment by thinking about the significance of one’s emotions like compassion or 
ethical disgust that one naturally feels in related situations. In this light, Mengzi’s 
emphasis on moral emotions in Mengzi 1A:4 and 1A:7 in the context of moral action is 
compatible with my thesis that Mengzi acknowledges the existence of the kind of moral 
action that is solely based on one’s conviction of what is right and wrong or what is more 
valuable than others, and this once again shows that Nivison’s “one-source morality” 
thesis of moral motivation is mistaken. 
Then, how shall we deal with Nivison’s worry that a moral action, when forced on 
someone who feels not yet ready for it, can actually harm that person’s long-term moral 
development? According to Nivison, this is not only his worry but also Mengzi’s, and it is 
well illustrated in passages like Mengzi 2A:2: As we have seen above, in that passage 
Mengzi compares the process of moral self-cultivation to the growth of a plant, and 
Mengzi’s point in this comparison seems to be that just as a plant grows into maturity 
according to its own course of development and cannot be forced to grow faster, so the 
cultivation of a virtuous character takes time and one should gradually move on by taking 
every necessary step on the proper course of moral development. 
However, I think that Mengzi does not share Nivison’s worry, and this can be 
shown, again, by analyzing the relevant passages more carefully. First of all, I agree with 
Nivison that the gradualist approach to moral cultivation is probably what Mengzi meant 
by his plant metaphor in Mengzi 2A:2, but I also believe that this analogy does not entail 
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Nivison’s interpretation that a moral action in Mengzi needs to be postponed or only 
partially performed until one feels ready to do the whole of it. For as we have just seen, a 
person like King Xuān or King Huì who came vividly to see the normative force of a 
moral action would not find that action as forced but only as rightly required, because his 
own value system or the way he prioritizes things in terms of their value, which is 
implicit in his feeling of ethical emotions for certain objects, tells him that he has enough 
motivation to do the moral action in question and has really no excuse for not doing it. 
Moreover, I think that Mengzi does not consider a compromised moral action as 
moral action at all, and his view of moral cultivation is such that one can build a virtuous 
character only by performing a great number of fully complete moral actions over a long 
period of time. For example, in Mengzi 3B:8 quoted above Mengzi makes it clear that he 
does not consider any partially-performed moral action to be acceptable, by saying that 
stealing a neighbor’s chicken once a month (rather than stealing them everyday) is still 
stealing which one should quit as quickly as possible; and in a portion of Mengzi 2A:2 to 
be quoted below, Mengzi seems to think that one can never attain virtue no matter how 
many times he performs incomplete moral action: 
 
“May I ask what flood-like qì 氣 is?” [Mengzi] said, “It’s difficult to explain. Its nature 
as qi is such that it is extremely big and extremely solid; and if you nourish it with 
rectitude and do not injure it, it can fill the whole space between Heaven and Earth. Its 
nature as qi is such that it accompanies righteousness and the Way; without these, it 
shrinks. It is produced by accumulating righteous deeds, and is not what you [can] obtain 
by incidental performance of righteousness. If you feel dissatisfaction about your deeds, 
it shrinks up.133
 
The flood-like qì Mengzi talks about in this passage is a kind of moral energy that 
enables one to act morally. Although it is not clear at this point what kind of moral energy 
flood-like qì exactly is and how it is related with Mengzi’s four moral sprouts, the 
purpose of this section makes it suffice to know that according to Mengzi, the moral 
energy contained in flood-like qì can be nourished by accumulating rectitude or righteous 
deeds over a long period of time. What I translated as “rectitude” here is originally “zhí” 
                                                 
133 “‘敢問何謂浩然之氣?’ 曰: ‘難言也. 其爲氣也, 至大至剛, 以直養而無害, 則塞於天地之間. 其爲
氣也, 配義與道, 無是, 餒也. 是集義所生者, 非義襲而取之也. 行有不慊於心, 則餒矣.’” Mengzi 
2A:2. 
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直, which literally means “straight” or “straightforward,” and an important connotation of 
this term is that when applied to action or a person’s character, a straight (zhí 直) action 
or a straight person would not accommodate any compromise. What I mean by 
“compromise” here is the act of bending one’s course of action due to non-moral 
considerations such as the prospect of profit or other kinds of opportunities to fulfill one’s 
non-moral desires, and such a compromise makes one fail to act in full accordance with 
the demand of morality or one’s ethical ideal. According to Mengzi, this kind of 
compromise is especially detrimental to the cultivation of a virtuous character, because it 
is the source of ethical dissatisfaction (bú qiè 不慊) that leaves one’s flood-like qì in the 
state of want (něi 餒) and makes it shrink. In other words, the character “qiè” 慊 in the 
original passage refers to one’s feeling of satisfaction, and “bú qiè” 不慊 means that one 
feels somehow dissatisfied or spiritually “hungry.” And since Mengzi thinks that the 
feeling of dissatisfaction resulting from one’s failure to live up to morality is what hinders 
one from cultivating his moral energy, it is clear that any compromised moral action has 




Emotions and Moral Cultivation 
 
 
In the previous chapter, we have seen that ethical emotions in Mengzi neither provide a 
complete basis for ethical judgment nor constitute the sole motivational source of moral 
action. As I have previously argued, emotions in Mengzi can be considered as concern-
based construals with the appearance of truth, and one’s reflective thinking (quán 權) 
and the subsequent judgment about what is morally right or ethically desirable in a 
certain situation remains one’s highest authority in moral judgment and the most 
powerful source of moral motivation. Nevertheless, ancient Chinese Confucians did not 
consider it to be an ideal situation when one’s ethical judgment constantly generates 
friction with one’s feelings and desires; for them, an ideal moral agent was one who 
would act spontaneously as he feels fitting in every situation without transgressing moral 
norms. So, Kongzi says that it was only at the age of seventy that he could follow what 
his mind desired without violating the norms1; and Mengzi says that one can cultivate 
humaneness (rén 仁) by gradually extending the boundary of the objects of one’s 
sympathy, and develop righteousness (yì 義) by making one’s moral sense more and 
more sensitive in distinguishing what is morally right from wrong.2
Then, Nivison was not mistaken at all in thinking that Mengzi exhorts people to 
become the sort of person who will always naturally and effectively do virtuous acts, and 
that being such a person involves having the right feelings and dispositions. In other 
words, although Nivison was mistaken in thinking that ethical emotions are the only 
source of moral motivation in Mengzi and that fully complete moral action can be 
                                                 
1 “吾…七十而從心所欲, 不踰矩.” Lunyu 2:4. 
2 “人皆有所不忍, 達之於其所忍, 仁也; 人皆有所不爲, 達之於其所爲, 義也. 人能充無欲害人之心, 
而仁不可勝用也; 人能充無穿踰之心, 而義不可勝用也.” Mengzi 7B:31. This passage will be 
explained in detail later. 
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postponed until one develops strong enough affective motivation, it still remains highly 
likely that the ideal Mengzian agent would not experience any discrepancy or tension 
between the way she judges things and the way she feels about things. Then, how could 
such a perfect moral character be developed? This is the main question of this chapter, 
and I am specifically interested in clarifying Mengzi’s theory of emotional extension (tuī 
推 or chōng 充). 
Many major scholars in Chinese philosophy have been writing on Mengzi’s 
notion of emotional extension. However, in my view, the most advanced interpretations 
of the Mengzian extension in the field still seem to be equally unsatisfactory in 
explaining how the Mengzian extension of moral emotion really occurs, or what the real 
mechanism behind the Mengzian extension is. In the following, I provide a brief 
summary of the three major interpretations of Mengzi’s concept of emotional extension 
proposed so far and discuss their respective problems. Next, I argue that this ubiquitous 
failure in explaining the exact mechanism of the Mengzian extension of moral emotions 
in most previously proposed interpretations is due to their lack of consideration for the 
huge role played by culture or social norms in the Mengzian emotional extension.  
That is, I argue that the social norms in ancient China such as the Confucian 
rituals embody certain cultural assumptions concerning which emotions are more 
important than others and what the appropriate boundaries for their applications are, and 
propose that the process of Mengzian emotional extension is mainly the process in which 
culture plays an important role in shaping our emotional reactions in a particular way. In 
my opinion, our due attention to the important role culture plays in the Mengzian 
extension of moral emotions will let us radically rethink Mengzi’s project of moral 
cultivation in general from a totally new perspective, which will turn out to be consistent 




6.1 Mengzi’s Emotional Extension—A Problematic Concept 
 
6.1.1 Two Interpretations of Mengzi’s Emotional Extension 
 293
 
In Section 5.2.1 of the previous chapter, I have briefly introduced Mengzi’s concept of 
emotional extension (tuī 推) and Nivison’s interpretation of it. As has been already 
mentioned there, the term “tuī” 推 was originally a technical term in the Later Mohist 
logic referring to an effort to get someone to grant what that person has not originally 
accepted by pointing out that it is the same as something that that person does accept, and 
we have also seen that Mengzi appropriates this term in Mengzi 1A:7 to explain his 
notion of emotional extension. To quote the relevant portion of the passage again to 
facilitate my discussion, it goes as follows: 
 
Treat your elders as befitting their age, and then reach out to other people’s elders; treat 
your youngsters as befitting their age, and then reach out to other people’s youngsters. [If 
you could do so, then] you would be able to [govern] the world [as if] moving it on your 
palm….That is, all you have to do is merely to take this feeling and apply it to other cases. 
So, [if you] extend your compassion, it will be sufficient for protecting [all the people] 
within the Four Seas; but [if you] don’t extend your compassion, you won’t have enough 
even for protecting your wife and children. That by which the ancients greatly surpassed 
others is nothing else: they were good at extending what they did, and that was all. Now, 
your compassion is sufficient to reach animals, but your benefits do not reach your 
people; why is it so?”3
 
As might be very familiar to the reader by now, in the omitted part of the passage Mengzi 
discusses with King Xuān a past incident in which the king spared an ox being led to the 
slaughter for a sacrificial ritual. He commanded that the ox be replaced with a sheep, but 
the real motive for his saving the ox, as Mengzi helps him realize, was his compassion for 
the poor creature that was terrified with the fear of death and resembled so much an 
innocent man going to execution. Once the king understood his compassion as the real 
motive behind his action, Mengzi goes on to argue that the king’s bad governance of his 
country that recently brought great harm to his people is actually because he did not “take 
this feeling” of compassion for the ox and “apply it” to the case of his people, when he 
apparently could. For the reason why King Xuān saved the ox is that the terrified ox 
reminded him of a human being about to be executed, and the fact that his benevolence 
reached a mere animal shows how much more he could have been benevolent to his 
                                                 
3 “老吾老, 以及人之老, 幼吾幼, 以及人之幼, 天下可運於掌….言擧斯心加諸彼而已. 故推恩足以保
四海, 不推恩無以保妻子. 古之人所以大過人者, 無他焉; 善推其所爲而已矣. 今恩足以及禽獸, 而
功不至於百姓者, 獨何與?” Mengzi 1A:7. The underlining is mine. 
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fellow human beings. 
However, what matters in Mengzi is not merely the king’s showing benevolence 
toward his people by taking care of their difficulties but also eventually his feeling 
sympathy for their suffering, because the ideal agent in Mengzi is the one who acts 
virtuously from the correct motives with the right feelings. In this light, what is crucial 
and problematic in the current story is that King Xuān could have felt sympathy for his 
subjects but actually did not, and an important question concerning Mengzi’s theory of 
emotional cultivation suggested in this passage is what makes the king “take up the 
feeling [of compassion] in one case” and “apply it to another.” Based on the fact that 
King Xuān could naturally feel compassion for the ox but found it difficult to feel the 
same way for his people, we could label the former type of cases “paradigmatic cases” 
(following Nivison4) and the latter type “extended cases.” In other words, according to 
this distinction, whereas paradigmatic cases of a moral emotion refer to those where one 
finds it appropriate to feel a certain emotion (e.g. compassion) and naturally feels so 
when encountering a certain kind of objects (e.g. the ox), extended cases of the same 
emotion refer to the situations where one does not spontaneously feel the same emotion 
in question about certain objects (e.g. the suffering people) while finding it appropriate to 
feel so. Then, our current question about Mengzi’s theory of emotional cultivation could 
be rephrased as follows: How could one come to feel proper ethical emotions in extended 
cases as naturally as he does in paradigmatic cases? 
In his article “Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi,” David Wong 
proposes that Mengzian extension can be conceived as an extension of both judgment and 
feeling.5 For example, when King Xuān comes to recognize that there are significant 
similarities between the ox that he saved from being killed and his subjects suffering 
from his misgovernment, and subsequently realizes that the latter deserve as much 
sympathy from him as the former, King Xuān can be considered to have achieved an 
extension in ethical judgment. However, the problem under consideration in this chapter 
is that such an understanding does not necessarily come hand in hand with the extension 
in another respect—King Xuān remains emotionally unmoved while recognizing that his 
                                                 
4 For example, see Nivison, “Motivation and Moral Action in Mengzi,” p. 100. 
5 David B. Wong, “Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi,” chap. in Essays on the Moral 
Philosophy of Mengzi, ed. Xiusheng Liu and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2002), p. 190. 
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people in difficulty are a proper object of his compassion. According to Wong, most of 
the solutions to this problem proposed previously to him can be classified into two groups, 
one being a “logical extension” interpretation and the other an “emotive extension” 
interpretation, as he calls them. Basically he argues against both interpretations and 
proposes his own “developmental extension” interpretation. In the following, I briefly 
summarize and critically discuss the “logical” and “emotive” interpretations of Mengzi’s 
emotional extension; and then in Section 6.1.2, I examine whether Wong’s own 
interpretation could make any better theoretical alternative. 
A seminal version of the logical extension interpretation had been originally 
suggested by Nivison himself, and it was greatly elaborated by Kwong-loi Shun. As we 
have seen in the previous chapter, concerning Mengzi 2A:9 where the ancient sage Bó Yí 
extended his disgust at wicked rulers and people of incorrect political allegiance as far as 
to the case of a person whose hat was not on right, Nivison cautiously suggests that the 
similarity between the paradigm cases (e.g. wicked rulers) and the extended case (the 
man whose hat was awry) might have required Bó Yí to make such a quasi-logical move 
and “extend” his feeling of disgust.6 But Nivison eventually rejects this view as not the 
one Mengzi would have taken seriously, saying that Mengzi was fully aware of the 
possible discrepancy between one’s seeing something to be done and having proper 
affective motivation for doing it.7 However, Kwong-loi Shun accepts Nivison’s original 
suggestion and further develops it into a careful argument. According to him, the incident 
of saving the ox in Mengzi 1A:7 is a clear case of suffering in which King Xuān’s 
sympathy successfully motivated a proper action. And what Mengzi is trying to do by 
reminding him of his people’s plight, Shun argues, is to let the king see his lack of 
consistency in treating the two similar cases. As Shun sees it, Mengzi thinks that the 
king’s recognition of his own inconsistency will somehow generate in him the 
appropriate sympathetic reaction to the second case.8
                                                 
6 For a more detailed explanation of the passage, see Section 5.2.1 of the previous chapter and Nivison, 
“Motivation and Moral Action in Mengzi,” pp. 98–99. Nivison’s original view on this matter appears in 
David S. Nivison, “Mencius and Motivation,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion XLVII, no. 3 
Thematic Issue S (September 1979), pp. 421–422. 
7 Nivison, “Motivation and Moral Action in Mengzi,” p. 99. 




However, this interpretation is problematic for several reasons. First, it is very 
difficult to understand how the intellectual recognition of inconsistency in one’s 
emotional reactions to two similar cases could lead to actually having the same emotion 
for both cases. For it is a well-known phenomenon that we seem to have little control 
over our emotions—some people feel fear when flying while clearly knowing that flight 
is the safest means of travel, and like King Xuān, we often find ourselves failing to feel 
sympathy for our fellow human beings who are clearly in miserable situations.9 Second, 
as Bryan Van Norden has pointed out, the maintenance of emotional consistency does not 
seem to be Mengzi’s primary concern here, because it would have been equally consistent 
if the king had revoked his order to save the ox and eliminated his initial compassion for 
that ox from his mind. However, Mengzi did not recommend this, and this shows that 
mere emotional consistency was not what Mengzi wanted the king to achieve.10 Third, 
concurring with Shun’s worry about his own interpretation, Wong points out that the 
logical extension interpretation significantly distorts our understanding of what the truly 
compassionate person should look like. For according to this view the justification of 
King Xuān’s compassionate treatment of his people is contingent on the existence of his 
desire to be consistent with his compassionate reaction to the ox, but a sounder picture of 
the compassionate person would expect him to look for the justifying reason for his 
benevolent treatment of others in those people’s suffering itself.11
The second interpretation of Mengzian extension that Wong distinguishes his 
view from is the emotive extension interpretation. According to this view, normal human 
adults possess a naturally developed full faculty of moral emotions, which only needs to 
be stimulated with sufficient force and vividness of certain relevant images for it to 
function properly. King Xuān is not an exception, and Mengzi’s urge to “take this heart 
and apply it to that case (of his people’s suffering)” is interpreted as an exhortation to tap 
into his fully developed natural sympathy through vivid imagination of his people’s 
suffering. A number of scholars can be considered to hold this view12, but the most 
                                                 
9 A similar concern seems to be found in Wong, “Is There a Distinction Between Reason and Emotion in 
Mengzi?” p. 40. 
10 Bryan W. Van Norden, “Kwong-Loi Shun on Moral Reasons in Mengzi,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 
18, no. 4 (1991), p. 355. 
11 Wong, “Is There a Distinction Between Reason and Emotion in Mengzi?” pp. 41–42. 
12 For example, Wong lists Bryan Van Norden, Craig Ihara, and Manyul Im under this group. See Wong, 
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elaborate version of it has been proposed by Manyul Im, and we also find some 
interesting supplemental ideas in Franklin Perkins’s work. So, my explanation of the 
emotive extension interpretation provided below will be focused on some of the works 
recently published by these two scholars. 
In his article “Emotional Control and Virtue in the Mengzi,” Manyul Im argues for 
his Natural Development Model (NDM hereafter) and his thesis of the unperfected nature 
of the nobleman’s (jūnzǐ 君子) character. According to the NDM, full human moral 
development occurs naturally, i.e. without the need of strengthening by practice, if certain 
minimal conditions like the satisfaction of the economic needs and the existence of stable 
social conditions are met. In other words, as long as “the minimal conditions have been 
met, one can be expected naturally to be able to feel and act in the morally proper 
ways.”13 In addition, Im also argues that the ideal of a morally good person in Mengzi 
does not require the perfection of one’s psychological capacities and dispositions. 
According to him, the nobleman, the Mengzian moral ideal, does suffer from the 
uncontrollability of his emotions once they are engaged; and the nobleman is also 
sometimes vulnerable to motivational conflict resulting from the presence of competing 
inclinations that pull the agent in different directions.14 For an example of the nobleman’s 
difficulty in emotional control, Im cites Mengzi 4A:18 where Mengzi says that the 
nobleman does not teach his own son because he can get angry when his son does not 
follow his instructions very well; and as a typical example of motivational conflict among 
the nobleman’s different inclinations, Im cites the case of the sage king Shùn, whose 
affection and loyalty to his family members were in severe tension with his public duties 
as ruler.15 
Im pits his interpretation against what he calls the perfectibility model. According 
to him, a typical proponent of this model is Aristotle, and it advises us that active 
emotional cultivation is desirable and necessary for full moral development. On this 
model, As Im sees it, emotional responses are to be perfected through practice and 
habituation, and it postulates that 1) the strength of an emotional disposition may be 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi,” p. 191. 
13 Manyul Im, “Emotional Control and Virtue in the Mencius,” Philosophy East and West 49, no. 1 (January 
1999), p. 10. 
14 Ibid., p. 7. 
15 Ibid., pp. 7–8. 
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modulated through habituation, and that 2) new sources of moral motivation may be 
acquired through habituation. On this model, a virtuous agent not only acts correctly but 
also feels aright.16 According to Im, this Aristotelian virtue theory became very popular 
in contemporary literature on Mengzi in the West, but unfortunately it is a wrong 
interpretation to ascribe to Mengzi. The moral education in Mengzi and other Confucians, 
Im argues, aims at “teaching the proper forms of behavior that express the attitudes 
essential to being a good person,” and it does not concern “the business of perfecting the 
students’ emotional responses.”17 To elaborate, the learning of morally proper behavior is 
a process of habituation that is analogous to the acquisition of a skill in using an ability 
we already possess. For example, one habituates oneself to certain deferential ritual 
behaviors through which she expresses her sense of respect for elders that has been 
already naturally developed prior to this habituation process.18
Wong’s criticism of Im’s view is brief, and it is mainly focused on refuting his 
Natural Development Thesis. According to Wong, the merit of the emotive extension 
interpretation is to be able to explain why Mengzi expects King Xuān immediately to 
treat his people benevolently and why he considers the king’s failure to do so to be due to 
simple refusal to act rather than incapacity to act. However, Wong also argues that the 
emotive extension interpretation does not go well with certain passages from the Mengzi 
which suggest that moral development is not merely a matter of a simple recovery or 
reinforcement of what is innately in the human mind. For example, following Nivison, 
Wong cites Mengzi 7B:11 as an important counterexample to Im’s thesis that emotional 
cultivation is unnecessary in Mengzi: “A person fond of [good] reputation can give away 
a state of a thousand chariots, but if one is not the sort of person to do it, reluctance 
would be written all over one’s face if one had to give away merely a basketful of rice 
and a bowlful of soup.”19 That is, Mengzi’s observation here is that a seemingly great act 
of sacrifice sometimes turns out to be motivated by a subtler kind of selfish desire, and 
such a desire often hinders one from even making a very small amount of sacrifice for 
                                                 
16 Ibid., p. 1. 
17 Ibid., pp. 3–4. 
18 Ibid., p. 15. 
19 “好名之人能讓千乘之國, 苟非其人, 簞食豆羹見於色.” Mengzi 7B:11. The translation is partly from 
Nivison, “Motivation and Moral Action in Mengzi,” p. 113 as quoted in Wong, “Reasons and Analogical 
Reasoning in Mengzi,” p. 191. 
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other people’s benefit. This means that Mengzi might have felt a need for a theory of 
transforming or systematically suppressing such problematic desires as an integral part of 
his ethical thought, and Im seems to need a good argument to explain such passages away. 
In addition to Wong’s argument, I would like to provide further arguments for the 
need of emotional cultivation in Mengzi’s thought, and that involves a critical discussion 
of Im’s view. First, there seems to be a little contradiction between Im’s two theses 
presented above. As I see it, Im cannot hold his NDM and the thesis of the unperfected 
nature of the nobleman’s character at the same time, because I believe that natural 
development of a person’s character necessarily involves the development of the agent’s 
emotional capacity. The capacity of proper emotional responses in various ethical 
situations is a crucial constituent of a person’s character, and Im has also said himself that 
“If the minimal conditions have been met, one can be expected naturally to be able to feel 
and act in the morally proper ways.”20 Moreover, one of Im’s main points is that one is 
capable of emotional engagement at will—for example, Im holds the view that King 
Xuān’s failure to feel compassion for his people in misery is due to his unwillingness, not 
inability to do so. He could feel compassion as easily and immediately as he could lift a 
feather or see a cartload of firewood. However, on the NDM the emotion that a person 
makes himself feel as he wishes should be at least a morally approvable one, if not 
perfect, and otherwise the NDM loses its significance. For if the Mengzian agent with 
naturally developed virtue is vulnerable to morally problematic or inappropriate emotions, 
what is it that is naturally developed in him? 
Then, how could this difficulty be resolved? Before pressing my argument any 
further against Im, I would like to consider how Im would try to solve this problem if he 
shared my worry. In my view, he might try to solve it by introducing a particular 
conception of emotional control and arguing that the deliberation and volition involved in 
one’s emotional control is what mainly accounts for one’s moral character. For Im, that 
King Xuān can engage in compassion at will for his people, as he interprets Mengzi to be 
arguing, is good evidence that emotion is under one’s control. However, as we have seen 
above, Im also holds that the Mengzian nobleman is not free from the surge of 
inappropriate emotions and the motivational conflict due to the presence of competing 
                                                 
20 Im, “Emotional Control and Virtue in the Mencius,” p. 10. 
 300
 
emotions in his mind. And then in order to reconcile these two seemingly contradicting 
stances about the human control of emotions in his interpretation of Mengzi, Im suggests 
a peculiar conception of emotional control by saying the following: 
 
The perfecting of one’s psychological capacities and dispositions…is not what is 
important to being a good person. Instead, the manipulation of one’s external 
circumstances is important, so that certain kinds of feelings and their associated 
motivations arise—or do not arise—in certain situations. So at the height of moral 
development, what have not been developed or tutored are the capacities that produce 
one’s motivations to act. Rather, one’s deliberative activity and will—the things required 
to see the need for, to pose, and to carry out the indirectly motivating, self-manipulative 
strategies—are what bear the burden of moral character.21
 
It becomes clear by these remarks that Im does not really think that under proper 
economic and social conditions one can naturally develop the capacities both to act and 
feel in morally proper ways. Im’s genuine view now rather seems to be that what 
naturally develops in one’s mind is the motivational power of one’s emotions, which do 
not always direct one to ethically good or morally correct actions and thus often need to 
be controlled through one’s manipulation of the external circumstances. But what is 
meant exactly by the “manipulation of external circumstances”? 
Franklin Perkins provides a nice explanation of it. Against several scholars’ recent 
claim that emotions or feelings in Mengzi can be commanded by will or changed by 
rational arguments directly (e.g. Kwong-Loi Shun’s logical extension interpretation), he 
argues that reason cannot directly control feelings but can indirectly control by training 
them. Then, how is the training of feelings possible? According to Perkins, two 
psychological facts about feelings or emotions are relevant here: First, feelings are 
evoked by experiences, not by choice or reason. For example, the sight of a suffering ox 
evokes sympathy whether we want it or not. Second, feelings shift by association, just as 
sympathy evoked by the sight of a particular ox’s suffering can be transferred to other 
oxen, and possibly to other kinds of sentient beings too.22 Given these two psychological 
facts, Perkins proposes a complex view of emotional control. That is, since our emotions 
are not evoked by rational choice but by circumstances, we need to control our 
                                                 
21 Ibid., p. 7. 
22 Perkins, “Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy,” p. 214. 
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circumstances in order to control our emotions. In other words, “Moral cultivation 
depends on choosing to put ourselves in the circumstances that will evoke the proper 
feelings in us, and to do this in a way that transfers these feelings to analogous groups.”23 
And according to Perkins, we need two kinds of abilities to direct this training of 
emotions: on one hand the ability to pay attention (sī 思) to the right kinds of 
experiences that evoke the right feelings, and on the other hand wisdom (zhì 智) that tells 
us what are the right kinds of things to pay attention to.24
Now, let us return to Im’s NDM and think further about its implications in terms 
of this conception of emotional control. As I mentioned above, Im seems to hold that 
Mengzian emotions carry some sort of naturally developed motivational power towards 
certain actions, but those actions are not always ethically good or morally right; and even 
when certain emotions motivate one to act morally, they can sometimes get excessive or 
deficient and miss the target. So, on Im’s view, the criterion with which the relevant 
faculty of the mind judges whether one’s natural emotion is appropriate or not in a certain 
situation resides in large part outside of the emotion, and consequently Mengzian 
emotions, even those that tend to direct us towards moral actions, remain objects of 
constant check and indirect control through the manipulation of one’s circumstances. In 
addition, in describing Mengzian emotions and the purported motivational power they 
embody, Im often uses such words as “deficiency,” “excess,” “strength,” and 
“continuum,” and argues that the purpose of the willful manipulation of one’s situations 
is to engage deficient emotions more actively and to prevent certain emotions from being 
engaged excessively.25 And what is noteworthy in this description of Mengzian emotions 
is that Im seems to attribute to Mengzi a kind of hydraulic model of emotions and 
motivation. In other words, on Im’s view an emotion is understood as a continuum of 
motivational power that naturally reaches a substantial degree of strength or intensity, but 
needs to be directed to right objects and expressed in an appropriate manner through 
one’s manipulation of the external circumstances. 
                                                 
23 Ibid., p. 215. 
24 Ibid., pp. 214–217. Bryan Van Norden, based on a careful analysis of all the usages of the term “sī” 思 
in the Mengzi, has proposed that “sī” 思 is a technical term in Mengzian psychology which can be 
translated as “concentration” and is related with its non-technical uses to mean “to recall,” “to long for,” “to 
think fondly of,” or “to think anxiously about.” See Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi,” p. 112. 
25 For example, see Im, “Emotional Control and Virtue in the Mencius,” p. 8. 
 302
 
However, these implications of the NDM seem to have some theoretical drawback, 
specifically concerning the correct picture of the ideal Mengzian agent and Mengzi’s 
conception of emotions. First, Im’s view of the Mengzian nobleman as normally suffering 
from uncontrollable emotions and vulnerable to motivational conflicts does not fit the 
general Confucian conception of the sage who does not desire against the moral norms 
(Lunyu 2:4), nor does it seem to explain very well some key passages from the Mengzi 
which place high value on the spontaneity in one’s feeling the right emotion in every 
situation and which emphasize the importance of cultivating one’s emotions. For example, 
as has been mentioned above, Mengzi says in Mengzi 7B:11 that although one could give 
away a state of a thousand chariots to someone else for the sake of one’s reputation, he 
would have a very hard time ceding merely a basketful of rice and a bowlful of soup to 
someone else if he is not the right kind of person.26 “The right kind of person” here 
definitely refers to no other than the nobleman, Mengzi’s ideal moral agent, and Mengzi 
contrasts the nobleman with another type of person who can successfully manage his own 
emotions to get the reputation of being indifferent to material goods but does not always 
succeed in controlling his true feelings. Now, is Mengzi suggesting here that his ideal 
agent is the one who never fails in managing his ugly emotions? I do not think so, 
because the correct point to be drawn from this contrast rather seems to be that Mengzi’s 
ideal agent is the type of person who would not begrudge his property at all when it is 
appropriate to cede things to others for their benefit. 
In addition, Mengzi says in Mengzi 7B:1 that the highest Confucian virtue of 
humaneness (rén 仁) involves getting to love or care about things that one was originally 
indifferent to, and this change in one’s attitude toward things seems to result from the 
cultivation of the relevant emotion: 
 
Mengzi said, “How inhumane King Huì 惠  of Liáng 梁  is! The humane person 
[extends his caring attitude in the way that he] starts from those he loves and reaches out 
to those he doesn’t love; [on the other hand,] the inhumane person [extends his 
ruthlessness in the way that he] starts from those he doesn’t love and reaches out to those 
he loves.” Gōngsūn Chǒu 公孫丑 asked, “What do you mean?” [Mengzi answered,] 
“For the sake of territory, King Huì of Liáng led his people to battle to the point of 
making pulp out of them, but was greatly defeated. When he was about to engage in a 
                                                 
26 “The right kind of person” here is a translation of “qí rén” 其人, literally meaning “that person.” 
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war again, he feared that he would not win, so he drove his sons and younger brothers 
whom he loved to die for the war. This is what I mean by ‘starting from those one doesn’t 
love and reaching out to those one loves’.”27
 
In the previous chapter, we have seen King Huì of Liáng being criticized by Mengzi for 
letting his people starve to death while keeping fat horses in his stables (Mengzi 1A:4). 
Now in this passage, we see that King Huì not only jeopardizes the life of his people for 
whom he has no love, but also sacrifices to the war his own sons and brothers whom he 
does love. According to Mengzi, this is exactly the opposite of what the humane person 
would do—extending his caring affection from those he loves to those he does not 
originally love, and it seems that his “reaching out” (jí 及) to the latter type of people not 
only involves benevolent treatment of them but also is accompanied by a proper affective 
attitude. In response to this, though, Im might argue that what Mengzi really recommends 
here is not any cultivation of new affection but merely a manipulation of the relevant 
situation so that the humane person’s latent caring affection gets stimulated and properly 
expressed towards the people’s suffering. 28  However, I think that this way of 
understanding the passage is not correct, because of the similarity between the passage 
under consideration and Mengzi 3A:5. As we have seen earlier, in the latter passage 
Mengzi asks the Mohist Yí Zhī a rhetorical question of whether one’s affection for one’s 
brother’s child is like one’s affection for one’s neighbor’s baby. Mengzi’s point was that it 
is not only natural but also appropriate for one to love one’s brother’s child more than 
one’s neighbor’s baby, and from this point it further follows that originally one has no 
reason to be expected to have developed a substantial concern for strangers on the street. 
However, Confucian morality also requires that one develop such a concern for the 
welfare of others, and it is through the long-term cultivation of the capacity to feel such a 
concern, not through an instant activation of one’s latent benevolence, that one eventually 
becomes a humane person. 
                                                 
27 “孟子曰: ‘不仁哉梁惠王也! 仁者以其所愛及其所不愛, 不仁者以其所不愛及其所愛.’ 公孫丑問曰: 
‘何謂也?’ ‘梁惠王以土地之故, 糜爛其民而戰之, 大敗. 將復之, 恐不能勝, 故驅其所愛子弟以殉之, 
是之謂以其所不愛及其所愛也.’” Mengzi 7B:1. 
28 This is the way Perkins argues in his “Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy,” pp. 211–215. However, a 
similar argument is also presented in Manyul Im, “Action, Emotion, and Inference in Mencius,” Journal of 
Chinese Philosophy 29, no. 2 (June 2002). 
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The second implication of the NDM—viz. that emotions carry some sort of 
motivational power analogous to hydraulic pressure—is also problematic, because this 
understanding of emotions seems to blur the distinction between emotions and desires 
and give us the wrong impression that emotions can be directed virtually at any objects 
by practice. As we have previously seen in Chapter 4, emotions in Mengzi are best 
interpreted as concern-based construals with the appearance of truth, or the particular 
ways in which things present themselves to a person who is in the grip of the 
corresponding emotions. And we have also seen that emotions as a kind of construal of 
certain situations should be clearly distinguished from the related desires to act in certain 
ways in those situations. For example, respect in Mengzi is primarily one’s sincere 
regarding of an elderly or worthy person to be worthy of respect, but it is not the same 
thing as one’s desire to treat an elderly or worthy person respectfully whenever one 
encounters such a person. However, Im’s NDM seems to blur this distinction and 
postulate that there is such an entity as fully-developed respect existing as a disposition in 
one’s mind independently of any object, like whirling water that can be released in any 
direction depending on where it gets an outlet. This seems to be a mistaken view, though. 
For if emotions in Mengzi are a kind of construal, by definition they can only occur when 
there are things to be construed. In other words, emotions are primarily our spontaneous 
responses to things that stimulate our emotional sensibility, and the contents of Mengzian 
emotions are primarily a special kind of evaluative thoughts: the ox is pitiful, the offer is 
humiliating, the man is worthy of respect, and so forth. However, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter, these concern-based construals do not normally motivate any action 
until they get combined with implicit or explicit judgmental approval (shìfēi zhī xīn 是非
之心) that they are indeed correct construals to act on in respective situations. In short, it 
is not only pointless but even impossible in Mengzi to direct one’s emotions (understood 
in Im’s terms) to new objects by artificial practice. It is pointless because Mengzian 
emotions are actually a kind of construals that do not motivate action by themselves, and 
it is impossible because there is no such a thing as an emotion as a stream of motivational 
energy with an unidentified object in the first place. 
 
6.1.2 Wong’s Alternative Interpretation and Its Limitations 
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So far, we have critically reviewed two influential interpretations of Mengzian extension: 
the logical extension and emotive extension interpretations. As we have seen above, 
neither of these two views seems tenable as a correct interpretation of Mengzian 
extension due to their theoretical flaws, and for this reason Wong explores the conceptual 
space between these two models and proposes a third view: “developmental extension” 
interpretation. By giving the name “developmental extension interpretation” to his own 
view, Wong aspires to overcome both kinds of defects that he finds in the previous 
interpretations. He says: 
 
My interpretation, unlike the logical extension interpretation, assumes no magical 
generation of motivationally effective compassion purely through logical argumentation. 
If the King had had no innate beginning of compassion, if there were no raw material of 
some natural feeling, no qi flowing in approximately the right direction already, no 
amount of logical argumentation would help to generate effective feeling for his people. 
My interpretation also differs from the emotive extension interpretation precisely because 
it recognizes real and substantial change in the composition of moral feelings as they are 
channeled and shaped by judgments about what there is reason to do.29
 
Then, how does Wong try to achieve his goals? A hint is already given in his remarks just 
quoted: Wong proposes that the innate moral feelings of human beings—such as King 
Xuān’s compassion for the ox—are instinctual feelings that to a significant degree are 
plastic and indeterminate. And he also proposes to understand the plasticity and 
indeterminateness of these emotions in the sense that these emotions have only partially 
formed intentional objects. The concept of intentional object captures an important aspect 
of emotions that I have presented in Chapter 4 (following Roberts) as concern-based 
construals: emotions are not merely brute sensations but perceptions of the salient 
features of the situations at hand; such perceptions are guided by what one’s primary 
concern is in each situation; and the features so perceived are the intentional objects of 
the respective emotions. Now according to Wong, the failure of emotional extension—viz. 
the phenomenon that one feels a certain ethical emotion for a set of objects very naturally 
(paradigmatic cases) but does not always feel the same way for other similar objects 
(extended cases)—results from the fact that one’s moral emotions do not have a complete 
list of intentional objects. Wong points out that this lack of a comprehensive list of 
                                                 
29 Wong, “Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi,” p. 196. 
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intentional objects is what makes Mengzian moral emotions indeterminate, and he argues 
that those emotions are also plastic in the sense that further determination of their 
intentional objects can bring about the appropriate emotional responses in extended 
cases.30 Then, how does the “further determination” of an emotion’s intentional object 
exactly occur? 
Let us consider an example, raised by Wong himself. There are paradigmatic 
cases of compassion where one would naturally shrink back or be appalled at the sight of 
something happening. For example, in such a case as a child about to fall into a well 
(Mengzi 2A:6), anyone would feel spontaneous alarm and distress and run to the rescue 
of this innocent victim. However, when we come to the case of a homeless person asking 
for change on the roadside, it is possible that we feel some sort of emotional disturbance 
while not being clear what that feeling exactly is. According to Wong, that feeling could 
be annoyance at being accosted, or fear of being attacked, or indignation that this person 
is not working for a living, or compassion for his difficulties, or even all of a bit of each 
of these emotions. Now, if what we are feeling in this case is more than one beginnings of 
these emotions, Wong argues, our feeling is indeterminate and needs further 
determination of its intentional object before it could crystallize into one of these definite 
emotions on which we could act accordingly.31 As for the crucial question of how that 
kind of determination exactly occurs, Wong proposes that it happens “when one perceives 
the immediate situation as giving rise to a reason to help someone.”32 So, if we perceive 
the situation of the homeless person as giving rise to a reason to help him rather than 
ignore him, it is by such a perception that we could determine the proper intentional 
object of our initially indeterminate and plastic feeling of disturbance. Furthermore, 
Wong argues that such a perception of a reason to act in a certain situation is made 
possible by “fixing our attention” (sī 思) on the relevant aspect of the situation.33 For 
example, what is required of King Xuān in order for him to extend his compassion for the 
ox to his people is only to focus on their suffering in such a way that he could perceive 
                                                 
30 Ibid., p. 192. 
31 Ibid., p. 193. 
32 Ibid., p. 194. 
33 Ibid., p. 196. 
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their suffering as a compelling reason to help them.34
This is the gist of Wong’s developmental extension interpretation. This 
interpretation, though, does not seem to provide an adequate answer to our current 
question. For our problem about the homeless person in the last paragraph was that we 
seemed to feel more than one incipient emotion about that person at the same time, and 
we did not know which emotion was really the right emotion to feel about that person. In 
other words, if an emotion is a kind of perception that tells us what features of a certain 
situation are the right ones that we should be concerned about in the situation, the fact 
that we felt more than one emotion about the homeless person means that we could not 
determine what were the right features to focus on as giving rise to a reason for our acting 
in one way rather than another. Then, it becomes clear that in a situation like this where 
different emotions compete with each other for the correct construal of the situation one 
is in, further determination of the intentional object of one’s vague feelings—or one’s 
perceiving the immediate situation as giving rise to a reason for acting in a particular way, 
in Wong’s terms—does not naturally occur. In response to this Wong would say that one 
can determine the correct intentional object of one’s vague, mixed feelings by fixing 
attention on reasons implicit in those emotions, but this explanation is not sufficient 
either, because one first needs to know what the real reasons are among the quasi-reasons 
that one’s conflicting emotions present to one as if they were the real reasons. This means 
that one’s attention-fixing cannot be an arbitrary activity, and it should be guided by a 
proper criterion to distinguish real reasons from pseudo-reasons. Then, what is such a 
criterion? 
According to Wong, the necessary criterion can be found in one’s analogical 
reasoning. What Wong means by analogical reasoning is a process in which one takes the 
spontaneous moral judgments embedded in Mengzian moral emotions as “baseline” 
intuitions, and then compares non-paradigmatic unclear cases to those basic “paradigms” 
to determine whether it is appropriate to have an emotional response in a non-
paradigmatic situation similar to the emotion that one had in a paradigmatic case. The 
criterion at work for such a kind of reasoning is the degree of similarity between 
paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic cases, and what enables one to determine the proper 
                                                 
34 Ibid., p. 193. 
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intentional object of one’s emotion in a non-paradigmatic or extended case is one’s 
willingness to treat similar cases similarly.35 For example, back to the case of King Xuān 
and his ox and people in Mengzi 1A:7, it is through this kind of analogical reasoning that 
the king can compare the situations of the ox and his people and come to realize that the 
similarity between the ox and his people in suffering makes it appropriate for him to feel 
compassion for his people by focusing on their suffering.36  
However, this explanation is highly problematic, because it does not seem to be 
very different from Shun’s logical extension interpretation that Wong has already 
criticized. As we have seen above, the point of Wong’s criticism was that the extension of 
one’s judgment from a paradigmatic case to an extended case based on the recognition of 
the similarity between the two cases is not necessarily accompanied by a similar 
extension in feeling, and it seems that exactly the same criticism can be applied to 
Wong’s current proposal. For if the proper intentional object of one’s emotion in a non-
paradigmatic situation is to be determined by one’s analogical reasoning, it is not clear 
how this newly determined intentional object could be forced onto one’s vague and 
mixed feelings that would keep resisting the decision of one’s reasoning by 
recommending to the mind different features of the non-paradigmatic situation in 
question as the most proper intentional object to be focused on in that situation. In my 
view, this shows that Wong’s developmental interpretation of Mengzian extension based 
on his conception of analogical reasoning is vulnerable to the same kind of problem that 
the logical extension interpretation suffers. 
According to Wong, what distinguishes his view of Mengzian extension from the 
logical extension interpretation is the fact that unlike the latter, his developmental 
extension interpretation postulates the existence of certain raw material of natural 
feelings that are largely indeterminate and plastic: 
 
My interpretation, unlike the logical extension interpretation, assumes no magical 
generation of motivationally effective compassion purely through logical argumentation. 
If the King had had no innate beginning of compassion, if there were no raw material of 
some natural feeling, no qi flowing in approximately the right direction already, no 
                                                 
35 Ibid., pp. 199–203. 
36 Ibid., p. 197. 
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amount of logical argumentation would help to generate effective feeling for his people.37
 
However, we have just seen in the last paragraph that Wong’s interpretation, despite his 
postulating the existence of certain plastic and indeterminate feelings, still suffers from 
the same kind of problem that plagues the logical extension interpretation. Now, Wong’s 
postulation of the “raw material of natural feeling[s]” seems to introduce another 
difficulty for his own interpretation, because by doing so he departs from his original 
understanding of Mengzian emotions as a special kind of perception of the salient 
features of certain situations and moves toward Manyul Im’s view of emotions in Mengzi 
as continua of motivational power that can be directed to certain objects and expressed in 
certain manners through the act of focusing one’s attention on whatever objects deemed 
appropriate. For example, while explaining the indeterminateness and plasticity of 
compassion Wong once says that “the sort of feeling we currently direct to the child 
[about to fall into a well] is directable towards the homeless person”,38 and Wong also 
tries to support his idea by interpreting Mengzi’s dichotomy of zhì 志 (“aims” or 
“directions of the mind”) and qì 氣 (“vital energy”) in his own way. 
Let us first look at the original passage from Mengzi 2A:2, which contains 
Mengzi’s explanation of this dichotomy: 
 
The will is the commander of qì 氣, and qì is what fills up the body. Wherever the will 
arrives, qì sets up camp there. So it is said, “Maintain your will, but do not abuse your 
qì.” [Gōngsūn Chǒu 公孫丑 asked,] “Having already said, ‘Wherever the will arrives, 
qì sets up camp there,’ why do you also say, ‘Maintain your will, but do not abuse your 
qì’?” [Mengzi] said, “When your will is unified, it can move your qì; and if your qì is 
unified, it can move your will. Now [such events or activities as] stumbling or running 
have to do with qì, but yet they [can] perturb one’s mind.” [Gōngsūn Chǒu 公孫丑 
asked,] “May I ask wherein you excel?” [Mengzi] said, “I am good at understanding 
[people’s] speech, and I nurture my flood-like qì well.”...39
 
                                                 
37 Ibid., p. 196. Emphasis is mine. 
38 Ibid., p. 193. Emphasis is original. 
39 “‘夫志, 氣之帥也; 氣, 體之充也. 夫志至焉, 氣次焉; 故曰: “持其志, 無暴其氣.”’ ‘旣曰, “志至焉, 
氣次焉.” 又曰, “持其志, 無暴其氣”者, 何也?’ 曰: ‘志壹則動氣, 氣壹則動志也. 今夫蹶者趨者, 是
氣也, 而反動其心.’ ‘敢問夫子惡乎長?’ 曰: ‘我知言, 我善養吾浩然之氣.’”… Mengzi 2A:2. In 
translating this passage, I have consulted Van Norden’s translation in Readings in Classical Chinese 
Philosophy, pp. 122–123. 
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What I translated as “will” in this passage is originally “zhì” 志, and in Mengzi it often 
refers to specific aims or directions of the mind rather than the general faculty of volition. 
From Mengzi’s saying that when unified it can move qì 氣 that is responsible for the 
movement of one’s body, though, we could also see that in the context of moral action zhì 
志 might be concerned with one’s ethical judgment and provides a relevant kind of 
motivation for moral action. On the other hand, from Mengzi’s saying that qì fills up the 
body and follows wherever one’s will is directed, qì in Mengzi seems to be some sort of 
material force or energy that constitutes one’s body and is responsible for its movement. 
However, Mengzi also mentions a special kind of qì (i.e. flood-like qì or hào rán zhī qì 
浩然之氣), and we have seen in the previous chapter that it is a kind of moral energy and 
grows by accumulating righteous deeds over a long period of time. Now, what concerns 
us about Wong’s interpretation of this passage is that he seems to consider zhì, aims or 
directions of the mind, to involve the determination of the intentional object of feeling in 
non-paradigmatic situations, and qì, “material force” or “energy,” to be equivalent to 
emotions or feelings whose intentional objects are not yet formed.40 Wong says: 
 
It is through a certain kind of focusing on situational features such as the suffering of the 
King’s subjects, through further determination of the intentional object of feeling, that the 
heart-mind “aims” the energy of feeling that is constituted by qi, but on the other hand, 
its aim would accomplish no movement were it not for the momentum provided by qi.41
 
It is clear in this remark that Wong departs from his initial view of emotions in Mengzi as 
a special kind of perception of the salient features of certain situations and starts to view 
them primarily as some sort of motivational energy that can be directed toward any 
actions once the intentional objects of those emotions are identified. However, this not 
only reveals that Wong fails to keep a consistent view of emotions throughout his 
interpretation of Mengzian extension of emotions, but also shows that now his changed 
view of Mengzian emotions as some sort of motivational energy highly resembles Im’s 
hydraulic view of emotions in Mengzi, and faces similar theoretical problems that the 
emotive extension interpretation needs to explain. That is, by conflating two views of 
                                                 
40 Wong, “Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi,” pp. 193–194. 
41 Ibid., p. 194. 
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emotion as some sort of perception or construal on one hand and as a kind of continuum 
of motivational energy on the other, Wong blurs the important distinction between 
emotion and desire in Mengzi and fails to maintain that Mengzian emotions are primarily 
spontaneous responses to things that stimulate one’s emotional sensibility rather than 
standing desires with unidentified objects that can be directed at any things by focusing 
attention on those objects. 
In short, although having been proposed as an alternative interpretation to 
overcome the theoretical flaws of the logical extension and emotive extension 
interpretations, Wong’s developmental interpretation of Mengzian extension rather turns 
out to be an eclectic mixture of the other two interpretations, and doubly vulnerable to the 
same kinds of problems that plague its rival interpretations.  
Then, what is the correct interpretation of Mengzi’s emotional extension? This is 
the question that I ultimately turn to in the final section of this chapter. However, before 
doing so, I would like to provide a broad overview of the ancient Chinese intellectual 
history in which the ethical ideal of spontaneous moral action based on proper emotions 
emerged and a primitive form of Mengzi’s question of how to achieve such an ideal by 
cultivating one’s emotions was first formulated. Specifically, I discuss the position of two 
primary ancient Chinese thinkers, Kongzi and Mòzǐ, on the relationship between their 
universalistic ethic and certain emotions like compassion and familial affection, hoping to 
show what the place of Mengzi’s view of emotional extension is in the broader context of 
the ancient Chinese intellectual discourse on ethics and emotions. 
 
 
6.2 Familial Affection, Impartial Care, and The Cultivation of Rén 仁 
 
In the first section of chapter 3, I have distinguished three senses of ài 愛 from Kongzi’s 
usage of the term in the Analects: 1) the feeling of affection or the affective bond between 
closely related people such as family members, relatives, lovers, and friends; 2) a loving 
or caring attitude that one consciously adopts for those who are relatively toward the 
outside of the concentric circles of people’s relationship to oneself; and 3) some sort of 
caring about animals or even inanimate things such as rituals, which would remain 
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around the farthest of these concentric circles. However, as I have briefly discussed at the 
end of Section 3.1 above, what I distinguished as three senses of ài could be just one 
meaning with various shades from the linguist’s point of view. Think about the word 
“enjoy.” When we hear someone saying “Sue enjoys this book,” we will naturally think 
that Sue enjoys reading the book. However, if Sue turns out to be a goat, then we will 
now think that Sue enjoys eating the book. Does this imply that “enjoy” has two 
meanings, viz. feeling pleasure in reading and feeling pleasure in eating? This is an 
untenable position, one might say, because one can also enjoy good music, walking in the 
mountain trail, and helping out sick people. Then, are there five meanings of “enjoy”? No. 
The right position should be that “enjoy” has just one meaning, but it is interpreted 
differently depending on which circumstances it is used in and what kinds of objects it 
takes.42
Then, it could be the case that the three senses of ài distinguished above share 
some core meaning—perhaps some sort of caring for valuable objects—that is expressed 
in different degrees for different objects. Moreover, if Mòzǐ’s theory of “impartial care” 
(jiān’ài 兼愛) or Mengzi’s theory of extending (tuī 推) moral emotions had been each 
an attempt to challenge or improve Kongzi’s ethical view of ài, we could also expect their 
theories to contain some tendency to understand Kongzi’s ài in a reductionistic way. 
However, ancient Greek distinguished at least three kinds of love and gave each of them 
a different name: 1) eros for a passionate, often sexual desire for one’s beloved; 2) agape 
for God’s unconditional love for us human beings and our love for God primarily in the 
Christian tradition; and 3) philia for affectionate regard or friendly feeling for one’s 
friends, family members, business partners, and one’s country.43 And in English, we often 
say such things as 1) “I love working with young philosophers,” 2) “I love my mother,” 
or even 3) “I love your haircut,” and arguably what are meant by “love” in these three 
cases are significantly different from each other. Given these linguistic phenomena, it 
could be merely an accident that Kongzi had only one word “ài” to refer to what I have 
distinguished earlier as three kinds of “love” or “care,” and it could be also the case that 
                                                 
42 William H. Baxter pointed this out to me in a conversation on 4/28/06. 
43 Bennett Helm, “Love,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2005 
Edition), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2005/entries/love/>. 
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when used for different kinds of objects, ài accordingly refer to different types of “love” 
or “care.” 
But why care so much about the difference? As will be shown below, Kongzi’s 
complex view of ài, which makes a crucial component of Kongzi’s conception of 
humaneness (rén 仁), has been more or less neglected despite its great contribution to the 
later development in theories of moral action and moral cultivation. Specifically, previous 
scholars have viewed Kongzi’s conception of ài mainly through the lens of Mengzi’s 
doctrine of “graded love,” and did not pay enough attention to Kongzi’s significant 
influence on Mòzǐ’s theory of “impartial care” (jiān’ài 兼愛 ). Moreover, having 
understood Kongzi’s conception of ài only in terms of Mengzi’s partialistic proposal of 
graded love, previous scholars have failed to see an important theoretical tension between 
Mengzi’s doctrine of graded love and his universalistic tendency expressed in his 
recommendation gradually to broaden the boundary of one’s compassion. As I see it, this 
tension in Mengzi’s ethical theory parallels the tension among Kongzi’s three senses of 
ài—especially between his conceptions of familial affection and universal caring attitude, 
and examining the way Mengzi resolves this tension will provide us with an important 
clue to the correct view of Mengzi’s theory of emotional extension. 
In Section 6.2.1 below, I discuss how Kongzi’s first two senses of ài—viz. 
familial affection and universal caring—are respectively related with sorrow at the 
misfortune of those close to oneself and one’s general sympathy for the misfortune of 
others, making a special effort to refute a recent attempt to assimilate Kongzi’s 
conception of ài (or rén 仁 by extension) to Nel Noddings’s partialistic conception of 
care. By doing so, I try to show that Kongzi’s conception of proper “love” (ài) contains 
not only partialistic but also universalistic elements, and this raises the important question 
of how one could go beyond the boundary of one’s natural affection for close people and 
extend one’s caring attitude to a larger group of people—a question which Kongzi left 
quite unanswered. Then, in Section 6.2.2, I discuss how the universalistic element of 
Kongzi’s conception of ài might have influenced Mòzǐ to propose the thesis of impartial 
care and his idiosyncratic theory of moral motivation. Specifically, I argue that self-love 
or one’s desire to promote one’s own interests provides the Mozian agent with a sufficient 
motivation for practicing impartial care, and basically this is Mòzǐ’s solution to Kongzi’s 
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unanswered question of how one could have a universalistic caring attitude despite one’s 
partialistic tendencies. However, Mòzǐ’s view of impartial care as an attitude that can be 
adopted without going through any change in emotions or affective cultivation did not 
satisfy Mengzi, and in the final section of this chapter we will see what Mengzi has to 
offer for this question. 
 
6.2.1 Familial Affection, Universal Caring, and Kongzi’s Conception of Ài 愛 
 
6.2.1.1 A Partialistic Interpretation of Kongzi’s Ài 愛 
 
Recently, there have been some attempts to understand the Confucian ethical thought—
especially that of Kongzi’s and Mengzi’s reflected in Lunyu and Mengzi—as a kind of 
care ethics. One of the crucial characteristics of care ethics is its strong particularistic 
view of ethics. According to the orthodox conception of morality, morality at the most 
fundamental level “assumes no particular connections between individuals other than 
equal membership in the moral community,”44 and morality does not distinguish between 
what I should do in a certain situation and what any other person should do in a situation 
like mine.45 In contrast, care ethics “is concerned with responsibility and responsiveness 
within relationships.”46 That is, one’s identity is defined to a large extent by the roles one 
plays in a complex web of relationships—one is somebody’s parent, somebody’s child, 
somebody’s spouse, somebody’s colleague or friend and so on, and the type of care one 
should take for the other is largely determined by what kind of relationship one is in with 
that other person. However, care ethics does not simply recommend one to care for one’s 
child, spouse, friend, and so forth in the appropriate manners dictated by one’s roles in 
these relationships. In other words, my love or concern for my child, spouse, or friend is 
not for anyone who might happen to be my child, spouse, or friend, but for those 
particular people who are my child, spouse, or friend. In this sense, the ethical questions 
in care ethics take strongly particularistic form: “What am I to do to respond adequately 
                                                 
44 Darwall, Philosophical Ethics, p. 220. 




to Joan’s need? What is my responsibility to Harold?”47
The difference between the contrasting demands of morality and of care ethics is 
well illustrated in Carol Gilligan’s interpretation of two children’s responses to the 
following situation: Heinz’s wife is very ill, and she would not survive without an 
expensive medicine. But Heinz does not have enough money to buy that medicine, and 
the pharmacist will not lower his price. What should Heinz do? To this question, Jake, an 
eleven-year-old boy, says that Heinz should steal the medicine, because “human life is 
worth more than money.”48 Jake thinks that this issue is “sort of like a math problem with 
humans”;49 he thinks that this issue is about “the relative value of life and property”50 
and the solution to this problem can be imposed on any individual in a similar situation. 
However, Amy, an eleven-year-old girl, proposes a different view: “There might be other 
ways besides stealing it, like if he could borrow the money…, but he really shouldn’t 
steal the drug—but his wife shouldn’t die either.” “If he stole the drug,” Amy continues, 
“he might save his wife then, but if he did, he might have to go to jail, and then his wife 
might get sicker again…So, they should really just talk it out and find some other way to 
make the money.”51 Amy thinks that the issue should be approached from within the web 
of relationships involving Heinz, his wife, the pharmacist (and any other possibly 
relevant people), and the solution to this issue should express different forms of care 
suitable for each of these participants in this web of relationships as particular 
individuals.52
Chenyang Li has argued that Confucian ethics of rén 仁 and feminist ethics of 
care “share philosophically significant common grounds.”53 According to Li, Kongzi 
used the concept of rén in two ways. On one hand, rén refers to “the tender aspect of 
human feelings and an altruistic concern for others,”54 but on the other hand rén also 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
48 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 26, quoted in Darwall, Philosophical Ethics, p. 222. 
49 Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p. 26, quoted in Darwall, Philosophical Ethics, p. 222. 
50 Darwall, Philosophical Ethics, p. 222. 
51 Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p. 28, quoted in Daniel Star, “Do Confucians Really Care? A Defense of 
the Distinctiveness of Care Ethics: A Reply to Chenyang Li,” Hypatia 17, no.1 (Winter 2002), p. 81. 
52 Darwall, Philosophical Ethics, p. 222. 
53 Chenyang Li, “The Confucian Concept of Jen and the Feminist Ethics of Care: A Comparative Study,” 
Hypatia 9, no.1 (Winter 1994), p. 70. 
54 Ibid., p. 72. 
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refers to the general virtue that encompasses particular virtues such as respectfulness, 
tolerance, trustworthiness, generosity, and so forth as its constituents. However, Li 
emphasizes, in Confucian ethics one cannot attain this general virtue without first 
cultivating the tender feeling of sympathy, and this aspect of rén as the feeling of 
sympathy or altruistic concern resembles the concept of care in feminist care ethics.55 
Furthermore, beyond this initial resemblance, Li also points out that both Confucian 
ethics of rén and care ethics recommend one to exert caring affection in a graded manner 
or to a limited number of people. To support this claim on the part of Kongzi, Li provides 
the following translation of Lunyu 6:30: 
 
Once [Confucius’] disciple Tzu-kung [Zǐgòng] asked him, “If a person confers benefits 
on the people universally and is able to assist all, what would you say of him? Would you 
call him a person of Jen [rén 仁]? Confucius said, “Why only a person of Jen? He is 
without doubt a sage. Even (sage-emperors) Yao and Shun fell short of it.56
 
According to Li’s interpretation, it is only sages who are capable of “universal love.” The 
highest moral ideal for ordinary people including Kongzi, on the other hand, is rén 仁: 
caring for people in a graded manner.57 Now, Li compares this position to that of care 
ethics. Li quotes this time Nel Noddings, another influential figure in care ethics: 
 
[M]y caring is always characterized by a move away from self.…I care deeply for those 
in my inner circles and more lightly for those farther removed from my personal 
life.…The acts performed out of caring vary with both situational conditions and type of 
relationship.…I shall reject the notion of universal love, finding it unattainable in any but 
the most abstract sense and thus a source of distraction.58
 
That is, Li reads out of these remarks of Noddings’s a view similar to the Confucian 
doctrine of “graded love” or “care with gradations” (ài yǒu chāděng 愛有差等), which 
Mengzi explicitly advocated against Mòzǐ’s doctrine of “universal love” or “impartial 
                                                 
55 Ibid. I will argue later that this is not fully the case. 
56 Ibid., p. 79. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Nel Noddings, Caring, a Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), p. 16 and p. 83, quoted in Li, “The Confucian Concept of Jen and the Feminist 
Ethics of Care,” p. 80. 
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care” (jiān’ài 兼愛).59 According to Li, 1) this view of care with gradations provides 
both Confucian ethics of rén and care ethics with the common ground to explain why 
human beings are psychologically prone to care for those closely related to themselves 
more than others, and 2) this view also explains why both the Confucian agent and the 
“one-caring”—the ideal agent in care ethics (Noddings’s term)—think that those who are 
closely related to oneself should have a stronger ethical pull than others.60
I do not want to participate in the recent debate over whether Confucian ethics is a 
kind of care ethics or something else,61 but I agree with Li that the concept of rén and the 
concept of care as conceived by Noddings have significant philosophical commonality, 
especially in terms of their shared emphasis on the priority of relations over strangers in 
some ethical situations. However, I also think that beneath this apparent similarity 
between “Confucian” ethics and care ethics resides a real distinction. As I see it, 
“Confucian” ethics, or preferably Kongzi’s ethical position which gets further developed 
in Mengzi, can be interpreted to provide a more sophisticated ethical position concerning 
the issue of partiality and justice than what Li suggests by assimilating Kongzi’s position 
to Noddings’s version of care ethics. And I believe that clarifying Kongzi’s complex 
position concerning this issue will let us have a better picture of Kongzi’s conception of 
ài 愛, which will in turn be more complicated than Li’s view of it only in terms of “care 
with gradations.” 
 
6.2.1.2 Particularism and Universalism in Kongzi’s Ethics 
 
Noddings’s view of care, which greatly resembles the “Confucian” view of care with 
gradations, has been exposed to severe criticism for its tendency to promote partiality and 
                                                 
59 Unlike ‘jiān’ài’ (“universal love”) which was originally coined by Mòzǐ, ‘ài yǒu chāděng’ (“There are 
gradations in love”) is not Mengzi’s original phrase. It is the Mohist Yí Zhī 夷之 who said in Mengzi 3A:5 
that “there are no gradations in love, but in applying it [one] starts with one’s parents” (愛無差等, 
施由親始), and it is based on this remark of Yí Zhī’s that the phrase “ài yǒu chāděng” was coined and 
ascribed to Mengzi later. 
60 Li, “The Confucian Concept of Jen and the Feminist Ethics of Care,” pp. 81–82. 
61 For some recent works criticizing Li’s view, see Ranjoo Seodu Herr, “Is Confucianism Compatible with 
Care Ethics? A Critique,” Philosophy East and West 53, no.4 (October 2003), Lijun Yuan, “Ethics of Care 
and Concept of Jen: A Reply to Chenyang Li,” Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 17, no.1 (Winter 
2002), and Star, “Do Confucians Really Care?” 
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to neglect the demand of justice. For instance, Noddings argues that genuine caring, 
which has to be for persons in definite relations with the one-caring, involves such 
phenomena as 1) “engrossment,” 2) “displacement of interest,” and 3) “motivational 
shift” on the part of the one-caring. According to Noddings, engrossment is a state of 
mind in which the one-caring “feels with” the person who is cared for (hereafter “the 
cared-for” following Noddings), receives the cared-for into oneself, and views things 
through the eyes of the cared-for.62 In this frame of mind, the one-caring is interested not 
in the reality of oneself but in the reality of the other. The one-caring carefully considers 
the cared-for’s nature, way of life, needs, and desires, and tries to apprehend the reality of 
the cared-for as closely as possible.63 Moreover, when the one-caring receives the cared-
for’s reality as nearly as possible without evaluation or assessment, the one-caring also 
feels impelled to act in behalf of the cared-for, as if her act were on behalf of the one-
caring herself. The one-caring allows herself to be transformed, adopts the goals of the 
cared-for as if they were her own, and helps the cared-for realize those goals.64
Noddings’s example of Ms. A, who would opt to fight on the side of her racist 
family against the blacks protesting for equal civil rights on the other side of the 
barricade, clearly shows how the one-caring would self-consciously neglect the demand 
of justice in order to protect those one loves.65 In this example, Ms. A clearly thinks that 
her racist father and aunt are wrong, and is “moved to tears”66 by Jim’s (one of Ms. A’s 
black classmates) eloquent speech on the prevalent injustice and inhumanity against 
blacks, but if there were a violent clash between whites and blacks, Ms. A would fight to 
protect her family. Although her gun will not aim at Jim because she also cares for him to 
some extent, she will definitely shoot other blacks who are less known to her. Noddings 
argues, Ms. A’s protection of her family at the expense of neglecting justice is “agonized 
fulfillment,” and there is no ethical diminution committed on the part of Ms. A.67  
We find a similar view in an exchange between Kongzi and the Magistrate of Shè 
(葉) concerning the proper conception of uprightness: One day, the Magistrate of Shè said 
                                                 
62 Noddings, Caring, pp. 30–32 and pp. 13–16. 
63 Ibid., pp. 14–16. 
64 Ibid., p. 16 and pp. 33–34. 
65 Ibid., pp. 109–112. 
66 Ibid., p. 109. 
67 Ibid., p. 110. 
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to Kongzi: “In my district there is a person called ‘upright Gōng.’68 His father took 
[another person’s] stray sheep and [this] son bore witness of it.” Kongzi retorted to the 
magistrate: “The upright people in my village are different from yours. Fathers cover up 
for their sons, and sons cover up for their fathers. Uprightness resides in such a 
behavior.”69 In this passage, Kongzi is not merely making a report on how his villagers 
behave when their fathers or sons infringe upon other people’s property rights: he is 
actually asserting that their covering up for each other against the law is the right thing to 
do from the ethical point of view. Kongzi’s emphasis on the importance of family 
relations is clear here, and it also seems clear that this emphasis on the value of family 
tends to promote partiality in ethical deliberation as much as Noddings’s version of care 
ethics would. 
However, one who takes Kongzi’s position to be purely partialistic—whether it be 
Mòzǐ or a contemporary interpreter of Kongzi’s thought70—needs to consider other 
textual evidence in the Analects with more impartiality. As David Wong has correctly 
pointed out, Kongzi’s ethical view includes both particularistic and universalistic 
elements, and “[his view] holds to a thesis of ‘differential pull’ in such a way that 
everyone has at least some substantial pull as reflected in the idea that certain things are 
owed to all.”71 For instance, when Zhònggōng 仲弓 (a disciple of Kongzi’s) became a 
steward of the Jì family who were actually ruling the Lǔ dukedom at the time, Kongzi 
advises him to promote worthy and talented people (“jǔ xiáncái” 舉賢才). In answer to 
Zhònggōng’s question of how to know all those people and promote them, Kongzi says, 
“Just promote those whom you know; as for those whom you do not know, would other 
people pass over them?”72 In this remark, Kongzi is not recommending his disciple to be 
partial in advancing the interest of those qualified individuals who happen to be close to 
him. Rather, Kongzi seems to have in mind some sort of political collaboration, in which 
                                                 
68 Gōng (躬) literally means body, and zhígōng (直躬) can mean behaving correctly according to some sort 
of standard, whether it be moral instructions or legal codes. 
69 Lunyu 13:18. 
70 Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, pp. 112–113. 
71 David Wong, “Universalism Versus Love with Distinctions: An Ancient Debate Revived,” Journal of 
Chinese Philosophy 16 (1989), p. 253. 
72 “擧爾所知. 爾所不知, 人其舍諸?” Lunyu 13:2. 
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everyone in the government is supposed to recommend those whom they know very well 
to be qualified for certain offices. 
Let me take another example. The traditional customs (lǐ 禮) of the Zhōu dynasty 
prohibit marriage within the same clan as a case of incest. And according to the same set 
of customs, a ruler’s wife was supposed to be addressed officially by her clan name 
preceded by the name of the country where she came from. So, if the wife belonged to 
the Jiāng 姜 clan and had grown up in the country of Qí 齊, she was supposed to go by 
“Qí Jiāng” 齊姜.  However, Zhāogōng 昭公 (r. 540–509 B.C.E.), a ruler of the Lǔ 
dukedom during Kongzi’s time, not only took a wife from his own Jī 姬 clan in the 
dukedom of Wú 吳, but also addressed her as “Wú Mèngzi” 吳孟子 instead of the 
correct appellation “Wú Jī” 吳姬, in order to conceal the clan origin of his wife. This 
means that Zhāogōng violated two important traditional marital customs, and this is why 
a person named Chén Sībài 陳司敗 asked Kongzi whether Zhāogōng understood the 
Customs. Kongzi, despite knowing very well why he got this question, still took part with 
Zhāogōng and said “Yes, he understood the Customs.” Having been given a highly 
unexpected answer, Chén complained to one of Kongzi’s disciples, “I heard that the 
nobleman is not partial; but is the nobleman partial after all?” And when the disciple 
informed Kongzi of this, Kongzi said, “I am fortunate; if I make a mistake, other people 
always notice it.”73
What is going on here? In this passage, Kongzi is being partial with the ruler of 
his country Lǔ, and covers up his ruler’s fault against other people’s criticism. This 
passage nicely parallels Lunyu 13:18, in which Kongzi said that uprightness resides in 
fathers and sons covering up each other against the law. The relationship between the 
ruler and the subject and that between the father and the son are among the most 
important human relationships in Confucian tradition, and just as the father and the son 
cover up each other’s mistake, so the ruler and his subject should act in the same way to 
some extent. So far, Kongzi’s agent does not seem to act very differently from 
Noddings’s Ms. A, who chooses to stand on the side of her racist family despite knowing 
                                                 
73 “陳司敗問昭公知禮乎, 孔子曰: ‘知禮.’ 孔子退, 揖巫馬期而進之, 曰: ‘吾聞君子不黨, 君子亦黨乎? 
君取於吳, 爲同姓, 謂之吳孟子. 君而知禮, 孰不知禮?’ 巫馬期以告. 子曰: ‘丘也幸; 苟有過, 人必
知之.’” Lunyu 7:31. 
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that they are wrong. Moreover, just as Noddings’s Ms. A believes that there is no ethical 
diminution committed in her taking part with her racist family against the demand of 
justice, Kongzi argues that covering up one’s father or son against the law is an ethically 
right thing to do. 
However, the parallel—both between Kongzi’s and Noddings’s agents and 
between Lunyu 13:18 and Lunyu 7:31—ends there. On one hand, unlike Noddings’s Ms. 
A, Kongzi in the episode of Lunyu 7:31 confesses that his covering up Zhāogōng’s 
misdeed was wrong. Most likely, Kongzi might have thought that his ruler’s incest and 
the ruler’s subsequent effort to conceal his misdeed were not only shameful in themselves 
but also harmful to realizing Kongzi’s vision of the ideal society, considering the ruler’s 
utmost importance as the ethical role-model for everyone in the country. In other words, 
if the ruler of a country committed incest and tried to avoid criticism by the means that 
only made his incest more conspicuous and shameful, what could Kongzi expect of the 
others? Then, why did Kongzi say to Chén Sībài that Zhāogōng understood the spirit of 
the Lǐ? Kongzi might have thought, I would submit, that although Zhāogōng was wrong 
and shameless in violating important social customs, it was also wrong for Kongzi to 
admit his ruler’s misdeed and criticize it openly. It was not courteous, and therefore not 
right, to be that harsh to one’s ruler, and fortunately enough, everyone still knew that 
Zhāogōng was wrong despite Kongzi’s saying otherwise. 
Applying this interpretation of Lunyu 7:31 to Lunyu 13:18, we come to see the 
new interpretive possibility that Kongzi’s conception of uprightness in Lunyu 13:18 is not 
an absolute one. In other words, as in Lunyu 7:31, Kongzi’s thought might have been that 
although every individual’s or every group’s property rights should be well protected in a 
good society, it should not be so strictly protected that it spoils people’s familial love and 
consequently hinders them from maintaining good familial relationships. As in the case 
of Lunyu 7:31 and 13:2, then, Kongzi was not recommending in this passage to promote 
the interest of one’s family at the expense of others actively and voluntarily. Kongzi’s 
message was rather that the affective bond between family members is so important that 
it can sometimes make the Kongzian agent fail to respect other people’s property rights 
fully, as in the case of those in Kongzi’s village. 
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However, one might argue: “The person whose lamb went astray and got taken by 
my father is also someone’s father and someone’s son. And even if I failed to report my 
father’s appropriation of the lamb because I cannot bear to see my father arrested and 
suffering in the prison, my failure to report my father’s dishonesty still works against the 
interest of this other family while promoting my family’s interest. Moreover, even if we 
grant that my failure to report my father’s crime is forgivable as long as it was not driven 
by my desire for material benefit but by my compassion for my father’s prospective 
misery, Kongzi is not free from the so-called collective action problem or coordination 
problem. That is, if it were all right for me to cover up for my father due to my 
compassion for him, the same kind of act must be all right for everyone in a similar 
situation. However, where is justice or the protection of individual property rights if 
everyone hid a person like my father in their houses? Kongzi cannot solve this collective 
action problem, and his purported concern for justice can be no more than lip service.” 
Mòzǐ argued against Kongzi’s followers of his time in a similar way.74 And it is 
possible that some of Kongzi’s theoretical descendants or some members of the broad rú 
儒 group held such a partialistic view. However, I do not think that Kongzi’s ethical view 
implied in Lunyu 13:18 is vulnerable to this argument. For when Kongzi’s villagers fail to 
respect their neighbor’s property rights, they would do so not because they are interested 
in their neighbor’s goods, but because they do not want their family members to be hurt. 
Moreover, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the nobleman—Kongzi’s ideal 
agent—does not want to pursue wealth by improper means. This means that Kongzi’s 
villagers, representing Kongzi’s agent with sufficient moral integrity, would do their best 
to compensate for their neighbor’s material loss, once they have made sure that their 
family members are secure and well.  
This speculation of mine is actually supported by the other two passages 
discussed above: In Lunyu 7:31, Kongzi says it is fortunate that other people always 
notice his mistake. As I see it, this remark of Kongzi’s implies that Kongzi feels guilty 
about his relational situation which forces him to take the part of his debased ruler, and 
Kongzi hopes that his intentional misrepresentation of his bad ruler does not mislead 
                                                 
74 For example, see Mòzǐ 墨子, “Jiān’ài xià” 兼愛下. Sūn Yíràng 孫詒讓, Mòzǐ xiángǔ 墨子閒詁 
(Běijīng 北京: Zhōnghuá shūjú 中華書局, 2001), pp. 117–118. 
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others. And in Lunyu 13:18, Kongzi says that promoting one’s well-qualified 
acquaintances would not make a case of partiality in a political environment where 
everyone is expected to do the same thing. In such an environment, the best way to 
promote the public good is actually to select the best qualified people among one’s 
acquaintances impartially. In short, I think that Kongzi’s ethical position reflected in the 
three Lunyu passages discussed above—Lunyu 7:31, 13:2, and 13:18—is not purely 
partialistic but a hybrid one, in which particularistic concerns for one’s relations play an 
important role but are also restricted in important ways by universalistic concerns for 
human beings in general. 
So far, I have discussed three Lunyu passages, some of which are sometimes 
quoted as evidence of Kongzi’s promoting partiality in ethical situations, and I have 
argued that the particularistic concerns in those passages are not emphasized out of 
proportion to the importance of universalistic or impartial concerns in the background. 
Now, before closing this section, I would like to consider one more passage that 
emphasizes universalistic concerns directly. Ironically, it is Lunyu 6:30, which Chenyang 
Li presented above as evidence of “love with gradations” or a partialistic concern in 
Kongzi’s thought. Look at the translation of the passage above more closely. Even in Li’s 
translation, it is clear that both Zǐgòng and Kongzi are not concerned with an ideal 
person’s psychological attitude toward other people but the consequence of his altruistic 
action. In other words, the message of the passage is that willing to benefit other people is 
not as difficult as actually benefiting them, because successfully benefiting others partly 
depends on external conditions that are not under the full control of a perfectly altruistic 
person; and this is exactly the reason why the ancient sage kings Yáo and Shùn would 
have found it a difficult goal to achieve. Moreover, in the same passage Kongzi also says 
the following: 
 
Rén 仁 is this: If you want a position [in the government], then help others have such 
positions; if you want to have a successful political career, then help others build such 
careers. [If you] could take analogy from what is near, it can be called a method of rén 
仁.75
                                                 
75 “夫仁者, 己欲立而立人, 己欲達而達人. 能近取譬, 可謂仁之方也已.” Lunyu 6:30. I discuss this 
passage in detail in Chapter 3. 
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This is a Kongzian version of the golden rule, which recommends helping others achieve 
what you would want for yourself. Kongzi does not make any stipulation here that you 
should help others only after having secured enough for yourself. Rather, the message of 
this dictum seems to be that if you and other people pursue the same thing, you should 
help others have it first. And it is clear that the spirit of this dictum is not that of “love 
with gradations.” 
 
6.2.1.3 Familial Affection and Sympathy: Two Main Components of Kongzi’s Ài 愛 
 
I think that those scholars who emphasize the importance of particularistic concerns in 
Confucian ethics make a common mistake. Their observation of the strong 
particularistic—and therefore to some extent partialistic—tendency in Confucian ethics is 
correct, but they make a wrong assumption that 1) Kongzi’s moral ideal of rén 仁 is 
solely based on the idea of graded love, and 2) it is from this idea that the strong 
particularistic tendency of Confucian ethics derives. For example, although having 
actually said that Kongzi’s rén refers to “the tender aspect of human feelings and an 
altruistic concern for others” (or just “sympathy” for short),76 Li does not forget to add 
that “Confucius and Mencius believed that a person practicing Jen (rén) should start from 
one’s parents and siblings and then extend to other people.…In other words, although one 
should love both his father and a stranger, he should love his father first and more than 
the stranger.” 77  In addition, David Wong thinks that although containing both 
particularistic and universalistic elements, Confucian ethics is still dominantly 
particularistic, and that “the Confucian emphasis on the importance of [one’s] ties to 
particular others seems to work against the claim that love can be extended to all in any 
reliable way.”78 In other words, he argues that “[w]e may accept the Confucian argument 
that we cannot do without these particular loyalties, but not the Confucian assurance that 
these loyalties will reliably grow into love for all under a set of practically possible 
institutions and given human nature as it is.” 79  In short, Li thinks that Kongzi’s 
                                                 
76 Li, “The Confucian Concept of Jen and the Feminist Ethics of Care,” p. 72. 
77 Ibid., p. 79. 




conception of rén is characterized by loving people in a graded manner, and Wong thinks 
that Kongzi’s love is partialistic by nature. 
However, from the perspective of the historian of Chinese philosophy, it is 
anachronistic to think that Kongzi’s moral ideal of rén 仁 is solely based on the idea of 
graded love, and it is not careful enough to think that Kongzi’s love is by nature 
partialistic and is unlikely to evolve into universal love. First, Mengzi’s idea of graded 
love or love with gradations is a sophisticated philosophical response to the Mohist Yí 
Zhī’s 夷之 idea of “universal love.” Basically, Yí Zhī’s idea of universal love is that 
there are no gradations in one’s love for human beings, although its application starts 
from one’s parents.80 In other words, according to Yí Zhī’s view, one can love one’s 
neighbor’s child as much as he loves his brother’s child.81 However, Mengzi thinks that 
this is wrong; he thinks that one cannot—and therefore to some extent should not—love 
one’s neighbor’s child as much as his brother’s child, and this is the reason why Mengzi 
criticizes Yí Zhī’s idea of non-graded love. In short, insofar as Mengzi’s idea of graded 
love is a response to Yí Zhī’s proposal of non-graded love, it is anachronistic to ascribe 
this idea to Kongzi’s conception of ài 愛, which constitutes the basis of his conception of 
rén 仁. 
Second, one might think it plausible that although Kongzi did not actually 
propose the doctrine of graded love, 1) Kongzi’s conception of ài 愛 and rén 仁 were 
already particularistic by nature; 2) it stimulated Mòzǐ to propose an alternative doctrine 
of “impartial care” (jiān’ài 兼愛); 3) Mòzǐ’s doctrine of “impartial care” developed into 
the later Mohist Yí Zhī’s doctrine of “universal love” or “non-graded love”; and 4) 
Mengzi criticized this doctrine of Yí Zhī’s by proposing the doctrine of graded love. 
Interpreted this way, Mengzi’s idea of graded love was not a new idea at all. Although 
having gotten redressed and theoretically more sophisticated, it was Kongzi’s old idea of 
partialistic love that Mengzi tried to advocate. However, there is not much textual 
evidence for this position. Advocates of this position often cite such passages as Lunyu 
13:18, but I have already argued that such passages do not actually show that Kongzi 
                                                 
80 “愛無差等, 施由親始.” Mengzi 3A:5. Yáng Bójùn, Mèngzǐ yìzhù 孟子譯注, p. 135. 
81 “人之親其兄之子爲若親其隣之赤子.” Ibid. 
 326
 
advocated a purely particularistic ethic. On the contrary, I argued, even such seemingly 
particularistic passages show the importance of universalistic concerns in Kongzi’s 
ethical thought.  
Moreover, in Chapter 3 (especially Sections 3.1 and 3.2) I have distinguished 
three different senses of ài 愛 and two senses of āi 哀 in the Analects. I have argued 
that ài 愛 is used in the Analects as (1) one’s natural affection for close people, (2) one’s 
caring attitude for virtually everyone that goes beyond one’s natural boundary of 
affection, and (3) some sort of valuing, which may be sometimes expressed as stinginess. 
On the other hand, I have shown that āi 哀 is mainly used in the Analects and the 
Zǔozhuàn as (1) one’s feeling of sorrow at the loss of close people and (2) the feeling of 
sympathy or pity for the misfortune or suffering of others. As I see it, the first and the 
second entries of each list match not only with each other but also with the particularistic 
and the universalistic concerns that I have identified in the previous section (6.2.1.2). In 
other words: on the one hand, one’s natural affection for close people tends to be 
expressed as the feeling of sorrow when misfortune befalls them, and such emotions or 
attitudes are expressions of one’s particularistic concerns; on the other hand, one’s caring 
attitude for virtually everyone is related with one’s feeling of sympathy for the suffering 
of others, and this shows that one has some universalistic concerns too. And I think that 
the importance of the latter group—viz. one’s universal caring attitude, sympathy, and 
universalistic concerns—in Kongzi’s ethical thought shows that Kongzi’s conception of 
love (ài 愛) is not purely partialistic by nature. 
At this point, concerning the relationship between the emotions of ài 愛 and āi 
哀, we are reminded of Rawls’s conception of attitude that I introduced in Chapter 2 
(Section 2.1.3). As I briefly summarized there, Rawls proposes that an attitude is a set of 
ordered families of dispositions, and that love is a good example of such an attitude. 
According to him, love consists of a set of dispositions such as the disposition to feel joy 
at the presence of the person one loves, and the disposition to feel sorrow when one’s 
loved one suffers. According to this view, we have the following parallel pictures of the 
relationship between the two components of Kongzi’s ài 愛 and āi 哀: (1) On one hand, 
one’s natural affection for close people, a constituent of Kongzi’s ài 愛, contains a 
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disposition to be expressed as sorrow (āi 哀) in a sorrowful situation, and this disposition 
is actualized as the emotional response of sorrow at the loss of close people or in a 
similar situation. (2) On the other hand, one’s universal caring attitude, another 
constituent of Kongzi’s ài 愛, involves one’s sympathetic concern for others that tends to 
respond to the suffering of others, and this tendency is actualized as the feeling of pity or 
sympathy (āi 哀) in a relevant situation. 
However, whereas one’s natural affection for close people seems to involve 
necessarily the disposition to feel sorrow when misfortune befalls those one holds dear, 
one’s universal caring attitude does not have to be the kind of concern that necessarily 
involves sympathy at the suffering of others. For unlike the natural affection for close 
people which is quite spontaneous and well-grounded in human nature, the attitude of 
universal caring is more or less what one consciously adopts, and one’s sympathetic 
concern for others is not the only reason that one adopts such an attitude. For example, 
one might want to treat others as one would treat oneself, thinking somewhat abstractly 
that doing so will make the world a much better place to live,82 or one might adopt such 
an attitude believing that treating everyone equally, including oneself, would be most 
beneficial to oneself eventually. In short, in so far as one adopts the attitude of universal 
caring only because of these abstract or somewhat selfish reasons, sympathy or 
sympathetic concern does not ground one’s universal caring attitude. Apparently, though, 
this is not the case for Kongzi. For as we have seen previously in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2), 
the feeling of pity or sympathy at the suffering of others is an important ethical emotion 
for the Confucian nobleman to have, and probably the nobleman’s universal caring 
attitude is in large part grounded in his sympathy.  
 
6.2.2 Self-Love and Impartial Care in the Mòzǐ 
 
6.2.2.1 From Kongzi’s Ài rén 愛人 to Mòzǐ’s Jiān’ài 兼愛 
 
Although pity or sympathy (āi 哀) is an important ethical emotion in the Analects that 
                                                 
82 Darwall, Philosophical Ethics, p. 225. 
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provides the affective foundation for the nobleman’s universal caring attitude, it is also 
true that Kongzi and his immediate disciples never clearly pointed out the close 
relationship between their doctrine of “ài rén” 愛人 or universal caring and the feeling 
of sympathy at the misfortune of others. Moreover, as we have seen in Chapter 3, Kongzi 
frequently emphasized one’s natural affection for family members and other relations as a 
crucial constituent of the nobleman’s virtuous character. In this circumstance, it might 
have remained quite vague to Kongzi’s followers and other contemporary intellectuals 
how one could go beyond the boundary of one’s natural affection for close people and 
extend one’s caring attitude to those outside one’s circle of closely related people. More 
specifically, Kongzi sometimes recommends the principle of “shù” 恕—“Do not do to 
others what you do not want them to inflict upon yourself,” or “Treat others as you want 
them to treat yourself”—as a crucial component of the highest Confucian moral ideal rén 
仁 (“humaneness”). However, in the Analects we do not find any clear explanation of 
how one could enact this principle, specifically whether enacting this dictum involves 
going against or placing constraints on one’s natural affection for close people, or 
whether something in one’s psychological make-up—e.g. one’s disposition to feel 
sympathy at the suffering of others—facilitates one’s treating others as one treats 
oneself.83
In the history of Chinese philosophy, we find the first reflective and highly 
systematic effort to answer this question in the Mòzǐ 墨子. According to Mòzǐ, the 
source of social disorder is individuals’ ideological differences84 and mutual hostility (bù 
xiāng ài 不相愛) between individuals, families, and countries.85 As Mòzǐ sees it, the 
reason why all levels of social entities try to harm each other is their factionalist tendency 
to promote their interests at the expense of others, and this tendency is supported by their 
belief that factionalism (bié 別) is the best way to advance their interests. The most 
explicit and self-conscious defense of such a factionalist tendency can be found in 
Wūmǎzǐ’s 巫馬子 remark to Mòzǐ: 
 
                                                 
83 For further discussion of this matter, see Section 2.2.2.3 of Chapter 2 above. 
84 Mòzǐ 墨子, “Shàngtóng shàng” 尚同上. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiángǔ, p. 74. 
85 Mòzǐ 墨子, “Jiān’ài shàng” 兼愛上. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiángǔ, p. 99. 
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I am different from you; I am not capable of impartial care. I love people from Zōu 鄒 
more than people from Yuè 越, love people from Lǔ 魯 more than people from Zōu, love 
those in my hometown more than people from Lǔ, love my family members more than 
those in my hometown, love my parents more than my [other] family members, and love 
myself more than my parents; this is because [the former] is closer to me [than the latter 
in each case]. If I were hit, I would feel pain, but if others were hit, I would not feel any 
pain. Why shall I not remove my source of pain but remove what I do not suffer at all? 
Therefore, I adopt [the policy of] “benefit myself by killing others;” but not [the policy of] 
“benefit others by killing myself.”86
 
Mòzǐ’s alternative to this factionalist position is “impartial care” (jiān’ài 兼愛). 
According to him, one can enact impartial care by “regarding (shì 視) another country as 
if it were one’s own country, regarding another family as if it were one’s own family, and 
regarding another person as if he or she were oneself,”87 and in the “Jiān’ài xià” 兼愛下 
chapter Mòzǐ recommends to care about (wèi 為) another country, another city, and 
another family as much as one cares about one’s own country, one’s own city, and one’s 
own family.88 As Graham has well pointed out, although including the character “ài” 愛 
which is often translated as “love” and which I have partly rendered above as one’s 
natural affection for close people, Mòzǐ’s jiān’ài 兼愛 has little to do with the warmth of 
the sentiment of love. As Graham said, “[Mòzǐ] uses ài as we use ‘love’ when talking of 
‘self-love,’ which is concern for oneself; jiān’ài is being as much concerned for one 
person as for another….[O]ne has the impression that Mohists were not people with 
warm sympathies towards everyone, but people whose personal affections [were] 
disciplined by a stern sense of justice.”89
According to Sīmǎ Qiān’s 司馬遷 “Zhòngní dìzǐ lièzhuàn” 仲尼弟子列傳 
(Biographies of Kongzi’s Disciples), Kongzi had a disciple named Wūmǎ Shī 巫馬施,90 
                                                 
86 “我與子異, 我不能兼愛. 我愛鄒人於越人, 愛魯人於鄒人, 愛我鄕人於魯人, 愛我家人於鄕人, 愛
我親於我家人, 愛我身於吾親, 以爲近我也. 擊我則疾, 擊彼則不疾於我, 我何故疾者之不拂, 而不
疾者之拂? 故有我有殺彼以我, 無殺我以利.” My translation of the last sentence follows Yú Yuè’s 俞
樾 emendation. See Mòzǐ 墨子, “Gēngzhù” 耕柱. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiángǔ, p. 435. 
87 “視人之國, 若視其國, 視人之家, 若視其家, 視人之身, 若視其身.” Mòzǐ 墨子, “Jiān’ài zhōng” 兼
愛中. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiángǔ, p. 103. 
88 “爲人之國, 若爲其國,…爲彼者由爲己也. 爲人之都, 若爲其都,…爲彼猶爲己也. 爲人之家, 若爲
其家,…爲彼猶爲己也.” Mòzǐ 墨子, “Jiān’ài xià” 兼愛下. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiángǔ, p. 115. 
89 Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, p. 12. 
90 Sīmǎ Qiān 司馬遷, Shǐjì 史記, p. 2218. 
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and Zhèng Xuán 鄭玄 (127–200 C.E.) said that Wūmǎ Shī was from Lǔ 魯 dukedom.91 
In addition, in the previous quotation Wūmǎzǐ 巫馬子 expresses greatest loyalty to the 
people of Lǔ among the peoples from various regions of China. Based on these facts, 
Wūmǎzǐ 巫馬子 in this Mòzǐ passage has been traditionally regarded as the Wūmǎ Shī 
巫馬施 mentioned in Sīmǎ Qiān’s “Biographies” or at least his son,92 and the partialistic 
doctrine presented by Wūmǎzǐ has usually been ascribed to the “Confucians.” However, 
Mòzǐ’s doctrine of impartial care explicated as “regarding another country as if it were 
one’s own country, regarding another family as if it were one’s own family, and regarding 
another person as if he or she were oneself” has stronger affinity with the universal caring 
attitude contained in Kongzi’s recommendation of ài rén 愛人 or his principle of shù 恕 
than with Wūmǎzǐ’s extremely egoistic position that puts oneself even before one’s 
parents. Moreover, at one place Mòzǐ explicates his doctrine of jiān’ài 兼愛 in terms of 
serving other people before taking care of oneself,93 and Kongzi sometimes explains his 
conception of virtue (dé 德) or humaneness (rén 仁) in terms of engaging in a difficult 
service for others first and thinking about the reward from it afterwards.94  
In this light, despite all of the differences in important theoretical details between 
Confucianism and Mohism that we will examine in the following, Mòzǐ’s proposal of 
jiān’ài 兼愛 and his philosophical argumentation against the partialistic thinkers of his 
time can be considered to inherit an important part of Kongzi’s conception of ài 愛, and 
to be an important theoretical effort to answer the question Kongzi left unsolved: How 
can one go beyond the boundary of one’s natural affection for close people and extend 
one’s caring attitude to a larger group of people? When put this way, the question sounds 
as if asking what kind of moral cultivation is required for one to overcome one’s 
partialistic tendencies and serve the common good of human beings in general. However, 
Mòzǐ would have taken this question differently, because he seems to believe that rational, 
persuasive arguments clearly showing where one’s greatest and securest benefit lies can 
                                                 
91 Ibid. 
92 Mòzǐ 墨子, “Gēngzhù” 耕柱. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiángǔ, p. 422. 
93 “先萬民之身, 後爲其身.” Mòzǐ 墨子, “Jiān’ài xià” 兼愛下. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiángǔ, p. 119. 




change people’s pattern of behavior successfully without changing their basic 
desiderative structure or their evaluative judgment of what things are worth pursuing. For 
example, Mòzǐ provides the following argument against Wūmǎzǐ’s 巫馬子 partialistic 
position that we have seen above: 
 
Master Mòzǐ said, “Are you going to conceal your thesis, or preach it to other people?” 
Master Wūmǎ said, “Why would I conceal my thesis? I will preach it to others.” Master 
Mòzǐ said, “Then, [if] one person were pleased [i.e. persuaded] by you, one person would 
want to benefit himself by killing you; [if] ten persons were pleased by you, ten persons 
would want to benefit themselves by killing you; [if] the whole world were pleased by you, 
all in the world would want to benefit themselves by killing you. [On the other hand, if] 
one person were not pleased by you, one person would want to kill you thinking that you 
are distributing inauspicious words; [if] ten persons were not pleased by you, ten persons 
would want to kill you thinking that you are distributing inauspicious words; [if] the 
whole world were not pleased by you, all in the world would want to kill you thinking that 
you are distributing inauspicious words. If they were pleased by you, they would want to 
kill you; if they were not pleased by you, they would also want to kill you…What does 
your doctrine benefit? If you insist on preaching without benefiting anything, it is wasting 
[your] words.95
 
This argument aims to show that adopting a partialistic policy does not help promote 
one’s benefit; on the contrary, it works against advancing one’s interests, and any rational 
agent would not adopt a policy that tends to bring about harm rather than benefit. Besides 
this negative argument, Mòzǐ also provides a positive argument for the benefit of 
enacting impartial care: 
 
Let us suppose that there are two officers, one holding to partiality and the other to 
impartiality. [Now,] the partialistic officer would say, “How can I care about my friend as 
if caring about myself, and care about my friend’s parents as if caring about my 
parents?” Consequently, when off-duty, he treats his friend [by] not feeding him when 
starving, not clothing him when cold, not taking care of him when ill, and not burying 
him when dead. Such are the partialistic officer’s words, and such his actions. [On the 
other hand,] the words and actions of the impartial officer are different. He would say, “I 
heard that the noble officer of the world definitely cares about his friend as if caring 
                                                 
95 “子墨子曰: ‘子之義將匿邪, 意將以告人乎?’ 巫馬子曰: ‘我何故匿我義? 吾將以告人.’ 子墨子曰: 
‘然則一人說子, 一人欲殺子以利己; 十人說子, 十人欲殺子以利己; 天下說子, 天下欲殺子以利己. 
一人不說子, 一人欲殺子, 以子爲施不祥言者也; 十人不說子, 十人欲殺子, 以子爲施不祥言者也; 
天下不說子, 天下欲殺子, 以子爲施不祥言者也. 說子亦欲殺子, 不說子亦欲殺子…子之言惡利也? 
若無所利而不言, 是蕩口也.’” In my translation, I followed Sūn Yíràng’s emendation of “bù yán (不言)” 
into “bì yán (必言).” Mòzǐ 墨子, “Gēngzhù” 耕柱. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiángǔ, pp. 435–436. 
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about himself, and cares about his friend’s parents as if caring about his parents; it is 
only after [acting so] that one becomes a noble officer of the world.” So, when off-duty, 
he treats his friend by feeding him when starving, clothing him when cold, taking care of 
him when ill, and burying him when dead. Such are the impartial officer’s words, and 
such his actions. So, these two officers disagree with each other in words, and oppose 
each other in actions. Let us also suppose that these officers are determined to keep their 
words and carry through their actions, so that their words and actions match like two 
parts of a tally, and there are no words but realized in actions. 
 Then, let me ask: Now, there is a great plain here, and an officer in armor and 
helmet is about to go for a battle, but the odds of life and death are unknown yet. Or, he is 
setting out on a distant mission as an emissary of his ruler to [such countries as] Bā, Yuè, 
Qí, or Jīng, but whether he could return is not clear. Then, let me ask, whom [of our two 
officers] shall he follow? [If he is to] ask somebody to support his parents and take care 
of his children and wife, shall it be his impartial friend or partialistic friend? I think that 
in the case like this, there is no foolish man or foolish woman in the world. Even one 
criticizing impartiality will definitely [think it] right to entrust his family to an impartial 
person. This [is the case where one] condemns impartiality in words but adopts it when 
making a choice [for oneself]—words and deeds miss each other here.96
 
In this argument, Mòzǐ points out that the benefit of impartial care is recognized and 
approved even by the adamant advocate of a partialistic policy; it is nothing else than his 
partialistic concern for himself and his family members that makes him break from his 
partialist position and entrust his family members to a person of impartiality. 
 
6.2.2.2 Was Mòzǐ a Voluntarist? 
 
At this point, I would like to examine what might be going on in the partialist’s mind 
when he changes his policy after being exposed to Mòzǐ’s arguments. Specifically, 
concerning some of David S. Nivison’s ideas on this topic, I would like to discuss 1) what 
psychological resources are called on for the partialist to change his policy, and 2) 
                                                 
96 “誰以爲二士, 使其一士者執別, 使其一士者執兼. 是故別士之言曰: ‘吾豈能爲吾友之身, 若爲吾
身, 爲吾友之親, 若爲吾親?’ 是故退睹其友, 飢卽不食, 寒卽不衣, 疾病不侍養, 死喪不葬埋. 別士
之言若此, 行若此. 兼士之言不然, 行亦不然. 曰: ‘吾聞爲高士於天下者, 必爲其友之身, 若爲其身, 
爲身友之親, 若爲其親, 然後可以爲高士於天下.’ 是故退睹其友, 飢則食之, 寒則衣之, 疾病侍養之, 
死喪葬埋之. 兼士之言若此, 行若此. 若之二士者, 言相非而行相反與. 當使若二士者, 言必信, 行
必果, 使言行之合猶合符節也, 無言而不行也. 然卽敢問: 今有平原廣野於此, 被甲嬰胄, 將往戰, 
死生之權未可識也; 又有君大夫之遠使於巴越齊荊, 往來及否未可識也. 然卽敢問, 不識將惡也, 家
室, 奉承親戚, 提挈妻子, 而寄託之, 不識於兼之有是乎, 於別之有是乎? 我以爲當其於此也, 天下
無愚夫愚婦 . 雖非兼之人 , 必寄託之於兼之有是也 . 此言而非兼 , 擇卽取兼 , 卽此言行費也 .” 
Translating this passage, I followed many scholars’ suggested emendations of the text, found in Mòzǐ 墨子, 
“Jiān’ài xià” 兼愛下. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiángǔ, pp. 116–118. 
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whether the partialist’s adopting the doctrine of jiān’ài 兼愛 also involves any change in 
his affections or emotions. As will become clear in the following, clarifying these issues 
is crucial for assessing whether Mòzǐ’s solution to Kongzi’s unsolved problem—viz. how 
one could go beyond the boundary of one’s natural affection for close people and extend 
one’s caring attitude to a larger group of people—was successful or not.  
In his “Philosophical Voluntarism in Fourth-Century China,” Nivison 
characterizes Mòzǐ as a radical voluntarist. Although Nivison does not provide any clear 
definition of “voluntarism,” we can have a good sense of it from his following remarks: 
 
Mòzǐ appeared to think…that if you can get people to follow a properly constructed 
argument implying that it would be in their rational interest for them to have certain 
affections (and beliefs, for that matter), then they will conclude that they should have 
those affections, and can at that point if they will (and they are simply perverse if they 
don’t) proceed to adopt them, just as they might decide, on persuasion, to move their 
limbs. It is usually said of Mòzǐ’s “universal love” (jiān’ài 兼愛) that it is not “love” at 
all, but merely cold self-interest.…Mòzǐ is surely not to be recommended as a philosopher 
with a deep understanding of love. But it is possible to read him as intending that his 
universal love really be an affection, and not just a stance.97
 
Nivison is making two points here. First, he ascribes to Mòzǐ the view that one can adopt 
certain beliefs or affections at will, if he decides to do so. Second, he argues that when 
one approves the doctrine of jiān’ài 兼愛 (“universal love” in Nivison’s terms) and 
decides to act upon it, one’s affective attitude towards other people drastically changes, 
say, from indifference to affective caring. As the reader might think now, these are 
strange views, and I will shortly argue that Nivison does not need to ascribe these views 
to Mòzǐ. But first, why does Nivison want to ascribe these views to Mòzǐ? He says: 
 
[A]t this level of Mohist thinking there is not yet a sensitivity to distinctions that analysis 
makes for some of the rest of us: between (a) doing something as “right,” i.e., identified 
by reason as useful and prudent; (b) doing something recognized as “really” right, i.e., 
dictated by morality (whether useful and prudent or not); and (c) doing it with the inner 
feeling that it just is the thing to do, a feeling that makes it the natural thing to do. Then a 
decision to do something under its first representation here would seem to carry along 
                                                 
97 David. S Nivison, “Philosophical Voluntarism in Fourth-Century China,” chap. in The Ways of 
Confucianism (Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1996), p. 130. 
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with it the appropriate disposition.98
 
That is, according to Nivison, Mòzǐ did not clearly distinguish between three reasons or 
motivations for doing something—i.e. (a) doing it because it is useful, (b) doing it 
because it is moral, and (c) doing it with the relevant moral dispositions or feelings, and 
consequently ended up arguing that once one is persuaded that doing something is useful, 
one is also persuaded that doing it is also morally right, and one can generate the relevant 
affective motivation for that action in one’s mind if one decides to do so. Interpreting 
Mòzǐ this way, Nivison anticipates Mencius’ purportedly more perceptive observation of 
the human mind (xīn 心) a century later: in Mencius 1A:7, “Mencius carefully shows the 
king that he really has in himself all the time the disposition needed to be really kind. [In 
contrast,] Mòzǐ merely tells people like King Xuan, ‘you can practice universal love. The 
six Sage Kings did it.’ For him, all you have to do is make up your mind to do it, and 
there’s no further problem.”99
However, I think that this is not the right picture to ascribe to Mòzǐ. I would like 
to refute Nivison’s second thesis first by providing three arguments. First, in agreement 
with several previous scholars,100 I think that the concept of ài 愛 in Mòzǐ’s term 
“jiān’ài” 兼愛  does not have any affective or emotional aspect. As Graham has 
originally pointed out,101 it is not just that Mòzǐ did not recommend love as an emotion; 
he distrusted emotions and recommended to eradicate all of them: 
 
Make sure to eradicate six [types of] outrageousness. Think when silent, teach when 
speaking, and work when moving. [If you can] get these three to alternate [continuously, 
you will] definitely become a sage. Make sure to eradicate joy, anger, pleasure, sorrow, 
love, [and hatred], and practice humaneness and righteousness. [If you can make your] 
hands, feet, mouth, nose, and ears act on righteousness, [you will] definitely become a 
sage.102
 
                                                 
98 Nivison, “Philosophical Voluntarism in Fourth-Century China,” p. 131. 
99 Ibid. 
100 For example, Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, p. 149; Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Mohist 
Philosophy,” The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge Press, 1998). 
101 Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, p. 48. 
102 “必去六辟. 嘿則思, 言則誨, 動則事, 使三者代御, 必爲聖人. 必去喜去怒, 去樂去悲, 去愛[去
惡], 而用仁義. 手足口鼻耳, 從事於義, 必爲聖人.” Mòzǐ 墨子, “Guìyì” 貴義. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ 
xiángǔ, pp. 442–443. 
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The term that Mòzǐ uses in this passage to label six emotions is “bì” 辟 (“to avoid”), and 
Sūn Yíràng glosses that “bì” 辟 here stands for “pì” 僻. “Pì” 僻 usually means 
‘outrageous,’ ‘biased,’ or ‘extreme,’ and thus is used for things that are bad or to be 
avoided. Since Mòzǐ uses this term to designate emotions, he seems to think that 
emotions are simply what hinder human beings from functioning properly by clouding 
their minds or prompting them in wrong directions. And since Mòzǐ’s list of such 
emotions includes ài 愛 (factional or partialistic love, presumably), it is likely that 
Mòzǐ’s “jiān’ài” 兼愛 does not have any affective or emotional aspect. 
Second, though, one might think that although Mòzǐ condemned ài 愛  as 
factional love, he might have still recommended jiān’ài 兼愛  as a calm, evenly 
distributed affection or goodwill for everyone. However, I think that this is an unlikely 
option in Mòzǐ for the following reason: As we have seen in Section 6.1.1.3 above, ài 愛 
as a natural or cultivated attitude or as a broad conception of emotion is closely 
intertwined with a set of other particular emotions. Specifically, we have seen that in 
Kongzi 1) ài 愛 as one’s natural affection for close people is expressed as deep sadness 
(āi 哀) at the loss of close people, and 2) ài 愛 as one’s universal caring attitude is 
based on one’s pity or sympathy (āi 哀) at the suffering of others. Moreover, we have 
also seen that in the Analects the filial son’s love for his parents makes him feel both fear 
and joy at their old parents’ surviving another year.103 However, we do not find a similar 
connection between Mòzǐ’s jiān’ài 兼愛 and other emotions in the Mòzǐ.  
For example, the chapter of “Eradicating Partiality” (“Qùsī” 去私) in Lǚshì 
chūnqiū 呂氏春秋 contains an anecdote of a chief (jùzǐ 鉅子) of a group of Mohists in 
Qín 秦. One day the chief’s son killed a man, but the king of Qín proposed to pardon 
him because he was the only son to the chief who was already very old. However, the 
Mohist chief insisted on executing his son, saying: 
 
According to the Mohist law, a murderer should be killed, and an injurer should be 
punished. This is in order to prohibit murder and injury, and prohibiting murder and 
injury is a great duty of the world. Even if your majesty pardon him and have your 
                                                 
103 Lunyu 4:21. For a detailed discussion of this passage, see Section 3.3 of my Chapter 3. 
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officials release him, I cannot but enforce the Mohist law [on my own terms].104
 
As the author of the chapter comments, the Mohist chief restrained himself from being 
partial to his son and managed to remain public-minded by practicing the “great duty.”105 
In this passage, one might think that although the chief’s attitude of jiān’ài 兼愛 
recommends him not to be affected by his partialistic, familial affection for his son, his 
jiān’ài 兼愛 can still be a fair-minded warm concern for everyone. However, in addition 
to the seeming indifference to his son’s poor lot, the chief in the current passage shows no 
sign of sympathy for the murdered person either. In this light, the Mohist law banning 
murder and injury does not seem to be based on a sympathetic concern for everyone, and 
we could infer that jiān’ài 兼愛 is not a properly tempered emotion.106
Third, I think that Mòzǐ’s “impartial care” (jiān’ài 兼愛) is more of a behavior 
than an emotion. In other words, I think that impartial care in the Mòzǐ is a type of 
behavior aimed at promoting the benefit (lì, 利) of the world, and the motivation of the 
agent for her act of impartial caring does not need to be based in a loving affection for the 
cared-for. At the beginning of the “Jiān’ài xià” 兼愛下 chapter, Mòzǐ declares that the 
primary business of the benevolent person (rénrén 仁人) is to promote the benefit and 
remove the harm of the world, and then he defines the greatest harm to be big countries 
attacking small ones, the powerful oppressing the weak, the many harassing the few, the 
cunning deceiving the foolish, and so forth.107 On the other hand, the benefit of the world 
is exactly its opposite—people of different capacities cooperating harmoniously, the old 
without wife or children are cared for until death, the young without parents get proper 
                                                 
104 “墨者之法曰: ‘殺人者死, 傷人者刑.’ 此所以禁殺傷人也. 夫禁殺傷人者, 天下之大義也. 王雖爲
之賜, 而令吏弗誅, 腹[黃+享]不可不行墨者之法.” (“黃” and “享” constitutes one character, which is the 
chief’s personal name, but is not included in the MS-Word character set.) Lǚshì chūnqiū 呂氏春秋, “Qùsī” 
去私. Chén Qíyóu, Lǚshì chūnqiū jiàoshì, p. 56. 
105 “子, 人之所私也. 忍所私以行大義, 鉅子可謂公矣.” Ibid. 
106 This point is corroborated by Ivanhoe’s comment on Mòzǐ’s argument against aggressive war: “What is 
striking in Mòzǐ’s searing and well-argued condemnation of aggressive war is the complete absence of 
descriptions of the horror of war. All Mòzǐ seems to see is the unprofitability of war. His overriding concern 
with lì (‘benefit’ or ‘profit’) led him to ignore a broad range of psychological goods and harms.” (Ivanhoe 
1998). In other words, the rationale behind Mòzǐ’s recommendation of jiān’ài 兼愛 and his condemnation 
of mutual hostility is not the emotion of fear at the horrible experiences people will have to go through in 
the war, but the cool calculation that mutual hostility between different levels of social entities do not 
promote the benefit of the world. 
107 Mòzǐ 墨子, “Jiān’ài xià” 兼愛下. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiángǔ, pp. 113–114. 
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support until maturity. 108  Here Mòzǐ defines the benefit and harm of the world 
respectively as the peaceful cooperation and hostile conflict between social entities, and 
he does not distinguish “ài rén” 愛 人  (“loving people”) from “lì rén” 利 人 
(“benefiting people”) very clearly. 
For example, in the “Jiān’ài xià” 兼愛下 chapter Mòzǐ once says that the 
benefits of the world are generated by “loving and benefiting people” (ài rén lì rén 愛人
利人),109 but it is not clear whether Mòzǐ regards ài 愛 here as a pre-existing emotion 
motivating one to benefit others or as a certain type of activity identical with the activity 
of benefiting others (“lì rén” 利人). However, I think that it is more plausible to interpret 
Mòzǐ’s “ài rén” 愛人 to be identical with “lì rén” 利人, because later in the same 
chapter Mòzǐ uses the compound “àilì” 愛利 (“loving and benefiting” or “caring and 
benefiting”) a number of times, and clearly indicates that àilì 愛利 is an activity to 
perform (cóngshì 從事) rather than an emotion to feel and an activity to perform.110 
Moreover, as we have seen above, Mòzǐ says that one can practice impartial care by 
regarding (shì 視) another country, another family, and another person as if it were one’s 
own country, one’s own family, and oneself, or by caring about (wèi 為) another country, 
another city, and another family as much as one cares about one’s own country, one’s own 
city, and one’s own family. Whether interpreted as looking at something in a particular 
light or as trying to provide more care for somebody than normally expected, Mòzǐ’s 
jiān’ài 兼愛 clearly involves the agent’s non-spontaneous, conscious efforts to go 
against her natural partialistic tendency, and in that sense I think jiān’ài 兼愛 is an 
action or at least a behavior rather than an emotion. 
So far we have seen that Mòzǐ’s jiān’ài 兼愛 does not contain any affective or 
emotional aspect, and now it must be also clear that the partialist whom Mòzǐ persuades 
to adopt his policy of jiān’ài 兼愛 does not have to go through any change in emotions. 
At this point, I would like to turn to Nivison’s first thesis about Mòzǐ and voluntarism, 
                                                 
108 Ibid., p. 116. 
109 “姑嘗本原若衆利之所自生, 此胡自生?...必曰從愛人利人生.” Ibid., p. 115. 
110 A typical phrase is “cóngshì hū àilì rén zhī qīn” 從事乎愛利人之親 (“to engage in caring for and 
benefiting another person’s parents”). See ibid., p. 125. 
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and think about what kinds of psychological resources are really called on for the 
partialist to change his policy in Mòzǐ’s theory. Nivison’s first thesis was that according 
to Mòzǐ’s moral psychology, one can adopt certain beliefs or affections at will if he 
decides to do so. However, since it is already clear that adopting Mòzǐ’s policy of 
impartial care does not necessarily involve any change in the agent’s emotions but 
requires a change of behavior, Nivison’s thesis concerning affections needs to be 
modified accordingly. We find a modified version of Nivison’s view in Philip J. Ivanhoe’s 
remark: 
 
Mòzǐ’s…basic approach to influencing people’s behaviour entailed an extreme form of 
voluntarism. He believed that most, or at least many, people could simply take up a form 
of behaviour and would do so if they were given good reasons for adopting it. Mòzǐ 
argued that anyone who truly understood that a given form of behaviour does indeed 
maximize the common good (as he understood it) would immediately act accordingly. 
This belief in the inexorable power of argument is of a piece with his sparse moral 
psychology and belief in the plasticity of human nature, and helps to explain his active 
and persistent interest in the forms and method of philosophical debate.111
 
In the following, I argue that as long as Mòzǐ’s impartial care is interpreted as a kind of 
action or even behavior, the role volition plays in one’s adopting and practicing impartial 
care is very small and insignificant. On the other hand, I think that what plays a crucial 
role in one’s changing policy and practicing impartial care is one’s particular kinds of 
desires or aspirations as opposed to volition or will-power as a separate faculty. However, 
in order to make this point I need to go through several steps, and I would like to start 
from analyzing Ivanhoe’s remark. 
To begin with, one might wonder what Ivanhoe means exactly by “good reasons” 
for adopting a certain type of behavior. In his remark, a “good reason” for adopting the 
behavior of impartial care seems to be the understanding that impartial caring maximizes 
the common good. However, granting that impartial caring indeed maximizes the 
common good, how can maximizing the common good be a good reason for an individual 
to adopt impartial caring? If the primary goal of an individual were maximizing her own 
good, would her understanding that impartial caring maximizes the common good appeal 
to her as a good reason to practice impartial caring? Not necessarily so. Then, how can 
                                                 
111 Ivanhoe, “Mohist Philosophy.” 
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the gap between the common good and the individual good be bridged? Later on in his 
article, Ivanhoe correctly says that Mòzǐ often asserts or assumes that maximizing the 
common or collective goods will result in maximizing individual good. For example, he 
mentions Mòzǐ’s argument in the “Jiān’ài xià” 兼愛下 chapter that a truly filial man 
would embrace impartial care as the best means to serve his parents well, because it 
would be only when he serves other people’s parents as if they were his own parents that 
other people would serve his parents as well.112 Then, the best interpretation of Ivanhoe’s 
remark quoted above would be the following:  
 
Given the strong likelihood that the maximization of the common good will entail the 
maximization of the individual good, the understanding that impartial caring will 
maximize the common good gives one a good reason to adopt and practice the policy of 
impartial care. In other words, one who understands the facts about the relationship 
among the common good, the individual good, and impartial care will see that practicing 
impartial care is in one’s best interest. 
 
Now, if Mòzǐ had held “an extreme form of voluntarism,” what is the role of 
volition in this picture for a rational agent to adopt impartial care? As I see it, there is no 
significant role for a radical voluntarism to play in Mòzǐ’s moral psychology. Let us think 
about this matter using an analogy. Suppose that I am thirsty now, and I go to my 
refrigerator to have a scoop of ice-cream. However, my wife in the kitchen offers me a 
cup of cool water instead, telling me that cool, pure water will be better for quenching my 
thirst than stuffy ice-cream. ‘She’s got a point,’ I think, and I drink the water. Then my 
seven-year-old son returns from the soccer-field, and reaches the ice-cream box that I 
took out of the refrigerator a minute ago. “No, have this. This will be better.” I offer my 
son a cup of cool water. However, having already seen the ice-cream, my son still craves 
the ice-cream even though he seems to understand my explanation of why cool water is 
better than ice-cream for quenching his thirst. I think it strange and say, “Do you just 
want the ice-cream or want the ice-cream because you are thirsty? If you are thirsty, 
you’d better have water.” And my son says, “Yes I’m thirsty and I know that water will 
be better than ice-cream, but I still want ice-cream for my thirst!” 
                                                 
112 Ibid. See also Mòzǐ 墨子, “Jiān’ài xià” 兼愛下. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiángǔ, p. 125. 
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In this picture, I had a desire to slake my thirst, and took up a glass of water and 
drank it without hesitation, once I thought that water would be better than ice-cream for 
my thirst. Perhaps I wanted the water and decided to drink it when I was persuaded that 
water was better for my thirst, but my wanting the water was almost automatic, and my 
deciding to drink it was almost unconscious. I did not need any remarkable support from 
my will-power to complete my act of drinking water. Likewise, Mòzǐ seems to assume 
that most of the agents to be persuaded by his argument are like me in this picture; they 
have basic intelligence to understand the relevant facts about pursuing their best interest, 
and once they understand where their best interest lies, their desire to enhance their own 
well-being provides them with enough motivation for going through the relevant 
procedure to accomplish their goals. In this light, the “inexorable power” of Mòzǐ’s 
argument comes from the conjunction of the listener’s desire to promote her good (i.e. 
her material well-being) and her understanding that the best way to promote her good is 
to take care of other people’s good too. An extra faculty of volition is not required for 
Mòzǐ’s argument to be compelling to such an agent.  
 
6.2.2.3 Self-love: The Sole Motivation for Impartial Care 
 
Mòzǐ indicates this picture of his moral psychology at several places of his “Jiān’ài” 兼
愛 chapters. For example, having presented several types of arguments proving the 
benefit of practicing impartial care in the third “Jiān’ài” 兼愛 chapter, Mòzǐ complains 
that many people still consider impartial care (jiān’ài 兼愛) to be an impracticable ideal. 
According to Mòzǐ, such people compare enacting jiān’ài to such an impossible task as 
jumping over the great rivers like Huánghé 黃河 and Chángjiāng 長江 carrying Mount 
Tai in one hand.113 Perhaps these people are like my son in the picture that I have 
presented in the previous section—they see that impartial caring is in their best interest, 
but like Wūmǎzǐ 巫馬子 quoted above, they also think that they are not capable of 
(bùnéng 不能) practicing impartial care. Mòzǐ initially responds to this objection by 
                                                 
113 “吾譬兼之不可爲也, 猶挈泰山以超江河也. 故兼者直願之也, 夫豈可爲之物哉?” Mòzǐ 墨子, 
“Jiān’ài xià” 兼愛下. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiángǔ, p. 120. 
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quoting passages from the Documents (shū 書) and the Poetry (shī 詩) which are meant 
to show that 1) there are precedents of the ancient sage kings who managed to practice 
impartial care, and that 2) this makes impartial care a certainly practicable ideal.114 
However, Mòzǐ’s interpretation of those passages is dubious, and it is not clear exactly 
how the sage kings could practice impartial care. That is, if they were capable of impartial 
care simply because they were a special kind of human beings, this cannot appeal to 
many ordinary people who might lack the sage kings’ moral character. 
So, Mòzǐ now faces a question of how to change people’s belief that impartial 
care is too difficult a task for them to undertake (nán ér bù kě wéi 難而不可為115), and 
the argument Mòzǐ provides for this purpose aims to show that impartial care is not a 
difficult task at all. According to him, people often do much more difficult things to curry 
their ruler’s favor, and they want to act as their ruler likes (hào 好) because they think 
that it is a good way to promote their interests. If such is most people’s behavioristic 
tendency, Mòzǐ argues, people should feel no difficulty in practicing impartial care, 
because impartial care is clearly in their rational interest and it is much easier than many 
other things people happily suffer to advance their interests. Mòzǐ makes this point by 
telling three parallel stories. Since these stories reveal some important theoretical aspects 
of Mòzǐ’s moral psychology that previous scholars have not fully addressed, I would like 
to quote and discuss these stories and Mòzǐ’s related argument in full detail below: 
 
In the past, King Líng 靈 of the state of Jīng 荊 liked slender waists. During his reign, 
low officials of Jīng did not eat more than one meal [per day], and they could not stand 
up without using a cane, and could not walk without leaning against the wall. So, 
reducing one’s diet is a very difficult thing to do, but many people did it [because] King 
Líng liked it. Within a generation the commoners [of Jīng] could also change 
[accordingly], and this was [due to their] seeking means to comply with their superiors. 
In the past, King Gōujiàn of the state Yuè 越 liked courage. He trained his 
soldiers and [other] subjects for three years, but he was not certain of his knowledge [of 
the degree that they were trained. So, one day] he set fire to his boats and encouraged his 
soldiers to advance by drumming. [Each row] of his soldiers stumbled over [those] in the 
row before, and those who were drowned or burned to death were incalculable. At that 
time [they] kept marching even when drumming was stopped; the soldiers of Yuè were 
really dreadful. So, burning oneself is a very difficult thing to do, but many people did it 
                                                 
114 See Mòzǐ 墨子, “Jiān’ài xià” 兼愛下. Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiángǔ, pp. 120–124. 
115 Ibid., p. 125. 
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[because] King Gōujiàn liked it. Within a generation the commoners [of Yuè] could also 
change [accordingly], and this was [due to their] seeking means to comply with their 
superiors. 
In the past, Duke Wén 文 of Jìn 晉 liked coarse clothes. During his reign, the 
officials of the state Jìn [wore] suits of coarse cloth, jackets of sheepskin, hats of softened 
silk, and shoes of coarse material. [In such attire,] they would have an audience with 
Duke Wén and walk about in his court. So, [wearing] coarse clothes is a very difficult 
thing to do, but many people did it [because] Duke Wén liked it. Within a generation the 
commoners [of Jìn] could also change [accordingly], and this was [due to their] seeking 
means to comply with their superiors. 
 So, reducing one’s diet, burning oneself, and [wearing] coarse clothes are 
extremely difficult things to do in the world; but many people did it because their rulers 
liked it, and within a generation the commoners could also change [accordingly]. Why 
was that so? [They] sought means to comply with their superiors. Now, as for [the policy 
of] mutual impartial caring and mutual benefiting, it is profitable and easy to practice 
beyond measure. As I suppose, [the only reason that this policy is not widely practiced is] 
only that there is no ruler who likes it. If there were rulers who like it, and if such rulers 
promote it with rewards and praise and dignify it with punishments, I suppose people’s 
inclination toward mutual impartial caring and mutual benefiting will be comparable to 
fire’s burning up and water’s flowing down; nothing in the world could stop that.116
 
It is interesting that the three stories in this passage, though exactly parallel in 
structure, concern different aspects of human beings. That is, whereas the ruler in the first 
story likes a particular type of physical appearance as beautiful, the second and third 
rulers like particular virtues either directly (i.e. King Gōujiàn’s liking of courage) or as 
manifested in a certain type of attire (i.e. Duke Wén’s liking of coarse clothes as 
manifesting frugality). However, what is more interesting and significant is that Mòzǐ 
represents the second and third rulers to be not interested in distinguishing genuine 
virtues and their resemblances. As we have seen earlier in Section 2.1.2 of Chapter 2, the 
ancient Chinese had a sophisticated distinction between one’s character (qíng 情) and its 
                                                 
116 “昔荊靈王好小要. 當靈王之身, 荊國之士飯不踰乎一, 固據而後興, 扶垣而後行. 故約食爲其難
爲也, 然後爲而靈王說之. 未踰於世而民可移也, 卽求以鄕其上也. 昔者越王句踐好勇. 敎其士臣三
年, 以其知爲未足以知之也, 焚舟失火, 鼓而進之. 其士偃前列, 伏水火而死, 有不可勝數也. 當此
之時, 不鼓而退也, 越國之士可謂顫矣. 故焚身爲其難爲也, 然後爲之越王說之. 未踰於世而民可移
也, 卽求以鄕其上也. 昔者晉文公好苴服. 當文公之時, 晉國之士, 大布之衣, 牂羊之裘, 練帛之冠, 
且苴之屨, 入見文公, 出以踐之朝. 故苴服爲其難爲也, 然後爲而文公說之. 未踰於世而民可移也, 
卽求以鄕其上也. 是故約食焚舟苴服, 此天下之至難爲也, 然後爲而上說之, 未踰於世而民可移也. 
何故也? 卽求以鄕其上也. 今若夫兼相愛，交相利, 此其有利且易爲也, 不可勝計也. 我以爲則無有
上說之者而已矣. 苟有上說之者, 勸之以賞譽, 威之以刑罰, 我以爲人之於就兼相愛交相利也, 譬之
猶火之就上, 水之就下也, 不可防止於天下.” My translation reflects scholars’ emendations of the text 
seen ibid., pp. 125–127. 
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manifestations in words and manners well before Mòzǐ, and Mòzǐ’s almost intentional 
neglect of this distinction is strikingly important for understanding his implicit theory of 
moral psychology. King Gōujiàn and Duke Wén in Mòzǐ’s stories do not seem to care 
whether people’s courageous and frugal behaviors are genuine or merely driven by their 
self-interest, and Mòzǐ’s presenting these rulers in this way reveals his firm belief that 
what is important about a virtue or a policy is their behavioral implications, and their 
psychological or motivational foundation is not a question of the highest priority insofar 
as they produce the expected result—promoting the benefit of the world. 
However, the primacy of the behavioral implications of a virtue or a policy does 
not make it a useless task to inquire into their motivational foundations. On the contrary, 
in order to make a certain type of behavior—impartial caring, for Mòzǐ—a constant 
practice among people, it is crucial 1) to know what motivates people to adopt that kind 
of behavior and 2) to maintain the relevant conditions that give them reasons to adopt and 
practice the recommended type of behavior. This gives Mòzǐ a good reason to be 
interested in clarifying this issue to some extent, and he seems to think that self-love, 
which is expressed as their desire to benefit themselves and is often accompanied by 
partialistic behaviors, can be also the strongest motivation for people’s continuous 
practicing of impartial care. As Kwong-loi Shun has pointed out, there is no genuine 
conflict between Mòzǐ’s recommendation of impartial care and people’s natural concern 
for themselves, because what is problematic is not the concern of the people for 
themselves but their concern for themselves combined with their disregard for others.117 
Moreover, in a previously quoted argument against Wūmǎzǐ 巫馬子, we have seen that 
Mòzǐ does not criticize Wūmǎzǐ’s self-love; what he criticizes is Wūmǎzǐ’s wrong belief 
that his partialistic policy (bié 別) is the right means to promote his self-interest. 
However, the current passage seems to present an even stronger position, namely that 
people’s desire to pursue their personal interest and avoid harm provides the sole and 
                                                 
117 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, pp. 30–31. People’s partialistic concern in Mòzǐ is not only 
for themselves but often also for their family, state, and so forth, but in my current discussion I am 
considering the most extreme case. Mòzǐ talks about the hostile conflict and competition even between 
family members at each beginning of his three “Jiān’ài” 兼愛 chapters. See Sūn Yíràng, Mòzǐ xiángǔ, pp. 
99–100, 101–102, and p. 114. 
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sufficient motivation for them to practice impartial care. I will further explain this 
position below by contrasting it with that of Kongzi’s on a similar topic. 
As we have seen in Section 2.2.2.3 of Chapter 2, by comparing the influence of 
the ruler’s virtue on the commoners to the wind blowing over the grass, Kongzi suggests 
that the commoners have the ability to appreciate their ruler’s virtue and emulate it. In 
other words, Kongzi thinks that if the ruler desires to be good, his subjects will emulate 
this desire of their ruler’s and eventually become good themselves to some extent. In this 
light, despite Kongzi’s belief in the commoners’ lack of intelligence to understand deep 
meanings of morality and their lack of leisure to study poetry, rituals, and music for their 
moral training, Kongzi seems to be very optimistic about the possibility to transform 
people’s character in a positive way, and we have seen that Kongzi’s firm rejection of Jì 
Kāngzǐ’s 季康子 proposal to use forceful means to regulate people’s behavior was also 
in this context. Now, the Mòzǐ passage quoted above also says that the commoners tend to 
emulate their ruler’s preference (hào 好 or yuè 說), and previous scholars have not paid 
enough attention to the rich philosophical implications of this passage. Consequently, 
they ended up mistakenly emphasizing the similarity rather than contrast between Mòzǐ’s 
and Kongzi’s views of the masses’ motivational foundation for embracing morality. 
According to Nivison, the current Mòzǐ passage under consideration strongly 
implies that Mòzǐ denies any fixed moral nature for human beings. Nivison says, like 
Gàozǐ 告子 who compares the formulation of moral character to making cups out of 
willow wood, Mòzǐ in the “Guìyì” 貴義 chapter likens the cultivation of a person’s 
character to making a wall. The point of these analogies is that like a piece of uncarved 
woodblock or a large amount of dumped soil waiting for the form of a cup or a wall to be 
imposed upon them, human nature lacks any pre-existing inclinations toward good or evil 
and can be shaped to take the moral form by proper cultivation.118 While Nivison 
elaborates the possible theoretical influence from Mòzǐ to Gàozǐ on this “plasticity of 
human nature” thesis, Schwartz and Hansen find the precursor of this view in Kongzi. 
Quoting part of the passage in question, Schwartz comments on the similarity between 
Kongzi and Mòzǐ in emphasizing the importance of the ruler’s charismatic power for 
                                                 
118 Nivison, “Philosophical Voluntarism in Fourth-Century China,” p. 130. 
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initiating desired moral changes among people.119 In addition, although not citing any 
specific textual evidence, Hansen is more explicit that in Mòzǐ, people’s internalizing the 
pattern of guidance their ruler adopts involves changing their prior dispositions.120 And 
according to Hansen, this is also true for Confucians who aim at reshaping and polishing 
human nature through training in the Rituals (lǐ 禮).121
However, a more careful reading of the text reveals that Mòzǐ departs from 
Kongzi significantly, and by doing so he proposes an interesting solution to Kongzi’s 
unanswered question, viz. how to make one overcome one’s selfish desires and extend 
one’s caring attitude to those outside one’s circle of closely related people. As we have 
seen earlier in Chapter 2, this was a hard question for Kongzi; Rǎn Qiú 冉求, one of 
Kongzi’s most talented disciples, complained of his insufficient moral strength to carry 
through Kongzi’s teaching, and Kongzi could do nothing but merely urge him to try more. 
However, Mòzǐ does not suffer this problem, because he acknowledges only one source 
of motivation for practicing impartial care: self-love. According to Mòzǐ in the passage 
under consideration, people emulate their rulers’ preference (hào 好 or yuè 說) as a 
means to show their compliance to their rulers, or literally “to turn toward their 
superiors” (xiàng qí shàng 鄉其上). Why would they do so? Ivanhoe says that they do so 
“simply to curry favor [with their rulers]”,122 and Hansen says that the commoners in 
Mòzǐ have a natural desire to conform to their superiors. 123  However, Ivanhoe’s 
suggestion sounds theoretically insufficient, and Hansen’s view seems textually ill-
grounded. For in the “Shàngtóng” 尚同  (“Upward Conformance”) chapters Mòzǐ 
presents everyone’s disagreement with one another as a natural state people originally 
find themselves in, and he recommends people’s compliance with their superiors as a 
remedy for this natural disorder. And if people’s complying with their superiors does not 
derive from their natural inclinations, there must be a special reason for people to want to 
conform to their superiors. 
                                                 
119 Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, p. 150. 
120 Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, p. 128. 
121 Ibid., p. 129. 
122 Ivanhoe, “Mohist Philosophy.” 
123 Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, p. 121. 
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I submit that people’s emulation of their ruler’s preference is not a simple result of 
their natural urge to comply with their superiors, but a well-calculated action to promote 
their best interests. In other words, they pretend to like what their rulers like because they 
think that doing so will advance their personal interests, and their emulation of their 
rulers’ liking at the level of behavior is hardly transformed into the genuine liking of what 
their rulers like. For example, in two of the three stories in the passage, it is clear that no 
one would ever become genuinely fond of limiting diet extremely to have a slender waist 
or marching into a burning boat to look brave, even though doing so might greatly help 
advance one’s personal interests otherwise. In addition, although not as clear as the other 
two cases, we could imagine that many will hate wearing coarse clothes all the time even 
if that makes them look frugal and have a better chance to be recruited by their frugal 
ruler. Mòzǐ seems to think that, at least in this passage, people would practice impartial 
care for exactly the same reason as in the other three cases of the stories. They would 
practice impartial care if their rulers like it, not because they really like it but because 
they think that doing so would bring them a better chance to promote their personal 
interests. Since they are ready to do even more difficult things for the same purpose, the 
apparent advantage of impartial caring over the other activities in terms of its relative 
easiness and the prospect of its being reciprocated, they have an inexorable reason to 
practice impartial care. 
Moreover, if they need an additional booster, the rulers can promote the practice 
of impartial caring by rewarding those who practice it and punishing those who do not. 
Since the system of reward and punishment would not work if people did not desire 
reward and fear punishment, and people’s desiring reward and fearing punishment are in 
turn based on their love of themselves, it is also clear that self-love is indispensable in 
Mòzǐ’s theory for giving people a constant reason to practice impartial care. In addition, 
Mòzǐ’s recommendation of reward and punishment to support people’s practice of 
impartial care indicates that Mòzǐ was pessimistic about the possibility to change people’s 
character in the way that they could appreciate the intrinsic value of impartial caring and 
develop genuine fondness of that practice. In this light, Mòzǐ’s view of self-love as the 
masses’ sole motivation for practicing impartial care is markedly different from Kongzi’s 
view of their character as changeable in a positive way to some extent, and Mòzǐ’s view 
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seems to be a precursor of Hán Fēi’s 韓非 legalist view of human nature as evil rather 
than being a successor of Kongzi’s implicit view of human nature as susceptible of moral 
influence. 
For these two reasons—namely that 1) Mòzǐ postulates no additional motivation 
for people’s practicing impartial care than self-love and that 2) Mòzǐ’s reward and 
punishment system for supporting people’s practice of impartial care requires self-love as 
a precondition for its operation, it is clear that self-love is the sole and sufficient 
motivation for people’s practice of impartial caring in Mòzǐ’s implicit theory of moral 
psychology as presented in this passage. 
 
 
6.3 Enculturation and A New View of Mengzi’s Emotional Extension 
 
However, Mòzǐ’s appeal to self-love or the desire to promote one’s own interests as a 
means to persuade people to adopt the universalistic attitude of impartial care did not 
satisfy Mengzi: When asked by King Huì 惠 of Liáng 梁 what means Mengzi has to 
profit the kingdom, Mengzi recommends the king not to think about profit but only about 
humaneness and righteousness. For if the king pursues profit then his subordinates will 
also pursue profit, and it will in turn bring about disastrous results not only to his 
kingdom but also to his throne. On the other hand, if the king could make his 
subordinates set their minds on humaneness and righteousness by making himself an 
ethical role-model for them, a harmonious and flourishing country would not be just a 
utopian ideal for them.124 However, the crucial question is how to make people like King 
Huì, who keeps fat horses in his stable while his people are starving to death (Mengzi 
1A:4) and drives his sons and brothers to the battlefield for the sake of land (Mengzi 
7B:1), genuinely benevolent and righteous people. We know that Mengzi proposes 
emotional cultivation or more specifically emotional extension, but we have also seen in 
Section 6.1 of this chapter that the three dominant interpretations of Mengzi’s theory of 
emotional extension in the field are equally problematic. However, although Wong’s 
                                                 
124 Mengzi 1A:1. 
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interpretation has unfortunately gone in a wrong direction, in the earlier version of his 
view published in 1991125 I find an important insight into the interpretation of Mengzi’s 
emotional extension that I intend to develop below. 
Instead of emphasizing the role of analogical reasoning in determining the 
intentional objects of emotions in non-paradigmatic cases, in his 1991 article Wong 
suggests that socialization and enculturation play a crucial role in Mengzi’s emotional 
extension. His suggestion is based on Ronald de Sousa’s concept of “paradigm 
scenarios,” which de Sousa originally proposes as a hypothesis for explaining how 
human beings build up a wide repertoire of emotions starting from mainly physiological 
and instinctual responses. According to de Sousa, “[p]aradigm scenarios involve two 
aspects: first, a situation type providing the characteristic objects of the specific emotion 
type…, and second, a set of characteristic or ‘normal’ responses to the situation, where 
normality is first a biological matter and then very quickly becomes a cultural one.”126 
For example, de Sousa explains, a baby between six and nine months returns its 
caretaker’s smile by smiling and frown by crying or frowning as a result of mere 
“vicarious resonance,” but in the next stage of development the baby can take its 
caretaker’s facial expressions as signs of what it can expect her to do and feel. And after 
nine months the baby will look to its caretaker for guidance as to what to look at and how 
to react or feel about it, and the caretaker’s guidance in this matter makes a primitive 
form of paradigm scenarios. As the baby grows up as a child it learns to talk about 
emotions in terms of the stories that give rise to them, and the child builds up a more and 
more sophisticated list of emotions as it learns more and more elaborate paradigm 
scenarios through its continuous encounter with art, literature, and culture.127
Now, Wong in his 1991 article adapts this concept of paradigm scenarios to his 
interpretation of Mengzian extension of compassion. According to him, the specific 
situation type characteristic of compassion is somebody’s suffering, and the paradigm 
scenarios for compassion prescribe that the normal responses to such a situation be 
helping the person in question escape his difficulties. In addition, following de Sousa, 
Wong argues that such responses in Mengzi are originally biological and instinctual ones, 
                                                 
125 Wong, “Is There a Distinction Between Reason and Emotion in Mencius?” 
126 De Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion, p. 182. Emphasis is original. 
127 Ibid., pp. 182–184. 
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and such matters as what should be perceived as suffering or whose suffering is to 
become salient as a reason to act in a certain situation can only be determined when one’s 
natural helping responses have developed through socialization and enculturation.128 
However, Wong does not develop this picture any further, and in this earlier version of 
his interpretation of Mengzian extension Wong already describes Mengzian emotions in 
paradigmatic cases as some sort of natural impulses or “inchoate stirrings” that can be 
channeled to certain type of actions in non-paradigmatic situations.129 However, we have 
already seen that this kind of hydraulic view of Mengzian emotions is hard to ascribe to 
Mengzi, and I think that my view of Mengzian emotions as concern-based construals 
works better with Wong’s original view that Mengzian emotional extension occurs 
primarily through the inculcation of social values in the process of enculturation or 
socialization. In the following, I discuss some textual evidence from the Mengzi that 
could support this new interpretation of Mengzian extension. 
Look at the following passage first, which was quoted earlier in Chapter 4 when I 
was explaining Mengzi’s conception of shame and dislike: 
 
Now [if] a person’s fourth finger is bent and does not stretch straight, [even if] it does not 
hurt or cause harm to one’s work, if there is anyone who could make it straight, [the 
person would go to him] without finding it far to travel from Qín to Chǔ; this is because 
of the finger that is not like others’. [However, many people] know to hate it when one’s 
finger is not like others’, but do not know to hate it when one’s heart and mind are not 
like others’—this is called not knowing the categories.130
 
In this passage, Mengzi says that those who find it shameful to have a malfunctioning 
finger should also feel shame when they have malfunctioning heart and mind; and 
Mengzi here seems to be concerned with the proper extension of emotions, specifically 
the extension of shame and dislike or the feeling of xiūwù zhī xīn 羞惡之心. According 
to Mengzi, the reason why some people feel shame for their malfunctioning finger but 
fail to feel the same way for their malfunctioning heart and mind is because they do not 
know that one’s physical and ethical inferiorities to others belong to the same category 
                                                 
128 Wong, “Is There a Distinction Between Reason and Emotion in Mencius?” p. 35. 
129 For example, see ibid., p. 40. 
130 “今有無名之指屈而不信, 非疾痛害事也, 如有能信之者, 則不遠秦楚之路, 爲指之不若人也. 指
不若人, 則知惡之; 心不若人, 則不知惡, 此之謂不知類也.” Mengzi 6A:12. 
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and deserve similar affective responses. However, Mengzi cannot be interpreted here to 
be saying that one’s recognition that there is no difference between one’s physical 
inferiority and ethical inferiority to others naturally enables one to feel the same way for 
both kinds of inferiorities, because this is exactly the position of the logical extension 
interpretation that we have earlier found problematic. Then, how shall we interpret 
Mengzi’s remark that one’s failure to extend one’s xiūwù zhī xīn properly is due to not 
knowing the categories (bù zhī lèi 不知類)? 
The solution to this question that I would like to suggest is to interpret the phrase 
“knowing the categories” (zhī lèi 知類) strongly, so that it does not mean a merely weak 
intellectual recognition of the similarity between two things but a more active kind of 
knowledge that involves proper affective responses to its objects. But before elaborating 
this idea further, I would like to ponder another passage from the Mengzi: 
 
Everyone has some things that they will not bear, and to extend this [response] to those 
things that they will bear is humaneness. Everyone has some things that they will not do, 
and to extend this [attitude] to those things that they will do is righteousness. If one can 
fill out one’s heart that does not desire to harm others, one could never use up one’s 
humaneness; if one can fill out one’s intention not to bore [holes] or climb [over the 
walls], one could never use up one’s righteousness; if one can fill out one’s [intention] not 
[to provide] grounds for receiving humiliating treatments, there will be nowhere that one 
goes and does not do what is right. Speaking to a scholar with whom one is not supposed 
to speak, this is seeking an end with words; not speaking [to someone with whom] one 
may speak, this is seeking an end by silence; all of these belong to the category of boring 
[holes] or climbing [over the walls].131
 
What Mengzi means by “some things that everyone will not bear” in this passage are 
probably indisputable objects of one’s compassion such as an endangered baby or an 
animal anticipating undeserved death, and what he means by “some things that everyone 
will not do” will be paradigmatic cases of wrongdoing such as robbery or theft that 
Mengzi generally describes as “boring holes in the wall and climbing over the walls to 
take what is not one’s own.” According to Mengzi, though, there are also things that 
people do not naturally feel sorry for or indignant about while still belonging to the same 
                                                 
131 “人皆有所不忍, 達之於其所忍, 仁也; 人皆有所不爲, 達之於其所爲, 義也. 人能充無欲害人之心, 
而仁不可勝用也; 人能充無穿踰之心, 而義不可勝用也; 人能充無受爾汝之實, 無所往而不爲義也. 
士未可以言而言, 是以言餂之也; 可以言而不言, 是以不言餂之也; 是皆穿踰之類也.” Mengzi 7B:31. 
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categories as the paradigmatic cases of humaneness and righteousness, and Mengzi says 
that one can achieve humaneness and righteousness by making oneself feel the same way 
for both the paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic cases of moral emotions. But how? 
In my view, a clue to this question could be found in the last part of the passage, 
where Mengzi mentions two examples of improper behavior—viz. speaking with 
someone one may not speak with and not speaking with someone one may speak with. 
That is, according to Mengzi, when one speaks with someone one is not supposed to 
speak with (or vice versa) in the light of one’s status or political stance, it is often because 
one has some hidden goals to pursue; and Mengzi also says that violating the social 
norms for private purposes is the same kind of misdeed as climbing over a wall and 
stealing somebody else’s property. Then, why does Mengzi say that (i.e. speaking with 
someone one is not supposed to speak with or vice versa belongs to the same category as 
stealing someone else’s property), and how does his saying this help one feel averse to 
the former activity as much as one would feel to the latter? As I see it, what Mengzi is 
intending to do here is some sort of indoctrination or mental habituation, hoping that 
those who are exposed to his sermons long enough will come to adopt the same 
perspective of things as he has and think and feel about things in the same way as he does, 
by coming to care about those things that they have not been concerned about before. If 
this is correct, it must be the case that a crucial part of Mengzian wisdom—which enables 
one to focus on the right features of the situation in question, engage in proper analogical 
reasoning across similar cases, and derive the correct moral judgment from such 
analogical reasoning, as we have seen in Chapter 5—is partly formed through this 
indoctrination process. But do we have evidence?  
Let us examine Mengzi’s following remark: 
 
No wonder that the king is not wise. Even a plant that most easily grows cannot survive if 
you expose it to the sun for one day and leave it in the cold for ten days. I [have the 
opportunity to] meet with him only rarely, and once I leave, those who make him cold 
arrive; what could I do if he had some sprout [of wisdom]?132
 
As has been discussed in Section 5.1.3 of the previous chapter, this passage is part of a 
                                                 
132 “無或乎王之不智也. 雖有天下易生之物也, 一日暴之, 十日寒之, 未有能生者也. 吾見亦罕矣, 吾
退而寒之者至矣, 吾如有萌焉何哉?” Mengzi 6A:9. 
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larger narrative whose point is to emphasize that wisdom cannot be acquired unless one 
exercises one’s intellect wholeheartedly. However, when taken on its own terms, this 
passage also reveals another important aspect of Mengzi’s thought on wisdom. That is, in 
this passage Mengzi seems to think that the growth of wisdom involves not only 
understanding the points of ethical doctrines and intellectually affirming them but also 
making them take root in one’s heart and effectively warding off bad influences from the 
outside that could potentially undermine one’s growing tree of wisdom. What I mean by 
“bad influences from outside” might include incorrect ethical positions from Mengzi’s 
perspective such as Yáng Zhū’s 楊朱 egoism or Mòzǐ’s cold impartiality, but more 
importantly what shrivel up one’s sprouts of virtues are people’s everyday activities 
driven by harmful, self-centered motives. So Mengzi says as follows:  
 
Thanks to the rest they get during the day or night and the qì of the calm morning, people 
have a modicum of liking and disliking that are close to [those of] others. But what they 
do during the day fetters and destroys those [feelings]. If the fettering is repeated, then 
their nocturnal qì is insufficient to preserve [those feelings]. If their nocturnal qì is 
insufficient to preserve, then they become not far from birds and beasts. People see their 
being [like] birds and beasts, and think that the natural endowment has never been in 
their mind, but how could this be the characteristic feature of human beings? So, with the 
right nourishment, there is nothing that would not grow; without the right nourishment, 
there is nothing that would not diminish.133
 
In this passage Mengzi is clear that what destroy people’s sprouts of virtues—including 
the sprout of wisdom—are their everyday activities aimed at ethically undesirable goals. 
As they repeat such activities day by day, they get used to the wrong motives of those 
activities and start to feel numb with their bad effects, eventually becoming 
indistinguishable from beasts who do not know to be concerned about right things. This 
result is exactly what Mengzi anticipated about the king who was “warmed up” by 
Mengzi for one day but then “frozen” for ten days by those around him in Mengzi 6A:9. 
The importance of long-term, constant exposure to the good effects of ethical 
role-models in moral self-cultivation is also emphasized in Mengzi 3B:6, where Mengzi 
                                                 
133 “其日夜之所息, 平旦之氣, 其好惡與人相近也者幾希; 則其旦晝之所爲, 有梏亡之矣. 梏之反覆, 
則其夜氣不足以存. 夜氣不足以存, 則其違禽獸不遠矣. 人見其禽獸也, 而以爲未嘗有才焉者, 是豈
人之情也哉? 故苟得其養, 無物不長; 苟失其養, 無物不消.” Mengzi 6A:8. The underlining is mine. 
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compares moral education to the teaching of a language, or more precisely, a particular 
dialect: 
 
Mengzi said to Dài Búshèng 戴不勝, “Do you wish your king to be good? I’ll tell you 
clearly. Suppose that here is an official of Chǔ 楚, who wants his son [to speak] the 
language of Qí 齊. Shall he have a man from Qí 齊 tutor his son, or have a man from 
Chǔ 楚 tutor him?” [Dài Búshèng] said, “[He shall] have a man from Qí 齊 tutor his 
son.” [Mengzi] said, “If a crowd of Chǔ people chatters around the boy when one person 
from Qí teaches him, even if you try [to make] him [speak] the language of Qí by 
whipping him every day, you cannot succeed. But [in the same manner,] if you take him to 
the Qí streets or villages like Zhuāng 莊 or Yuè 嶽 and let him live there for several 
years, even if you try [to make] him [speak] the language of Chǔ by whipping him every 
day, you cannot succeed either. [Now,] you consider Xuē Jūzhōu 薛居州 to be a good 
man, and [that’s why you] had him stay at the king’s place. If those at the king’s place 
were all [like] Xuē Jūzhōu regardless of their age or rank, whom could the king do bad 
things with? [But] if those at the king’s place are all [unlike] Xuē Jūzhōu regardless of 
their age or rank, whom could the king do good things with? [And in the latter situation,] 
what difference could just one Xuē Jūzhōu make about the king of Sòng 宋?”134
 
What Mengzi emphasizes in this passage seems to be the importance of emulation in 
moral education or moral self-cultivation: just as the young members of a particular 
linguistic community learn how properly to use their language mainly by observing the 
other, more mature members of their community as opposed to those belonging to a 
different linguistic group, the members of a moral community learn the norms of their 
community and get ethical guidance and psychological support in performing good acts 
by exposing themselves to the influence of the good, rather than bad, members of their 
community. However, emulation in Mengzi does not seem to remain merely at the level 
of behavior. To me, Mengzi also seems to think that the leading members of the moral 
community should aspire not only to emulate their role-models’ behaviors but also to 
emulate their general ethical outlook and the way they feel about things in particular 
ethical situations, especially in non-paradigmatic situations where uncultivated innate 
moral emotions are of little use. 
                                                 
134 “孟子謂戴不勝曰: ‘子欲子之王之善與? 我明告子. 有楚大夫於此, 欲其子之齊語也, 則使齊人傅
諸? 使楚人傅諸?’ 曰: ‘使齊人傅之.’ 曰: ‘一齊人傅之, 衆楚人咻之, 雖日撻而求其齊也, 不可得矣; 
引而置之莊嶽之閒數年, 雖日撻而求其楚, 亦不可得矣. 子謂薛居州, 善士也, 使之居於王所. 在於
王所者, 長幼卑尊皆薛居州也, 王誰與爲不善? 在王所者, 長幼卑尊皆非薛居州也, 王誰與爲善? 一
薛居州, 獨如宋王何?’” Mengzi 3B:6. 
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At this point, one might wonder why I use such terms as “emulation of outlook” 
or “emulation of feeling,” instead of discussing how people can come to realize what the 
right things to care about really are in ethically non-paradigmatic situations, and how they 
subsequently come to feel appropriate emotions in various situations based on their 
diverse but proper concerns about things. Admittedly, the “emulation of outlook” or the 
“emulation of feeling” in Mengzi are not supposed to occur in a blind fashion or even 
against the natural grain of one’s moral sensibility; to a large extent, the Mengzian agent 
should be considered not merely to aim at mimicking the virtuous person’s perspective 
and emotions but try to have his perspective and emotions genuinely. Disappointingly, 
though, there seems to be some significant room for cultural or other kinds of 
arbitrariness in Mengzi’s conception of emotional extension, and I think that what fills 
this gap is a set of social values or group preferences that are not always well-grounded 
but still inculcated in the minds of the followers of Kongzi through some sort of 
enculturation or indoctrination process, which may well include the appeal to the 
authority of the Confucian sages. Mengzi 5B:4 provides a good example of such a case: 
 
Wànzhāng 萬章 asked, “May I ask what the correct attitude is when engaging in social 
intercourse?” [Mengzi] said, “It is respect.” [Wànzhāng] said, “‘Outright rejection of 
[someone’s gift] is considered to be disrespectful,’ what [does this saying mean]?” 
[Mengzi] said, “When a superior presents a gift, if one accepts it only after asking oneself 
whether he would have acquired it by right means or not, this is deemed disrespectful; 
this is why [one is] not [supposed] to reject it.” [Wànzhāng] said, “What if one does not 
reject it with express words, but only rejects it in one’s heart thinking that ‘it is wrong for 
him to take it from the people,’ and declines it with other excuse? Wouldn’t it be 
acceptable?” [Mengzi] said, “As long as the donor associates with others in the proper 
way and treats others according to the rituals, even Kongzi would have accepted such a 
gift.” [Wànzhāng] said, “Suppose that there is someone who waylays people outside a 
city gate; [if] he associates with others in the proper way and sends things [to others] 
according to the rituals, can one accept the loot?” [Mengzi] said, “No, it is not 
acceptable….” [Wànzhāng] said, “Nowadays, the rulers’ taking things from their people 
is no different from looting. If [they] polish their rituals in social intercourse and the 
nobleman takes their gifts on that ground, what kind of justification is it?” [Mengzi] said, 
“Do you think that if a true king should arise, he would line up the contemporary rulers 
and kill [all of] them? [Or do you think that] he would [try to] teach them first, and kill 
them only when they don’t change [their bad ways]? To say that taking what is not one’s 
own is robbery is to fill the categories and push the moral principles to the extreme. 
When Kongzi was holding office in Lǔ, [it was the custom of] the people of Lǔ to compete 
with each other [for game] in a hunt, and Kongzi did the same thing. If competing [for 
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game] in a hunt is acceptable, how much more would the accepting of a gift be?”135
 
The topic of this conversation between Mengzi and one of his advanced disciples 
Wànzhāng is whether it is appropriate to accept gifts from one’s superiors when they are 
likely to have acquired those goods in the first place through improper means. Since they 
are one’s superiors, though, one is supposed to treat them deferentially, and this makes it 
hard for one to reject their gifts only on the ground that those goods might not belong to 
them properly. This problematic situation gives rise to a discussion between Mengzi and 
Wànzhāng, where Mengzi tries to persuade his disciple that it is all right to accept gifts 
from such people as long as they are polite and follow the elaborate norms in social 
intercourse faithfully. Wànzhāng, though, seems to think that righteousness is a more 
important virtue than respect in such a situation; for he compares the rulers of his time to 
robbers who ambush beside the roads outside the city gates and rob passengers of their 
belongings. To use Mengzi’s words, Wànzhāng seems to think that taking what is not 
one’s own through improper means is to be considered as robbery or theft in a broad 
sense, and one should not accept an improper gift even if that counts as lack of respect 
toward one’s superior. 
As I see it, Mengzi is losing the debate with his disciple Wànzhāng, because he 
does not explain here why considering the wicked rulers of his time as robbers is a 
mistake—specifically a fallacy of excessive inference in which one “fills the categories 
and push the moral principles” (chōng lèi zhì yì 充類至義) to the extreme (jìn 盡). As 
we have seen above, in Mengzi 7B:31 Mengzi clearly says that the behaviors of speaking 
with someone one may not speak with and not speaking with someone one may speak 
with both belong to the category of stealing somebody else’s property when they are 
equally motivated by the hidden desire to promote self-interests at the expense of the 
social norms, and for this reason Mengzi recommends that one should fill out one’s 
                                                 
135 “萬章問曰: ‘敢問交際何心也?’ 孟子曰: ‘恭也.’ 曰: ‘“卻之卻之爲不恭”, 何哉?’ 曰: ‘尊者賜之, 曰, 
“其所取之者義乎, 不義乎?” 而後受之, 以是爲不恭, 故弗卻也.’ 曰: ‘請無以辭卻之, 以心卻之, 曰, 
“其取諸民之不義也”, 而以他辭無受, 不可乎?’ 曰: ‘其交也以道, 其接也以禮, 斯孔子受之矣.’ 萬章
曰: ‘今有禦人於國門之外者, 其交也以道, 其餽也以禮, 斯可受禦與?’ 曰: ‘不可….’ 曰: ‘今之諸侯取
之於民也, 猶禦也. 苟善其禮際矣, 斯君子受之, 敢問何說也?’ 曰: ‘子以爲有王者作, 將比今之諸侯
而誅之乎? 其敎之不改而後誅之乎? 夫謂非其有而取之者盜也, 充類至義之盡也. 孔子之仕於魯也, 
魯人獵較, 孔子亦獵較. 獵較猶可, 而況受其賜乎?’” Mengzi 5B:4. 
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intention not to “bore holes or climb over the walls” to the extent that one would not do 
the things that one used to do in the past without feeling guilt, shame, or other kinds of 
negative emotions. In other words, in Mengzi 7B:31 Mengzi seems to be saying that the 
cultivation of one’s ethical emotions resides in making one’s moral emotional sensibility 
extremely refined and sensitive. However, now in Mengzi 5B:4, he seems to contradict 
himself by saying that certain things are too extreme to be the proper objects of one’s 
ethical feelings, and therefore one should stop cultivating one’s moral emotional 
sensibility at a certain point.  
But how do we know where is the right point to stop cultivating our ethical 
emotions? Conceptually it is possible that, although one is supposed to cultivate one’s 
moral sensibility as much as possible in principle, in actuality one should stop cultivating 
it before it gets too sensitive or even paranoid. But how do we know when to stop, 
especially when there is a disagreement about such a question among the good members 
of the moral community, such as between Mengzi and his advanced disciple Wànzhāng?  
Mengzi’s solution to this question seems to be introducing the authority of the 
sage to the debate: Competing with other people for animals in a hunt is not a very decent 
behavior for the well-cultivated nobleman, but Kongzi participated in such an activity 
probably because he considered it to be alright to do so. Now, Kongzi is a sage whose 
decision no one can doubt, and accepting a gift presented according to correct protocols 
is a much decent act in comparison to fighting over the animals in a hunt. Therefore, it is 
too extreme to feel averse to accepting a gift politely presented by one’s superiors. 
However, if this were the point Mengzi is getting at by appealing to the authority of 
Kongzi as sage, it does not make a very persuasive argument, because Mengzi here is 
only appealing to Kongzi’s purported sagacity and people’s admiration of him rather than 
clearly revealing what was the rationale behind Kongzi’s participation in the lowly 
activity as an ideal agent. With such a rationale kept under the veil of mysterious 
authority, people may find it hard to relate to Kongzi competing with others in pursuit of 
better animals in a hunt, and consequently they may also find it hardly convincing that 
one should not feel averse to accepting goods that were not acquired by proper means in 
the first place. In this light, it is understandable that Wànzhāng responds to Mengzi’s 
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argument only with the following perplexed question: “Then, was it not to carry out the 
Way that Kongzi held office?”136
                                                 
136 “然則孔子之仕也, 非事道與?” Ibid. Mengzi answers to this question in the omitted part of the passage, 






Although often conceived as comparable to the Western conception of emotion and 
sometimes used for the so-called “cross-cultural comparison” of emotion, in the context 
of moral philosophy the ancient Chinese term “qíng” 情 best refers to the concept of 
character. As referring to certain psychological items in an individual’s mind including 
her goals and aspirations, emotional reactions at certain objects, and deep-seated 
evaluative judgments of things, a person’s qíng 情 reveals to its observer what kind of 
person she is and how she is distinct from others in character. 
In ancient China, perhaps as much as today, knowing about other people’s 
character correctly had significant practical implications: associating with right players in 
politics and finding right spouses meant secure life and prosperity, and people of flawed 
character were considered definitely to bring about disaster not only to themselves but 
also to others. For this reason, ancient Chinese thinkers emphasized the importance of 
good character in the flourishing of a community, and Kongzi and Mengzi devoted 
special attention to the philosophical discussion of emotions due to their being a crucial 
constituent of a person’s character. 
What is fascinating about Kongzi’s conception of emotion is that he seems to 
view emotions to be intertwined with some sort of evaluative thinking: When one feels 
both joy and fear simultaneously about the age of one’s old parents (Lunyu 4:21), one’s 
joy and fear respectively take her parents’ staying healthy and their being close to death 
as their intentional objects. These two emotions in turn are each expressions of the filial 
child’s hào 好 (“desire” or “liking”) and wù 惡 (“aversion” or “disliking”), which 
respectively find the parents’ remaining healthy desirable (hǎo 好) and their getting old 
undesirable (è 惡). 
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Mengzi inherits Kongzi’s insight into the “rationality of emotions” and further 
develops it in his theory of moral emotions. The best interpretation of Mengzi’s view of 
emotions is to regard Mengzian emotions as some sort of “concern-based construals.” For 
example, if a person felt some sort of painful feeling at the sight of a baby about to fall 
into a well and ran to the rescue of it (Mengzi 2A:6), that person’s feeling of distress is 
primarily her construal of the situation as one where an innocent being is endangered, and 
such a construal is possible only when she is concerned about the welfare of the baby in 
particular or the welfare of other beings in general. 
This “construal view” of Mengzian emotions enables us to avoid previous 
scholars’ mistaken interpretations that consider Mengzian emotions as either desires or 
behavioral dispositions. More importantly, though, my view of Mengzian emotions 
enables us to perceive the important theoretical distinction between Mengzi’s shìfēi zhī 
xīn and the other three sprouts of his: Whereas compassion, respect, and the feeling of 
shame and dislike are merely construals of their respective situations, shìfēi zhī xīn is 
largely equivalent to the psychological state of judgment; and when combined with one 
of these ethical emotions, it elevates that emotion, previously a mere presentation of 
things to the person feeling that emotion, to the status of a kind of moral judgment. 
Shìfēi zhī xīn as a kind of moral judgment plays two important roles in Mengzi’s 
theory of emotions and moral agency. First, when two moral emotions pull the agent in 
different directions with conflicting ethical considerations, one can arrive at a correct 
moral judgment by taking both emotions in view and weighing (quán 權) the relative 
importance of the respective emotions’ ethical demands. Wong’s thesis of no distinction 
between reason and emotion in Mengzi overlooks this reflective function of the mind that 
goes far beyond the “rationality” of emotions, and we can see that moral emotions in 
Mengzi often provide only a partial basis for all-things-considered ethical judgment. 
Second, the characteristic of shìfēi zhī xīn as moral judgment enables us to solve 
Nivison’s “immediate action problem.” According to Nivison, the only source of moral 
motivation in Mengzi is one’s ethical emotions, and one cannot perform moral actions 
until one has fully cultivated these ethical “sprouts.” This seems to introduce a serious 
moral dilemma for Mengzi, though, because Mengzi acknowledges that there are some 
moral obligations that should be fulfilled immediately. However, what really motivates 
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oneself in Mengzi is not an emotion but an ethical reason that may or may not be 
embodied in an emotion, and this in turn reveals Mengzi’s idea that full moral action is 
possible even before one fully cultivates one’s ethical emotions. 
However, the ideal Mengzian agent is the one who does the right thing not only 
with correct knowledge but also with proper affective motives, and this raises the 
question of how one could “extend” one’s ethical emotions in paradigmatic situations to 
non-paradigmatic cases. In my view, Mengzian emotional extension occurs primarily 
through some sort of enculturation or social habituation process. That is, I think that the 
social norms in ancient China such as the Confucian rituals embody certain cultural 
assumptions concerning which emotions are more important than others and what the 
appropriate boundaries for their applications are, and it is largely by habituating oneself 
to the ethical role-models’ general ethical outlook and their particular judgments that the 
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